G.R. No. L-23636. October 31, 1967
TABACALERA INSURANCE COMPANY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY AND/OR MANILA PORT SERVICE, ET AL., DEFENDANTS, MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY AND/OR MANILA PORT SERVICE…
ANGELES, J.:
An appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, in Civil Case No. 50906, dated May 10, 1964, ordering the defendants
Manila Railroad Company and Manila Port Service to pay to the plaintiff Tabacalera Insurance Company the amount of P1,117.64 representing the CIF value of the latter’s lost shipment,
P300.00 as attorney’s fees and costs.
So much of the facts that gave rise to the controversy will be
stated to disclose the law questions involved, to wit:
1. Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action – plaintiff having sued in
the alternative Humburg-Amerika Line or its local
agents C. F. Sharp & Company, Inc. under a contract of carriage by sea, and
the Manila Railroad Company and Manila Port-Service as arrastre
operators – for recovery of the amount of P1,067.85 representing the value of
certain short-landed or short-delivered shipment of goods consigned to
plaintiff’s predecessor-in-interest;
2. Whether or not the filing of a “provisional claim”
within 15 days from the discharge of the goods from the carrying vessel without
stating the value of the loss, complied with a requirement in a contract that
the “claim for value of the loss “should be represented within said
period; and
3. Whether or not under a clause in the said contract limiting the
liability of the arrastre operators to the
“invoice value” of the lost goods but in no case exceeding P500.00
per package, an amount admittedly bigger than said invoice value but less than
the value of the lost goods when computed on the basis of P500.00 per package,
may be awarded.
On or about 6 of June, 1961, the vessel SS “Leverkusen” took on board at
Antwerp, Belguim
for shipment to Manila consignment cargoes, including
2,825 jute bags of glue and glue hardener consigned to the Sta. Clara Lumber
Company, Inc. The consignee took from
the plaintiff Tabacalera Insurance Company an
insurance policy for P99,892.00 covering the said
shipment against all risks. The vessel arrived
at the port of Manila
on July 11, 1961, and the
shipment was discharged unto the custody of the Manila Port Service on July 13, 1961. On the following day, July 14, 1961, the G. R. Walse
& Co. (Broker) filed with the defendant Manila Port Service a
“provisional claim” worded as follows:
“On the basis of our clients, Sta. Clara Lumber Co. Inc.,
provisional claim is hereby filed against you for damage and shortages
sustained on the cargo listed below which arrived per above-mentioned vessel,
namely:
MARKS BAD
ORDER CARGO
875 Bags Glue and Hardener
x
x x x
Non-delivered and/or Shortlanded
Cargo
x x x
x 386 Bags Glue and Hardener
x
x x x
“Final claim for the foregoing will be presented by the
aforementioned client on their loses, if any.”
The goods were thereafter delivered by the Manila Port Service to
the Sta. Clara Lumber Co., Inc., the last delivery of which took place on July 20, 1961. Claiming to have sustained loss or damage by
reason of non-delivery of 33 bags covered by the shipment in question, the Sta.
Clara Lumber Co., Inc. and/or the Tabacalera
Insurance Company, the latter having been subrogated to the rights of the
former, filed a formal claim with the defendants on September 25, 1961, for
payment of P1,117.64 representing the CIF value of the
lost goods, which defendants failed or refused to pay.
On July 10, 1962,
the Tabacalera Insurance Company filed a complaint
in the Court of First Instance of Manila for recovery of the value of the lost
goods. It sued the defendant
alternatively, claiming that it suffered damage due either to the negligence of
the Humburg-Amerika Line while the shipment was on
board the SS “LeverKusen“,
or the negligence of the Manila Railroad Company and the Manila Port Service
after said shipment was discharged unto their custody by their co-defendant
shipping company. Defendants filed
separate answers.
