MANSUETA T. TIBULAN, MARIO TIBULAN AND ULYSSES TIBULAN, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, ACTING MINISTER OF LABOR, AND LUZON STEVE­DORING CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioners here seek to set aside (a) a decision of the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission dated 29 November 1975 which reversed the Decision of the Acting Referee
awarding to petitioner Mansueta Tibulan
and her children Mario and Ulysses, both surnamed Tibulan,
compensation benefits by reason of the death of Pedro Tibulan,
as well as (b) the orders dated 19 July 1977 and 7 June 1978 of the Secretary
and Acting Secretary of the Department of Labor denying petitioners’ first and
second Motions for Reconsideration, respectively.

Pedro Tibulan started working for
private respondent Luzon Stevedoring Corporation as Barge Patron of one of its
barges sometime in 1930, and remained there until his death in 1965.  In 1963, he began to suffer from high blood
pressure, hypertension and heart ailment.

On 23 December 1965,
when Pedro Tibulan returned home from work, he
complained to his wife of chest and stomach pains.  The latter brought him to the Philippine
General Hospital for treatment.  Pedro
died the very next day.  The cause of his
death was diagnosed as myocardial infarction, aortic insufficiency and hypertension.^[1]

On 13 September 1966,
in representation of herself and her two (2) minor children, Mansueta Tibulan through her then
counsel, Atty. Felizardo Moreno, filed a claim for
compensation benefits under the pertinent provisions of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act (Act No. 3428, as amended) docketed as Case No. RO-4-WC-5412.  On 29 September 1966, without any
authority from Mansueta, Atty. Moreno filed a motion
to dismiss claiming that the filing of said motion was authorized by petitioner
Mansueta and that petitioner was no longer interested
in prosecuting her claim against respondent company.  The Acting Referee granted said motion in his
order dated 29 September 1966.

On 9 November 1966, Mansueta through
another counsel, Atty. Gaspar Tagle
filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, claiming that she
had not consented to the filing of the motion to dismiss, not having understood
its contents:  that she never had the
intention of asking for dismissal of her claim and had not received any
pecuniary benefits by reason of the said dismissal; that the said dismissal had
prejudiced her interest and that of her children.  The Acting Referee denied the motion for
having been filed out of time.  This
order of denial was served on the petitioners through their new counsel on 1 February 1967.

On 6 February 1967, petitioner interposed a Petition for Review
on the following grounds, namely:  that
the order dismissing the claim was null and void considering that the motion to
dismiss dated 29 September 1966 was filed without the authority of Mansueta and her children; that the Acting Referee’s order
dated 29 September 1966 did not start the running of the period to file the
petition for review since the same was not served on petitioners’ counsel; that
the Petition for Review was filed under the provisions of Section 38 of the
Rules of Court which had supplemental effect under Section 2, Rule 7 of the
Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. 
This Petition for Review (or for relief) remained formally unacted upon despite the fact that the Commission in
October 1971 remanded the case to its Regional Office No. 4 for further
proceedings.

Several years went by without any further proceedings being
taken.  On 29 November 1974, petitioners refiled
their claim which was docketed as RO-4-WC
Case No. 160991.  A copy of the
re-filed claim was furnished to private respondent corporation which, on 14 January 1975, filed its Employer’s Report of Accident or Sickness controverting petitioner’s claim on grounds of “(a)
lack of employer-employee relationship; (b) cause of death not
service-connected; and (c) claim is time-barred.” The Acting
Referee then required the parties to file their respective affidavits.  Only petitioner Mansueta
filed her affidavit to which she attached a certification of her marriage to
the deceased and the baptismal certificates of her minor children.  Respondent corporation
filed nothing.

In his decision^[2]
dated 25 August 1975, the
Acting Referee awarded to petitioners the sum of P5,990.40
as compensation benefits, P200.00 as burial expenses and P300.00 as attorney’s
fees.

Not satisfied with the decision, private respondent corporation
filed with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission a motion for reconsideration
on the ground of pendency of another, similar claim
filed by petitioners.

