RUFINA C. DE PAULA, IN HER CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VICTOR GASTON, PETITIONER, VS. JOSE ESCAY, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

This is a special civil action of certiorari instituted in this Court,
seeking to annul an order of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
the Honorable Jose Teodoro, Sr., presiding, approving the claim of respondent
Jose Escay in the amount of P5,418.31 plus legal interest of P2,682.06 and
P810.03 as attorney’s fees and approving its payment by the administratrix out
of the funds of the estate. The claim arose out of a contract of lease between
claimant Jose Escay as lessee of Hacienda Puyas No. 1, and the administratrix as
lessor. This contract of lease was executed on May 12, 1937, with the court’s
approval, and amended on April 29, 1942, also with the court’s approval. Under
the original contract of lease (Exhibit A of Annex A), the administratrix was
obliged to deliver to Escay ten per cent of the sugar, rice and corn produced
from Hacienda Puyas No. 1 from 1943 until the full sum of P7,000, the estimated
cost of property transferred to the estate, was fully covered. In the subsequent
amendment of the contract, the lease was declared terminated with the close of
the 1942-43 harvest, with the right on the part of either party to demand a
liquidation of the accounts in relation to the lease one year after the
re-establishment of the peace.

Pursuant to the above agreement, Jose Escay filed his claim on June 29, 1954,
attaching thereto a copy of the contract of lease and a detailed statement of
accounts showing that the administratrix is indebted to him in the sums of
P5,418.31 as principal and P2,682.06 as interest. The administratrix opposed the
claim on the following grounds, namely, (1) that it can not be presented as a
claim because the administration proceedings were commenced since 1932 yet and
the claim can not now be presented as one under section 5 of Rule 87 of the
Rules of Court; and (2) that the court sitting in probate has no jurisdiction to
entertain the claim, especially as the same is being controverted. The lower
court held that the claim was properly filed (under the authority of III Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, pp. 393-94 and the case of Escueta vs.
Sy Juilliong, 5 Phil., 405). As to the contention that the claim is not
chargeable against the estate but against the administratrix in her personal
capacity because there is an over payment of rentals, the trial court held that
as the contract of lease was approved by the court and the claim is an offshoot
of said contract, she may not now repudiate it. As to the claim that the
administratrix had not been given opportunity to contest the correctness of the
claim, the court held that the administratrix had not offered to disprove the
items contained in the statement of accounts.

The first legal issue submitted to us for resolution is the supposed lack of
authority or jurisdiction on the part of the court to consider the claim in the
administration proceedings. There is no question that the claim does not fall
under the provisions of section 5 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, because the
same is not a debt or money claim incurred by the deceased during his lifetime
and collectible after his death. It is an ordinary demand or claim for the
payment of the balance of an account due under a contract of lease entered into
by the administratrix under the court’s approval. There is no express provision
of the Rules governing the method by which the demand for payment may be made.
May the claim be enforced by a simple motion in the administration proceedings,
or by an ordinary action?

Under our judicial system, there is only one grade of court of general
jurisdiction invested with power to take cognizance of all kinds of cases,
whether civil or criminal, or all kinds of special proceedings, whether probate,
or land registration, or naturalization. In the same grade, we have the Court of
Industrial Relations and the Agrarian Court, but these are courts of limited
jurisdiction. We do not have probate courts dedicated to the trial of probate
cases alone; our courts of first instance have jurisdiction of probate
proceedings, such as administration and distribution and guardianship, jointly
with the civil or criminal actions, and when taking cognizance of probate cases
they do not hold court or sessions at specified places, or periods, or terms,
and their power over the same is not separate and distinct, as is the case in
common law countries where the same court may at one time sit as a court of
common please, at another as a probate court, and still at another as a court of
claims. As a result the practice has been for demands against administrators
(not by those against third parties) to be presented in the court of first
instance where the special proceeding of administration is pending, if the
demand has relation to an act of administration and in the ordinary course
thereof. This is because the administration is under the direct supervision of
the court and the administrator is subject to its authority. When the demand is
in favor of the administrator and the party against whom it is enforced is a
third party, not under the court’s jurisdiction, the demand can not be by mere
motion by the administrator, but by an independent action against the third
person. For obvious reasons, the demand can not be made because third persons
not under the jurisdiction of the court are involved.

From the above considerations, it can be seen, in the case at bar, that as
the lease contract was entered into by the administratrix with the approval of
the court in the ordinary course of administration and with the court’s approval
in the administration proceedings, to consider tne claim in the same
administration proceedings may not be denied for the claim purpose to make the
administratrix comply with the obligations contracted in the course of
administration with the court’s consent and approval. There is no question that
the court has jurisdiction of the administrator in so far as the property and
the contract are concerned; as to the movant, he submitted himself to the
court’s jurisdiction by filing his claim. The claimant is not prohibited from
filing an independent action to recover the claim, but the existence of such a
remedy is not a bar to the remedy that he had pursued in the case at bar.

The objection of the administratrix to the presentation of the claim before
the court may have been impelled by the belief that the amounts she may be
compelled to pay by virtue of the demand of Escay may be charged against the
estate, when the same should fall under her personal responsibility. She was
entitled to receive only the amount of the rentals under the lease contract and
no more, and Escay should not make the estate under administration responsible
for the amount received by the administratrix in excess of the rentals actually
due. The consideration of the claim in the administration proceedings, however,
does not necessarily mean that the administratrix may not be held personally
liable for the excess. The mere fact that the court in passing upon the claim
may order her, the administratrix, to pay the full amount of the demand, does
not mean that the total amount which she is compelled to pay could be chargeable
against the said estate under administration. Certainly, the estate would only
be responsible for the amount which she is legally entitled to receive as
rentals; it can not be held responsible for the excess of the amount collected
over and above the rentals due under the lease. For this excess the
administratrix will have to be personally responsible and the court in ordering
payment of the said excess would order the administratrix to be personally
responsible therefor. The above circumstances, however, do not deprive the court
of power to consider the claim; and the administratrix for herself is estopped
from denying that the amounts received in excess of the true rentals were
received by her in such capacity. One who contracts with another in a
representative capacity cannot claim that amounts received by her in said
representative capacity are /due from her in another capacity (Arnold
vs. International Banking Corporation, 50 Phil., 477; Kellerman
vs. Miller [1897] 5 Pa. Super. Ct. 44S and Magee vs. Mellon
[1852] 23 Miss. 585, cited in 64 A. L. R. 1558-1559; In re Glover, 29 S. W.
982).

Insofar as the correctness of the amounts stated in the claim or demand, we
find that the administratrix never offered to disprove the amounts stated in the
claim. Notwithstanding the fact that the account is itemized to the last detail,
with a description of the methods by which payment were made, only a general
denial was made which is not even under oath. The administratrix should have
indicated the items the truthfulness or correctness of which she wanted to deny.
There was in fact, therefore, no valid denial of any item and all the items were
deemed admitted. It must be taken into account that the present action is one of
certiorari, based on lack or excess of jurisdiction andVor abuse of discretion.
Under these circumstances, we are constrained to find that the court did not
abuse its discretion in approving the claim, there being no specific denial of
any of the items of the claim or specific offer of proof by her of the
incorrectness of any of the items of the claim.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition should be as it hereby
is denied. With costs against the petitioner.

Bengzon, Acting C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista
Angelo, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ.. concur.

Petition denied.