G.R. No. L-16780. May 31, 1961
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. MAXIMINO GUMAYAN AND PEOPLE’S SURETY & INSURANCE COMPANY, DEFENDANTS, PEOPLE’S SURETY & INSURANCE CO., DEFENDANT AND APP…
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
by that court on the ground that it involves only question of law.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On or about May 15, 1950, Maximino Gumayan was issued a license to engage in
the business of receiving palay for storage at Cagamutan Norte, Leganes, Iloilo,
in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3893 as amended by Republic Act No.
247, known as the General Bonded Warehouse Law. Pursuant to the requirements of
said Act, Gumayan as principal and the People’s Surety and Insurance Company as
surety, filed Bond No. 35 dated July 13, 1951 in the amount of P3,700 Bond No.
82 dated March 13, 1953 in the amount of P3,666.67, and Bond No. 67 dated
February 11, 1952 in the amount of P3,667, to insure the return to the
depositors of the palay that may be received by Gumayan under his license or the
payment of their market value in case they could not be returned. Later, Gumayan
in turn delivered to the People’s Surety and Insurance Company two indemnity
agreements, the first signed by Gumayan himself and the second signed by him
jointly and severally with another person, Pablo H. Hinon, agreeing to indemnify
the surety company for any damages, costs, payments, expenses, including
attorney’s fees with 12% interest in case of delay in payment that said company
may sustain or incur as a consequence of its having executed two of the
aforementioned Bonds (i.e., Bonds Nos. 35 and 82).
On or about December 14, 1954, the Republic of the Philippines filed Civil
Case No. 3339 in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against Gumayan and the
People’s Surety and Insurance Company alleging that Gumayan, inspite of demands
by plaintiff, had failed to return 2,733 cavans of palay received by him for
storage from different persons named in the complaint or to pay their value at
the price of P10 per cavan or a total of P27,830; and prayed for judgment
against Gumayan and the surety company on their surety bonds, in the amount of
P11,033.67, plus legal interests and costs.
In his answer, Gumayan claimed that the deposits of palay mentioned in the
complaint had been either fully or partly paid to the depositors, and that
arrangements had been made by him for the payment of the remaining outstanding
claims which allegedly amounted to only P6,571. The defendant surety company, on
its part, adopted in its answer the defenses interposed by Gumayan, and also
filed a cross-claim against him for all amounts that it might be sentenced to
pay under their bonds. The surety company likewise filed a third-party
complainant against Pablo H. Hinon one of the signatories to one of the
indemnity agreements delivered by Gumayan to the surety company.
Issues having been joined, the case was set for trial on January 18, 1957. On
January 15, 1957, defendant Gumayan filed a motion for postponement on the
ground that counsel would be in the town of Estancia from January 16 to 19,
1957, in connection with an administrative case pending therein. When the case
was thus called for trial on January 18, 1957, neither defendant Gumayan nor
counsel was present. The court, however, denied Gumayan’s motion for
postponement and allowed the plaintiff and the surety company to introduce their
respective evidence. Then on February 13, 1957, the court rendered judgment in
the case the dispositive portion of which reads:
“Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(a) Maximino Gumayan and People’s Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. are
hereby sentenced to, jointly and severally, pay plaintiff the amount of
P11,033.67 with interest thereon at the legal rate from the filing of the
complaint until fully paid;(b) Maximino Gumayan is hereby sentenced to pay plaintiff the sum of
P2,066.83 with interest thereon at the legal rate from the filing of the
complaint until fully paid;(c) On the cross-claim of People’s Surety & Insurance Co., Inc.
against Maximino Gumayan, the latter is hereby sentenced to pay the former,
whatever amount the former shall have paid the plaintiff pursuant to this
judgment;(d) Costs are taxed against the herein defendants.”
From the above judgment, both Gumayan and the People’s Surety & Insurance
Company appealed.
In his appeal, defendant Gumayan claims that the lower court erred (1) in
denying his motion for postponement; (2) in not furnishing him with a copy of
the order denying his motion for postponement; and (3) in denying his motion for
new trial.
We see no merit in these assigned errors.
