SC CIRCULAR NO. 12, June 30, 1987

Article III, Section. 2 of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines provides:

“Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shell be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.” (Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing provision is a verbatim reproduction of Article
III, Section 3 of the 1935 Constitution, and Article IV, Section 3 of
the 1973 Constitution, except that the word “personally” is now inserted
after the word “determined” in the 1987 Constitution; in the 1935
Constitution, the term “warrants” was used generally while the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions specify both search warrant and warrant of arrest;
and the authority to issue such warrants given in the 1973 Constitution
to “other responsible officer: as may be authorized by law”, in addition
to the judge, has been deleted in the 1987 Constitution.

Conflicting interpretations of the new provision of the 1987
Constitution have been made by lower court judges, in view of the
insertion of the word “personally”. Hence, pursuant to the supervisory
jurisdiction of this Court, the following guidelines are established for the
guidance of the bench and bar:

1. The purpose of a preliminary investigation is only to determine probable cause. As stressed in Hashim vs. Boncan,
   71 Phil. 216, January 31, 1931 “x x x the investigating judge or prosecuting
   officer acts upon, probable cause and reasonable belief, not upon proof
   beyond a reasonable  doubt. The occasion is not for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence
   only as may engender well-grounded belief that an offense has been
   committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. When all this is
   fulfilled, the accused will not be permitted to cast about for fancied
   reasons to delay the proceedings; the time to ask for more is at the trial. x x x “

2. Both under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the settled rulings of
   our jurisprudence, which rulings the drafters of the 1987 Constitution were
   certainly cognizant of and took into consideration, is that the judge,
   in determination of the existence of probable cause for  the issuance of the
   warrant of arrest, may rely upon certification of the fiscal that he has
   conducted a preliminary investigation and that a probable cause exists. (See Hashim vs. Boncan, supra; and Placer vs. Villanueva  126 SCRA 463, citing U.S. vs. Ocampo, 18 Phil. 1 and Amarga vs. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739)

3. The insertion of the word “personally” for the judge’s
   determination of the existence of probable cause in the 1987
   Constitution serves to underscore the exclusive and personal
   responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence
   of a probable cause. He is proscribed from delegating this task of
   investigation to any other person. He must do it personally.

4. In satisfying himself of the existence of a probable cause for
   the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge, following the
   established doctrine and procedure, may either:

(a) Rely upon the fiscal’s certification of the existence of
probable cause whether or not the case is cognizable only by the
Regional Trial Court and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or

(b) If on the face of the information he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s certification and require the
submission of the supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause.

5. The Supreme Court admonition should be heeded that while the
   Constitution does confer upon the judge the power to conduct preliminary
   examination preparatory to issuing a warrant of arrest, sound policy
   reasons should curb the propensity to make use of such competence, since
   judges of the CFI and CCC (now RTC) “should not encumber themselves
   with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal
   complaints” but should “concentrate on hearing and deciding criminal
   cases filed before their courts.” (Collector of Customs vs. Villaluz
   and five other cases jointly decided, 71 SCRA 356 [1976]).

Strict compliance with these guidelines is hereby enjoined.

June 30, 1987.