JOSE C. CRISTOBAL, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. ALEJANDRO MELCHOR AND FEDERICO ARCALA, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

Jose C. Cristobal appeals from a
decision dated May 18, 1972
of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 83962 which
dismissed his complaint for declaratory relief and reinstatement in the
government service.^[1]

The incidents which led to this suit are set forth in the
decision of the court a quo, thus:

“The plaintiff was formerly employed as a private secretary in
the President’s Private Office, Malacañan, Manila,
having been appointed to that position on July 1, 1961 with a salary of P4,188.00 per annum.  He is a third grade civil service
eligible.  On or about the second week of
January, 1962, the then Executive Secretary Amelito
R. Mutuc, by means of a letter dated January 1, 1962, informed the
plaintiff that his services as private secretary in the President’s Private
Office were ‘terminated effective today’. 
A similar letter was addressed by Secretary Mutuc
to some other employees in the Office of the President.  The dismissed employees appealed to the
President by means of letters dated January
3, 1962 and January 26,
1962 for a reconsideration of their separation from the
service.  In a letter dated February 27, 1962, their request for
reconsideration was denied by Secretary Mutuc, acting
‘by authority of the President’.

“On March 24, 1962, five of the employees who were separated
(not including the herein plaintiff) filed a civil action before the Court of
First Instance of Manila against Secretary Mutuc and
the cash-disbursing officer of the Office of the President praying for
reinstatement and the payment of their salaries effective as of January 1,
1962, entitled ‘Raul R. Ingles, et als. vs. Amelito R. Mutuc, et als.’ Civil Case No. 49965. 
From a judgment dismissing their
complaint, the said employees appealed to the Supreme Court which rendered a
decision promulgated on November 29, 1968 reversing the dismissal of their
complaint and declaring their removal from office as illegal and contrary to
law, and ordering their reinstatement and the payment of their salaries from
January 1, 1962 up to the date of their actual reinstatement (G.R. No. L-20390).

“Sometime in May, 1962, when the civil action filed by Raul R.
Ingles, et als. was still pending in the Court of
First Instance of Manila, the dismissed employees who filed said action were
recalled to their positions in the Office of the President, without prejudice
to the continuation of their civil action. 
With respect to the other employees who were not reinstated, efforts
were exerted by Secretary Mutuc to look for
placements outside of Malacañan so that they may be
reemployed.  The herein plaintiff was one
of those who had not been fortunate enough to be reappointed to any position as
befits his qualifications.

“He waited for Secretary Mutuc to
make good his assurance that he would be recalled to the service, until
Secretary Mutuc was replaced by other executive
secretaries who likewise assured the plaintiff of assistance to be reemployed
at ‘the opportune time’.

“After the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-20390
was promulgated on November 29, 1968,
the plaintiff addressed a letter to the Office of the President dated January 19, 1969, requesting
reinstatement to his former position and the payment of salary from January 1, 1962 up to the time of
actual reinstatement, supposedly in accordance with the decision of the Supreme
Court in the aforementioned case.  This
request was denied repeatedly by the Office of the President in successive
letters addressed to the plaintiff dated September 1, 1969, January 19, 1970,
April 23, 1970, May 23, 1970 and May 19, 1971, the last of which declared the matter ‘definitely closed’.”
(pp. 151-153, CFI Record)

Having received the letter of May 19, 1971, from the Office of the President, Jose Cristobal filed on August
10, 1971, with the Court of First Instance of Manila a complaint
naming then Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor and
Federico Arcala, cash disbursing officer, Office of
the President of the Philippines,
as defendants, and praying for the following:

“1.  Declaring plaintiff’s dismissal as illegal
and contrary to law;

“2.  Ordering defendant Executive Secretary
Alejandro Melchor to certify the name of plaintiff in
the payroll of the Office of the President of the Philippines, to be
retroactive as of January 1, 1962, the effective date that the plaintiff was
illegally dismissed from the service;

“3.  Ordering defendant Federico Arcala to pay all the emoluments and/or salary to which the
plaintiff is entitled effective as of January 1, 1962, the date of his illegal
termination from the service; and

“4.  Ordering the defendants to allow plaintiff to
continue with the performance of his duties in the Secretary Office Staff,
Office of the President of the Philippines.

