MIGUELITO BATOCABE, PETITIONER, VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 171, VALENZUELA CITY, HON. MARIA NENA J. SANTOS, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
REYES, JR., J., J.:
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On July 25, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed with Branch 171 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela (RTC) an Information (Rollo, p. 21) charging Natalia Soria and petitioner Miguelito Batocabe, a Vault Keeper in the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Valenzuela City, with the crime of Infidelity in the Custody of Public Documents, defined and penalized under Article 226 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines (RPC). The accusatory portion of the said Information reads:
“That during the period from September 21, 1997 to September 6, 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Valenzuela, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused NATALIA SORIA, being then the Records Officer or Record Custodian of the Office of the Register of Deeds, Valenzuela City, while in the performance of her official functions and taking advantage of the same, conspiring with co-accused Mike Batocabe (a public officer Vault Keeper) did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously remove, destroy or conceal a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Jesus Bautista, Sr., married to Consuelo Nunez with waiver of rights, filed by Spouses Reynaldo N. Bautista and Teresita C. Bautista which became the basis for the cancellation of TCT Nos. (T-49854)5070 and T-43853)73948 over two parcels of land with a total land area of 8,167 square meters, located in Marulas, Polo (Valenzuela), Bulacan, originally in the name of Jesus Bautista, Sr., married to Consuelo Nunez and the issuance of TCT Nos. V-47038 and V-47039 in the names of Reynaldo N. Bautista married to Teresita Bautista (2/3 share) and Violeta N. Bautista-Vicencio married to Gerino Vicencio (1/4) to the damage and prejudice of the heirs and the public interest as well.
CONTRARY TO LAW.” (Rollo, p. 21)
Upon arraignment, the petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to the crime leveled against him. Subsequently, or on August 20, 2004, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a “Motion for Leave of Court to Amend Information and to Admit Attached Amended Information” dated August 9, 2004 (Rollo, pp. 23-30), seeking to add the word “serious” in the last statement of the Original Information to read “xxx to the serious damage and prejudice of the heirs and the public interest as well.” It pointed out that the amendment to the information was a matter of form, and that it did not seriously prejudice the rights of the petitioner as it merely stated with additional precision something which was already contained in the Original Information .
On September 13, 2004, the petitioner interposed his opposition to the said motion of the Office of the Ombudsman (Rollo, pp. 34-40). According to the petitioner, the amendment sought, which consisted in the insertion of the word “serious” before the phrase “damage and prejudice” in the Amended Information, was not merely a matter of form, but rather a substantial amendment since it sought to alter the nature of the offense and increase the penalty for which he may be made to suffer.
After considering the respective arguments of the parties, the RTC, in the Order dated October 13, 2004, granted the motion of the Office of the Ombudsman, ruling that the disputed amendment to the Original Information was only a matter of form. Thus:
“In the present case, this Court notes that the recital of facts in the Information, to which accused Batocabe entered his plea, would not be changed with the insertion of the word, ‘serious’ in the information. It would only serve to clarify that the accused are being charged under paragraph 2 of Article 226 of the Revised Penal Code and not under paragraph 1 thereof which is within the jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial courts. What matters is that in the body of the Information itself there is a narration of the acts or omissions of the accused from which can be gleaned the extent of damage sustained by the private offended party. The insertion of a word, in this instance, the word ‘serious’ just summed up with one word the extent of the prejudice borne by the offended party. In fact, the absence of said adjective would not in any way diminish the gravity of the effects of such acts or omissions as recited in the Information.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the ‘Motion for Leave of Court to Amend Information and to Admit Attached Amended Information’ is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the attached Amended Information is hereby ADMITTED.” (Rollo, p. 61)
Dissatisfied therewith, the petitioner filed an urgent motion for reconsideration of the Order dated October 13, 2004, insisting that that the insertion of the word “serious” was a substantial amendment and adversely affected his right to be informed of the accusation against him (Rollo, pp. 41-44).
On December 10, 2004, the trial court denied the said motion filed by the petitioner, reiterating its stand that the recital of facts in the Original Information, to which the petitioner entered his plea, was not changed by the insertion of the word “serious” in the Amended Information, and that the said word just summed up with one word the extent of the prejudice borne by the offended party (Rollo, p. 18).
Still unconvinced, the petitioner now comes to Us via this instant petition raising the following issues:
“1. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE DESPITE SHOWING LACK OF JURISDICTION THERETO;
2. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED ORDER (GRANTING THE AMENDMENT OF INFORMATION) DESPITE IT HAVING NO JURISDICTION AT ALL.” (Rollo, p. 6)
Essentially, the petitioner wants Us to resolve the following issues: 1) whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the criminal case; 2) whether the amendment to the Original Information was formal or substantial, and 3) whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion of the Office of Ombudsman to amend the Original Information.
The petition is devoid of merit.
There is no question that the jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute and that the elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case. In other words, the fundamental rule is that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial (Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, 301 SCRA 298, 327 [1999]). In People vs. Lagon, 185 SCRA 442, 447 (1990), citing People vs. Buissan 105 SCRA 547 (1981), the Supreme Court explained the aforementioned rule in this wise:
“. . . [i]n criminal prosecutions, jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial (People v. Cuello, 1 SCRA 814) or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented during the trial (People v. Co Hiok, 62 Phil. 503) but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes, together with other legal obligations, on the basis of the facts as recited in the complaint or information (People v. Purisima, 69 SCRA 347) constitutive of the offense charged, for once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the information is filed, it is retained regardless whether the evidence proves a lesser offense than that charged in the information (People v. Mision, 48 O.G. 1330).” (Emphasis Supplied)
The petitioner maintains that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case considering that the Original Information failed to allege that the damage or prejudice caused to the offended party and the public by reason of the wrongful act of the petitioner was serious, thus downgrading the crime for which he was being charged to Infidelity in the Custody of Public Documents defined and penalized under paragraph 2 of Article 226* of the RPC, and not under paragraph 1 of the said Article.
