CITIZENS LABOR UNION-CCLU, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, MALAYANG MANGGAGAWA SA ESSO, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC., RESPONDENTS.

G.R.L-24320. entitled “Citizens
Labor Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, Malayang Manggagawa Sa Esso, Department of Labor and Esso
Standard Eastern Inc.,”is a petition for certiorari
and mandamus with preliminary injunction. The petitioner therein prayed, among
other things, that a writ of preliminary injunction issue to compel the Court of
Industrial Relations (to be hereinafter referred to as the CIR) to act on the
motion filed by the said petitioner Citizens Labor Union (to be hereinafter
referred to as the CLU) to suspend certification election, and to enjoin the
Department of Labor from holding the secret ballot election scheduled for March
22, 1965; or, in the alternative, should the CIR fail to act on the motion in
question and such inaction be interpreted as a denial thereof, that the petition
be given due course under Rule 43, Revised Rules of Court, judgment be rendered
reversing the order of March 6, 1965, infra, and that the petition for
certification election filed by the Malayans Manggagawa Sa Esso (to be
hereinafter referred to as the MME) be dismissed. The dispositive portion of the order of March 6,
1965
reads:

“WHEREFORE, pursuant to the
provisions of Section 12, Republic Act No. 875, and the Rules on Certification
Election of this Court, the Department of Labor is hereby requested to conduct
the necessary certification election among the regular rank and file employees
and/or laborers of the Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. at
Pandacan Terminal, Manila, whose names appear in
Exhibit X-Court, in order to determine whether they desire to be represented for
collective bargaining purposes with the employer firm by either the Citizens
Labor Union (CLU) or the Malayang Manggagawa Sa Esso (PFPW) or
neither; and upon conclusion of the said election, to submit a report of the
result thereof, for further disposition.”

G.R. No. L-24431. entitled “Citizens Labor Union vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, Malayang Manggagawa Sa Esso, Esso Standard Eastern Inc.,” is a petition for certiorari to
review the order of March 6,
1965 ,
quoted above, and the resolution of the CIR en banc of April 2,
1965 ,
the dispositive portion which reads:

“After a close perusal of the
records as well as the arguments of the parties, the Court en banc fails to find
sufficient justification for altering or modifying the aforesaid Order.

“BOTH MOTIONS DENIED.”

The chronology of the events
leading to these two cases follows.

The MME on January 7, 1965 filed
a petition for certification election with the CIR (case 1459-MC), alleging that
it is a labor union organized among the employees of Esso Standard Eastern Inc. (ESSO) Pandacan Terminal, Manila; that it represents the majority
of the non-supervisory employees of the said terminal unit; that there exists a
collective bargaining agreement between the CLU and the ESSO, of a duration of 3
years and 3 months, from April 8, 1963 to July 8, 1966; and that its aim in
asking for a certification election is merely to determine which union will
administer the contract during the remainder of the term thereof. The CLU and
the ESSO filed motions to dismiss the petition based on several grounds, most
important of which is that the existing collective bargaining contract is a bar
to the holding of a certification election.

After due hearing, the CIR, thru
the Honorable Judge Tabigne, issued an order dated
March 6, 1965, denying the motions to dismiss the petition for certification
election, holding that the existing collective bargaining contract is no bar to
a certification election, and requesting the Department of Labor to conduct the
necessary election. The CLU and the ESSO filed with the CIR en banc separate
motions for reconsideration, to which the MMB filed its opposition. Meanwhile,
the Department of Labor scheduled the secret ballot election for March 22, 1965
, from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. , with notice to the parties concerned. The CLU
and the ESSO on March 18, 1965 filed with the CIR en banc separate motions to
suspend the certification election as set, upon the basis of their respective
motions for reconsideration then pending, ESSO on its part alleging that the
certification election if held would render academic its said motion for
reconsideration.

On March 19, 1965 the CLU filed
with this Court a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary
injunction (L-24320) This was given due course and the parties respondents
therein as required filed their respective answers, but no writ of preliminary
injunction was issued to direct the CIR to suspend the certification election or
to enjoin the Department of Labor from proceeding with its scheduled secret
ballot election. The latter proceeded with the election and the result thereof
shows that the MME obtained votes of more than one-half of the rank and file
employees and laborers of the ESSO Pandacan Terminal
unit eligible to vote.