“Plaintiff prays for such other relief or remedy as this
Honorable Court may deem just and equitable under the premises.” (pp. 1-3,
ibid.)

Answering the complaint, the defendants represented by the Office
of the Solicitor General alleged that plaintiff Jose Cristobal
had no cause of action as he is deemed to have abandoned his office for failure
to institute the proper proceedings to assert his right within one year from
the date of separation pursuant to Sec. 16, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, he
having come to court only after the lapse of more than nine years, thereby in
effect acquiescing to his separation, and therefore he is not entitled to any
salary from termination of his employment. 
(pp. 38-40, ibid.)

On October 16, 1971,
an amended complaint was submitted to the trial court to include as additional
defendants Leticia B. Nonato who was allegedly
appointed to the position of Jose Cristobal and Simplicio Nonato, husband of
Leticia B. Nonato, and to invoke the additional
relief for reinstatement to the position occupied by defendant Leticia B. Nonato.  (pp. 55-58,
ibid.)

The Nonatos were served with summons
but did not file an answer to the complaint, hence, on motion of the plaintiff Cristobal, they were declared in default in an order dated January 15, 1972.  (p. 94, ibid.)

A pre-trial was held after which parties submitted “a
partial stipulation of facts” dated February 26, 1976. 
(pp. 102-104, ibid.)

Trial on the merits was held during which plaintiff Cristobal submitted his documentary evidence marked
respectively as Exhibits “A” to “P” inclusive all of which
were admitted by the trial court. 
Counsel for the defendants then manifested that no evidence was being
presented for the government.

On May 18, 1972,
as already adverted to above, the trial court then presided by the Honorable Conrado Vasquez, now Justice of the Court of Appeals,
rendered its decision dismissing the complaint reasoning in the following
manner:

“Section 16 of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court expressly
provides that an action against a public office or employee may not be filed
for the plaintiff’s ouster from office unless the same is commenced within one
year after the cause of the ouster, or the right of the plaintiff to hold such
office or position arose.  This period of
one year is a condition precedent for the existence of the cause of action for
quo warranto (Bumanlag vs.
Fernandez, G.R. No. L-11482, November
29, 1960).  The rationale of
this doctrine is that the Government must be immediately informed or advised if
any person claims to be entitled to an office or position in the civil service,
as against another actually holding it, so that the Government may not be faced
with the predicament of having to pay two salaries, one for the person actually holding the office although illegally, and
another for one not actually rendering service although entitled to do so
(Madrid vs. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-12523, May 31, 1960).  The
fact that the petitioner sought to pursue administrative remedies to secure his
reinstatement does not excuse the failure to file the action within the one
year period.

‘The pendency of administrative remedies
does not operate to suspend the period of one year within which a petition for
quo warranto should be filed.  While it may be desirable that administrative
remedies be first resorted to, no one is compelled or bound to do so, and as
said remedies neither are pre-requisite to nor bar the institution of quo warranto proceedings, they should not be allowed to suspend
the period of one year.  Public interest
requires that the right to a public office should be determined as speedily as
practi­cable’ (3 Moran, 1963 Ed., p. 207, citing Torres vs. Quintos,
G.R. No. L-3304, April 5, 1951).”
(pp. 154-155, ibid.)

We are now confronted with the following assignment of errors in
appellant Cristobal’s brief, to wit:

“I

“THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN DECLARING PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT GUILTY OF ABANDONMENT OF ACTION FOR MORE
THAN ONE YEAR.

“II

“THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT DE­CLARING THAT THIS CASE BEING BASED ON ACT OF THE GOVERNMENT
THAT HAS BEEN DECLARED BY THE SUPREME COURT AS ILLEGAL AND CONTRARY TO LAW
SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW ON PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION.” (p.
26, rollo)

The primary question to be resolved in
this appeal is whether or not appellant Cristobal
lost his right to seek judicial relief for not having filed his complaint
within the one-year period provided for in Section 16, Rule 66 of the Rules of
Court.  In short, is the principle of laches or non-compliance with the “Statute of
Limitations” applicable against appellant?

