THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. APOLONIO CARLOS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

The appellant was found guilty of treason by the People’s Court and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P7,000, and costs.

The findings of the People’s Court are not assigned as errors or
disputed.

The lower court found that one day in July or August, 1944, about two or
three o’clock in the morning, a truck pulled up to the curb in front of a house
on Constancia Street, Sampaloc, Manila, where one Martin Mateo lived. From the
truck the accused, a Japanese spy, alighted together with members of the
Japanese military police and pointed Martin Mateo’s house and Fermin Javier’s
house to his Japanese companions, whereupon the Japanese soldiers broke into
Martin Mateo’s dwelling first and Fermin Javier’s afterwards. In those houses
they seized Martin Mateo, Ladislao Matco and Fermin Javier, bound their hands,
and put them in the truck. Along with other persons who had been rounded up in
other places and who had been kept in the truck while it was parked, they were
taken to Fort Santiago where the two Mateos and Fermin Javier were tortured and
from which they were released six days later. The reason for the arrest and
maltreatment of Martin and Ladislao Mateo was that they had refused to divulge
the whereabouts of their brother, Marcelino Mateo, who was a guerrilla and who
had escaped from the Japanese. And Fermin Javier was arrested and tortured
because he himself was a guerrilla, a fact which Carlos knew or at least
suspected.

The defendant in this instance invokes only questions of law. He assigns four
alleged errors, viz.:

“I. The lower court erred in not holding that the accused cannot be convicted
of the offense of treason committed against the government of the United States
and of the Philippines, because it is a settled principle in international law
that in a territory ‘actually under the authority of the enemy’, all laws of
political complexion of the previous government are suspended, and are without
force and inasmuch as the laws of the United States and the Commonwealth of the
Philippines defining and penalyzing the crime of treason are all of political
complexion, they were suspended and had no binding effect whatsoever upon the
inhabitants in the said occupied territories.

“II. The People’s Court erred in not declaring the accused could not have
violated the Philippine law on treason, because it is also a settled principle
in international law that in such occupied territories all laws inconsistent
with the occupation are being likewise suspended and without force and effect
over the inhabitants, and since the laws of the United States and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines defining and penalizing treason against the said
government are by their very nature evidently inconsistent with the said
occupation of the Philippines by the Imperial Japanese forces, the said laws
must be deemed as having been suspended and without force and effect upon the
Filipinos, during the said occupation.

“III. The People’s Court erred in not holding that the accused herein cannot
be convicted of the crime of treason committed against the government of the
United States and of the Philippines, because it is a settled principle in
international law that once the territory is so occupied by the enemy, the
allegiance is as a legal obligation distinguishable and distinguished from
loyalty of the inhabitants therein to the former government or governments is
temporarily suspended, and it being necessary and essential for the commission
of the offense of treason against the United States and the Commonwealth of the
Philippines that the supposed offender should owe allegiance to said government
at the time of the alleged offense, it follows that the accused cannot possibly
be chargeable with treason against the United States and the Commonwealth of the
Philippines for acts allegedly committed by him in the territory of the
Philippines actually occupied by the Japanese during said occupation.

“IV. The decision rendered in this case should be reversed and set aside,
because the law creating the People’s Court is
unconstitutional.”

The questions propounded in the first, second and third assignments of error
were squarely raised and decided in the case of Laurel vs. Misa (77
Phil., 856). That decision controls this appeal so far as the pleas of suspended
allegiance and change of sovereignty are concerned. On the strength thereof, the
first three assignments of error must be overruled.

The fourth assignment of error attacks the law creating the People’s Court as
unconstitutional. Numerous provisions of the People’s Court Act are singled out
as contrary to the Organic Law. But in formulating many of his propositions the
appellant has not indicated the reasons or the authorities which sustain them.
We shall dispose of them as briefly as they are presented. For better
understanding, we shall reproduce the appellant’s propositions and will comment
on them separately.