The CLU on March 23, 1965 filed
with the CIR a motion to annul the certification election on several grounds,
among which are that the election was held illegally and irregularly as it was
conducted on a holiday, and that it was had without participation of the CLU
therein. The ESSO on the following March 29 also filed with the CIR a similar
motion to annul the certification election. The MME thereafter filed its
opposition thereto.

The CIR en banc, by resolution of
April 2, 1965 , denied the motions for reconsideration of the order of March 6,
1965 . From this resolution, the CLU filed a notice of appeal.

The CIR on April 26, 1965 issued
an order denying the motions for reconsideration seeking annulment of the
certification election held on March 22, 1965 . In the same order, on the basis
of the result of the secret ballot election, the CIR certified the MME as the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the non-supervisory employees of the
ESSO at its Pandacan Terminal unit. The CLU and the
ESSO filed separate motions to have this last order reconsidered. These motions
are pending resolution.

The CLU on May 9, 1965 filed with
this Court an urgent petition praying for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain the CIR from proceeding with the enforcement of its order
of April 26, 1965, on the ground that the issues to be heard in L-24320 which
was set for hearing on June 16, 1965 would become moot and academic if the said
order were enforced. The CLU on the following May 12 moved to have hearing
advanced to May 19, 1965 . This Court on May 14, 1965 issued the injunction
prayed for, restraining the CIR from enforcing its order of April 26, 1965 , and
also from proceeding or taking any other action in connection with the
certification election case. This Court also advanced the hearing to May 26,
1965 .

The CLU on June 10, 1965 filed
with this Court a petition for review of the order of March 6, 1965 and of the
CIR resolution en banc of April 2, 1965 (L-24431. The MME moved to have the
petition dismissed on the ground that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain
it as the CLU failed to file with the CIR its notice of appeal from the order of
March 6, 1965 and the CIR resolution en banc of April 2, 1965 within the
prescribed reglementary period. We gave due course to
the petition for review and resolved further to consider it together with G.R.
No. L-24320 (Res. of July 14, 1965).

Pending this Court’s adjudication
of the two cases, or more precisely on October 13, 1966, the MME filed with this
Court a “Motion for Preliminary Injunction”, alleging that the ESSO and the CLU
had extended the term of the existing collective bargaining contract to December
31, 1966; that pursuant to its salient provisions, the CLU and the ESSO at any
time between October 31 and December 31, 1966 will commence negotiations for a
new collective bargaining agreement and sign the same, unless a preliminary
injunction is issued by this Court; that a new agreement will render moot and
academic the order of the CIR certifying the MME as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all the employees of the ESSO at its Pandacan Terminal unit, and may again be alleged as a bar to
the holding of a new certification election. The motion was opposed by the CLU
and the ESSO, both alleging in concert that since March 22, 1965 when the secret
ballot election was held, there has occurred a substantial change in the
composition of the rank and file of the employees and laborers at the ESSO Pandacan Terminal unit, a good number of them having left
their employment, retired, or been compulsorily laid off with the approval of
the CIR, resulting in a change of employee composition in the unit; that the
ESSO will negotiate and conclude a new collective bargaining contract with the
union that commands the majority of the present labor force, either the CLU or
the MME, as the case may be; and that if this Court issues the restraining
order, it will suspend the process of a new collective bargaining agreement to
the prejudice of the workers who would be denied the economic benefits thereof.

On November 3, 1966 , we issued
in G.R. No. L-24320 an injunction commanding the CLU and the ESSO to refrain
from negotiating and concluding a new collective bargaining agreement until
after this Court shall have decided the case on the merits.

