SERGIO F. DEL CASTILLO, PETITIONER, VS. MANUEL H. JAVELONA, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF BAGO, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

It appears that on October 7, 1959, Sergio F. del Castillo filed a complaint
for breach of contract and damages against the Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc.
(Civ. Case No. 330), before the Justice of the Peace Court of Bago, Negros
Occidental, presided over by Justice of the Peace Manuel H. Javelona. Before the
defendant company could answer, JP Javelona filed a petition with Hon. Jose
Querubin, the Executive Judge of the Occidental Negros CFI, requesting that he
(Javelona) be authorized to inhibit himself from hearing the case on the ground
that counsel for defendant company, Atty. Emilio Y. Hilado, is his first degree
cousin. Judge Querubin designated respondent Luis G. Torres, Pulupandan JP to
hear Civil Case No. 330. In the interim, the defendant company had filed its
answer and JP Torres had set the case for hearing. No hearings were held,
however, due to the absence of JP Torres and/or postponements asked by
defendant. On January 27, 1960, plaintiff therein (now petitioner), filed a
motion for the reconsideration of the order of Judge Querubin, alleging that
relationship between Judge and counsel is not a legal basis for inhibition,
citing Section 1 of Rule 126 of the Rules and American cases. JP Javelona
answered the motion for reconsideration stating: (1) That he inhibited himself
from presiding over the trial of Civil Case No. 330 in the Bago JP Court on the
ground that he is a first degree cousin of defendant’s counsel; (2) that he
candidly believes that such relationship might cast some suspicion in his
integrity as a JP if and when his first cousin wins, and bring unpleasant
consequences, if he loses; and (3) that a JP of Sagay, ftegros Occidental, was
dismissed from the service on the same ground of relationship, with the party or
with the adverse attorney.

On February 12, 1960, Judge Jose F. Fernandez, then the Executive Judge, same
CFI, handed down the following Order:

“Although it is true as stated in the motion for reconsideration that the
reason advanced by Judge Javelona is not one of those specified in Sec. 1, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court, nevertheless, it appears that the matter in question
is one of ‘inhibition’, and ‘disqualification’. And it appearing that the reason
advanced by Judge Javelona is a valid cause for inhibition, the motion for
reconsideration is hereby denied.”

Questioning the jurisdiction of respondent Torres to try the case, alleging
that the order designating him to preside over the case is contrary to law,
petitioner del Castillo brought the matter to us and prays:

1) That after due hearing, this Court render judgment declaring that Rule 126
of the Rules provides for the only valid grounds which a judge may avail to
disqualify himself; that apart from said rule, there is no other law providing
for ground of inhibition as distinguished from disqualification and that
relationship to counsel is not a valid and legal ground for disqualification or
inhibition;

2) That accordingly, respondent Manuel H. Javelona cannot, lawfully
disqualify himself from hearing Civil Case No. 330 and the Executive Judge of
the Court of First Instance can, neither lawfully disqualify respondent Javelona
from presiding over said case and designate respondent;

3) That the orders issued by respondent Executive Judge designating, and the
one sustaining the designation of respondent Torres to preside over said Civil
Case No. 330 be declared null and void;

4) That this Court declare, all the actuations of respondent Torres in said
civil case are null and void; and

5) That respondent Javelona be compelled to hear said Civil Case No.
330.

The petition does not allege lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
respondent Executive Judge to grant the petition to inhibit. No excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion is attributed to said respondent
Executive Judge. Even on this score alone, certiorari does not lie because the
respondent Judge in granting JP Javelona’s petition to inhibit might have only
made an erroneous conclusion of law or of facts, which can not be corrected by
certiorari (Gov’t. vs. Judge of First Instance of Iloilo, 34 Phil., 157). The
apprehension of petitioner that the designated JP may not be legally clothed
with jurisdiction, and Civil Case No. 330 would again be retried before
respondent Javelona, thereby entailing waste of time, effort and money, is also
without valid basis so as to entitle him to the relief prayed for.

Leaving aside, however, the procedural aspect of the controversy, let us take
up the question of the legality of the inhibition by JP Javelona and the order
authorizing the same issued by respondent Judge. Admittedly, the law governing
disqualification or inhibition of judges is Rule 126, which provides:

“Sec. 1.—Disqualification of judges.—No judge or judicial officer
shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to
either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, computed
according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record.”