The Government holds fast to Section
16, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court and so did the court a quo in
upholding the dismissal of appellant’s complaint which according to both is
essentially a quo warranto proceeding.

We agree with defendants-appellees that in this jurisdiction the consistent doctrine
followed by this Court is that in actions of quo warranto
involving right to an office, the action must be instituted within the period
of one year from the time the cause of action arose.^[2]

Verily, this Court has stated in Unabia vs. City Mayor, et al., 99 Phil. 253,
257:

“x x x
This has been the law in the Island since 1901, the
period having been originally fixed in section 216 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Act No. 190).  We find this
provision to be an expression of policy on the part of the State that persons
claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed should
immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so
within a period of one year, they shall be considered as having lost their
right thereto by abandonment.  There are
weighty reasons of public policy and convenience that demand the adoption of a
similar period for persons claiming rights to positions in the civil
service.  There must be stability in the
service so that public business may not be unduly retarded; delays in the statement of the right to
positions in the service must be discouraged. 
xx xx xx

xxx                xxx                   xxx

“Further, the Government must be immediately informed or
advised if any person claims to be entitled to an office or a position in the
civil service as against another actually holding it, so that the Government
may not be faced with the predicament of having to pay two salaries, one, for the person actually holding the office,
although illegally, and another, for one not actually rendering service
although entitled to do so.  We hold that
in view of the policy of the State contained in the law fixing the period of
one year within which actions for quo warranto
may be instituted, any person claiming right to a position in the civil service
should also be required to file his petition for reinstatement with the period
of one year, otherwise he is thereby considered as having abandoned his
office.”

In effect, it is the doctrine of laches
which is invoked to defeat Jose Cristobal’s suit, for
not only did Cristobal fail to file his complaint
within one year from the date of separation but, it is claimed, he allowed
almost nine years to pass before coming to court by reason of which he is
deemed to have acquiesced to his removal.

In Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, this Court stated that in a general sense,
laches is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.^[3]

However, as will be indicated below, there are certain
exceptional circumstances attending which take this case out of the rule
enunciated above and lead Us to grant relief to appellant.  Thus —

1. There was no acquiescence to or inaction on the part of
Jose Cristobal amounting to abandonment of his right
to reinstatement in office.

We lay stress on the findings of the trial court based on the unrebutted evidence of plaintiff Cristobal
that upon receipt of the letter of January 1, 1962, advising him of his
separation from the service, Cristobal, with the
other dismissed employees, sought reconsideration in a letter dated January 3,
1962, calling inter alia the attention of then
Executive Secretary Amelito Mutuc
that he (Cristobal) was a civil service eligible
employee with eight years of service in the government and consequently
entitled to security of tenure under the Constitution.  This was followed by another letter of January 26, 1962.^[4]

Reconsideration having been denied, a complaint was filed on March 24, 1962, with the Court of
First Instance of Manila entitled “Raul R. Ingles, et al. vs. Amelito R. Mutuc, et al.”,
(Civil Case 49965) which prayed for reinstatement and payment of salaries as of
January 1, 1962.  The trial court dismissed this complaint but
upon appeal to the Supreme Court the judgment was reversed in a Decision
promulgated on November 29, 1968, in G.R. L-20390, the Court holding
that the removal of the plaintiff-employees was illegal and contrary to law and
that they were entitled to be reinstated with payment of their salaries from
January 1, 1962 up to the date of their actual reinstatement.^[5]

Cristobal was not one of the plaintiffs
in the civil case, it is true, but his non-participation is not fatal to his
cause of action.  During the pendency of the civil case Cristobal
continued to press his request for reinstatement together with the other
employees who had filed the complaint and was in fact promised reinstatement as
will be shown more in detail later.

