KAISAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA LA CAMPANA, PETITIONER, VS. RICARDO TANTONGCO AND THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS.

On January 18, 1957, the respondent Court of Industrial Relations
promulgated an Order in Cases Nos. 584 [V], (1), (2), (3), (5) and (6),
all entitled “Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa La Campana (KKM) vs.
La Campana Starch and Coffee Factory, and the Administrator of the
Estate of Ramon Tantongco”, ordering the reinstatement and payment of
back wages of twelve (12) employees involved in said cases. The
respondents therein, after their motion for reconsideration had been
denied by the Court (CIR), presented a petition for Certiorari with
this Court, docketed as case G. R. No. L-12355, entitled “La Campana
Starch & Coffee Factory & Ricardo Tantongco, as administrator
of the Estate of Ramon Tantongco, Petitioners, vs. Kaisahan
Ng Mga Manggagawa sa La Campana (KKM) and the CIR, Respondents”. The
above petition was dismissed by this Court in a Resolution dated June
12, 1957, for “lack of merit”.

On February 18, 1957, the order of the CIR having
become final and executory, the Kaisahan filed a motion of Execution on
August 13, 1957. The employees who were ordered to be reinstated and
whose back wages should be paid, presented themselves for work on
August 28, 1957. Upon refusal of the La Campana and/or Ricardo
Tantongco to comply with the final order, the Kaisahan on August 30,
1957, presented a petition to cite Ricardo Tantongco for Contempt.

Under date of September 6, 1957, Tantongco presented a
“Manifestation” averring therein that he was not anymore the
administrator of the Estate of Ramon Tantongco, such estate having been
distributed and proceedings closed and his bond as administrator has
already been cancelled by the probate court and, therefore, he should
not be cited for contempt.

On September 30, 1957, the CIR entered an Order whereby it
required the La Campana or its Manager or the person who has charge of
the management, and the Administrator of the Estate of Ramon Tantongco,
to comply with the Order of February 18, 1957 within five (5) days from
receipt, specially to (a) reinstate the persons named in said Order of
February 18, 1957; and (b) to deposit the amount of P65,534.01 with the
Court. Upon the alleged refusal of the La Campana, more specifically
Ricardo Tantongco, to comply with the above order, the Kaisahan filed a
manifestation informing the CIR of said refusal. A preliminary
investigation was subsequently conducted by the Acting Prosecutor and
Attorney of the respondent Court, wherein Ricardo Tantongco appeared
with counsel. On November 18, 1957, after the preliminary
investigation, a complaint for Indirect Contempt was filed against
Ricardo Tantongco, “People of the Philippines vs. Ricardo
Tantongco”, Case No. V-24. Upon the filing of the contempt case,
Ricardo Tantongco presented a petition for Certiorari with Preliminary
Injunction, G.R. No. L-13119, entitled “Ricardo Tantongco vs.
Kaisahan and the Court of Industrial Relations, praying that the CIR be
enjoined from proceeding with the trial of the contempt case and from
enforcing the Order of September 30, 1957, requiring him to reinstate
the 12 employees and to deposit P65,534.01. This Court issued the writ
of preliminary injunction, and after hearing, rendered a decision on
September 22, 1959, holding among others, that the respondent Ricardo
Tantongco was “the proper person and official to which the orders of
the CIR are addressed and who is in duty bound to comply with the
same”. The writ earlier issued was accordingly dissolved. The contempt
case was subsequently heard and on March 3, 1960, the prosecution
rested its case. Tantongco manifested his desire to file a Motion to
Dismiss, as in fact he filed same on March 4, 1960. At the subsequent
hearings, Tantongco insisted on the resolution of his Motion to
Dismiss. The Presiding Judge, however, in open court, deferred
resolution of said Motion until after the reception of evidence and
re-set the hearing for March 8, 1960, with the warning that should
Tantongco fail to appear, the case would be considered submitted for
decision. A written Order to this effect was handed down on March 5,
1960. On the scheduled hearing, Tantongco failed to appear and on April
30, 1960, Judge Jose S. Bautista rendered judgment, the pertinent
portions of which read:

“From the evidence thus presented, which is
unrebutted, it is clear that the accused refused to follow the order of
this Court dated February 18, 1957 and September 30, 1957, such action
constitutes indirect contempt of Court.

WHEREFORE, the accused is sentenced to be imprisoned until he
complies with the orders of this Court dated February 18, 1957 and
September 30, 1957.”

