SOUTHWEST AGRICULTURAL MARKETING CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS AND GUSTAVO A. SUAREZ, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

Appeal by plaintiff, Southwest Agricultural Marketing Corp., from
an order, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing the complaint in
this case, without special pronouncement as to costs.

Plaintiff is a domestic corporation seemingly engaged – in its own
behalf and as agent of others – in the export of coprax
from the port of Davao.  By virtue of a contract entered into, on May 9, 1963, pursuant to section 1213
of the Tariff and Customs Code – hereinafter referred to as the Code^[1]
– by and between the Commissioner of Customs – hereinafter referred to as
Commissioner – on behalf of the Government and Gustavo A.  Suarez, the arrastre
service for said port was awarded to
the latter.  Since the Code contains no
schedule of arrastre charges for cargo exported from
the Port of Davao, the Secretary of Finance had authorized the
Commissioner1 to adopt, in the aforementioned contract, the schedule of arrastre charges set forth in section 3106(b) of said Code
for cargo exported from the Port of Iloilo.  Hence, paragraph 14 of the contract
incorporated said schedule, which fixed, inter alia,
a fee of P2.00 for “general cargo” – except as otherwise specifically
provided – “per ton of 40 cubic feet or 1, 000 kilos”, with the
proviso “that there shall be a minimum charge of P1.00.”

It would seem that, applying this rate, Suarez was demanding
payment of the aggregate sum of P36, 690.48 from the plaintiff, who objected
thereto and, accordingly, commenced, in the Court of First Instance of Manila,
the present action against the Secretary of Finance, the Commissioner and
Suarez, alleging that the imposition of said export charges is illegal and
unconscionable, upon the ground that the silence of the Code in connection
therewith, as regards the Port of Davao, implies that
no such charges shall be imposed therein, and that the amount fixed by the Code
for the Port of Zamboanga is only P0.30 per ton.  The prayer in plaintiff’s complaint is: (1)
that “the export arrastre contract for the Port
of Davao be declared null and void” (2) that
plaintiff be “allowed to withdraw and/or be refunded the total amount of
P17,988.80 x x
it has deposited and/or paid to defendants under protest, or such other
additional amounts which plaintiff will have deposited and/or paid under protest”;
and (3) that a writ bf preliminary injunction be issued, restraining the
defendants “from enforcing the above-mentioned contract.”

The defendants opposed the issuance of said writ and moved to
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and absence of cause of action owing
to plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative re­medies.  After due hearing, the lower court issued the
order ap­pealed from, dismissing the complaint, upon the ground that the
present action falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Tax
Appeals.

Upon the other hand, plaintiff maintains that this is “an
action to nullify the export arrastre contract and
not to protest exorbitant export arrastre charges”, so that it is within the
jurisdiction of the lower court, not of the Court of Tax Appeals.   This pretense is belied by paragraph 10 of
plaintiff’s complaint, in which it is alleged:

“That defendant Suarez is threatening and actually trying to
collect from the plaintiff the total amount of P36, 690.48 as export arrastre service for which reason plaintiff is constrained to file this instant action for the courts to
adjudicate this matter.  “

In other words, plaintiff
was “constrained to file this ins­tant action” to prevent the
collection of said sum of P36,690.48 by defendant Suarez.   The prayer for the annulment
of the lat­ter’s arrastre contract was only a means
to achieve said purpose.   As a matter of
fact, plaintiff does not care who gets the contract for the arrastre
service in the Port
of Davao.   It
merely objects to the P2.00 arrastre charge per ton
prescribed in said contract, which charge he assails as illegal and
unconscionable.

The legality or
illegality of said charge depends, however, upon whether or not it is
sanctioned by the Code, upon the autho­rity of which the contract incorporating
the export arrastre charges was made.   Thus, the issue raised by plaintiff calls
for the interpretation and construction of said Code and other laws
administered by the Bureau of Customs, the determination of which is within the
“exclusive” appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals.1 Thus, in Millarez v. Amparo,2 we declared:

“Republic Act No. 1125, section 7, effective June 16, 1954 gave
the Court of Tax Appeals exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review on appeal,
decisions of the Commissioner of Customs, involving ‘seizure, detention or
release of property affected * * * or other matters arising under the Customs
Law or other law administered by the Bureau of Customs’. x x x this provision necessarily has taken away
the power of the Manila court of first instance to ‘review’
decisions of the Customs authorities, x x x.

“Consequently the respondent judge had no authority to
entertain the complaints of Serree Investments, Lim Hu and Fructuoso Nepomuceno, which, although entitled Mandamus and Certiorari
were in reality petitions to
review the actuations of the
proper customs authorities, now exclusively reviewable
by the Court of Tax Appeals (R. A. 1125). 
Furthermore, conceding that the complaints were strictly mandamus or certiorari civil actions, still they were groundless, the
petitioners having an adequate remedy by appeal, as stated, to the Court of Tax
Appeals. x x x.”

This view has been consistently reiterated in subsequent cases,1 and we find no plausible reason to depart therefrom.

It is true that, pursuant to section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125,
the Tax Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction except on appeal from a decision
of the Commissioner of Customs, and that no such decision exists.  This is, however, due to the fact that
plaintiff has not taken the steps prescribed by law2 therefor, namely: payment of the charges in question
coupled with a written protest against said charges,3 and, upon
rendition of the decision thereon of the Collector of Customs of Davao, an appeal therefrom, if
adverse to the plaintiff, to the Commissioner of Customs, whose decision in such
appeal may, in turn, be reviewed by the Court of Tax Appeals, to the exclusion
of other courts.  Indeed, the absence of
such decision of the Commissioner of Customs merely underscores plaintiff’s
failure to exhaust administrative
remedies1 and suggests a lack of cause of action.

WHEREFORE,
the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against plaintiff,
Southwest Agricultural Marketing Corporation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, Fernando, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., did not take part.

^[1]
Republic Act No. 1937.

1 In a third indorsement dated September
30, 1960.

1 Section 7(2), Republic Act No. 1125.

2 97 Phil. 282.

1 NAMARCO v. Macadaeg, 98 Phil. 185, 190; Sampaguita
Shoe & Slipper Factory v. Comm. of Customs, 102 Phil. 850;
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Manahan, L-12096, April 30, 1959, 105 Phil. 1299, 1300; Acting Collector of
Customs v. De la Rama Steamship, L-20676, Feb.
26, 1965; Auyong Hian v.
Court of Tax Appeals, L-25181, Jan. 11, 1967; De Joya
v. Lantin, L-24037, April 27, 1967; Acting
Collector of Customs v. Caluag, L-23925, May
24, 1967; Romualdez v. Area, L-20516, Nov. 15,
1967.

2 Sections 2308
to 2309 of the Code.

3 Luzon Stevedoring v. Court of Tax Appeals, L-21005, Oct. 22, 1966.

1 Acting Collector of Customs v.
Caluag, L-23925, May 24, 1967.