More importantly, Cristobal could be
expected – without necessarily spending time and money by going to court – to relie upon the outcome of the case filed by his co-employees
to protect his interests considering the similarity of his situation to that of
the plaintiffs therein and the identical relief being sought.  On this point, We find a statement of Justice
Louis Brandeis of the United States Supreme Court in Southern Pacific vs. Bogert, relevant and persuasive, and We quote:

“The essence of laches is not merely
lapse of time.  It is essential that
there be also acquiescence in the alleged wrong or lack of diligence in seeking
a remedy.  Here plaintiffs, or others representing
them, protested * * * and ever since they have * * * persisted in the diligent
pursuit of a remedy * * *.  Where the
cause of action is of such a nature that a suit to enforce it would be brought
on behalf, not only of the plaintiff, but of all persons similarly situated, it
is not essential that each such person should intervene in the suit brought in order that he be deemed thereafter
free from the laches which bars those who sleep on
their rights.” (250 U.S. 483, 39 S. Ct. 536, 63 L. Ed. 1099,
1106-1107; Underline supplied.  See also Overfield vs. Pennroad
Corporation, et al., 42 Fed. Supp. 586, 613)

2. It was an act of the government through its responsible
officials more particularly then Executive Secretary Amelito
Mutuc and his successors which contributed to the
alleged delay in the filing of Cristobal’s present
complaint for reinstatement.

The evidence of Cristobal establish the
following:  After the Ingles suit
was filed in court, the dismissed employees, Cristobal
included, continued to seek reconsideration of their dismissal.  It was then that Executive Secretary Mutuc assured the employees that without prejudice to the
continuation of the civil action, he would work for their reinstatement.  Accordingly, some of the dismissed employees
were recalled to their respective positions in the Office of the President
among whom were the plaintiffs in the civil case and several others who were
not parties therein.^[6]
Secretary Mutuc even tried to place the others
outside of the Malacañang Office.  An affidavit of Emiliano
Punzal, retired Presidential Records Officer, attests
to the fact that Jose C. Cristobal “was among
those in the list of separated employees ordered for placement to a position
commensurate to his qualification and experience.”^[7]
In the meantime, however, Secretary Mutuc was
replaced by other Executive Secretaries to whom Cristobal
over and over again presented his request for reinstatement and who gave the
same assurance that Cristobal would be recalled and
re-employed at “the opportune time”.^[8]

It was this continued promise of the government officials concerned
which led Cristobal to bide his time and wait for the Office of the President
to comply with its commitment. 
Furthermore, he had behind him the decision of the Supreme Court in Ingles
vs. Mutuc which he believed should be applied in
his favor.  But when Cristobal,
in answer to his various letters, received the letter of May 19, 1971 from the
Office of the President denying his reinstatement and declaring the matter
“definitely closed” because of his failure to file an action in court
within one year from his separation,^[9]
it was only then that he saw the necessity of seeking redress from the courts.

Surely, it would now be the height of inequity and cutting a deep
wound in Our sense of justice, if after Cristobal
relied and reposed his faith and trust on the word and promises of the former
Executive Secretaries who dealt with him and who preceded the herein respondent
Executive Secretary Melchor, We were to hold that he
lost his right to seek relief because of lapse of time.

The doctrine of laches is an equitable
principle applied to promote but never to defeat justice.^[10]
Thus, where laches is invoked against a plaintiff by
reason of the latter’s failure to come to court within the statutory period
provided in the law, the doctrine of laches will not
be taken against him where the defendant is shown to have promised from time to
time to grant the relief sought for.^[11]
Again, We have jurisprudence that where a defendant or those claiming under him
recognized or directly or impliedly acknowledged existence of the right
asserted by a plaintiff, such recognition may be invoked as a valid excuse for
a plaintiff’s delay in seeking to enforce such right.^[12]
In brief, it is indeed the better rule that courts, under the principle of
equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or
the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest
wrong and injustice would result.^[13]

3. The dismissal of appellant Cristobal
was contrary to law on the strength of this Court’s Decision in Ingles vs. Mutuc.

