G.R. Nos. L-48736-37. April 19, 1984
EM TRANSPORT, INC., PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE JACOBO C. CLAVE, PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT, AND THE HONORABLE RONALDO B. ZAMORA, PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT FOR LEGAL AFFAIR…
FERNANDO, C.J.:
Zagado, Anastacio Marfil, Dioscoro Dimpal and other drivers of the taxis
of the EM Transport, Inc. who later joined them there being a total of
sixty-six (66) in all of the emergency cost of living allowance pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 525 by respondent Jacobo C. Clave, the
Presidential Executive Assistant of the Office of the President
sustaining a decision of the respondent Presidential Assistant for Legal
Affairs of the Office of the President, Ronaldo B. Zamora, now
incumbent Assemblyman, is assailed in this certiorari proceeding.[1] The principal reliance for the reversal sought is on the due process,[2]
both in its procedural and substantive aspects. The claim of the
denial of procedural due process arose in the opinion of petitioner from
the fact that the order of the Officer-in-Charge of Regional Office No.
IV of the then Department of Labor was issued without the benefit of
any hearing. The assertion of lack of substantive due process was based
on what petitioner considered to be the oppressive and unjust character
of the application to the respondent taxi-drivers of the Presidential
Decree working as they do under the “boundary system”. As will be
shown, the arguments adduced do not suffice to call for a reversal. The
petition is not impressed with merit.
The decision of respondent Zamora, now under review states the case and
the facts with clarity and right of respondent taxi-drivers to the
emergency cost-of-living allowance under Presidential Decree No. 525
with persuasiveness. Thus: “This is an appeal filed by
respondent-appellant (company), through counsel, from the order dated
December 27, 1977, of the Secretary of Labor (Secretary for short)
affirming the order of the Officer-in-Charge of Regional Office No. 4
and dismissing the partial appeal of both parties. Records reveal that
complainants-appellees are taxi drivers of the company who were then
paid on commission basis which was subsequently changed to boundary
system pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement entered into by
and between the herein company and the Samahan ng mga Tsuper sa E.M.
Transport, Inc. and Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services
(TUPAS) of which the former are members. On April 19, 1976,
complainants-appellees filed a complaint against the company for
non-payment of emergency cost of living allowance pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 525 and non-payment of the 13th month pay under
Presidential Decree No. 851. On February 28, 1977, the Regional Office
No. 4 issued an order granting payment of emergency cost of living
allowance to complainants-appellees and dismissing their claim for
payment of the 13th month pay. Thereafter, both parties filed their
partial appeal from this order, complainants-appellees reiterating their
claim for payment of the 13th month pay and respondent-appellant
contending that the former are not entitled to the emergency cost of
living allowance, considering that they work under the boundary system
and, therefore, have no fixed salary. On June 30, 1977, the
Officer-in-Charge of Regional Office No. 4 issued an order affirming
said order of February 28, 1977, and denying both parties’ partial
appeal, treated as motions for reconsideration, for lack of merit.
Dissatisfied, both parties filed their partial appeal to the Secretary
who issued the appealed order. On February 20, 1978,
respondent-appellant filed the instant appeal. * * * The main issue to
be resolved as this Office sees it is whether or not
complainants-appellees are entitled to emergency cost of living
allowance under PD 525. Respondent-appellant anchors its defense on the
fact that since complainants-appellees are paid on commission basis
which was later on changed to boundary system and, further, are not
covered by the minimum wage law, they, therefore, are not entitled to
emergency cost of living allowance under said Decree. This contention
is rendered untenable by Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing PD 525, which pertinently states: ‘Section 2. Employees
Covered. (a) The Decree shall apply to all employees of covered
employers, regardless of their position, designation or employment
status, and irrespective of the method by which their wages are paid,
including temporary, casual, probationary, and seasonal employees and
workers.’ It is therefore clear that ‘irrespective of the method by
which their wages are paid,’ whether on commission basis and later on
converted to boundary system as in the case at bar, the
complainants-appellees are covered by the provisions of said Decree.
The aforequoted provision is indubitable and needs no further
explanation. However, this Office is at a loss as to the basis of the
computation of the total amount of the award and the listing of the
deserving drivers, it appearing that no evidence from respondent was
received on this point by the department. The elementary rules of
justice and fair play dictate that a fair determination of the amount of
the individual awards be made on the basis of material evidence and
pertinent records submitted by the parties herein. In view of all the
foregoing, the decision of the Secretary of Labor upholding the
entitlement of complainants-appellees to the cost of living allowance
should be, as hereby it is, affirmed. Accordingly, the Department of
Labor is hereby directed to receive the necessary evidence to determine
the listing of the deserving drivers and the amount of individual
awards.”[3]
To repeat, the petition lacks merit and must be dismissed.
1. Presidential Decree No. 525 is quite clear. It is free from
ambiguity. Its very title “Making Mandatory the Payment of Emergency
Allowance Under Letter of Instructions No. 174” speaks categorically.