We will first dispose of the
jurisdictional objection interposed by the MME in its brief: that this Court did
not acquire Jurisdiction over the petition for review (L-24431) on the ground
that the CLU failed to file its notice of appeal from the order of March 6, 1965
and the CIR resolution en banc of April 2, 1965 within the prescribed reglementary period. We cannot sustain this view. By giving
due course to the petition for review (see Res. of July 14, 1965 ), we
necessarily denied the motion to dismiss the petition for review, and
simultaneously regarded the petition for mandamus and certiorari with
preliminary injunction (L-24320) as a petition for review. The CLU in that
petition in fact prayed this Court that, should the “inaction of the Respondent
Court en banc be interpreted as a denial of the said motion to Suspend Election
and the Motion for Reconsideration,” the petition be treated as one for review
under Rule 43 of the Revised. Rules of Court, that judgment be rendered therein
reversing the order of March 6, 1965 , and that the petition of the MME for
certification election be dismissed. Our resolution is in line with the ruling
in Cruz vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., G.R. No. L-18277, August 31,
1963 . We there held that

“Although as heretofore stated,
this is an action for mandamus, prohibition and certiorari, primarily to compel
the respondent court to act on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of
November 29, 1960, nevertheless, in view of the inaction of the court,
notwithstanding the repeated petitions to pass upon the motions in question
which could be interpreted as an insistence on or adherence to the judges’
respective previous rulings, and therefore, a denial of the motion for
reconsideration, and considering that we have here already before us all the
records of the case, it is believed that the interest of justice would be better
subserved if the present petition should be treated as
one for review.”

We will now define the
diametrically opposite positions taken by the two competing unions.

In seeking the reversal and
setting aside of the order of the CIR of March 6, 1965 and the dismissal of the
petition for certification election filed by the MME, the concerted grounds
relied upon by the CLU and the ESSO are that the MME was not qualified to ask
for certification election, not having observed the legal requisites therefor; that the petition for certification election was
made to circumvent the results of the elections held in the ESSO Pandacan Terminal unit on December 4, 1964 wherein the MME’s officers were defeated; that the certification
election is being used as a justification for unethical, illegal and immoral
union-raiding and union-grabbing which disturb industrial peace; that a
certification election cannot be held pending the adjudication of the unfair
labor practice actions filed against the CLU and the MME in connection with the
strikes staged by the said unions (Case 3943 and Charge 442 before the CIR); and
that the certification election is barred by the “Contract-Bar Policy”.

The MME, upon the other hand,
urges the dismissal of these two cases before us and the affirmance of the orders in question, contending that the
CIR committed no abuse of discretion in ordering a certification election, its
judgment in certification proceedings being entitled to almost complete finality
in the absence of patent abuse; that the CLU can no longer be considered as the
representative of the rank and file of the employees and laborers of ESSO at its
Pandacan Terminal unit, because it has lost its
majority status inasmuch as the overwhelming majority of its members have given
up their membership therein; that the MME was conclusively established to have
obtained the majority status as a result of the secret ballot election held on
March 22, 1965; that the “Contract-Bar Policy” relied upon by the CLU and the
ESSO for the non-holding of a certification election can not be applied, because
here the existing collective bargaining agreement is not one of reasonable
duration as it has been in existence for more than 10 years, that is from 1953
to 1964, and moreover that the MME in its petition for certification election
expressly bound itself not to change, modify, or contest the contract during its
unexpired term; and that the right of the workers to elect their bargaining
agent to represent them is paramount and should not be curtailed or restricted
in any manner unless absolutely necessary.

We thus confront the problem of
determining which of the competing unions should be recognized as the
“appropriate bargaining unit” of the rank and file of the employees and laborers
of ESSO at its Pandacan Terminal unit, pursuant to
Section 12-(a) of the Industrial Peace Act.

We must observe at this juncture,
however, that the passage of time has removed all meaning and validity from the
positions taken by the two competing unions. Except for the motion for
preliminary injunction filed by the MME recently, that is, on October 13, 1966 ,
all the pleadings extant in the record are dated and were filed prior to July 8,
1966 , the date when the life of the collective bargaining agreement in question
expired. All that the MME seeks is that it be declared the sole and collective
bargaining agent to “administer the contract during its remaining term (see
order of March 6, 1965), Upon the other hand, the opposition of the CLU and the
ESSO is grounded mainly on the existence of the collective bargaining agreement
which, they claim, is of a reasonable duration, and therefore precludes the
holding of a certification election by virtue of the “Contract-Bar Policy”, The
collective bargaining agreement lapsed on July 8, 1966; the positions of the two
labor unions have therefore become academic.

