VADIM N. CHIRSKOFF, PETIONER, VS. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION AND DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, RESPONDENTS.

This is a second petition for habeas
corpus by Vadim N. Chirskoff, the first petition having been dismissed
in an order promulgated on September 7, 1948, in G. R. No. L-2838,
entitled Vadim N. Chirskoff vs. The Commissioner of Immigration, et al.; on the authority of Borovsky vs. The Commissioner of Immigration^[1](L-2852) and Mejoff vs. The Director of Prisons^[2] (L-2855).

The history of the prisoner’s detention is thus set forth in the
petition. Chirskoff entered the Philippines on June 19, 1946 with a
passport duly visaed by the United States Consul in Shanghai, for the
purpose of making repairs on and taking delivery of certain vessels
purchased by or in behalf of the Java China Trading Co., Ltd. The
vessels having been repaired and dispatched to Shanghai, the petitioner
remained behind and stayed for the reason, according to him, that he
had “suffered an economic collapse and his return to Shanghai became
impracticable.”

In the meantime Chirskoff obtained employment in a lumber concern
in Bataan and later in a similar concern in Floridablanca, Pampanga. It
was while working at the latter place that he was arrested by order of
the Commissioner of Immigration on March 16, 1948, charged with aiding,
helping and promoting “the final objective of the Hukbalahaps to
overthrow the Government. After that arrest, specifically on April 5,
1948, the Deportation Board ordered the petitioner’s deportation to
Russia, not on the ground stated in the warrant of arrest but on the
purported ground that he “violated condition of the temporary stay
given him by failing to depart from the Philippines upon its
expiration, thus rendering himself subject to deportation under Section
37(2) (7) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.” No
formal charges for giving aid to Hukbalahaps have ever been filed.

The immigration authorities were unable to carry out the
deportation order, and it is alleged that because of that inability the
petitioner repeatedly expressed his desire to leave the country on his
own account but that his request was not heeded. The petitioner says
that he could easily have departed from the Philippines without any
expense on the part of the Government when, upon express authority of
the respondent Commissioner of Immigration, he secured employment in
the Swedish SS. Axel Salem which was to sail from the
Philippines in 1948, but, so he states, the respondent Commissioner of
Immigration for no valid and practical reason withdrew the said
authority.

Except as to the circumstances of the Immigrants’ entries into the Philippines, this case and the cases of Borovsky vs. Commissioner of Immigration and Mejoff vs.
Director of Prisons referred to in the order dismissing the herein
petitioner’s first application, are identical. Borovsky’s and Mejoff’s
applications had been denied because arrangements were being made to
have the petitioners deported. Like Chirskoff, Borovsky and Mejoff each
later filed a second application for habeas corpus docketed as G.R.
No. L-4352 and G.R. No. L-4254. Both these applications have recently
been granted for the reason that since the denial of the first a period
of over two years had elapsed without the applicants having been
deported and the prospects of removing them were not in sight.

In the last mentioned cases we held that foreign nationals, not
enemy, against whom no criminal charges have been formally made or
judicial order issued, may not indefinitely be kept in detention; that
in the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” approved by the General
Assembly of the United Nations of which the Philippines is a member,
the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as
applied to human beings were proclaimed; that the theory on which the
court is given power to act is that the warrant of deportation, not
having been able to be executed, is functus officio and the alien is being held without any authority of law (U. S. vs.
Nichols, 47 Fed. Supp. 201); that the possibility that the petitioners
might join or aid disloyal elements if turned out at large does not
justify prolonged detention, the remedy in that case being to impose
conditions in the order of release and exact bail in reasonable amount
with sufficient sureties.

Following our decisions in Borovsky vs. Commissioner of Immigration, supra, and Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons, Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons, supra,
it is ordered that the writ issue commanding the respondents to release
the petitioner from custody upon these terms; The petitioner shall be
placed under the surveillance of the Immigration authorities or their
agents in such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that
he keep peace and be available when the Government is ready to deport
him. The surveillance shall be reasonable and the question of
reasonableness shall be submitted to this Court or to the Court of
First Instance of Manila for decision in case of abuse. He shall also
put up a bond for the above purpose in the amount of P5,000.00 with
sufficient surety or sureties, which bond the Commissioner of
Immigration is authorized to exact by Section 40 of Commonwealth Act
No, 613.

No costs will be charged.

Paras, C. J., Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes and Jugo, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.

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^[1] 84 Phil., 161, supra, p. 107.

^[2] 84 Phil., 218; Supra, p. 70.

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PABLO, M., concurrente:

El recurrente en esta causa vino a Filipinas el 19 de junio de 1946 con pasaporte debidamente expedido y con visto bueno del consul de Estados Unidos en Shanghai; que no pudo salir de Filipinas y volver a Shanghai por reveses economicos.  El recurrente obtuvo empleo en una compania maderera en Bataan y despues en una aserradora en Floridablanca, Pampanga.  Mentras estaba emplea- do en esta aserradora, fue arrestado en 16 de marzo, 1948 por una denuncia de que estaba ayudando a los Hukbalahaps; pero en 5 de abril del mismo año, no habiendose establecido su culpabilidad, el Comisionado de Inmigracion ordeno su deportacion, no por ayudar a los Huks, sino por no haber cumplido la condici6n de su permanencia temporal en el pals al expirar el plazo concedido a 51.  (Art. 37 (2) y (7) de la Ley de Inmigracion de 1940, tal corno fue enmendada.)

El recurrente, por lo visto, no estd en las mismas condiciones que Boris Mejoff y Victor Borovsky:  Mejoff vino a Filipinas como espla del ejercito japones y Borovsky es un vago, borracho y espia.  SI recurrente vino con pasaporte y con empleo;  despue”s de terminar su trabajo en el barco comprado por la Java China Trading Co., Ltd. en-contro empleo en dos aserradoras; que si no pudo salir fue por razones economicas.  No debe confundirse al recurrente Chirskoff con los dos citados.

En mi disidencia en la causa de Mejoff, G, R. No. L-4254, he dicho lo siguiente:  “Si el solicitante no hubiera sido espia, si no hubiera venido aquf para ayudar a las hordaV japonefces en la subyugaci6n del pueblo filipino, si hubiera venido corao visitante, por ejemplo, y, por azares de la fortuna, no pudo salir, yo seria el primero en abogar por su liberacion inmediata.”

Concurro con la parte dispositiva de la decision de la mayoria.