G.R. No. L-23849. September 30, 1969
VIRGILIO M. LAYNO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. I & I EQUIPMENT & SERVICE COMPANY, JUDGE JESUS DE VEYRA OF BRANCH XIV OF COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA AND SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF…
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This case is before us on appeal by the plaintiff from the order
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XI, dismissing the complaint,
upon defendant’s motion, in Civil Case No. 52213 and setting aside the
temporary restraining order theretofore issued.
The antecedent facts as stated in the order are accepted as correct by
both parties, to wit:
“The undisputed facts are – that on 8 November 1960 defendant I & I Equipment
& Service Company filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 44649) against herein
plaintiff in this Court (Branch XIV); on 29 November 1960 the parties entered into a compromise
agreement in virtue of which this Court (Branch XIV) rendered judgment
approving the said compromise agreement on 1 December 1960. On 15 April 1961, herein defendant, I & I
Equipment & Service Company (plaintiff in Case No. 44649), filed a motion
for execution dated April 7, 1961, claiming that out of the sum of P32,650.00
mentioned in said decision, herein plaintiff (defendant in Case No. 44649)
paid only P10,000.00, leaving an unpaid balance of P22,625.00. This motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution was granted and the corresponding writ of execution was issued by the
Clerk of this Court. On 17 August 1961,
plaintiff herein filed a petition for relief from judgment with this Court
(Branch XIV), seeking the annulment and setting aside of the decision in Civil
Case No. 44649 on the ground that there was error and mistake committed by this
Court (Br. XIV) in rendering its decision, and that there was fraud and deceit
of herein defendant I & I Equipment & Service Company as to the total
obligation of the herein plaintiff to said defendant in respect to rentals of
the D-8 tractor. On 18 August 1961, this Court (Br. XIV) denied the
petition for Relief from Judgment on the ground that the period prescribed in
Rule 38 had already lapsed, that the fraud alleged in the petition is
intrinsic, and that the petition for relief is insufficient in form and
substance under Rule 38, Section 4, Rules of Court. Herein plaintiff then filed with the Court of
Appeals Petition for Certiorari with Injunction, which petition was dismissed
by the Court of Appeals in its decision of 31 January 1962, holding that this Court (Br. XIV) has not
acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition for relief from
judgment, with costs against herein plaintiff, petitioner therein. At present a motion for an alias writ of
execution in Case No. 44649 filed by herein defendant I & I Equipment &
Service Company on 14 November 1962, and a contempt charge against plaintiff
herein (defendant in Case No. 44649) which arose as a result of an attempt to
execute the decision in that case are the subject of proceedings before this
Court (Br. XIV). Herein plaintiff filed this complaint on 15 November 1962, which was assigned to this
Branch, seeking the annulment of the decision in Civil Case No. 44649, with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Branch XIV from
proceeding with the execution of the decision and the contempt
proceedings.”
On 29 November 1962
the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on two grounds: (1) that it does
not state any cause of action and (2) that if it states a cause of action the
same is barred by prior judgment. In
granting a motion to dismiss the court a quo ruled that it was
without jurisdiction to entertain the complaint; more specifically, citing Cabigao vs. del Rosario, 44 Phil. 182, “that no court
has power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court
of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having an equal power to grant the
relief sought by injunction . . . (that) the various branches of the Court of
First Instance of Manila are in a sense coordinate courts and to allow them to
interfere with each other’s judgments or decrees by injunction would obviously
lead to confusion and might seriously hinder the administration of
justice.”
In this appeal, originally taken to the Court of Appeals but
subsequently certified by it to us, there being no question of fact involved,
the appellant assigns several errors, which may be categorized into two main
propositions: first, that the
subject-matter of the action, which is one to set aside, or annul a judgment on
the ground of fraud, is within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
of Manila – not exclusively of any particular or individual branch thereof, nor
necessarily of that branch alone which rendered said judgment; and second, that
once such jurisdiction is conceded, the court that actually takes cognizance of
the case has the power or authority to issue a writ of injunction to restrain
the court which rendered the judgment from enforcing the same by
execution. Cabigao
vs. del Rosario, supra, according to the appellant, merely lays down a general
rule based on comity or necessity out of respect and due regard for a
coordinate tribunal, but which rule is subject to exceptions in appropriate
cases.