In Ingles the defendants-appellees
maintained before this Court that the principal issue in the case was whether
or not the plaintiffs-employees were occupying positions primarily confidential
in nature and therefore subject to removal at the pleasure of the appointing
power, and that this issue was to be resolved in the affirmative.  The Court speaking through then Justice,
later Chief Justice, Roberto Concepcion, held inter
alia that one holding in the government a
primarily confidential position is “in the Civil Service” and that
“officers or employees in the unclassified” as well as “those in
the classified service” are protected by the provision in the organic law
that “no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law” (Section 4, Article XII,
1935 Constitution); that while the incumbent of a primarily confidential
position holds office at the pleasure only of the appointing power and such
pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not “removed” or
“dismissed” but that his term merely “expires”; that there
was no evidence to indicate that the respective positions of the dismissed plaintiffs
were “primarily confidential” in nature and on the contrary the
compensation attached and the designation given thereto suggest the purely or
at least mainly clerical nature of their work; and consequently, considering
that the plaintiffs were admittedly civil service eligibles
with several years of service in the Government, their removal from office was
“illegal and contrary to law”.^[14]

The Court’s Decision in Ingles vs. Mutuc
constitutes the law of the case now before Us.

Appellant herein, Jose Cristobal, is a
civil service eligible with eight (8) years of service in the government.  He was holding “Item 9” – “Private
Secretary I” – in the Budget for the “President’s Private
Office” with annual compensation of P4,188.00.  No evidence was adduced by the government to
show that Cristobal’s position was “primarily
confidential”.^[15]
On the contrary as stated by this Court in Ingles vs. Mutuc
the compensation attached to this item and the other items except for one and
the designation of the position indicate the purely clerical nature of
the functions of the employees dismissed from the service.  In fact, none of the letters sent to the
herein appellant from the Office of the President ever indicated that he was
holding his position at the pleasure of the appointing power or that his
services were terminated because his term of office had
“expired”.  The only reason
given – and this appears in the letter of September 1, 1969 from the Office of
the President – was that he failed to institute the proper proceeding to assert
his right, if any, to the position within the period of one year from the date
of termination and under settled jurisprudence he is deemed to have abandoned
his right to said office or acquiesced in his removal.^[16]

To summarize, with the circumstances thus surrounding this
particular case, viz:  (a) Jose Cristobal
consistently pressed for a reconsideration of his separation from the service;
(b) he was given assurance that he would be recalled at the opportune time; and
(c) that the sudden termination of his employment without cause after eight
years of service in the government is contrary to law following the
ruling in Ingles vs. Mutuc which inures to the
benefit of Cristobal who is similarly situated as the
plaintiffs in said case and who merely desisted from joining the suit because
of the assurance given him that he would be recalled to the service – with all
these factors, We repeat, there is justification for not applying existing
jurisprudence to his case.

This Court, applying the principle of equity, need not be bound
to a rigid application of the law, but rather its action should conform to the
conditions or exigencies of a given problem or situation in order to grant a
relief that will serve the ends of justice.

To paraphrase then Chief Justice John Edwin Marshall of the
United States Supreme Court, let us do complete justice and not do justice by
halves.^[17]
Just as in Ingles vs. Mutuc this Court gave
justice to plaintiffs, so shall We do justice to Jose Cristobal.

In granting relief to the herein appellant on the matter of back
salaries We note, however, that there is no proof to show that during all these
years from January 1, 1962,
to the present, appellant at no time worked or was employed at some other
office.  In fairness to the Government We
cannot ignore the probability of Cristobal’s having sought
employment elsewhere during that period to support himself and his family.

Applying by analogy the rulings of this Court in the matter of
fixing back wages to employees who were victims of unfair labor practices of
their employers so as to obviate the necessity of a hearing on the point and
avoid further delay, and considering the lapse of almost nine years before
appellant filed this suit, We resolve, to grant back salaries at the rate last
received by him only for a period of five (5) years without qualification
and deduction.^[18]

IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, the decision of the
court a quo is set aside. 
Defendants-appellees or the Public Officials
concerned are directed:

1. To reinstate Jose Cristobal, either
in the Office of the President or in some other government office, to any
position for which he is qualified by reason of his civil service eligibility,
subject to present requirements of age and physical fitness; and

2. To pay appellant Cristobal back
salaries for a period of FIVE YEARS at the rate of Four Thousand, One Hundred
Eighty-eight Pesos (P4,188,00) per
annum without qualification and deduction.

