ILDEFONSO GERALDO, SR., PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND WACK-WACK GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner seeks a review of the December 26, 1975 decision of the respondent Commission
affirming the October 29, 1975
decision of the Acting Referee in RPO-WC Case No. C-954,
which denied petitioner’s compensation claim.

The records reveal the following:

1.  On January 7, 1972, at about 3:00 o’clock in the morning, petitioner, while
at home, suffered from an ailment for which he was immediately brought to Lourdes
Hospital wherein he was confined
from January 7 to 19, 1972
(pp. 22-24, WCC rec.).  His illness was
diagnosed as “hypertension, with secondary hemigalegia,
left arm” with a “fair” prognosis (p. 4, WCC rec.).

2.  On January 11, 1972, respondent employer
filed its Report of Accident or Sickness and stated that it is controverting petitioner’s right to compensation on the
ground that his illness was not directly caused by his work,
nor aggravated by or the result of the nature of his work (p. 3, WCC
rec.).  On January 13, 1972, respondent employer further submitted a
physician’s report signed by its doctor stating that he first treated
petitioner on January 8, 1972
and opined that his ailment was not work-connected (p. 4, WCC rec.).

3.  Petitioner never
completely recovered from his ailment and when he was discharged on January 20, 1972 from the hospital,
the left half of his body was still paralyzed. 
Consequently, he was not able to resume his work with respondent
employer which retired him in January, 1972 (p. 29, WCC rec.) at the age
of 61, after he had already served respondent employer for forty-one (41)
years, more or less, and was holding the twin jobs of timekeeper and gas
station in-charge.  These jobs required
him to issue gasoline and oil to its members and customers and to record the
same, to receive gas and oil deliveries, to prepare and check house personnel’s
time card, and to prepare payroll (pp. 28, 29, WCC rec.).

4.  By reason of his
retirement due to his illness, respondent employer paid him P8,817.95 which, according to the testimony of petitioner’s
son, was the amount left of his father’s gratuity benefit from respondent
employer of 15-day pay for every year of service, after the latter deducted therefrom his father’s medical expenses.  (On the basis of petitioner’s last salary of
P470.00, his gratuity fee is P9,635.00 [P470.00/2 x
41]).  However, respondent employer
maintained that this amount was given to petitioner not as a gratuity benefit
but “for humanitarian considerations due to the illness he suffered in
January, 1972 x x x”
which was paid to him “x x x
as full and complete payment of whatever workmen’s compensation or disability
benefits he may be entitled to under the applicable law, x x
x” (p. 138, WCC rec.).  The respondent employer, however, did not
present the vouchers covering the aforesaid payment, as according to it, the same
were lost while in the possession of its former counsel (p. 58, rec.; p. 138,
WCC rec.).

5.  On June 30, 1972, petitioner filed his notice
and claim for compensation on the basis of his afore-stated ailment.  While he alleged in his claim that the place
of accident was “company premises” and that “for 3 to 4 years
before actual disability, (he) had been under treatment by employer’s doctor,
until, while at work on the 6th of January, 1972, he felt dizzy and was brought
to the hospital, Lourdes Hospital” (p. 2, WCC rec.), his very own
testimony shows that the place of accident was his home and the accident took
place on January 7, 1972, at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning and that he had
never been treated by the respondent’s doctor prior to his January 7, 1972
ailment (pp. 23-25, WCC rec.).

