JULIETA H. ONG, PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE ALEXANDER P. TAMAYO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 15 OF MALOLOS CITY, BULACAN AND ARMELIA AMPARO, RES…

Ong versus Tamayo

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari filed by Julieta H. Ong against Judge Alexander P. Tamayo, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Bulacan, and against private respondent Armelia Amparo. Ong asks the Supreme Court to annul the decision and order of the Regional Trial Court holding her civilly liable for the full amount of several dishonored checks, even though she had earlier been acquitted in the criminal cases for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. The case matters because it fixes two rules every practitioner must know: the correct remedy from a judgment of a Regional Trial Court rendered in its appellate jurisdiction, and the survival of civil liability despite an acquittal grounded on reasonable doubt.

Procedural History

Private respondent Armelia Amparo filed a complaint charging Julieta Ong with eight counts of violation of the Bouncing Checks Law before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Meycauayan, Bulacan. After the prosecution rested, Ong filed a demurrer to evidence. The Municipal Trial Court granted the demurrer in a resolution dated May 12, 2010, dismissed the cases, and held that with the acquittal the civil liability found no factual support.

Amparo appealed the civil aspect to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. In a decision dated September 6, 2010, the Regional Trial Court set aside the resolution, ruled that civil liability requires only a preponderance of evidence, and remanded the case to the court of origin to allow Ong to present evidence. On May 31, 2012, the Municipal Trial Court rendered judgment on the civil aspect in favor of Amparo, ordering Fred Lunaria to pay the full amount and holding Ong jointly and solidarily liable. Ong appealed to the Regional Trial Court, which in its decision dated April 30, 2013 denied the appeal but modified the judgment by excluding Lunaria from joint and solidary liability. Ong's motion for reconsideration was denied in an order dated June 20, 2013. Ong then came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Facts

Sometime in May 2007, a certain Fred Lunaria approached Armelia Amparo and offered for re-discounting a Philippine National Bank check belonging to, and allegedly issued by, Julieta Ong. Lunaria claimed that Ong had told him to look for somebody to re-discount the check. Amparo agreed, relying on her long business dealings with Ong and on Ong's good credit line.

Every two days thereafter, Lunaria returned with another check for re-discounting. In all, nine checks were involved, drawn from June 2007 to September 2007, in varying amounts. When presented for encashment, all the checks except the last two were dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason account closed. Demands were made upon Ong, but she failed and refused to pay.

When confronted with the checks, Ong flatly denied having issued them, yet she did not categorically deny her signatures, nor claim that the checks were forged or stolen. The trial court found that the checks were the personal checks of Ong, drawn and issued payable to cash, and that they bounced for the reason account closed.

Issues

• Whether or not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to assail a decision and order of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
• Whether or not Julieta Ong may be held civilly liable for the full amount of the dishonored checks despite her acquittal in the criminal cases for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:

When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

This provision governs the availability of certiorari, which requires that there be no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Section 1 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides:

A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of Five hundred pesos (P500.00) for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.

This provision supplies the correct remedy from a judgment of the Regional Trial Court rendered on appeal, which is precisely the posture of the assailed decision and order.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court agreed with the private respondent that Ong availed of the wrong remedy. The extraordinary remedy of certiorari can be availed only if there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A petition for review, on the other hand, may be filed by a party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Since the Regional Trial Court issued the assailed decision and order in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the proper remedy was a petition for review under Rule 42, and certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal.

On the second issue, the Court held that even if the petition were properly filed under Rule 65, it would still be dismissed. Certiorari is a limited form of review, restricted to resolving errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. As long as the lower courts act within their jurisdiction, alleged errors in the exercise of discretion are mere errors of judgment correctable by appeal or petition for review. The Regional Trial Court acted within its jurisdiction when it adjudged Ong civilly liable.

The Court stressed that every act or omission punishable by law has its accompanying civil liability. If the judgment is one of acquittal, the imposition of civil liability depends on whether the act or omission from which it might arise exists. The elements of the offense are the making, drawing, and issuance of a check for account or value; knowledge of the maker that there were no sufficient funds; and dishonor by the drawee bank. The second element, which involves a state of mind, is the hardest to prove. Here the first and third elements were duly proven, and Ong was acquitted only because the prosecution failed to prove notice of dishonor. Nevertheless, the act from which her civil liability arose, the making and issuing of the worthless checks, clearly existed. Her acquittal was based on reasonable doubt and did not relieve her of civil liability.

The Court also relied on the presumption that the drawer of a check issued it for valuable consideration. As the drawer, Ong was presumed to have issued the checks for value, and it was incumbent upon her to overthrow that presumption, which she failed to do.

Doctrine

First, the remedy from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction is a petition for review under Rule 42, not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Certiorari lies only when there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and it cannot substitute for a lost appeal.

Second, certiorari is confined to errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Where the lower court acts within its jurisdiction, errors in the exercise of discretion are correctable only by appeal or petition for review.

Third, every act or omission punishable by law carries its accompanying civil liability. An acquittal based on reasonable doubt does not extinguish civil liability where the act or omission from which it arose actually exists, and such civil liability is proved by a mere preponderance of evidence.

Fourth, the drawer of a check is presumed to have issued it for valuable consideration, and the burden rests on the drawer to overthrow that presumption.

Disposition

The petition for certiorari was dismissed for lack of merit, and the civil liability of Julieta Ong for the full amount of the checks was sustained.

Remember This

Memorize this line: an acquittal based on reasonable doubt does not extinguish civil liability where the act or omission from which it arose exists, and the remedy from an appellate judgment of the Regional Trial Court is a petition for review under Rule 42, not certiorari. Examiners use this case to test the Rule 42 and Rule 65 distinction and the survival of civil liability after acquittal in Bouncing Checks Law prosecutions.