PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JERRY DELA CRUZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

People versus Dela Cruz

The Case

This is People of the Philippines versus Jerry dela Cruz, a criminal appeal from a conviction for homicide. The People prosecuted Jerry dela Cruz for the stabbing death of Pepito Tadal, and the accused now asks the Supreme Court to overturn his conviction. The case matters because it is a clean teaching vehicle on the dying declaration — the ante-mortem statement — as evidence of the highest order, and on how our courts treat the identification of an assailant by a man who knows he is about to die.

Procedural History

An information for homicide was filed against Jerry dela Cruz and two unnamed persons referred to as John Does before Branch 68 of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac. The accused entered a plea of not guilty, and trial followed. The trial court rendered its decision on August 21, 2003, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. It sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term, ordered him to pay moral damages, civil indemnity, and attorney's fees, and archived the case against the two John Does pending their arrest.

The accused appealed directly to the Supreme Court, assigning as errors the trial court's reliance on the dying declaration and its finding of guilt despite the prosecution's alleged failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Facts

On the evening of February 3, 2000, in Barangay San Francisco, Santa Ignacia, Tarlac, Rosita Tadal was inside her house when she heard her husband Pepito Tadal cry for help. She went outside and found him sprawled on the ground, bathed in his own blood. He told her he had been stabbed. Her son-in-law, Carlos Soriano, came to help carry him to the hospital.

On the way, Carlos asked Pepito twice who his assailant was, and Pepito answered, "Jerry." At the hospital, Rosita also asked him, and he replied, "Jerry dela Cruz." He added that it was Jerry dela Cruz at the bamboo bridge, and, conscious of his impending death, said in the local tongue, "I may not survive, I'm dying." He had eight stab wounds. He was operated on in the early hours of the following day and died of massive blood loss.

The accused denied the charge and put up alibi, claiming he was inside his house in the same barangay at the time of the incident. The trial court convicted him, giving full weight to the dying declaration as testified to by Rosita and Carlos.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in giving weight and credence to the dying declaration of Pepito Tadal.
• Whether or not the accused's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt despite his defense of alibi.

Applicable Provisions

Section 37 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as quoted in the decision, provides:

Under Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court, the declaration of a dying person with the consciousness of impending death may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and the surrounding circumstances of such death.

This is the very provision that makes the victim's identification of his assailant admissible, and the Court measures the statement against its four requisites.

The Court also states the four requisites in these words:

There are four requisites which must concur in order that a dying declaration may be admissible: (1) it must concern the crime and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (2) at the time it was made, the declarant was under the consciousness of an impending death; (3) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (4) the declaration is offered in any criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in which the declarant was the victim.

These requisites are the checklist the Court applies to the victim's statements, and all four are satisfied here.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the dying declaration was properly given weight. It recalled the doctrine that a dying declaration is evidence of the highest order, for when a person is at the point of death, every motive of falsehood is silenced. The Court found all four requisites present: the declaration concerned the stabbing and the circumstances of death; the victim was conscious of impending death, having said he would not survive; he was competent as a witness; and the declaration was offered in a homicide case in which he was the victim.

The accused argued that the victim said only "Jerry," and that other persons in the barangay bore that name. The Court rejected this. Rosita testified that the victim gave the complete name, Jerry dela Cruz, and the victim also referred to the location of the accused's house at the bamboo bridge and at the other side of the river. The Court held that the accused's self-serving denial could not prevail over Rosita's categorical testimony.

The Court likewise rejected the claim that Rosita's testimony was an adulterated version of her affidavit. It held that an affidavit, taken ex parte, is generally inferior to testimony in open court, and that inconsistencies between the two do not necessarily discredit the witness. It also found no merit in the attack on the one-week delay in Carlos giving his sworn statement, since delay in reporting a crime is not uncommon where sufficiently explained.

On the second issue, the Court held that the alibi could not stand against positive identification. The crime occurred in the same barangay, and no proof showed it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the scene. As between alibi and a dying declaration, the latter deserves weight and credence. The Court also deferred to the trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses, since the trial court had the best opportunity to observe their demeanor.

On the civil aspect, the Court deleted the award of attorney's fees, as the heirs were not entitled to exemplary damages. But although actual damages were not proved, it awarded temperate damages of 25,000 pesos for burial and funeral expenses.

Doctrine

A dying declaration is evidence of the highest order, because when a person is at the point of death, every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the strongest of reasons to speak the truth. It is admissible under Section 37 of Rule 130 when four requisites concur: it concerns the crime and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; the declarant was conscious of impending death; the declarant was competent as a witness; and it is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide in which the declarant was the victim.

An affidavit is generally inferior to testimony in open court, and inconsistencies between them do not necessarily discredit the witness. Alibi is unavailing against positive identification or against an ante-mortem declaration received in evidence. And where actual damages are not proved but the fact of death is established, temperate damages may be awarded.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for homicide, deleted the award of attorney's fees, and ordered the accused to pay the heirs 25,000 pesos as temperate damages.

Remember This

Memorize the four requisites of a dying declaration and the line that it is evidence of the highest order, for a dying man has no motive to lie. Examiners use this case to test the requisites of an ante-mortem statement, the identification of an assailant by first name plus circumstance, and the rule that alibi yields to a dying declaration.