CECILIO BUENAVENTURA, PETITIONER, VS. EMILIO PEÑA, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

The petitioner, Cecilio Buenaventura, is the plaintiff in civil case No. 971
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, wherein he sought to obtain a judicial
declaration upholding his right over the occupancy and lease of stalls Nos. 1162
and 1495 of the Quinta Market, and an order restraining the defendants therein
from ousting him from said market stalls. A writ of preliminary injunction was
issued by the respondent Judge, Hon. Emilio Peña, directed against Mayor
Valeriano Fugoso and his co-defendants. After trial, said respondent Judge
rendered a decision declaring the respondent Domingo Coquiat to be the lawful
occupant of the stalls in question, and setting aside the writ of preliminary
injunction aforementioned. From this decision the petitioner has appealed, but
prior to the expiration of the period for appeal, the respondent Domingo
Coquiat, one of the defendants in civil case No. 971, filed an urgent motion for
execution based mainly on the following grounds:

“It is to be remembered that Domingo Coquiat has long been deprived of the
occupancy of Market Stalls Nos. 1162 and 1495, Quinta Market, Manila,
consequently depriving, him for so long a time of the only means of support for
himself and his family. Each day of delay in the execution of the judgment means
a corresponding day of difficulty on his part and that of his family in
procuring the necessary provision for their support. Aside from the fact that
plaintiff has several other stalls in the Quinta Market, Manila, besides the two
stalls in question that he is illegally occupying he has already profited so
much from the said market stalls in question at the expense of the defendant
Domingo Coquiat, the lawful occupant of the same. Nobody should be allowed to
enrich himself at the expense of another.”

This motion was granted by the respondent judge, and the order to that effect
was entered at the foot of the second page of said motion.

In the present petition for certiorari, the petitioner contends that the
order of the respondent judge directing immediate execution of his decision in
civil case No. 971 constitutes a grave abuse of discretion on his part, there
being no good reasons therefor.

Under section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the trial court may, in its
discretion, order execution before the expiration of the time to appeal, upon
good reasons to be stated in a special order. The sufficiency of the reasons for
ordering such execution is naturally to be determined by said court; and we will
not substitute our own way of thinking for that of the trial court with
reference to such matters, if its discretionary power is to have any
meaning.

Of course, interference by this Court may be in order, if it be shown that
there has been an abuse of discretion or that “since the issuance of the order,
conditions have so far changed as to necessitate the intervention of the
appellate court to protect the interests of the parties against contingencies
which were not, or could not have been, contemplated by the trial judge at the
time of the issuance of the order.” (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol.
1, 2d ed., p. 644, citing Calvo vs. De Gutierrez, 4 Phil., 203; Case
vs. Metropole Hotel and Restaurant, 5 Phil., 49; Gamay vs.
Gutierrez David, 48 Phil., 768.) In the case at bar, however, we cannot hold
that the fact that the respondent Domingo Coquiat has long been deprived of the
possession of the market stalls awarded to him by the decision in civil case No.
971, and the consequent loss on his part of the benefits that should daily
accrue to him by occupying said stalls, are reasons not good enough for ordering
immediate execution. And the cogency of such reasons are not affected by the
lack of any finding in the decision in said case as to damages.

There is another ground making the present petition untenable. The decision
in civil case No. 971 set aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued at its
commencement. Under section 4 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, unless otherwise
ordered by the trial court, a judgment dissolving or denying an injunction shall
not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the
pendency of an appeal, although said court, in its discretion, may restore such
injunction during the pendency of the appeal upon such terms as to bond or
otherwise as it may consider proper for the security of the rights of the
adverse party. In the instant case, the respondent judge not only did not
restore the writ of preliminary injunction dissolved in his decision, but
expressly ordered its execution and refused to allow the herein petitioner to
file a supersedeas bond. In the absence of such injunction, the defendant City
officials in civil case No. 971 could have proceeded with the ouster of the
petitioner from the stalls in question. Indeed, there is really nothing to be
executed under the decision which merely determined who has a better title to
said stalls; and the order of the respondent judge now complained of, can only
be interpreted to mean as an authorization for the City authorities to carry
out, with the aid of the sheriff, the said ouster.

The petition is hereby dismissed, and writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued accordingly dissolved. So ordered, with costs against the
petitioner.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Hontiveros,
Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

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PERFECTO, J.:

Petitioner filed a complaint against the Mayor of Manila and other city
officers to restrain them from ousting plaintiff from stalls 1162 and 1495 in
the Quinta Market. The complaint is dated October 18, 1946. Domingo Coquiat
filed an answer claiming to be the rightful occupant of said stalls. The other
defendants filed an answer praying for the dismissal of the complaint On January
30, 1947, respondent judge rendered decision declaring Coquiat the lawful
occupant of the stalls, with costs against the plaintiff.

On February 12, 1947, Coquiat moved for the execution of the judgment “by
authorizing the sheriff of Manila to eject Cecilio Buenaventura and his
representatives from market stalls Nos. 1162 and 1495, Quinta Market, Manila, in
order that Domingo Coquiat can immediately occupy” them. Plaintiff filed an
opposition to said motion on February 20, 1947. Respondent judge issued an order
of execution addressed to the sheriff of Manila to the following effect:

“Now, therefore, we command you to cause the plaintiff Cecilio Buenaventura
to forthwith vacate the stalls Nos. 1162 and 1495 of the Quinta Market, Manila,
and that defendant Domingo Coquiat have restitution of the
same.”

The above writ was issued upon respondent judge’s order of February 21, 1947,
consisting of two words, “Motion granted,” written in the second page of the
motion for execution filed on February 12, 1947.

The power of the lower court to order execution of judgment before the
expiration of the time to appeal is regulated by section 2 of Rule 39, where it
is provided that execution may be issued “upon good reasons to be stated in a
special order.”

This provision appears to have been violated as in the two words “Motion
granted” written by respondent judge there is no reason stated at all, whether
good or bad, in support of the issuance of execution.

This clear violation of
law is more than enough ground why said order should be set aside, and so we
vote.