So Ordered.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Martin, Fernandez,
and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Makasiar, J., reserves his vote.

^[1] This appeal originally was with the Court of
Appeals, but in a resolution of February 2, 1976, it was certified to this Tribunal as it
involved purely a question of law.  On March
12, 1976, the appeal
was accepted and the case declared submitted for decision on the basis of the
briefs filed with the Court of Appeals.

^[2] Villegas vs. De la Cruz, 1965, 15 SCRA
720 citing:  Unabia
v. City Mayor, et al., 99 Phil. 253, 257; Pinullar
v. President of the Senate, L-11667, June 30, 1958; Roque
v. President of the Senate, L-10949, July 25, 1958; Madrid v.
Auditor General, et al., L-13523, May 31, 1960; Mesias
v. Jover, L-8543, November 22, 1955; Abella v. Rodriguez, L-10512, November 29, 1957; Eranda v. Del Rosario, L-10552, April 28, 1958; Quingco v. Rodriguez, L-12144, September 17, 1958; Tabora v. City of Cebu,
L-11574, October 31, 1958; De la Cerna v. Osmeña, L-12492, May 23,1959; Argos v. Veloso, 83 Phil. 929; Tumulak v.
Egay, 82 Phil. 828; Bumanglag
v. Fernandez, et al., L-11482, November 29, 1960; Cui v. Cui,
L-18727, August 31, 1964.  See also Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15
SCRA 710.

^[3] April
15, 1968, 23 SCRA 35

^[4] pp. 108-109, CFI records

^[5] 26 SCRA 171

^[6] Exhibits L, M, N, O, pp. 181-185 CFI records

^[7] Exhibit J, p. 179, ibid.

^[8] Exhibit P, p. 186, ibid.

^[9] pp. 14-13, ibid.

^[10] Bunch, et al. vs. United States, et al., 1918, 252 Fed. 673, 678

^[11] Backus vs. Backus, 1919, 175 N.W. 400,
207 Mich. 690. 
This is an action filed by one against his brother to recover corpo­rate
stocks bought by the defendant with plaintiff’s money which was filed after
five years from the time his cause of action arose.  The defense of laches
was not up­held by the Supreme Court of Michigan, it appearing that defendant
promised from time to time to transfer the stocks to plaintiff.

^[12] Browning vs. Browning, et al., 100
S.E. 860, 85 W. Va. 46, (1919)

^[13] Fogg vs. St. Louis, H & K. R. Co.
(C.C.) 17 Fed. 871, American Digest, 1658 to 1896, Century Edition, Vol. 19, p.
462.

^[14] Supra, pp. 177-178.

^[15] p. 3, CFI records.  See also Ingles vs. Mutuc, supra p. 177, where the Court stated that
except for “item 2” (one private secretary to the President –
P9,000.00) there is nothing in the other items in the budget for “the
Office of the President” to indicate that the respective positions are
primarily confidential in nature.

^[16] p. 14, CFI records.

^[17] “The court of equity in all cases
delights to do complete justice, and not by halves.” Marshall, C.J. –
Knight vs. Knight, 3 P. Wms. 331, 334; Corbet vs. Johnson, 1 Brock. 77, 81 – both cited in
Hefner, et al. vs. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 123 U.S., 309, 313.

^[18]
Mercury Drug Co. Inc., et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al.,
L-23357, April 30, 1974,
per Makasiar, J.

 Feati
University Club vs. Feati University,
L-31503, August 15, 1974,
per Teehankee, J.

NASSCO vs. CIR, L-31852 and
L-32724, June 28, 1974, per
Teehankee, J.

Almira,
et al. vs. B.F. Goodrich Phil., Inc., L-34974, July 25, 1974, per Fernando, J.

Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd.
Employees Association vs. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., L-25291,
January 30, 1971, per Castro, J.; March 10, 1977 (Resolution on motion for
reconsideration of respondents) per Castro, C.J.