The parties submitted the case upon a stipulation of facts where
they agreed, inter alia, that the SS
“Leverkusen” discharged the entire shipment
of 2,825 bags unto the custody of the Manila Port Service on July 13, 1961, complete
and in good order; that said arrastre operator
received the “provisional claim” on July 14, 1961; that of the 2,825
bags of glue and hardener consigned to the Sta. Clara Lumber Co., only 2,792
bags were delivered to said company by the Manila Port Service on July 20,
1961; that plaintiff as insurer paid to the consignee the amount of P1,165.89
representing its liability under the insurance covering the said goods; that on
September 25, 1961, the insurer or consignee filed a “formal claim”
of P1,117.64 representing the CIF value of the lost shipment; that the invoice
value of the lost 33 bags of glue and hardener is P1,051.28, while its CIF
value is P1,117.64; and, that the liability of the Manila Port Service, if any,
shall be limited to the invoice value of the goods which in no case shall be
more than P500.00 per package as provided in Section 15 of the Management
Contract.
Upon the stipulation of facts, the Court of First Instance of
Manila, as stated in the opening paragraph of this opinion, condemned the
defendant Manila Railroad Company and the Manila Port Service to pay the
plaintiff the amount of P1,117.64, attorney’s fees and costs. Hence, this appeal.
Appellants contend that insofar as they are concerned, the Court
of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action because the amount involved is less than P5,000.00
and falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of
Manila. They argue that as against the
carrier, the cause of action is based on the contract of
carriage, while as against them as arrastre
operators, the cause of action is based on a contract of deposit, which causes
of action may be brought separately.
They insist that there was an improper joinder
of causes of action, alleging that the right to plead alternative causes of
action in a case should be subject to the fundamental limitation that each and
every cause of action must be within the original jurisdiction of the court in
which the complaint is filed.
We find the contention to be untenable. The joinder of
alternative parties and causes of action complained of, is clearly justified under
the allegations in the complaint and expressly sanctioned by the following
provisions of the Rules of Court:
“Joinder
of causes of action. –
Subject to the rules regarding jurisdiction and joinder
of parties, a party may in one pleading state, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party
(a) if the said causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or
relation between the parties, or (b) if the causes of action are for demands for
money, or of the same nature or character.
“In the cases falling under clause (a) of the preceeding paragraph, the action shall be filed in the
inferior court unless any of the causes joined falls within the jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance, in which case it shall be filed in the latter
court.” (Sec. 5, Rule 2, Rules of Court)
“Alternative Defendants. – Where the plaintiff is uncertain against
which of several persons he is entitled to relief, he may join any or all of
them as defendants in the alternative, although a right to relief against one
may be inconsistent with a right of relief against the other.” (Sec. 13,
Rule 3, Rules of Court)
Applying these rules, this Court in the case of The American
Insurance Company v. Macondray & Co., Inc., et
al., L-24031, August 19, 1967,
quoted with approval a previous ruling in Switzerland General Insurance Co.,
Ltd. v. Java Pacific and Hoegh Lines and the Manila
Railroad, L-21760 April 30, 1966
where We said:
“As may be seen, the instant case comes within the purview of
the rule above-quoted for therein it is postulated that a party may in one
pleading state in the alternative as many causes of action as he may have
against an opposing party if they arise from the same transaction with the
particularity that the case may be filed in the Court of First Instance if any
of said cause of action falls within its jurisdiction. This is precisely what was done in this
particular case. Because of the uncertainty
of the place where the disappearance of the shipment occurred, plaintiff
brought the case in the alternative before the Court of First Instance upon the
theory that it may have occurred while the shipment was in transit or while in
the custody of the arrastre operator.”
And so with the case of Firemen’s
Insurance Company v. Manila Port Service, et al., L-22810, August 31, 1967 where, in meeting the same
objection now raised in the case at bar, We disposed of the argument as
follows:
“They question the trial court’s jurisdiction to hear and
decide this case, because the relief sought in the complaint, insofar as
appellants are concerned, is the recovery of P854.14, plus attorney’s fees, in
the sum of P200.00, and costs, which is within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of municipal courts.” It should be noted, however, that in
addition to the appellants herein, who were sued as custodians or depositaries
of the goods consigned to E. J. Nell Co., the latter’s subrogee,
plaintiffs herein had, also, impleaded, in the
alternative, Klavenese Line and/or Smith, Bell &
Co. under the contract of carriage between them and the shipper, James S.