The brief says:

“(a) It (People’s Court Act) contains provisions which deal on matters
entirely foreign to the subject matter expressed in its title, such as:

“(1) The first proviso of section 2 thereof, which retains the jurisdiction
of the Court of First Instance to try and decide cases of crimes against
national security committed during the second world war not filed within six
months, notwithstanding the fact that according to its title, the People’s Court
is precisely created for that purpose, and impliedly, the People’s Court
jurisdiction in regard to said crimes is exclusive;

“(2) The second proviso of the same section which grants the People’s Court
jurisdiction to convict and sentence those accused therein even of crimes other
than those against national security, although its title does not in any way
indicate that such jurisdiction over other crimes would be granted to the said
court;

“(3) Section 14 thereof, which adds to the disqualifications of Justices of
the Supreme Court and provides a procedure for their substitution, a matter not
indicated in any manner in its title;

“(4) The first proviso of section 19 thereof, which changes the existing
Rules of Court on the subject of bail although its title speaks only of the
creation of the People’s Court and the Office of Special Prosecutors; and

“(5) The second proviso of the same section, which suspends the provisions of
article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law, which is not referred
to in its title either expressly or by implication.”

The People’s Court was intended to be a full and complete scheme with its own
machinery for the indictment, trial and judgment of treason cases. The various
provisos mentioned, in our opinion, are allied and germane to the subject matter
and purposes of the People’s Court Act; they are subordinate to its end. The
multitude of matters which the legislation, by its nature, has to embrace would
make mention of all of them in the title of the act cumbersome. It is not
necessary, and the Congress is not expected, to make the title of an enactment a
complete index of its contents. (Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Municipality of Binalonan, 32 Phil., 634.) The constitutional rule is satisfied
if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title.

The brief says:

“(b) It deprives persons similarly situated of the equal protection of
the laws inasmuch as:

“(1) Only those political offenders against whom cases are filed within six
months from the passage of the law are to be tried in the People’s Court, while
others are to be tried in the Courts of First Instance;

“(2) Political offenders accused in the People’s Court are denied preliminary
examination and/or investigation whereas the others who may be accused of the
same crimes in the Courts of First Instance shall be entitled thereto;

“(3) Political offenders accused in the People’s Court have limited right to
appeal, while those who may be accused of the same crimes in the Courts of First
Instance have absolute right of appeal inasmuch as under section 13 of the law,
Rules 42 and 46 of the Rules of Court are made applicable to the latter;

“(4) Appeals in the cases involving persons who held any office or position
under either or both the Philippine Executive Commission and the Philippine
Republic or any branch, instrumentality and/or agency thereof are to be heard
and decided by a substantially different Supreme Court, thus causing lack of
uniformity in rulings over the same subject;

“(5) The first proviso of section 19 thereof prescribes a different rule as
to the granting of release on bail only with respect to the political offenders
detained by the United States Army and released to the Commonwealth of the
Philippines but not as to other political offenders accused or accusable of the
same crimes; and

“(6) The second proviso of section 19 thereof suspends article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code only as to those political detainees released by the United
States Army to the Commonwealth of the Philippines or, at most, only to those
accused or accusable of the crimes specified in the law and not as to all
persons accused or accusable of crimes against national security committed
during the second world war, much less to all offenders, notwithstanding the
fact that there is no reasonable and real difference among said groups of
offenders.”

(1) The People’s Court is a court of special and restricted jurisdiction
created under the stress of an emergency and national security. It was devised
to operate for a limited period only, a limitation imposed by economic necessity
and other factors of public policy. Obviously, the main concern in the creation
of a special court was the trial and disposition of the cases, numbering over
6,000, of accused who were being held by the United States military authorities
and who were to be turned over to the Commonwealth Government. It was presumed
that there were other cases of treason not included in this number—cases which
might not be discovered until years afterward—, and the possibility was not
overlooked that even some of the cases which the United States Army was on the
eve of placing under the jurisdiction of the Philippine Government could not be
filed and submitted for trial within a foreseeable future owing to lack of
readily available evidence, absence of witnesses, or other causes. On the other
hand, considerations of economy and public interests forbade maintenance of the
People’s Court for an indefinite period. Under the circumstances, it was
necessary that a provision be made requiring that only cases which could be
brought to court within six months and which were deemed enough to occupy the
attention of the People’s Court within the limited time of its life, should be
cognizable by it, and the rest should be instituted in the proper Courts of
First Instance. Such provision is not an arbitrary and intentional
discrimination, and does not work as a deprivation of the right to equal
protection of the laws. Both in privileges or advantages conferred, if any, and
in liabilities imposed, if any, persons under equal circumstances are treated
alike. It does not deprive appellant of the protection enjoyed by others falling
within his class. The equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Constitution “does not prevent a state or municipality from adjusting its
legislation to differences in situations and making a discrimination or
distinction in its legislation in respect of things that are different, provided
that the discrimination or distinction has a reasonable foundation or rational
basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative
sense, that is, outside of the wide discretion which the legislative body may
exercise.” (16 C. J. S., 997.) Moreover, with its associate feature the People’s
Court is designed to extend greater protection to persons charged with
collaboration with the enemy. If others are prosecuted before a Court of First
Instance, they and not the appellant should have cause to complain of
discrimination.