Tantongco moved for a reconsideration of the above decision to the
Court en banc, contending that (1) the order is arbitrary and contrary
to law; (2) the order is illegal, because the Court has no power to
issue such order; and (3) the order is not supported by the evidence.
After hearing, the Court en banc, on March 2, 1961, rendered judgment, the pertinent portions (majority opinion) of which, read:

“* * * The accused insisted that the evidence of the
prosecution is not sufficient beyond reasonable doubt to convict the
accused of the charge in the complaint. This condition can be seen from
the evidence of the prosecution thus presented. It appears from the
evidence of the prosecution that the Order dated September 30, 1957,
wherein the accused was charged of refusing to comply was never served
on the said accused. The testimonies of the different witnesses are
mere hearsay and are not therefore of probative value in a criminal
complaint where the accused is charged of indirect contempt for alleged
refusal to comply with the terms and conditions of a valid order. The
witnesses merely said that the accused refused to accept the Order of
the Court dated September 30, 1957, without actually proving1 that such
Order was really and actually served upon the accused Eicardo
Tantongco. The only direct evidence to show that the copy of such Order
was supposed to have been served on the accused was the testimony of
the bailiff of the Court, Mr. Penilla; and his testimony in answer to
questions therein propounded brings to light the following:

It is clear that when the Order of September 30,
1957 was allegedly served on the accused Ricardo Tantongco, he was
absent. Consequently, such service of the Order sought to be served,
was notactually served on the accused. It is claimed that one Mr.
Fernandez received from the bailiff of the court, Mr. Penilla, the copy
of the Order of the Court on October 5, 1957, but the said bailiff had
no knowledge that the said Mr. Fernandez is a personnel or employee
empowered or authorized by the accused to receive documents or
communications for and in his behalf. The evidence did not also
disclose that the said Mr. Fernandez who claimed to have received the
alleged order, copy of the Order in Cases Nos. 585-V (1),(2), (3), (5)
and (6) was never presented in court to testify as to what connection
he had with the accused, and why he allegedly received such Order.
There is no showing that this person is an employee of the accused and
if he is not responsible employee or in any way connected in the employ
of the accused Ricardo Tantongco, then the service of such order to
such person could not be considered in evidence sufficient to serve the
purpose of the rules of court that an order has been duly served on the
accused.

“Indirect contempt partakes the nature of a criminal
action and under the law a person so accused of indirect contempt has
the same rights before any court of justice to present evidence in
defense of his rights. One of these rights of an accused is to move for
the dismissal of a complaint if it is shown that the evidence therein
submitted are not sufficient beyond reasonable doubt that the person
therein accused has committed the alleged contempt. It is incumbent
upon the Trial Court to decide first such motion to dismiss * * *.
Under the present situation, there is no direct evidence to show that
the Orders of the Trial Court involved were sufficiently and properly
served upon the accused Ricardo Tantongco. Now, why shall we put him in
prison until he complies with the said Order when he did not receive
such Order in the ordinary course of business under the laws of this
country?

“* * * Accused, however, refused to submit evidence
until after the Trial Court has ruled on his motion to dismiss. Under
the situation, the Trial Court considered the case submitted for
decision without giving the accused the opportunity to submit his
evidence in defense of his rights.

“We believe that the
action taken by the Trial Court is way out of beat. The right of an
accused to move for the dismissal of a case after prosecution has
rested its case is a right recognized in this jurisdiction. * * *
(People vs. Moro Manacol, 81 Phil., 543 46 Off. Gaz. [1] 341).

* * * * * * *

It must be remembered that proceedings in indirect contempt is penal in nature (Villanueva vs. Lim, 69 Phil., 650), and as such the accused is entitled to be heard in evidence * * *.

It
is our view that the Order of the Trial Court dated April 30, 1960,
deprived the accused of his day in court and denied him due process of
law and the equal protection of the laws. It is our honest belief that
even in indirect contempt case, the accused should be given ample
opportunity to properly defend himself by availing all rights, stages,
means and remedies allowed under our democratic processes in a regime
where the rule of law is supreme. Considering that the evidence in this
case thus presented as basis of the decision and/or order of April 30,
1960 is not the evidence beyond reasonable doubt called for under the
law and proceedings criminal in nature, we are constrained to vote for the dismissal of this case.”

The trial judge, Hon. Jose S. Bautista dissented, while Judge Baltazar M. Villanueva gave the following vote:

“FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, without
advancing any opinion on the question of sufficiency of the evidence, I
hereby hold that the Motion to Dismiss by the accused is a prejudicial
question which must be first resolved by the Trial Court before it
could force the accused to present his defense should the said motion
be dismissed and, therefore, I vote for the reconsideration and setting
aside of the order of the Trial Court dated April 30, 1960 and for the
remand of the case for further trial in conformity with the foregoing
opinion.”