In its decision^[3]
dated 29 November 1975,
the Workmen’s Compensation Commission reversed the decision of the Acting Referee.  The Commission ruled that there was no causal
connection between the work of the deceased and the cause of his death,
petitioners having failed to show that the deceased was incapacitated for work
prior to his death:  and, that the
Certificate of Marriage and the Baptismal Certificates submitted by petitioners
were insufficient to prove their relationship with and filiation
to the deceased.  Petitioners filed two
(2) motions for reconsideration both of which were denied by the Secretary and
the Acting Secretary of the Department of Labor, respectively.

In the instant Petition for Review, the petitioners assail the
decision of the Commission for not having entertained their two (2) motions for
reconsideration although meritorious.

In turn, respondent company urges that, under the provisions of
the Labor Code, petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Commission dated 29 November 1975 was filed out of time, having been filed
beyond the ten-day reglementary period.  It must be observed that petitioners’ claim
was filed under the pertinent provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and not
of the Labor Code, and that under the former Act, the reglementary period was fifteen (15) days.

The records show that while the claim
was pending before the Commission, Atty. Hermoso,
petitioners’ previous counsel, was appointed to the Judge Advocate General’s
Office (JAGO) and at the time the decision was received in his house on 22
December 1975, he was away at Mactan Airbase serving
as its Provost Court Officer.  It was
only on 5 January 1976, when
he came back to Manila that he had
learned of said decision.  Consequently,
he was able to file the motion for reconsideration only on 13 January 1976. 
In view of this excusable negligence, we believe that the period should
be considered to have had started to run from 6 January 1976 and not from 22 December 1975. 
Under this view, the first motion for reconsideration may be regarded as
filed seasonably.  As is well-known, the
Workmen’s Compensation Act is a piece of social welfare legislation which seeks
to give effect to the concept of social justice,^[4]
and the provisions of which should accordingly be liberally construed in favor
of the employee or the claimant.^[5]

The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not
petitioners are entitled to the compensation benefits under the provisions of
the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

It appears that petitioners’ claim was not just denied by the
Commission on the ground of lack of causal connection between Pedro’s death and
the conditions of his work, but also for the reason that the petitioners had
allegedly failed to establish their relationship to the deceased.  As observed, however, petitioner Mansueta Tibulan had in fact attached to her
affidavit filed with the Acting Referee several documents to support her claim,
namely:  a medical certificate, the
baptismal certificates of petitioners Mario and Ulysses Tibulan,
a certification of Mansueta’s marriage to the
deceased issued by the parish priest who had solemnized the marriage.  Mansueta had also
attached to her motion for reconsideration which she had filed with the
Commission copies of the birth certificates of Mario and Ulysses Tibulan.  The
totality of this evidence was, in this case, quite sufficient to establish
petitioners’ relationship to the deceased. 
In any case, it is merely commonplace to note that strict observance of
the technical rules of evidence is not properly demanded in Workmen’s
Compensation cases.^[6]
Moreover, respondent corporation did not present any
evidence controverting petitioners’ documentation.

Respondent company, whatever else it may have stated in its
earlier “Employer’s Report of Accident and Sickness,” does not
dispute before this Court that Pedro Tibulan had been
in its employ as Barge Patron during his lifetime.  The records further show that Pedro’s illness
had begun in 1963 while still employed by the respondent company.  Considering that the claim was filed under
the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, petitioners are entitled to
the presumption of compensability which, under the provisions of said act, arise under the aforementioned circumstances.^[7]

Because Pedro Tibulan’s illness is
presumed to be compensable, his employer, respondent
corporation, had the burden of
controverting and overcoming such presumption with
competent evidence showing that the deceased’s illness was not in fact
work-connected and had in fact not been aggravated by the conditions of
his employment.

We do not believe that respondent company was successful in discharging the burden of disproving
the work-relatedness of Pedro Tibulan’s illness.  Respondent company merely argued that because
the deceased was occupying a supervisory position, therefore, the cause of his
death could not be directly traceable to his employment.  To overcome the legal presumption of
compensability, evidence must do more than merely create a doubt.^[8]
In the instant case, no substantial doubt was generated by respondent company’s
contention.

