G.R. No. L-49959. June 19, 1984
UNITED RCPI COMMUNICATIONS LABOR ASSOCIATION (URCPICLA) – FUR, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE AMADO GAT INCIONG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOR, RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF …
FERNANDO, C.J.:
assumption of jurisdiction by the Deputy Minister of Labor, respondent
Inciong,[1] and his failure
to order the immediate execution of a decision of the Voluntary
Arbitrator, then Dean of the University of the Philippines College of
Law, now Commissioner of Elections, Froilan Bacungan. It was his ruling
that “the respondent company is under legal obligation to implement the
general wage increase that it failed to implement effective January 1973
but that equity demands that such implementation should take into
account the financial conditions of the Company.”[2]
It is undisputed that in the collective bargaining Agreement for the
years 1972 to December 31, 1974, private respondent agreed to give
salary increases to the employees covered by the agreement during its
duration.[3] It did not do
so. When negotiations between it and petitioner union failed to break
the impasse, both parties chose a voluntary arbitrator, the then Dean
Bacungan.[4] It was further agreed that his decision “shall be final, binding, immediately executory and non-appealable.”[5] As such, he directed the parties to submit their position papers, after which a hearing would be held.[6]
Private respondent, in its position paper, admitted the
non-implementation, but pleaded in justification the occurrence of
circumstances and events arising after the 1972-1974 collective contract
was concluded, rendering it unable to comply with its obligation.[7] After petitioner-union submitted its memorandum,[8] the parties were heard, resulting in the above decision.[9]
While the petitioner-union, referring to its final, binding, executory
and non-appealable character asked for its immediate implementation,[10] private respondent countered by filing a motion for its reconsideration, alleging lack of capacity to pay.[11] It was denied.[12]
The entire case was then referred to the Chairman of the National
Labor Relations Commission through the Executive Arbiter, public
respondent Guillermo C. Medina, who, after determining the amount of
such monetary award, issued a writ of execution against private
respondent.[13]
As to why there was such an assumption of jurisdiction by respondent
Inciong, is explained in the Comment for respondent public officials
submitted by the Office of the Solicitor General. It stated that
conformably to such writ of execution, the Office of the Sheriff served
garnishment notices to all depository banks of private respondent. The
consequence was that it issued a memorandum to all its employees,
informing them of its inability to pay their salaries and wages for
August 15 and 31, 1978. That was when private respondent, in a letter
dated August 11, 1978, sought the intervention of the Minister of Labor.[14]
By virtue of such request, the Minister of Labor referred the matter
to respondent Inciong, who in turn invited the parties to a conference
on August 14, 1978.[15] Such a
conference was held, with private respondent being represented by its
President, two Vice-Presidents and its counsel. Respondent Union was
represented by counsel.[16]
The aforesaid decision was the result, according to such Comment,
endorsed favorably by the representatives of the parties attending as
well as the then National Labor Relations Commission Vice-Chairman. That
is the background of this petition, filed after petitioner-Union
apparently had lost its patience for the failure to receive the salary
increases due its members.
The assailed order of respondent Inciong, issued on August 14, 1978,
reads as follows: “In order to normalize the operations of the RCPI
pending final settlement of the payment of the obligations of the
company under the Order of Dean Froilan Bacungan dated February 22,
1978, the following is hereby ordered for immediate compliance by the
parties: 1. Management shall pay immediately to all covered workers its
obligations under the Bacungan Order for June, July and August 1978. 2.
Starting September 1, 1978, management shall start paying regularly
every payday its current obligations under the Bacungan order. 3. The
Minister of Labor shall assume jurisdiction under PD 823 as amended over
the determination of the formula for the payment of the backpay under
the Bacungan Order; decision is within 20 working days from first
hearing. 4. Management shall pay its employees their salaries from
August 16-31, 1978, and thereafter. 5. The orders of garnishment issued
by Executive Labor Arbiter Guillermo Medina are hereby lifted effective
immediately. 6. Management shall file a bond not later than August 18,
1978 to cover its obligations from June 1973 to May 1978. [So ordered].”[17]
In the light of the above facts, the Court is of the opinion and so
holds that the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator, on whose behalf the
suit is brought by petitioner-union, should be immediately implemented.
