G.R. No. L-14793. April 28, 1961
PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENT CHURCH, REPRESENTED BY HILARION S. ZUMEL, PETITIONER, VS. JUANA MATEO AND ISIDRO G. OLAÑO, RESPONDENTS.
PAREDES, J.:
that it involves purely questions of law.
On December 11, 1952, the Philippine Independent Church, represented by
Hilarion S. Zumel, filed a petition for review of the decree of registration in
Cadastral Case No. 38, GLRO No. 1554, Lot No. 748, issued in the name of spouses
Juana Mateo and Isidro G. Olaño. In the petition, it is alleged that said Isidro
G. Olaño, formerly parish priest of petitioner church, and as such in charge and
trustee of the properties of the same, by gross misrepresentation and with
intent to defraud the petitioner, succeeded in having lot 748 adjudicated to him
and his wife in Cadastral Case No. 88 on September 9, 1940, and subsequently
procured, thru actual fraud, the registration of said lot, resulting in the
issuance in their names of decree of registration No. 6172 on December 14, 1951;
that the property (Lot No. 748) is the exclusive property of petitioner church
and that the petition was presented within the prescribed period of one (1)
year.
On January 24, 1953, at the hearing of the petition, counsel for respondents
verbally asked that Hilarion S. Zumel be required to allege in the petition
whether he represented the De los Reyes faction or the Fonacier faction of the
Philippine Independent Church. The lower court ordered petitioner to file a
pleading making reference as to his faction. On January 26, 1953, petitioner
filed an amended petition alleging therein that he belonged to the Fonacier
Faction of the Philippine Independent Church. On January 28, 1953, counsel for
respondents presented a “Motion for Bill Particulars”, asking the court to order
petitioner to make a definite, positive and clear allegation as to the identity
of said petitioner, whether the Philippine Independent Church headed by Isabelo
de los Reyes, Jr. or that headed by Bishop Santiago Fonacier. On February 6,
1953, upon order of the lower court, Zamel filed another amended petition,
stating that it was the Philippine Independent Church headed by Bishop Santiago
Fonacier (Fonacier faction).
No further proceedings was had on the case until October 4, 1955, or after
the lapse of more than two (2) years, when respondents, thru counsel, filed a
Motion to Dismiss the petition on the ground that the petitioner had no legal
interest in the land and, therefore, had no legal capacity and/or personality to
seek the relief prayed for. It was argued that because the Supreme Court had
finally decided the controversy as to who is the lawful titular head of the
Philippine Independent Church, vesting the same in Isabelo de los Reyes,
Jr.[1] the party entitled to the relief
embodied in Sec. 38 of the Land Registration Act was the Philippine Independent
Church headed by De los Reyes, Jr. and not that faction headed by Fonacier, with
whom Zumel was affiliated.
An opposition to the above motion was presented by Zumel claiming, among
others, that the averment “Fonacier Faction” appearing in the amended complaint
was not at all an indication of a factual or formal division of the Philippine
Independent Church; that the controversy extended only to the difference in
opinion as to who is the rightful head of said church; that after the courts
have decided that De los Reyes is the lawful head, Zumel has finally recognized
him as such; that De los Reyes had authorized him (Zumel), thru a Special Power
of Attorney, to act as agent of said De los Reyes in the case; that the
respondents in registering the property in their own private names, have
deprived the petitioner church (whether headed by Fonacier or De los Reyes) of
its property; and that the Philippine Independent Church represented by Zumel is
one and the same church headed by De los Reyes, and as such it has legal
interest in the property, sufficient in Jaw to vest it personality to seek the
relief.
The trial court on October 31, 1955, rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads:—
“WHEREFORE, the motion to dismiss filed by Atty. Melanio T. Singson, should
be, as it is hereby, granted. This case is definitely dismissed, without costs,
and without prejudice of a more proper separate action”.
Petitioner-appellant in its brief contends that it was error (1) to dismiss
the petition upon a mere motion, since the petition raised issues which are
evidentiary in nature; (2) to rule that the amendments made in the original
petition after one (1) year reglementary period, took it out of the
jurisdictional period provided for the review of decree of registration.
There is no merit in the first assignment of error. There was nothing to be
proved, because all the facts upon which the trial court could base its
resolution, were all in the pleadings. Anent the second assignment of error: it
is true that averments were made, by way of amendments in the original petition
to review, so as to include the faction with which representative Zumel was
affiliated. The trial court deemed the procedure necessary, considering the fact
that there was then pending before the Courts the determination as to who the
lawful head of the petitioner church was. Factually, however, the affiliation of
petitioner’s representative is of no moment. The true petitioner is the
Philippine Independent Church, which under the allegations of the petition,
appears to be the owner of the property in litigation, registered by appellees
in their own names. We have held that the erroneous designation of the
representative when defendant itself is named, is not sufficient to set aside
proceedings had in a case (De Nilo vs. Romero, G. R. No. L-15193, Feb.
29, 1961). In the case at bar, whether the representative of the petitioner
belongs to the Fonacier faction or De los Reyes faction, could not have deprived
the Philippine Independent Church of its rights and interests in the land in
question, it appearing that the principal petitioner is the said church. The
fact that De los Reyes, the lawful head of the petitioner church as found by
this Court, had subsequently authorized Zumel to represent said church in the
litigation, (Exhs. A & B) is more than sufficient to meet the requirements
of Sec. 38, of Act No. 496. Of course, the lower court discounted the authority
given by De los Reyes to Zumel by stating:
“The aforequoted power of attorney does not ratify the past actuations of
Rev. Zumel in initiating this case. In the hypothesis that it has the effect of
ratifying his previous acts in this case, it cannot have the effect of
automatically or ipso jure reviving the ‘original’ petition, outside of
the said period, because a pleading superseded by a subsequent pleading, ceases
to be a pleading in the case. Under the same assumption, it may have the effect,
at most, of maintaining the re-amended petition which was filed beyond the
jurisdictional period of one year. In order to properly implement the ultimate
purpose of the said power of attorney, the proper remedy should be sought in a
separate ordinary action”.
Amendments in pleadings do not necessarily expunge those previously filed.
Amendments made, more so when ordered by the court, relate back to the date of
the original complaint, if, as in the case at bar, the claim asserted in the
amended pleading arose out of the same conduct, transaction or occurrence.
Amendment presupposes the existence of something to be amended and, therefore,
the tolling of the period should relate back to the filing of the pleading
sought to be amended. The recommendation of the trial court that the
implementation of the power of attorney should be in a separate ordinary action,
is frowned upon by the rules on multiplicity of suits. It would be to the
greater advantage of the litigants and the courts to have incidents in
litigations decided in a singular action.
In view hereof, we find that the dismissal of the petition on the grounds
stated in. the resolution in question is erroneous. The same should be, as it is
hereby set aside and another entered, remanding the case for further proceedings
wherein the parties may present their evidence to prove their respective
averments and/or defenses.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo,
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
[1] Fornacier vs. De los Reyes, 96
Phil. 415.