CANDIDO SAN LUIS, complainant, vs. BENJAMIN B. PINEDA, respondent.

San Luis versus Pineda

The Case

This is an administrative case for disbarment. Candido San Luis filed a complaint asking that Benjamin B. Pineda be punished by disbarment, on the ground that Pineda had been expelled from the Bar before the Second World War, had nonetheless continued to practice law, and had later been convicted by final judgment of the crime of robbery, for which he received a conditional pardon. The case matters because it fixes two enduring rules: a disbarred lawyer who keeps practicing is in contempt of court, and a pardon does not by itself restore the privilege to practice law.

Procedural History

The complainant brought the matter directly to the Supreme Court by a complaint praying for disbarment, or in the alternative for contempt, and for a new disbarment should it appear that Pineda had been reinstated to the Bar after 1941. The Court referred the matter to the Solicitor General for investigation and report. The Solicitor General reported that Pineda had indeed continued to practice law in Jolo during the latter part of 1941, that is, after he had been disbarred in July 1940, but that no evidence proved any legal practice by the respondent after 1941. On that basis the Solicitor General recommended that the respondent should only be warned not to practice law again. The Supreme Court, sitting in an original administrative proceeding, approved that recommendation and disposed of the complaint itself.

Facts

A few months before December 1941, Benjamin B. Pineda had been expelled as a member of the Bar. He had in fact been disbarred in July 1940. Notwithstanding that disbarment, he continued to practice law, and the investigation established that he practiced in Jolo during the latter part of 1941.

In 1953, Pineda was convicted by final judgment of the crime of robbery. President Magsaysay later granted him a conditional pardon. The complainant insisted that the pardon did not blot out the stain of moral misconduct, and prayed that the Court act for contempt, or order a new disbarment if Pineda had by then been reinstated.

The Court's records did not show that Pineda had ever been readmitted to the Bar. No evidence proved that he practiced law at any time after 1941. Because 1941 was, by the time of the decision, too far away, the Court declined to impose the heavier penalty and contented itself with a warning.

Issues

• Whether or not a lawyer who continues to practice law after being disbarred is guilty of contempt of court.
• Whether or not a conditional pardon granted to a disbarred lawyer who was convicted of robbery restores his privilege to practice law.
• Whether or not, on the facts established, the respondent should be disbarred anew or merely warned not to engage in the legal profession until regularly readmitted.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote a statute. It states the governing rule of contempt in its own words, and that statement is the provision it applies:

Needless to say, practice of law by one who is disbarred constitutes contempt of court.

This rule is what makes Pineda's continued practice in Jolo after his disbarment in July 1940 punishable, and it is the reason the Court could act on the complaint at all.

The Court also relies on the settled effect of a pardon, which it treats as not blotting out the stain of moral misconduct, so that the 1953 robbery conviction and the conditional pardon did not by themselves restore the respondent to the Bar.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that practice of law by one who is disbarred constitutes contempt of court, citing the settled authorities. The respondent's continued practice in Jolo during the latter part of 1941, after his disbarment in July 1940, therefore exposed him to punishment for contempt.

On the second issue, the Court did not accept the complainant's premise that the conditional pardon wiped out the consequences of the robbery conviction. A pardon does not blot out the stain of moral misconduct, and the records did not show that Pineda had ever been readmitted to the Bar. The privilege to practice law therefore remained withdrawn.

On the third issue, the Court weighed the age of the misconduct. The Solicitor General found no evidence of legal practice by the respondent after 1941, and the Court observed that 1941 was too far away. It accordingly approved the recommendation of the Solicitor General and administered a warning instead of a new disbarment, with the express qualification that the respondent must first be regularly readmitted before he may practice again.

Doctrine

First, the practice of law by a person who has been disbarred is contempt of court. Disbarment removes the privilege of lawyering, and any act of lawyering after it is an affront to the Court that imposed the penalty.

Second, a pardon, and in this case a conditional pardon, does not automatically restore a disbarred lawyer to the Bar. The stain of moral misconduct is not blotted out by executive clemency, and readmission must be secured in the regular way.

Third, a lawyer who has been disbarred may not engage in the legal profession again until he is regularly readmitted. The warning in this case is framed exactly that way, and it is the operative language a reviewee should be able to reproduce.

Disposition

The Court approved the recommendation of the Solicitor General, did not impose a new disbarment, and warned the respondent not to engage in the legal profession again until he is regularly readmitted to the Bar.

Remember This

Memorize the line: practice of law by one who is disbarred constitutes contempt of court, and a pardon does not restore the privilege to practice. Examiners use this case to test the effect of disbarment and pardon on the privilege to practice, and the rule that readmission must be regular and express.