6.  After several hearings,
whereby only petitioner presented witnesses, while respondent employer
submitted only the affidavit of its General Manager and its physician’s report,
the Acting Referee on October 29, 1975, rendered a decision dismissing the
claim on the ground of satisfaction thereof, thus:

“We shall not dwell anymore in detail on the facts obtaining
in the case as there has been an admission made by the respondent that benefits
had been extended to the claimant by virtue of his illness.  Needless to point, the compensability of the
case is now a settled matter.  It shall
now be our task to resolve whether the amount advanced by the respondent to the
herein claimant could properly be considered as payment made under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended. 
As we are informed, an amount of P8,870.95
(should be P8,817.95) was given by the respondent to the claimant in a bank
check dated April 7, 1972.  It was given to the claimant for humanitarian
consideration for the illness he suffered in January, 1972.  Such being the case, we consider the same
amount which is not a benefit extended as liability of the respondent under any
agreement, contract or existing law and therefore should be considered as
advanced payment for workmen’s compensation benefits.  Since the amount extended to the claimant was
more than the maximum compensation (P6,000.00) he is
entitled for his kind of disability, then, we consider his claim now before us
to be fully satisfied.”

Petitioner duly moved to reconsider the aforesaid decision
contending inter alia that the Acting
Referee erred in concluding that the amount of P8,817.95
was given by respondent employer to petitioner as advance payment for workmen’s
compensation benefits, because the same was given as “gratuity
benefits” in accordance with respondent employer’s long-standing practice
and policy.

In a decision dated December
26, 1975, the respondent Commission sustained the contention of
petitioner, thus:

“x x x The
findings by the Acting Referee below that the amount of P8,817.95 paid by the
respondent to claimant in a bank check dated April 7, 1972 is considered as an
advance payment for workmen’s compensation benefits is an error.  The said amount was paid by respondent as a gratuity
or retirement benefit in consideration for the 41 years of service of herein
claimant.  For, if said payment was
really intended for the payment of its liability under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act, as amended, respondent should have moved for the dismissal of the claim on
the ground of satisfaction, considering that the payment was made prior to the
filing of the instant case for disability compensation.  Respondent in its Employer’s Report did not
raise this as a ground for controverting the claim
(see item 8, Employer’s Report of Sickness). 
Moreover, if respondent gave the amount for humanitarian considerations
due to claimant’s illness which we are not inclined to believe, it would have
paid not more than the maximum compensation of P6,000.00.”

But respondent Commission went on to affirm the order of
dismissal and denied petitioner’s compensation claim for the reason that:

“x x x
claimant failed to establish a causal link of the illness to the
employment.  As testified to by the
claimant himself he suffered the attack right in his house at 3:00 o’clock in the morning.  There is no showing that he had complained of
any ailment while in the performance of his work.  Furthermore, it is now settled rule in this
jurisdiction that hypertension is not a disease but merely a symptom of an
illness which can be corrected by proper and correct food habits.  While it is true that a claimant in a
workmen’s compensation case may not prove his case to the point of demonstration,
it is however necessary to show a causal relation of the illness to the nature
of the employment.  In the absence
thereof, there is no basis upon which the legal presumption of causation or
aggravation may be validly invoked.  In
the present case, claimant utterly failed to satisfy this requirement, and
accordingly this Commission is constrained to deny this claim.”

Hence, this recourse.

The only issue posed in this case is whether or not respondent
Commission gravely abused its discretion in absolving respondent employer of
liability upon a ground already settled, liability therefor
admitted, and which was not invoked by respondent employer as a defense before
the respondent Commission.

WE rule in the affirmative.

1.  Indeed, the
compensability of the ailment of petitioner has been laid to rest by the
failure of respondent employer to invoke the contrary before the respondent
Commission, to which herein petitioner appealed the order of the Acting Referee
dismissing his claim on the ground that while the compensability of the claim
has been admitted and settled, the same, however, was already satisfied by the
respondent employer when it paid petitioner the amount of P8,817.95.  While respondent was not required to appeal
from the aforesaid decision which was favorable to it, it should have opposed
the appeal of petitioner and therein raised, so as to preserve, the issue of
compensability of petitioner’s ailment. 
Such failure on its part put an end to the aforesaid issue of
compensability and the respondent Commission was therefore limited to the issue
of non-satisfaction of the claim raised by petitioner in his appeal.  Consequently, respondent, after sustaining
petitioner’s stand that the amount of P8,817.95 was
paid by respondent employer to petitioner not as workmen’s compensation benefits
but as gratuity benefits, was already without jurisdiction to still deny
petitioner’s appeal on the aforesaid ground of non-compensability.  For as WE have emphatically declared:  “x x x It is not good policy in regard to social legislation x
xx x for the Workmen’s Compensation Commission to go out of its way in
absolving an employer from liability for compensation for work-connected injury
or death of his employee or worker by upholding grounds not invoked by the
employer before it” (Buenaventura vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission,
76 SCRA 485, 490 [1977]; Vda. de Calado
vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 38 SCRA 569, 585-586 [1971]).