(2) Section 22 in denying preliminary investigation to persons accused before
the People’s Court is justified by the conditions prevailing when the law was
enacted. In view of the great number of prisoners then under detention and the
length of time and amount of labor that would be consumed if so many prisoners
were allowed the right to have preliminary investigation, considered with the
necessity of disposing of these cases at the earliest possible dates in the
interest of the public and of the accused themselves, it was not an unwise
measure which dispensed with such investigation in such cases. Preliminary
investigation, it must be remembered, is not a fundamental right guaranteed by
the Constitution. For the rest, the constitutional prohibition against
discrimination among defendants placed in the same situation and condition is
not infringed.

(3) For the same reasons stated before, this contention cannot be upheld.
There is a rational basis for the distinction. The employment of two modes of
appellate procedure in the two classes of cases involved are, in our opinion,
suitably adapted to the differences, in their composition, between the courts
from which the appeals are taken. The People’s Court is a collegiate court
whereas the Court of First Instance is presided over by a single judge. Appeal
is not a constitutional but statutory right. The admitted fact that there is no
discrimination among appeals from the same court or class of court saves the
provision objected to from being unconstitutional.

(4) This objection does not seem to fall within the subject of constitutional
guarantee against deprivation of equal protection of the laws. Be that as it
may, we find no merit in the appellant’s contention. The disqualification under
the People’s Court Act of some or a majority of the members of this Court and
their substitution by justices of the Court of Appeals or judges of the Courts
of First Instance do not make the Supreme Court, as thus constituted, a new
court in the eyes of the law. A court is an entity possessing a personality
separate and distinct from the men who compose or sit on it. This objection is
no more valid than that of a party in an ordinary action who protests that his
case is heard by a Supreme Court which, by reason of disability of a majority of
its regular members, is made up mostly of judges from outside. As to the “lack
of uniformity in rulings over the same subject,” it need only be said that the
Constitution does not insure uniformity of judicial decisions; neither does it
assure immunity from judicial error.

(5) and (6) The two provisos in section 19 do not constitute denial of equal
protection of the laws. The distinction made by these provisos between two sets
of accused in the “granting or release on bail” and in the application of
article 125 of the Revised Penal Code are not arbitrary or fanciful calculated
to favor or prejudice one or the other class. This point was discussed at length
and made clear in Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372), in which this Court
explained the reasons which necessitated the extension to six months of the
authorized detention of persons charged with treason before the filing of
information. The provisos rest “on some real and substantial difference or
distinction bearing a just and fair relation to the legislation.” (16 C. J. S.,
998.)

The brief says:

“(c) It is a bill of attainder in that it virtually imposes upon
specific, known and identified individuals or group of individuals, the penalty
of detention and imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months without any
form of judicial trial or procedure.”

“The bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without
judicial trial.” (Cummings vs. Missouri, 4 Wall., 232, etc.) Detention of
a prisoner for a period not exceeding six months pending investigation or trial
is not a punishment but a necessary extension of the well recognized power to
hold the criminal suspected for investigation. This proviso was held by this
Court to be justified and reasonable under existing circumstances in Laurel
vs. Misa, supra.

The brief says:

“(d) Section 2 thereof which purports to define the jurisdiction of
the People’s Court constitutes an invalid and void delegation of legislative
power which is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines by the
Constitution, in so far as said section virtually leaves unqualifiedly in the
discretion of the Solicitor General and/or the Office of Special Prosecutors the
power to determine the actual cases over which the People’s Court shall have
jurisdiction.”