At the time of the order of respondent Inciong, there was justification
for the gradual implementation so as “to take into account the
financial conditions of the company.” So it was required in the decision
of Dean Bacungan. That was in 1978. Private respondent was satisfied.
It did not appeal. It knew it was required to pay “immediately to all
covered employees its obligations under the Bacungan order for June,
July and August, 1978.”[18] Then, starting September 1, 1978, it had to pay “regularly every payday its current obligations under the Bacungan order.”[19]
Nothing could be clearer, therefore, than that under the order now
assailed by petitioner-union, private respondent had no choice except to
comply with the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator as early as
September 1, 1978. Nor is this all. There is also this provision in the
Order of respondent Inciong: “Management shall pay its employees their
salaries from August 16-31, 1978, and thereafter.”[20]
There would be no unfairness involved therefore if in accordance with
its terms, the obligation to make such payments which had long since
accrued being honored. The law is thus clearly on the side of
petitioner-union.
Even from the standpoint of the economics involved, the case for
petitioner-union is particularly strong. The increases provided in such
collective contract are rather minimal. For employees in the Greater
Manila Area, the increase is P30.00 a month, plus longevity pay of P1.00
for every year of service for 1972, P20.00 a month for 1973 and P20.00 a
month for 1974; for employees in Class A and B Stations, P25.00 a month
plus longevity pay of P1.00 for every year of service for 1972, P20.00 a
month for 1973 and P20.00 a month for 1974; for employees in Class C
and D Stations, P20.00 a month plus longevity pay of P1.00 for every
year of service for 1972, P15.00 a month for 1973 and P15.00 a month for
1974.[21] The assailed order
on its face shows how far respondent Inciong had been sympathetic to
what respondent Company considered the difficulty inherent in its
financial condition. The objections it had persistently raised renders
it liable to the suspicion that there is lacking that modicum of good
faith expected of every party to a contract. To demonstrate that such a
misgiving is not well-founded, private respondent can do no less than
abide by its explicit terms. What is more, to accept the posture of
private respondent is to ignore what has been so long and so often
stressed by this Court on the respect to be accorded the social justice
mandate[22] and protection to labor guarantee[23]
of the Constitution. No further delay in the implementation of such
order can thus be tolerated. In this connection, it may not be amiss to
state that as held in Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor
and Employment,[24] even when
the power of compulsory arbitration “allowable under the Constitution
and quite understandable in labor disputes affected with a national
interest”[25] is invoked, “to
be free from the taint of unconstitutionality, [it] must be exercised
in accordance with the constitutional mandate of protection to labor.”[26]
It follows, therefore, that equally so, where the resort by the
parties to settle a dispute is through voluntary arbitration, it becomes
equally indubitable that there be fidelity to the fundamental
principles that labor be protected and social justice be promoted.
WHEREFORE, the immediate implementation of the decision of Voluntary
Arbitrator Froilan Bacungan is hereby ordered. This decision is
immediately executory. Costs against private respondent.
Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Escolin, and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
[1] The other respondents
are the Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) and
Guillermo C. Medina of the National Labor Relations Commission.
[2] Petition, par. 9
[3] Ibid, par. 2.
[4] Ibid, par. 3-4.
[5] Ibid, par. 4.
[6] Ibid, par. 6.
[7] Ibid, par. 7.
[8] Ibid, par. 8.
[9] Ibid, par. 9.
[10] Ibid, par. 10.
[11] Ibid, pars. 11 and 14.
[12] Ibid, par. 15.
[13] Ibid, pars. 15, 16, and 17.
[14] Comment, 7.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Annex O to Petition.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Annex A to Petition.
[22] According to Article II,
Section 6 of the Constitution: “The State shall promote social justice
to ensure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the people. Towards
this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse
property ownership and profits.”
[23] According to Article II,
Section 9 of the Constitution: “The State shall afford protection to
labor, promote full employment and equality in employment, ensure equal
work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the
rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security
of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The State may provide
for compulsory arbitration.”
[24] No. 58184, October 30, 1981, 108 SCRA 757.
[25] Ibid, 773.
[26] Ibid.