The majority opinion is now the subject of the present Petition for
Review, the Kaisahan, as petitioner, alleging that the respondent CIR
committed a grave error of law in dismissing the case. The basis of the
allegation is the decision of this Court in G. R. No. L-13119, supra holding
that the respondent Ricardo Tantongco was the “proper person and
official to whom the orders of the CIR are addressed and who is in duty
bound to comply with the same”.

Respondent CIR filed a separate Answer, and after the customary
admission and denials, advanced, in argument the propriety of the
majority decision dismissing the contempt case. It was opined that
respqndent Tantongco, who was charged with indirect contempt, which
partakes of a criminal prosecution, had the right to present a Motion
to Dismiss on insufficiency of evidence, after the prosecution has
rested and is entitled to a resolution of said motion before he can be
compelled to present his evidence in defense; that the trial judge in
considering the case submitted, even before evidence in defense was
adduced virtually deprived Tantongco of his day in court and denied him
of his liberty without due process of law. The answer of respondent
Court also invokes the principle that this Court has no authority or
jurisdiction to Review the instant case, it appearing that the question
involved is dominantly factual. In support of this contention, the
respondent Court said:

“In the Resolution En Banc (Annex “J”), findings of
fact were made as to whether the accused—respondent herein—had in fact
received copies of the orders which he was charged of having refused to
comply. In the said resolution, a finding was made that respondent
herein did not receive copies of said orders. This is a clear finding
of fact and jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is that the issue is not
within the corrective jurisdiction of this Honorable Tribunal (Section
6, Republic Act No. 875; and Teodoro Donato case, G.R. No. L-12506). As
a matter of fact, in the said Resolution it was there found that “* * *
the evidence in this case thus presented as basis of the decision
and/or order of April 30, 1960 is not the evidence beyond reasonable
doubt called for under the law and proceedings criminal in nature, * *
*.” From the analysis of the evidence as shown in the Resolution, this
is a factual finding.”

Respondent Tantongco, in his Answer, after admitting and denying
some of the allegations in the petition, and after invoking the same
grounds sponsored by the CIR claimed that the petition at bar places
him in double jeopardy since the dismissal of the case of indirect
contempt against him, admittedly a criminal prosecution, amounted to an
acquittal which became final immediately.

There are two issues which we are called upon to determine in the
present proceeding, i. e., whether under the facts recited in the
petition, this Court can review the case and whether double jeopardy
attaches.

There is no doubt that the CIR had the jurisdiction to hear the
indirect contempt case (Section 6, Com. Act No. 103). The presiding
Judge, who tried the case and sentenced the respondent, had authority
to take cognizance of the case and the Court En Banc had also the
authority to review his findings, both of facts and of law. The Court
En Banc reversed the findings of the trial Judge, both on the issues of
fact and law, when the majority opinion found that the record does not
show that respondent Tantongco actually received the Orders which he
was called upon to comply with, a pivotal point in the matter of
evidence, and when it further held that the trial judge should not have
considered the case submitted for decision, without first resolving the
motion to dismiss and permitting respondent Tantongco to adduce
evidence in his defense, in the event of an adverse resolution.

We share the view expressed by respondent CIR that the case under
consideration involves factual findings, which under consistent rulings
of this Court, we are not authorized to review, or alter, unless such
findings are completely devoid of basis, and there is grave abuse of
discretion (Cristobal Olaivar vs. Manila Elec. Company &
CIR, 71 Phil., 503, and cases cited therein). The findings of fact by
the CIR are final and conclusive and are binding upon this Court when
(1) the parties were given the opportunity to present evidence (2) the
tribunal considered the evidence presented; (3) there is something to
support the findings; and (4) the evidence supporting the findings is
substantial (Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Osco Workers
Fraternity Labor, et al. 110 Phil., 627). The record of the case at bar
and the well considered opinion of the majority of the respondent
Court, clearly reveal that all the above requirements concur.

Much emphasis is placed by petitioner on the decision of this Court in case G. R. No. L-13119, supra,
where we held that respondent Tantongco was the proper person to whom
the orders sought to be complied with should be directed. The majority
decision of the respondent Court did not, in any way, contradict this
finding. It dismissed the contempt case, on the ground that there was
no evidence on record, to show beyond doubt, that the orders which
respondent Tantongco supposedly refused to obey, were actually received
by him. Certainly, the trial judge could not convict an accused of
indirect contempt, when he did not receive said orders.

On this score alone, the petition for Certiorari to Review the Order
of respondent Court, should be dismissed, thereby rendering unnecessary
the further discussion of the other issue of double jeopardy.

Conformably with all the foregoing, the petition is hereby dismissed
and the decision sought to be reviewed is affirmed, with costs against
the Petitioner Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa La Campana.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.