The payment of emergency allowance is mandatory. It applies to all
employers. The only exemption is “a severely distressed industry or
branch thereof, or enterprise therein, as defined by the Department of
Labor in accordance with established standard methods of determining the
same.”[4] Petitioner does
not belong to such category. There is no escaping the conclusion then
that compliance is required from the petitioner. Absent any valid
ground for non-applicability as to it under the due process objection,
it cannot evade its liability. There was in the recent case of National
Federation of Labor v. Eisma[5] a reiteration of the Lizarraga Hermanos doctrine: “The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the
law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.”[6]2. There is no merit to the contention that there was lack of
procedural due process. Even if it be assumed that the Order of the
Officer-in-Charge was issued without any hearing, the subsequent
developments revealed that the claim of the petitioner was accorded the
fullest consideration. So it is apparent from his own petition. He
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the same
Officer-in-Charge.[7] He
appealed to the then Secretary of Labor, now Minister, Blas Ople,
raising the same question. Again, he was unsuccessful, the order of
such Officer-in-Charge being affirmed in toto.[8]
After which, the matter was elevated to the Office of the President
resulting in the decision of the Presidential Assistant for Legal
Affairs, now Assemblyman Ronaldo B. Zamora.[9]
There was, thereafter, a motion for reconsideration, but, again, no
merit could be discerned therein as evidenced by the denial of then
Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave.[10] According to Dormitorio v. Fernandez:[11]
“The order * * * was the subject of a motion for reconsideration. The
motion for reconsideration was thereafter denied. Under the
circumstances, the failure to give notice to petitioners had been cured.
That is a well-settled doctrine.”[12]3. There is no merit either to the argument that there was a denial
of substantive due process. What is involved is a police power
measure, regulatory in character. It is a well-settled doctrine that to
nullify it on substantive due process ground, there must be a factual
foundation of invalidity.[13]
The need for such support is all the more exigent considering that
Presidential Decree No. 525 was inspired by the constitutional mandates
of social justice[14] and protection to labor.[15]
The petition is thus devoid of any reason to justify the petitioner
from being exempted, on a plea of unconstitutional application because
of the alleged arbitrariness. Moreover, when it is noted how careful
then Presidential Legal Assistant Zamora was in his decision to avoid
any injustice to petitioner, there will be a greater realization of how
flimsy and insubstantial is such due process argument. As therein
stated: “However, this office is at a loss as to the basis of the
computation of the total amount of the award and the listing of the
deserving drivers, it appearing that no evidence from respondent was
received on this point by the department. The elementary rules of
justice and fair play dictate that a fair determination of the amount of
the individual awards be made on the basis of material evidence and
pertinent records submitted by the parties herein.”
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed for lack of
merit. The restraining order issued in this case is hereby lifted.
This decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner EM
Transport, Inc.
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., concurs. Taxi drivers under the boundary system were held to be employees (National Labor Union vs. Dirglasan, 98 Phil. 649).
Escolin and De Castro, JJ., did not take part.
[1] The decision of
respondent Zamora sustained an Order of the Officer-in-Charge of
Regional Office No. IV of the then Department of Labor granting such
emergency cost of living allowance retroactive August 1, 1974 provided
all income does not amount to P400.00 or more a month which order in
turn was affirmed by the then Secretary of Labor, now Minister Blas Ople
resulting in the appeal to the Office of the President.
[2] Article IV, Section 1 of
the Constitution provides: “No person shall be deprived of life or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.”
[3] Decision of Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs Ronaldo B. Zamora dated June 6, 1978, Annex A to Petition.
[4] P.D. 525, Section 1.
[5] G. R. No. 61236, January 31, 1984.
[6] 24 Phil. 513 (1913). It
cited the following cases: In Asuncion, Jr. v. Segundo, G.R. No. 59593,
promulgated on September 24, 1983, reference was made to Kapisanan ng
mga Manggagawa v. Manila Railroad Co., L-25316, February 28, 1979, 88
SCRA 616. The opinion cited 13 cases starting from People v. Mapa,
L-22301, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164 to Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals,
L-27455, June 28, 1973, 51 SCRA 381. After the Manggagawa decision came
two later cases of the same tenor: Banawa v. Mirano, L-24750, May 16,
1980, 97 SCRA 517; Insular Lumber Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals, L-31057,
May 29, 1981, 104 SCRA 710. All in all, since the 1967 decision in
Mapa, seventeen cases have applied the ruling in Lizarraga Hermanos.
[7] Petition, par. 4.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid, par. 7.
[10] Ibid, par. 8.
[11] L-25897, August 21, 1976, 72 SCRA 388.
[12] The following cases were
cited: Borja v. Flores, 62 Phil. 106 (1935); De Borja v. Tan, 93 Phil.
167 (1953); Flash Taxicab Co., Inc. v. Cruz, L-15464, March 30, 1963, 7
SCRA 518; Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v. Castillo, L-24657, Nov. 27, 1967, 21
SCRA 1071; Demaronsing v. Tandayag, L-27057, Aug. 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 484;
Maglasang v. Ople, L-38813, April 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 508; Nation Multi
Service Labor Union v. Agcaoili, L-39741, May 30, 1975, 64 SCRA 274.
After Dormitorio, such a doctrine was reiterated in Tan Beng v. City
Sheriff of Manila, L-24375, May 18, 1978, 83 SCRA 229.
[13] Cf. Ermita-Malate Hotel
and Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor, L-24693, 20 SCRA 849,
July 31, 1967 cited with approval in De la Cruz v. Paras, L-42571-72,
July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 569.
[14] Article II, Section 6 of
the Constitution provides: “The State shall promote social justice to
ensure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the people. Towards
this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse
property ownership and profits.”
[15] Article II, Section 9 of
the Constitution provides: “The State shall afford protection to
labor, promote full employment and equality in employment, ensure equal
work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the
rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security
of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The State may
provide for compulsory arbitration.”