2.  Moreover, respondent
employer’s defense that the ailment of petitioner was not work-connected,
therefore not compensable, was not sufficiently shown.  The only evidence submitted in support
thereof were the affidavit of its General Manager to the effect that “as
timekeeper, claimant’s nature of employment was purely clerical as he was not
required to do manual labor or other strenuous job, nor was he exposed to the
elements of nature” and Physician’s Report of its doctor who gave the
opinion that petitioners ailment was not work-connected.  Certainly, these
evidence do not meet the quantum of evidence necessary to establish the fact of
lack of work-connection of ailment and employment; nor are they sufficient to
overcome the presumption of compensability obtaining in favor of petitioner’s
ailment as it is clear that his ailment supervened in the course of his employment.  In Mulingtapang vs.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission (80 SCRA, 611, 614-615 [1977]), WE emphasized
that x x x the evidence
necessary to destroy the aforesaid legal presumption of compensability must do
more than create a doubt.  It must be
such as a reasonable mind must accept as adequate to support a conclusion.  Hence, WE have repeatedly ruled that the mere
opinions of doctors on the non-causal connection between illness and/or death
and the nature of claimant’s work, presented as evidence by the employer, do
not meet the required quantum of evidence as aforestated;
and therefore such opinions cannot prevail over the presumption of
compensability established by law (Simon vs. Republic, 71 SCRA 643 [1977];
Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 288 [1974]; Abena vs. Quisumbing, 22 SCRA
1282-1283 [1968]; and Magalona vs. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, 21 SCRA 1203 [1967]).”

3.  Finally, the multifarious
activities of petitioner called for by his twin jobs as gas station in-charge and
timekeeper caused and/or aggravated his ailment of hypertension.  As station in-charge, petitioner had to issue
gasoline and oil to members and customers of respondent employer and thereafter
to record them.  And as timekeeper, he
had to prepare and check house personnel’s time cards.  In addition, petitioner likewise prepared
payrolls (pp. 28-29, WCC rec.).  It
requires no medical testimony to conclude that by reason of the aforesaid
number and nature of petitioner’s work, tension or stress permeated and
characterized petitioner’s everyday life with respondent employer.  Stress or tension is admittedly one of the
causes of hypertension (Landicho vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, G.R. No. L-45996, March
26, 1979).  Hence, as aforestated, petitioner’s ailment of hypertension was
work-connected and/or aggravated.

Consequently, even on the merits of the issue of compensability,
respondent employer’s position cannot be sustained.

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION IS
HEREBY REVERSED AND RESPONDENT EMPLOYER IS HEREBY ORDERED

1.  TO PAY PETITIONER THE AMOUNT OF SIX THOUSAND
(P6,000.00) PESOS AS DISABILITY BENEFITS;

2.  TO REIMBURSE PETITIONER HIS MEDICAL EXPENSES
DULY SUPPORTED BY RECEIPTS;

3.  TO PAY ATTORNEY’S FEES EQUIVALENT TO TEN PERCENT
(10%) OF THE AWARD; AND

4.  TO PAY THE SUCCESSOR OF THE DEFUNCT COMMISSION
ADMINISTRATIVE FEES.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Fernandez,
Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.