Baker. Admittedly,
such contract of carriage calls for the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction,
which municipal courts do not have, and is within the original exclusive
competence of courts of first instance.
And since Section 5 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court permits the joinder of the two (2) causes of action, in the
alternative, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had jurisdiction
over both, even if one of said causes of action were within the exclusive jurisdiction
of a lower court.”
Be that as it may, however, appellants maintain that the Tabacalera Insurance Company has no cause of action against
them, insisting that the filing of a “provisional claim”, virtually
couched in general and sweeping language, without stating the nature and extent
of the damage to the cargo and the number of packages lost, is now a compliance
of the requirement in the Management Contract that the “claim for
value” of lost or damaged goods should be filed within fifteen (15) days
from the discharge of the last package from the carrying vessel. They argue that since the “formal
claim” was filed only on September 25, 1961 which is clearly outside the
said period, they should be relieved of any and all liability as expressly
provided in the same Management Contract aforementioned.
The contention is without merit.
The rule is now well settled that the filing of a provisional
claim within 15 days from the discharge of the goods from the carrying vessel
is a sufficient compliance of the requirement of Sec. 15 of the Management
Contract heavily relied upon by herein appellants. (United Insurance Company, Inc. v. Royal
Inter-ocean Lines, et al., L-22688, April 27, 1967; Domestic Insurance Co. of
the Phil. v. Manila Railroad, et al., L-24066, August 30, 1967; Atlantic Mutual
Insurance Co. et al. v. Manila Port Service, L-21907, April 29, 1966; State
Bonding & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Manila Port Service, L-21833, February 28,
1966; Yu Kimteng Construction Corp. v. Manila
Railroad, L-17027, November 29, 1965; G.S.I.S. v. MRR, L-20342, November 29,
1965). The circumstances that the said
provisional claim did not specify the value of the loss, still substantially
complies with the requirement of the contract aforesaid, and is not a defense
against he claim of the consignee after it shall have ascertained later the
value of its actual loss or damage (State Bonding & Insurance Co. v. Manila
Port Service; Domestic Insurance Co. of the Phil. v. Manila Port Service, supra). And the rule is not without reason. While claims should be filed within the
period provided to afford the carrier or depositary reasonable opportunity and
facilities to check the validity of the claims while facts are still fresh in
the minds of the persons who took part in the transaction and the documents are
still available (David Consunji, et al. v. Manila
Port Service, 110 Phil. 231; Phil. Education Co., Inc. v. Manila Port Service,
et al., L-24091, September 20, 1967), the consignee should likewise be given
reasonable opportunity to examine and determine with certainty the extent of
the loss or damage to its goods after the same shall have been delivered by the
arrastre operators which may or may not be within
the 15-day period stipulated. Meanwhile
therefore, that a consignee has not actually received the goods consigned to
it, the filing of a provisional claim should be allowed to beat the short
period granted under the contract, provided that at the time the provisional
claim is submitted the consignee has acquired some general knowledge or
information that its shipment has been damaged or lost.
Finally, the clause in the Management Contract limiting the
liability of the appellant herein to the invoice value of the goods which in
no case shall be more than P500.00 per package is too plain to be
susceptible to a meaning other than its clear literal import. It simply means that the liability of the arrastre operators should be equal to the invoice value of
the goods if said invoice value does not exceed P500.00 per package; if the
invoice value of one package exceeds P500.00, however, then the basis of the
liability is P500.00 multiplied by the number of packages lost which then, in
the absence of any other stipulation in the contract, shall be less than the
invoice value of the goods. But the
stipulation, by no means, should preclude the award of attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation which is just and equitable under thee circumstances of
this case. While We have to declare that
the lower court fell into error in ordering the appellants to pay the appellee the amount of P1,117.64
representing the CIF value of the lost goods instead of the invoice value which
is P1,051.28, We find no abuse of discretion on its part in awarding P300.00
to the appellee as attorney’s fees.
WHEREFORE, and conformably herewith, the award of P1,117.64 to the appellee in the
decision appealed from is reduced to P1,051.28, the invoice value of the lost
goods. Judgment affirmed in all other
respects. No pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, and
Fernando, JJ., concur.