As to the denial of Gumayan’s motion for postponement, we have repeatedly
held that such motions are addressed to the sound discretion of the court[1] and that movant has no right to assume that
his motion would be granted, especially on less than three day’s notice and must
be in court on the day of the hearing so that if his motion is denied, he can
proceed with the trial[2] considering that
counsel for Gumayan gave no valid excusable reason in his motion for
postponement why he had to attend the administrative case in the town of
Estancia in preference to the hearing of this case; that copies of the motion
for postponement were served on the other parties by ordinary mail only on
January 15, 1957, so that they could not have had at least three day’s notice
thereof before the hearing on January 18, 1957; and that both plaintiff and the
surety company were in court ready for trial on the day set for hearing; the
lower court committed no abuse of discretion in denying Gumayan’s motion for
postponement and in allowing the other parties to introduce their respective
evidence even in the absence of Gumayan or counsel.
Gumayan argues that he was not furnished with a copy of the order denying his
motion for postponement, and that for this reason, he was deprived of his chance
to present evidence in support of his defense. Again we see no merit in this
claim. While it is true that Gumayan was entitled to a copy of the court’s order
denying his motion for postponement, he suffered no prejudice by such lack of
notice, for he lost his chance to present evidence not because he was not
notified of the denial of his motion for postponement, but because of his
unwarranted absence in court on the date of the hearing. Anyway, Gumayan was
served a copy of the decision rendered by the court, and such notice of the
decision based on evidence presented at the hearing by the other parties during
Gumayan’s absence was sufficient notice to him of the denial of his motion for
postponement.
Finally, Gumayan urges that the lower court erred in denying his motion for
reconsideration asking that he be allowed to introduce his evidence. This motion
of Gumayan, which was not really a motion for reconsideration but a motion for
new trial, was again correctly denied, because it offered no justifiable excuse
for Gumayan or counsel’s failure to attend the hearing on January 18, 1957, nor
did it attach affidavits of merit showing the facts and/or evidence upon which
Gumayan bases his defense that he had allegedly fully or partly settled the
accounts sued upon by plaintiff in its complaint (sections 1 and 2, Rule 37,
Rules of Court). Either one of these two reasons constitutes sufficient ground
for the denial of Gumayan’s motion for new trial.
We now come to the appeal interposed by the defendant People’s Surety and
Insurance Company from that portion of the decision of the court a quo
granting it recovery under its cross-claim against defendant Gumayan and its
third-party complaint against third-party defendant Pablo H. Hinon, to wit:
“Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
* * * * *
* *(c) On the cross-claim of People’s Surety & Insurance Co. Inc.
against Maximino Gumayan, the latter is hereby sentenced to pay the former,
whatever amount the former shall have paid the plaintiff pursuant to this
judgment;(d) On the third-party complaint of People’s Surety & Insurance
Co., Inc. against Pablo H. Hinon the latter is hereby sentenced to pay the
former whatever amount it shall have paid the plaintiff under the surety bond
No. 35 dated July 13, 1951 plus 15% of said amount for attorney’s
fees.”
Relying on the following provisions of the two indemnity agreements (Exhibits
1 and 2) signed by Gumayan and Hinon in its favor:
“Indemnity.—To indemnify the Company for any damages, prejudice, loss,
costs, payments, advances, and expenses of whatever kind and nature, including
counsel or attorney’s fees, which the Company may, at any time, sustain or
incur, as a consequence of having executed the above-mentioned Bond, its
renewals, extension or substitutions and said attorney’s fees shall not be less
than fifteen (15%) per cent of the amount claimed by the Company in each action,
the same to be due and payable, irrespective of whether the case is settled
judicially or extrajudicially.* * * * *
* *Interest in Case of Delay.—In the event of delay in payment of the
said sum or sums, by the undersigned, they will pay interest at the rate of 12%
per annum on same, which interest, if not paid, will be liquidated and
accumulated to the capital quarterly, and shall earn the same interest as the
capital; all this without prejudice to the Company’s right to demand judicially
or extrajudicially the full payment of its claims.”
appellant surety company claims that it is entitled to recover, (1) on its
cross-claim against Gumayan, not only whatever amounts it would pay plaintiff
under its bonds, but also costs, if paid by it, attorney’s fees equivalent to
15% of whatever amounts it would have to pay plaintiff, and interest at the rate
of 12% in the event of delay in payment by Gumayan; and (2) on its third-party
complaint against Pablo H. Hinon, not only whatever amount it would pay
plaintiff under the surety bond No. 35, and 15% of said amount as attorney’s
fees, but also costs if paid by the surety company, and 12% interest per annum
on all payments due to the company, in case of delay in payment.