The question posed, therefore, is whether or not, in the absence of any
challenge directed against him by either party to a case, a judge, may
voluntarily request that he be allowed to inhibit himself from hearing and
deciding a case, where the lawyer for one of the parties is his “first degree
cousin” or on grounds of similar nature. Obviously, Rule 126 enumerates the
grounds for disqualification of a judge upon being challenged and under which he
should disqualify himself. The rule, however, has never been interpreted to
prohibit a judge from voluntarily inhibiting himself, in the absence of any
challenge by either party, due to his close blood relationship with counsel for
one of said parties. Considering the spirit of the Rule, it would seem that
cases of voluntary inhibition, based on good, sound and/or ethical grounds, is a
matter of discretion on the part of the judge and the official who is empowered
to act upon the request for such inhibition.

In the case of Gutierrez vs. Hon. A. Santos, et al. 112 Phil., 184, the judge
had inhibited himself on the ground that the opinion expressed by him in a
letter addressed by him as counsel for Manuel Borja and others, to the then
Secretary of the Interior “might, some way or another, influence his decision in
the case at bar” and expressed his fear of not being able to render a truly
impartial judgment. This Court, interpreting the Rule said:

“Petitioner invoking the provisions of Section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court, argues that the case of respondent Judge does not fall under any one of
the grounds for the disqualification of judicial officers stated therein.
Assuming arguendo that a literal interpretation of the legal provision relied
upon justifies petitioner’s contention to a certain degree, it should, not be
forgotten that, in construing and applying said legal provision, we cannot
disregard its true intention nor the real ground for the disqualification of a
judge or judicial officer, which is the impossibility of rendering an impartial
judgment upon the matter before him. It has been said, in fact, that due process
of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and
that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge (30 Am. Jur. p. 767). Moreover, second only to the duty of
rendering a just decision, is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not
arouse any suspicion as to its fairness and the integrity of the Judge.
Consequently, we take it to be the true intention of the law-stated in general
terms—that no judge shall preside in a case in which he is not wholly free,
disinterested, impartial and independent (30 Am. Jur. Supra) because—

“* * * However upright the judge, and however free from the slightest
inclination but to do justice, there is peril of his unconscious bias
or prejudice, or lest any former opinion formed ex-parte may still
linger to affect unconsciously his present judgment, or lest he may be moved or
swayed unconsciously by his knowledge of the facts which may not be revealed or
stated at the trial, or can not under the rules of evidence. No effort of the
will can shut out memory; there is no art of forgetting. We cannot be certain
that the human mind will deliberate and determine unaffected by that which it
knows, but which it should forget in that process * * * (Ann. Cas. 1917A, p.
1235).

Little need be commented on the salutary ruling, just quoted, except to add
that if in the instant case, counsel for respondent company, will win the case,
the petitioner could not be prevented from applying the saying that “Blood is
thicker than water”, and from thinking and suspecting that respondent Javelona
was biased and prejudiced. The courts should administer justice free from
suspicion of bias and prejudice; otherwise, parties litigants might lose
confidence in the judiciary and destroy its nobleness and decorum.

In the cases cited by the petitioner, the qualification of the trial judge
was challenged by one of the parties thereto and not one has ruled upon the
question of voluntary inhibition, like the case at bar. We do not wish to dwell
on semantics, by establishing a distinction between inhibition and
disqualification. They may mean the same thing and bring the same result, in the
final analysis. For while the judge who is disqualified under said Rule 126 may
and should inhibit himself; he who remains qualified may be inhibited or may
inhibit himself on some other grounds. In other words, while Rule 126 provides
for disqualification, it does not include nor preclude cases and circumstances
for voluntary inhibition which depends upon the discretion of the officers
concerned.

We should also be mindful of the supervisory duties of the Court of First
Instances over the justice of the peace courts, which includes the power to
reprimand the justice of the peace or recommend his removal and disqualification
from holding office or suspend him from office pending action by the President
(Sec. 97 Judiciary Act of 1948). And the Court of First Instance, in proper
cases “shall advise and instruct them whenever requested, or when occasion
arises, and such justices shall apply to him and not to the Secretary of Justice
for advise and instructions * * * “(section 96, ditto), which simply go to show
that the respondent JP Javelona and Torres and the respondent Executive Judge,
have all acted within the discretional powers and duties vested upon them by
law, in the exercise of which, they have not abused, gravely or otherwise.

The respondents have taken a bold step towards the strengthening of the
judicial and ethical precepts discussed in this opinion, and this court can not
but spouse their cause and declare that mandamus does not likewise lie, because
the petitioner has not established a clear right to compel respondents to act in
accordance with his petition.

Having reached this conclusion, we find it superfluous to rule on the
admissibility or not of the petitioner’s deposition.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merits, with costs
against herein petitioner, Sergio F. del Castillo.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.
B. L., Barrera, Dizon, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.