VICTORIO DOMINGUEZ, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. ANTONIO LIM TAMA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

This action was instituted in the Court
of, First Instance of the Province of Marinduque by Dr. Victorio
Dominguez, a medical practitioner, to recover from the defendant,
Antonio Lim Tama, a sum of money alleged to be due to the plaintiff for
a surgical operation performed upon Protasio Sales and for surgical and
medical services rendered to the same person. In the Court of First.
Instance judgment was entered absolving the defendant from the
complaint, and the plaintiff appealed.

The facts necessary to an understanding of the controversy are
briefly these: In the month of April of the year 1913, the defendant
was conducting a bakery in the municipality of Gasan, on the Island of
Marinduque. Among the servants engaged in helping to run the said
bakery was a boy, named Protasio Sales, of the age of 15 years, who
earned a salary of ‘Hi per month. Early in the morning of one of the
days of April, 1918, Protasio was aroused from sleep by his master, and
was told to clean a machine used in the shop for kneading flour. While
engaged in performing this task the boy’s hand was caught in the
machinery and crushed to such a degree that the member had to be
amputated. At this time, the plaintiff, Dr. Victorio Dominguez, who is
a resident of Boac, happened to be casually present in Gasan, and he
was called in to see the injured boy. Upon examining the wound, the
doctor saw that an operation would be necessary, but as it was
impracticable to perform it on that day, he applied remedies designed
to give temporary relief, and returned with his surgical instruments
early the next morning. Before the operation was undertaken, the
defendant,, Lim Tama, agreed to be responsible for the expenses of the
surgical operation and the medical services and supplies incident to
the treatment of the case. Relying upon this promise, the plaintiff
proceeded with the amputation, and in the subsequent treatment of the
case forty-five visits were necessary before a cure was effected. The
bill for all the expenses incident to the case, including P300 for the
surgical operation, P8 for medical supplies, and P10 for each visit,
amounts to P758, for which amount judgment is asked in the complaint.

The defense is based chiefly on the fact that Doctor Dominguez was,
at the time the services mentioned were rendered, the president of the
sanitary division which includes the municipality of Gasan. It is
accordingly insisted that the services in question were rendered in the
performance of official duty and that the plaintiff is discapacitated
from recovering the value of these services by the express language of
section 1035 of the Administrative Code, which is as follows:

“SEC. 1035. In no case shall an officer or
physician whose duty it is to render free medical service receive any
payment therefor, either directly or indirectly.”

As this provision is clear and unequivocal, it only remains to
inquire whether the services in question were rendered under such
conditions that the plaintiff, as president of the sanitary division,
was bound to render them gratis. The answer to this question depends
largely upon the interpretation of certain provisions contained in
section 1006 of the same Code. In defining the duties of the president
of a sanitary division, it is there said:

” (i) * * * He shall, whenever
practicable, furnish free medicines to indigent patients, and when
requested, he shall render, free of charge, medical services to all
Government officers and employees, to all persons in custody, and to
other persons entitled to such service.

” (j)
In the case of accidents or serious injuries received by an indigent
person whose condition is such as not to allow of removal to the
municipal building, he shall when requested afford free treatment at
the person’s own house or elsewhere.”

A related provision of the same Code, but which really does not
contribute materially to the solution of the case, is found in section
1030, which imposes on district health officers the duty to render, or
cause to be rendered by the local health officers, when practicable,
such medical service as may be required for prisoners “or other persons
entitled to free medical service.” The provisions most to the purpose
are those quoted above from section 1006, and the case turns upon the
point whether, under the circumstances above stated, Protasio Sales was
an indigent person in the sense intended by those provisions.

The word indigent, as used in English, has reference to a state of
destitution, and is generally used of necessitous persons who have
become a public charge. It is very evident that Protasio Sales was not
indigent in this sense, prior to receiving the injury above described,
for he was earning an honest livelihood, though of the modest character
suited to his station in life. On the other hand, his resources were
manifestly inadequate to sustain the expenses incident to the calamity
which befell him; and there can be no doubt it was the inevitable duty
of the plaintiff, as a public health officer, to render such aid to the
boy as was within his power. Whether he was bound under the
circumstances to render this service gratis is quite another question.

It should not escape attention in this connection that there
existed between Lim Tama and Protasio Sales the relation of master and
servant, which is everywhere recognized as entailing upon the master a
moral responsibility for the welfare of the servant—a responsibility
more pronounced where the servant, as in this case, is of immature
years and not sui juris. Under these circumstances it was in
our opinion competent for the defendant to bind himself to answer for
the value of the services rendered by the plaintiff; and it cannot be
said that the contract to this effect was illegal as being prohibited
by law. Under the circumstances stated, Protasio Sales was a dependent
person—not an indigent person as contemplated in the provisions of law
above quoted and as he was a dependent person, it was lawful for his
employer to obligate himself to pay for the surgical and medical
service rendered to him by the plaintiff.

Upon the question of the value of these services, we are of the
opinion that, upon the proof, the amount claimed in the complaint is
just, and judgment will be entered accordingly.

The judgment appealed from is reversed, and the plaintiff will
recover of the defendant the sum of P758, with interest at the rate of
6 per cent per annum from September 4, 1919, in accordance with section
510 of the Code of Civil Procedure, without express finding as to costs
of either instance.

Mapa, C. J., Araullo, Malcolm, and Villamor, JJ., concur.