The suggested modification of the judgment of the court a quo against the
third-party defendant Pablo H. Hinon is warranted, because Hinon is bound by the
terms of the indemnity agreement Exhibit “1” which he signed in behalf of the
appellant surety company jointly and severally with defendant Gumayan, and said
indemnity agreement clearly stipulates that the indemnitors would pay any costs,
if paid by the surety company, and 12% interest on all amounts due from the
indemnitors to the company in case of delay in payment.
With respect to the judgment against defendant Gumayan on the appellant
surety company’s cross-claim against him, however, it will be noticed that the
two indemnity agreements delivered by Gumayan to the appellant surety company
(the first signed by him with third-party defendant Hinon, Exhibit “1”, and the
second, signed by Gumayan himself, Exhibit “2”) only answer for two out of the
three bonds issued by the appellant company in favor of plaintiff: i.e., Bonds
Nos. 35 and 82, for the amounts of P3,700 and P3,667.00 respectively, or a total
amount of P7,367. In so far as the appellant company would make payment on these
bonds to plaintiff, it is correct in claiming that Gumayan should indemnify it
not only for the principal amounts paid, but also for costs, 15% attorney’s fees
and 12% interest per annum in case of delay in payment, as provided for in the
indemnity agreements Exhibits 1 and 2. On any payments the appellant surety
company would make to plaintiff on Bond No. 67, however, which is not guaranteed
by the indemnity agreements Exhibits “1” and “2”, said surety company would only
be entitled to reimbursement of all the amounts paid and costs, if paid by it,
as decreed by the court below.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified in the sense that
paragraphs (c) and (d) of its dispositive portion should read as
follows:
“(c) On the cross-claim of People’s Surety & Insurance Co., Inc.
against Maximino Gumayan, the latter is hereby sentenced to pay the former,
whatever amount the former shall have paid the plaintiff pursuant to this
judgment, plus costs if paid partly or wholly by said company; and on all
amounts paid by the surety company to plaintiff on Bonds Nos. 35 and 82,
defendant Gumayan is sentenced to pay the surety company 15% thereof as
attorney’s fees, plus 12% interest per annum in case of delay in payment on all
sums due the surety company on said bonds.(d) On the third-party complaint of People’s Surety & Insurance
Co., Inc. against Pablo H. Hinon, the latter is hereby sentenced to pay the
former whatever amount it shall pay the plaintiff under the surety bond No. 35,
plus 15% of said amount as attorney’s fees and 12% interest per annum on the
total amount due in case of delay in payment, plus costs if the surety company
would pay the same partly or wholly; unless all such amounts would have been
paid by defendant Gumayan to the surety company under the latter’s cross-claim
against the former.”
In all other respects, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. Defendant
Gumayan shall pay the costs of his own appeal, while the costs of the appeal of
the People’s Surety & Insurance Company shall be taxed against defendant
Gumayan and third-party defendant Pablo H. Hinon.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla,
Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, De Leon, and
Natividad, JJ., concur.
[1] Martir vs. Jalandoni, 107 Phil.,
308; Panti vs. Prov. Bd. of Catanduanes, 106 Phil., 1093; Adan vs.
Pantalla, 105 Phil., 921; Casilan vs. Gancayco, 104 Phil., 418; 56 Off.
Gaz., (13) 2799; Dimayuga vs. Dimayuga, 96 Phil., 859; 51 Off. Gaz., (5)
2397; Bautista vs. Mun. Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal, 98 Phil., 409; 52
Off. Gaz., (2) 759.
[2] National Lumber Hardware Co.
vs. Velasco, 106 Phil., 1098; Wack Wack Golf and Country Club vs.
C.A., 106 Phil., 501; Benares Montelibano vs. Benares, 103 Phil., 106;
Parina vs. Cobangbang, G.R. No. L-8398, March 21, 1956; Salvador
vs. Romero, 96 Phil., 34; 50 Off. Gaz. [11] 5279.