The petitioner avers that pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 226 of the RPC, the imposable penalty is only prison correccional in its minimum and medium periods, which penalty ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, the petitioner insists that Municipal Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over the instant case considering that the imposable penalty for the offense he was being charged does not exceed six years of imprisonment. For which reason, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, and hence could not allow the amendment to the Original Information to confer jurisdiction upon itself.
The petitioner submits that by inserting the word “serious” before the phrase “damage and prejudice” in the Amended Information, the case would no longer fall within the ambit of paragraph 2, but rather within paragraph 1 of Article 226 of the RPC, which calls for the imposition of a higher penalty of prision mayor. The petitioner thus insists that the amendment to the Original Information which was allowed by the RTC in its Order dated October 13, 2004 was not merely formal but a substantial one considering that the said amendment altered the penalty attached to the offense.
We are not persuaded.
Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that:
“SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
xxx xxx xxx”
It is clear from the foregoing rule, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or information may be made without leave of court before the accused enters his plea. After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused (People vs. Janairo, 311 SCRA 58, 67 [1999]).
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form (Matalam vs. Sandiganbayan, Second Division, 455 SCRA 736, 747 [2005]). In People vs. Casey, 103 SCRA 21 (1981), which was cited in the recent case of Banal III vs. Panganiban, 475 SCRA 164, 173-174 (2005), the Supreme Court laid down the test in determining whether an amendment is a matter of form or substance, thus:
“The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of an information has been said to be whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. A look into Our jurisprudence on the matter shows that an amendment to an information introduced after the accused has pleaded not guilty thereto, which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein, does not expose the accused to a charge which could call for a higher penalty, does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance — not prejudicial to the accused, and therefore, not prohibited by Section 13, Rule 110 (now Section 14) of the Revised Rules of Court.“ (People vs. Casey, 103 SCRA 21, 31-32 [1981])
Applying the forgoing test, the Supreme Court had ruled the following to be merely formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; (5) an amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged (Matalam vs. Sandiganbayan, Second Division, 455 SCRA 736, 747 [2005]).
After a thorough review of the records, We rule that the insertion of the word “serious” before the phrase “damage and prejudice” in the Amended Information was not a substantial amendment but merely a formal one. For even without the insertion of such word, one can reasonably deduce that the alleged act of the petitioner, a Vault Keeper assigned in the Office of the Register of Deeds in Valenzuela City, in destroying, removing or concealing the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a deceased person involving two (2) parcels of land with a total land area of eight thousand one hundred and sixty-seven (8,167) square meters would undoubtedly result in serious damage to the heirs of that deceased person since they would be unjustly deprived of their rightful shares in the said properties. What is more, the alleged destruction, concealment or removal of the said document by the petitioner from the records of the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Valenzuela City would undeniably impair public confidence in the integrity not only of public records, but also in the integrity of government employees and officials as well. Such effect constitutes damage to public interest, and such damage is beyond doubt a serious one.
Thus, it is beyond cavil that the insertion of the word “serious” in the Amended Information stated with precision something that was already contained in the Original Information, and which added nothing essential for the conviction of the petitioner of the crime charged. It did not involve a variance of the nature of the offense committed and cause a change in the basic theory of the prosecution which would require the petitioner to prepare his defense anew. The defense available to the petitioner under the Original Information as it originally stood was still available to him after it was amended. Neither did it expose the petitioner to a charge that called for a higher penalty beyond that stated in the law. Clearly then, the assailed amendment was only in form and not in substance.
It must be emphasized that the petition before Us is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Certiorari under the said Rule is a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop. It offers only a limited form of review. Its principal function is to keep an inferior tribunal within its jurisdiction (Angara vs. Fedman Development Corporation, 440 SCRA 467, 477 [2004]). It is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 409 SCRA 455 [2003]). In other words, for certiorari to lie, it must be shown that the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 336 SCRA 258, 263 [2000]). “Grave abuse of discretion” implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an invasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law — mere abuse of discretion is not enough (Samson B. Bedruz, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, G. R. No. 161640, December 9, 2005).
In the instant petition, We so rule that based on the allegations in the Original Information, the RTC correctly assumed jurisdiction over the criminal case, and that it did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it allowed the formal amendment to the Original Information after the arraignment of the petitioner. As previously discussed herein, such actuations of the RTC were amply supported by prevailing law and existing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed Orders dated October 13, 2004 and December 10, 2004 of public respondent Hon. Judge Maria Nena J. Santos, Presiding Judge of Branch 171 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Reyes, (Chairman) and Lanzanas, JJ., concur.
* “ARTICLE 226. Removal, concealment or destruction of documents. — Any public officer who shall remove, destroy or conceal documents or papers officially entrusted to him, shall suffer:
- The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, whenever serious damage shall have been caused thereby to a third party or to the public interest.
- The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, whenever the damage caused to a third party or to the public interest shall not have been serious.
In either case, the additional penalty of temporary special disqualification in its maximum period to perpetual special disqualification shall be imposed.”