RAFAELA G. VDA. DE CASTRO, PETITIONER, VS. MAJOR GENERAL FABIAN VER, AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SECURITY AGENCY (NISA); JUAN PONCE ENRILE, AS SECRETARY O…

Castro versus Ver

The Case

This is a petition for the writ of habeas corpus filed by Rafaela G. Vda. de Castro on behalf of her son, Rolando G. Castro, against Major General Fabian Ver as Commanding Officer of the National Intelligence Security Agency, Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile, and other respondents. The mother alleged that her son was arrested at their residence without any warrant of arrest, search and seizure, and was detained at the Camp Crame stockade, kept incommunicado, in a detention she called illegal and without legal authority. The case matters because it is a martial law decision: it shows that the writ of habeas corpus remained available during martial rule, but also marks the limit of that availability for persons detained for acts related to the basic objective of the martial law proclamation.

Procedural History

The petition was filed directly with the Supreme Court on January 15, 1976. The next day, January 16, 1976, the Court issued the writ, commanding the respondents or their authorized representatives to appear and produce the body of Rolando G. Castro before the Court and to show the cause of his imprisonment or restraint, both acts to be done on January 21, 1976, when the parties would be heard. Upon urgent motion of the Solicitor General on behalf of the respondents, the filing of the return and the hearing were postponed to January 23, 1976. On that date the respondents produced the person of the detainee and filed their return. The Court then resolved the petition on the basis of that return and the detainee's own affidavit.

Facts

On January 13, 1976, Rolando G. Castro, forty two years of age, single, and a government employee, was arrested at the family residence by Lieutenant Batac, without any warrant of arrest, search and seizure order. He was brought to the Camp Crame stockade. Two days later, his mother filed this petition, asserting that the detention was illegal and without justification or legal authority, and that her son was being kept incommunicado.

In their return, the respondents stated that the detainee was arrested by elements of the Fifth Constabulary Security Unit and was being detained at Camp Crame by virtue of Arrest, Search and Seizure Order Number 3140, dated January 10, 1976, issued by the Secretary of National Defense, for knowingly, wilfully, and by overt act joining the Communist Party of the Philippines in violation of the Anti-Subversion Act. They added that a thirty two caliber Mauser pistol and seventy seven rounds of ammunition were seized from him after he failed to produce a license to possess the same. They also asserted that within seventy two hours of the arrest, Captain Virgilio G. Saldajeno, Legal Officer of the Fifth Constabulary Security Unit, called the detainee's residence and informed his relatives of his whereabouts and of the fact that they could visit him at Camp Crame.

Attached to the return was an affidavit of Rolando G. Castro himself, stating that he was not being held incommunicado and that he did not agree with the filing of the petition, because he, as a lawyer aware of his rights, would rather clear his name in the investigation being conducted by the Philippine Constabulary. He voluntarily moved for the withdrawal of the petition.

Issues

• Whether or not the writ of habeas corpus is available during martial rule.
• Whether or not a person arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the proclamation of martial rule may use the writ to put an end to his deprivation of freedom.
• Whether or not the petition may be withdrawn at the instance of the detained person himself, whose personal liberty is at stake.

Applicable Provisions

The decision applies the Anti-Subversion Act, which the return invokes as the ground for the arrest:

For knowingly, wilfully and by overt act joining the Communist Party of the Philippines in violation of the Anti-Subversion Act (Rep. Act No. 1700).

This is the charge stated in the return, and it is what places the detention within the category of acts related to the basic objective of the martial law proclamation.

The decision also rests on Arrest, Search and Seizure Order Number 3140, dated January 10, 1976, issued by the Secretary of National Defense, which the return cites as the authority for the detention in place of a judicial warrant.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the writ of habeas corpus is available even during martial rule. The petition itself, the Court said, together with several others acted upon by the Court, sufficiently indicates the availability of the writ during martial rule. The Court recognized that instances of unjustified and unwarranted detention may occur, but it has so far been shown that either the top officials of the defense establishment or the courts of justice can step in to right matters.

On the second issue, the Court held that the remedy is not available to every detainee. It is only with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the proclamation of martial rule who are precluded from utilizing this remedy to put an end to their deprivation of freedom. The Court stated the rule in these words:

It is only with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the proclamation of martial rule who are precluded from utilizing this remedy to put an end to their deprivation of freedom.

On the third issue, the Court held that the withdrawal must be allowed. Considering that the person detained has voluntarily moved for the withdrawal of the petition, and since it is his personal liberty that is at stake, the Court voted to allow such withdrawal.

Doctrine

First, the writ of habeas corpus is not suspended by the mere fact of martial rule; it remains available, and relief may come from the top officials of the defense establishment or from the courts of justice.

Second, the writ cannot be used by a person arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the proclamation of martial rule, such as the violation of the Anti-Subversion Act charged in the return, to put an end to his deprivation of freedom.

Third, where the detained person himself, whose personal liberty is at stake, voluntarily moves for the withdrawal of the petition filed in his behalf, the Court will allow the withdrawal and terminate the case.

Disposition

The petition for habeas corpus was considered withdrawn and the case terminated, the detainee having voluntarily moved for its withdrawal.

Remember This

The line to memorize is that the writ of habeas corpus was available during martial rule, but not for persons detained for acts related to the basic objective of the proclamation, who are precluded from using it to end their deprivation of freedom. Examiners use this case to test the availability of the writ during martial law and the effect of the detainee's own voluntary withdrawal of a petition filed in his behalf.