FELISA C. EVANGELISTA, PETITIONER, VS. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE), RESPONDENTS.

Evangelista versus Employees' Compensation Commission

The Case

This is a petition filed by Felisa Evangelista against the Employees' Compensation Commission and the Government Service Insurance System, asking the Supreme Court to review the Commission's decision denying her claim for death income benefits arising from the death of her husband, Tomas Evangelista. The case matters because it fixes the governing law for a claim that arose before the Amended Labor Code took effect, and because it restates the heart of the old workmen's compensation regime: the presumption of compensability. Under that presumption, the employee need not prove that the illness was caused or aggravated by the work. The illness itself is immaterial; what counts is that it supervened in the course of employment.

Procedural History

Felisa Evangelista filed a claim for death income benefits with the Government Service Insurance System. The System denied the claim on the ground that there was no showing that her husband's ailment directly arose from or was aggravated by his employment. The claim then went to the Employees' Compensation Commission, which affirmed the denial. From that decision, the widow came to the Supreme Court by petition to review. The Court set aside the decision appealed from and granted the claim.

Facts

Tomas Evangelista began serving the government at the age of twenty two, as a laborer of the Bureau of Posts. His employment was interrupted by the Second World War, and he resumed government service in October 1945 as clerk of the People's Court. His work with the Department of Justice began on April 1, 1947 and continued until November 13, 1975, through various positions. In 1947 he was appointed Agent of the Office of the Solicitor General, and in October 1953 he became Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Samar. At the time of his death he held the position of Third Assistant Provincial Fiscal.

His duties consisted of conducting preliminary investigations, prosecuting criminal cases, representing the state in some civil and special proceedings, and performing such functions pertaining to fiscals. It was while he was working as Special Counsel in the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Cebu that he was first treated, in 1956, for moderately advanced tuberculosis of the right apex of his lung, as certified by the physician who treated him from 1956 to September 1975.

He was hospitalized for the same illness at St. Luke's Hospital in Quezon City from November 2, 1975 to November 14, 1975, and on that last date he died of tuberculosis bronchiectasis. His widow then claimed death income benefits, and the claim was denied and the denial affirmed, bringing the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the claim for death income benefits should be decided under the Workmen's Compensation Act rather than the Amended Labor Code.
• Whether or not the illness which caused the death of Tomas Evangelista is presumed compensable, there being no substantial evidence to the contrary.

Applicable Provisions

Section 44 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as the Court applies it, provides:

In the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the claim is compensable when the illness supervened during the employment.

This presumption is the pivot of the case: it relieves the claimant of proving causation and shifts the burden to the employer or the System to rebut it with substantial evidence.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the claim should be decided under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The illness of Tomas Evangelista supervened while he was employed by the Department of Justice, years before the Amended Labor Code took effect. The governing law is therefore the law in force when the illness supervened, not the later Code.

On the second issue, the Court held that the claim is compensable. Under Section 44 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that when the illness supervened during the employment the claim is compensable. The Court explained the consequence of that presumption: an employee is freed from the burden of proving that his illness or injury was caused or aggravated by the nature of his work. The cause of the ailment is immaterial; what is important is that it occurred or was aggravated in the course of employment. The Court found no evidence to rebut the disputable presumption that the claim is compensable.

Doctrine

A claim for death or income benefits arising from an illness that supervened before the Amended Labor Code took effect is governed by the Workmen's Compensation Act. Under Section 44 of that Act, when the illness supervened during the employment, the claim is presumed compensable in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary. The employee is freed from the burden of proving that the illness was caused or aggravated by the nature of his work. The cause of the ailment is immaterial; what matters is that it occurred or was aggravated in the course of employment. The presumption is disputable, and it stands unless the employer or the System rebuts it with substantial evidence.

Disposition

The Court set aside the decision appealed from and ordered the Government Service Insurance System to pay the widow six thousand pesos as death compensation benefits, to reimburse her hospital and medical expenses supported by proper receipts, to pay her six hundred pesos as attorney's fees, and to pay the Ministry of Labor sixty one pesos as administrative fees.

Remember This

Memorize the rule: under Section 44 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, illness supervening during employment is presumed compensable, and the cause of the ailment is immaterial. Examiners use this case to test the presumption of compensability and the choice of law for claims that arose before the Amended Labor Code took effect.