All these notwithstanding, we
still confront the very real and fundamental problem of which union should be
recognized as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the ESSO employees
at the Pandacan Terminal unit. The extension of the
life of the collective bargaining agreement to December 31, 1966, while
significant, is really of little moment, because after that date, the problem
will still be there, as big as life, unless it is resolved before then.

This Court in numerous cases has
reaffirmed its attitude that it is a sound and unassailable labor practice for
labor and management to conclude a new contract before the expiry date of any
collective bargaining agreement in order to avoid a hiatus in management-labor
relations. The Industrial Peace Act was designed primarily to promote industrial
peace through encouragement of collective bargaining. Any undue delay in the
selection of a bargaining representative can hardly be said to contribute to
that end.

The CLU claims that it is the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent on the strength of its prior collective
bargaining history (Democratic Labor Assn. vs. Cebu
Stevedoring, G.R. No. L-10321, Feb. 28, 1958); the MME claims that it is the one
that should be recognized on the basis of the will of the employees (Democratic
Labor Assn. vs. Cebu Stevedoring, supra) manifested in
the secret ballot election held on March 22, 1965 in favor of the MME as their
sole and exclusive bargaining agent, which collective will should not be brushed
aside lightly. Like the CLU, the MME claims that its majority status should be
presumed to continue up to the present time and for as long as the question has
not been finally resolved (NLRB vs. International Furniture Co., 212 F.2d 431;
The Celanese Corporation of America, 95 NLRB 664).

Against the presumption of
continued majority status, however, is the rule that such majority status does
not continue forever “especially in face of an assertion and offer of proof to
the contrary” (Steward Die Casting Corp. vs. National Labor Relations Board
[1940; CCA 8th] 114 F. 2d, 849 (writ of certiorari denied in (941), 312 US 680,
85 L ed 1119, 61 S Ct 449), or “in view of altered circumstances which have
likely occurred in the interim” (Reliance Mfg. Co. vs. National Labor Relations
Board [1941; CCA 8th] 125 F. 2d, 311), or “by a change in the conditions which
demonstrates that a shift in sentiment actually exists among the employees, and
is caused by other factors than the employer’s refusal to bargain collectively”
(National Labor Relations Board vs. P. Lorillard Co. [1941; CCA 6th], 117 F. 2d
921). It would seem then that the burden of coming forward with proof of
majority status is upon the union asserting it.

Against the claim of the MME that
it represents the will of the majority of the rank and file employees at the
Pandacan Terminal unit, is the manifestation, advanced
with vehemence, of both the CLU and the ESSO that after the secret ballot
election held on March 22, 1965, the employee composition has substantially
changed because a great number of the employees and laborers in the Pandacan Terminal unit have left their employment, retired,
or been compulsorily laid off with the approval of the CIR. On its part, ESSO
further claims that the salient facts obtaining in the two cases before us have
been so altered by the lapse of time and by developments shaped and brought
about by the parties themselves, that “nothing will be gained if an altered
factual situation is compelled to await a decision applicable to an entirely
different set of facts.” (see ESSO opposition to the motion for issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, filed on October 20, 1966 ).

The above conflicting assertions
are not based on any evidence of record, but they are nevertheless assertions
formally and solemnly made and therefore cannot be ignored.

But precisely because the record
is barren of evidence upon which this Court may properly reach a definitive
determination as to which of the two unions should be upheld, at this time, as
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent, this Court will not even begin to
attempt to resolve the problem in favor of one or the other labor union.

By express mandate of law, the
CIR is empowered to investigate controversies concerning the matter of
representation of labor in its dealings with management, and, depending upon the
results of its investigation, thereafter to certify to the parties the name of
the labor organization that, in proper proceedings, has been selected to act as
the appropriate bargaining unit (sec. 12-(b), Industrial Peace Act).

UPON THE FOREGOING
PREMISES,
this Court is constrained to remand, as it hereby remands, this case to the
Court of Industrial Relations, with instructions that it exert and exercise,
without delay, the powers conferred upon it by law, and take such actions and
issue such orders as the environmental circumstances will accordingly warrant.

No pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J. B. L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J. P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

Barrera, J., on leave.