The appellant submits that insofar as the motion to dismiss filed
by the defendants in the lower court is concerned the only issue is whether or
not the complaint in Civil Case No. 52213 states a cause of action.
The appellees, in addition to refuting
the appellant’s assignment of errors, make a counter-assignment of their own
for the purpose of sustaining the correctness of the order of dismissal,
alleging that the lower court erred “(1) in not holding that the complaint
in Case No. 52213 did not state a cause of action; and (2) in not holding that
the appellant’s cause of action, if any, is barred by prior judgment.”
It may be observed, in passing, that the issue of jurisdiction
would not have arisen if Case No. 52213, filed to annul or set aside the
judgment in Case No. 44649, had been assigned to Branch XIV of the Manila Court
of First Instance, which was the court which rendered the said judgment. In fact the appellees
suggest that the appellant could and should have requested the reassignment of
the case to said branch. But since
jurisdiction is conferred by law[1]
and, considering the subject-matter of the action, it is conferred in this case
on the Court of First Instance in the generic sense and not on any particular
branch thereof, it may not indeed be altogether free from doubt if the continued
viability of the action from the point of view of jurisdiction should depend
upon the entirely fortuitous circumstance of its assignment to one or another
branch of the same court.
However, we see no need to resolve this issue definitely herein,
since the order of dismissal must be sustained on another ground, namely, that
the appellant’s cause of action is barred by prior judgment. It is to be noted that in their complaint the
appellants allege extrinsic fraud on the part of the appellee
I & I Equipment & Service Company, the fraud consisting of the fact
that the latter had the complete records of all the payments already made to it
by the appellant but concealed some of them when the said compromise agreement
was entered into and when it was submitted to the court for the corresponding judgment
of approval. This is the same fraud
alleged and relied upon by the appellant in his petition for relief from said
judgment, which was denied by the trial court and subsequently by the Court of
Appeals. The latter court then held
(CA-G. R. No. 29845-R):
“Besides, the alleged fraud is intrinsic so that it cannot be
basis for the petition for relief. The
petitioner is an attorney-at-law so that his claim that he was not given time
to consult his record is incredible or without basis. Besides, his claim that there was assurance
made by the respondent company that inaccuracies in the compromise agreement
would be adjusted should have been included in the compromise agreement, if
that were true, which is not so, in the instant case, the alleged fraud
consisted solely in the petitioner’s claim that the respondent company
deliberately misled him as to the correct amount of his obligation to the
company but this did not deprive him of his day in court. He could have refused to execute the
compromise agreement. He could have
filed an answer and presented evidence, if he had any, to contradict the
evidence of the company at the trial.
He could have put at issue at the trial the correct amount of his
obligation to the company so that if he was misled as to the correct amount of
his obligation we believe the fraud if any, was intrinsic.
‘”The distinction in treatment of extrinsic and intrinsic
fraud, traces to the natural desire to assure finality to parties
litigant. The line of finality,
therefore, is allegedly drawn between that which was or could have been put in
issue at the former trial or that; which could not.” (Moore’s
Federal Practice, 3269)
‘”A judgment can be annulled by a separate action after it has
become final only for extrinsic fraud, not for alleged perjury or the
withholding of information from the court, as otherwise there would be no end
to litigation, perjury being of such common occurrence in trials.”‘ (Almada v. Cruz, 47 O.G., 1179, Sept. 30, 1949, G.R. No. L-1696.)
Moreover, the Court of Appeals in the same decision made an
express finding that “there was no fraud or mistake in connection with the
execution of the compromise agreement…”
The appellant insists that the fraud committed by the appellees is not intrinsic but extrinsic, as alleged in the
complaint in this case. For indeed, to
be a ground to annul a judgment the fraud must be extrinsic to the litigation.[2]
The insistence is futile, for precisely it is this very question concerning the
nature of the fraud that was settled in CA-G. R. No. 29845-R. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the fraud was intrinsic, and that ruling may no longer be
reopened.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, with
costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.
[1]
SEC. 44, Judiciary Act of 1948.
[2] Almeda, et al., vs. Cruz, 47 0.G. 1179; Labayen vs. Talisay-Silay Milling
Co., 68 Phil. 376; Varela vs. Villanueva, et al., 50 O. G. 4242; Tarca et al., vs. Carretero,
52 O. G. 3558.)