Upon the other hand, the petitioners claimed that the conditions
under which Pedro Tibulan had served as Barge Patron
had some connection with the emergence and development of the disease which
caused his death.  Petitioners pointed
out that the deceased had worked for respondent company for almost thirty-five
(35) years, from 1930 up to his death on 24 December 1965. 
The barge to which the deceased was assigned was being used to transport
heavy cargoes up and down and around the Pasig River
and had under his supervision
only two (2) sailors.  These conditions
lead us to the inference that while the position of the deceased was not one
requiring mainly manual labor, nonetheless,
he could not have avoided strenuous physical activity in carrying out his
duties.  Certainly, the captain or patron
of a cargo barge was not expected to, and would
not have been allowed to, live his life behind a desk.

Further, it appears that
when Pedro Tibulan first joined respondent company,
he was in fact in good health. 
Where an employee entered employment in good health and suffered an illness in the course of employment which
illness he never had before said employment, he has in his favor the statutory
presumption that his disease or illness is compensable.  Once more, respondent
corporation was unable to overturn the applicable statutory presumption
of compensability and of the work-related character of Pedro Tibulan’s illness.^[9]

Finally, since respondent
company failed to submit any affidavit or counter-affidavit to the Acting
Referee as required by the provisions of Department Order No. 3, it must be
deemed to have renounced its right to challenge petitioners’ claim and to have
waived all non-jurisdictional defenses.^[10]

The Acting Referee’s
award in 1975 in favor of petitioners was clearly in order.  It is difficult to understand why
private respondent corporation should have felt
compelled to appeal that award which came after the claim had been pending for
nine (9) years; that appeal was frivolous and insubstantial.  It is even more difficult to comprehend the
reversal of that award by the Commission in a decision notable only for its
failure to apply the simple and widely-known statutory presumption of
compensation, and which compelled petitioners to come to this Court and which
resulted in the further prolongation
of this case.  Under these circumstances,
petitioners are entitled to legal interest on the amount of the original award
computed from the date of rendition of that award by the Acting Referee.^[11]

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is GRANTED and the
Decision dated 29 November 1975
of respondent Workmen’s Compensation Commission in WCC Case No. R04-160991, the
Order of the Secretary of the Department of Labor dated 19 July 1977 and the Order dated 7 June 1978 by the Acting Secretary of
the Department of Labor are hereby SET ASIDE. 
Respondent Luzon Stevedoring Corporation is hereby DIRECTED to pay
petitioners the award rendered by the Acting Referee on 25 August 1975 in the
amount of P5,990.40 as compensation benefits and
P200.00 as funeral expense, together with legal interest on these amounts
computed from 25 August 1975 until full payment thereof, and 10% of the
resulting aggregate amount as attorney’s fees. 
Costs against public and private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Gutierrez,
Jr., Bidin, and
Cortes, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, Annex “B” of Petition, p. 28.

^[2]
Id., Annex “A”
of Petition, p. 26.

^[3]
Id., Annex “B”
of Petition, pp. 27-29.

^[4]
Molet v.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 83 SCRA 170 (1978); Parlago
v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 83 SCRA 829 (1978).

^[5]
Vda.
de Pagaling v.
Philippine Packing Corporation, 87 SCRA 399 (1978); Octavio
v. Workmen’s Compensation Act, 87 SCRA 416 (1978).

^[6]
Espiritu v.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 84 SCRA 636 (1978).

^[7]
Pillsbury Mindanao Flour Mill Co., Inc. vs. Murillo,
81 SCRA 306 (1978); Lorenzo vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 81
SCRA 434 (1978); Trinidad vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 81 SCRA 664 (1978).

^[8]
Lizardo vs.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 89 SCRA 77 (1979).

^[9]
Lizardo
vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 87 SCRA 77 (1978); Landicho
vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 89 SCRA 147 (1979); Marasigan
vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 89 SCRA 259 (1979); Dulay
vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 89 SCRA 659 (1979).

^[10]
Dinario v.
Workmen’s Commission, 70 SCRA 292 (1976); Security Services Unlimited, Inc. v.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 69 SCRA 269 (1976).

^[11]
See Eladia
de Lima, et al. v. Laguna Tayabas Company, et
al. 160 SCRA 70 (1988).