Granting the correctness of the premise of this proposition, it does not
follow that the authority vested in the Solicitor General amounts to a
delegation of legislative power. We do not think that power to institute certain
cases in one court or another in the discretion of the prosecuting attorney is
an exercise of legislative power. “The true distinction is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as
to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution,
to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to
the latter no valid objection can be made.” (Cincinnati, V. & Z. R. Co.
vs. Clinton County Comr’s [1852], 1 Ohio St., 77, cited in Tañada on the
Constitution of the Philippines, p. 291.)

The brief says:

“(e) Sections 1, 4 and 18 thereof abridge, limit and curtail the power
of appointment of the President or the Chief Executive in that—

“(1) Section 1 practically leaves the President with such a very small field
of choice in the appointment of the members of the court that he can hardly use
his discretion in regard thereto; and

“(4) Sections 4 and 18 actually designate and appoint the persons who will
occupy the positions left vacant by those appointed to the People’s Court and
the Office of Special Prosecutors respectively.”

The power to create offices and courts is vested in the legislative
department. Subject to constitutional restrictions, the Congress may determine
on the eligibility and qualification of officers and provide the method for
filling them. We find no valid objection on constitutional ground to a law which
directs that a special temporary court should be filled by appointment by the
Chief Executive himself from among judges already on the bench and/or other
quasi-judicial officers. As to outsiders who might have to be appointed by
reason of insufficiency of qualified men already in the service, the Chief
Executive is left with a wide field of choice.

The theory that “sections 4 and 18 actually designate and appoint the persons
who will occupy the positions left vacant by those appointed to the People’s
Court and the Office of Special Prosecutors respectively” loses sight of the
fact that the positions referred to are, as a matter of fact, vacant only in
theory, and for the duration of the People’s Court, and that the law does no
more than say that after those judges and officers shall have accomplished their
work, they shall go back to their permanent posts.

The brief says:

“(f) The said law provides for the designation and/or transfer of
judges appointed for particular districts to another place outside of their
respective districts without the consent of the Supreme Court.”

Section 7 of Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “no judge
appointed for a particular district shall be designated or transferred to
another district without the approval of the Supreme Court. The Congress shall
by law determine the residence of judges of the inferior courts.” This
constitutional provision, as its language clearly states, refers to transfers
from one judicial district to another. It does not prohibit the appointment or
designation of a judge of the Court of First Instance or any other judge from
being appointed temporarily or permanently with his consent to a court of
different grade and make-up, such as the People’s Court.

The brief says:

“(g) Sections 13 and 19 thereof prescribed rules of procedure
regarding appeal and bail which violate the rule of uniformity of rules for all
courts of the same grade established in the Constitution.”

It is the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court which are required by
section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution to be uniform for all courts of
the same grade. The People’s Court is not a court of the same grade, considering
many of its special features, and its purposes, as the Court of First Instance
or any other existing court in the Philippines, so that the adoption of special
rules of procedure for said court different from those applicable to Courts of
First Instance is not violative of this constitutional mandate. More than this,
the last sentence of the section expressly authorizes the Congress “to repeal,
alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and
the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.”

The brief says:

“(h) It is destructive of the independence of the judiciary and
thereby violates the constitutional provision that the Philippines is a
republican state because:

“(1) By creating a special court with jurisdiction over cases which were
already within the jurisdiction of the existing Courts of First Instance without
any real necessity and urgent justification, considering that the persons
involved in said cases were more or less known and identified at the time of the
creation of said special court, the law establishes a precedent under which the
legislature may at any time remove from the jurisdiction of existing courts
cases involving definite or specific individuals or groups of individuals to
serve any purpose which said legislature or the legislators composing the same
may wish to accomplish, either to the benefit or damage of said individuals or
groups of individuals;

“(2) By limiting the choice of the judges to compose the People’s Court to
those who did not hold any position in the Philippine Executive Commission
and/or the so-called Republic of the Philippines, the law makes a classification
that has absolutely no rational basis inasmuch as the reason for discriminating
against those who served in said governments, which is, that they might be
prejudiced or influenced in favor of the accused exists in equal measure for
those who did not serve, in the sense that they may likewise be prejudiced or
influenced against the accused; and

“(3) In leaving practically in the hands of the Solicitor General the
absolute right to choose, in which court he shall prosecute the cases
contemplated by the law, and in providing that the judges of the People’s Court
shall be chosen from a limited group of the judges of the Court of First
Instance, etc., the law does not leave a wide room for the play of external
factors in the administration of justice to those concerned but also destroys
the confidence of the people in the judiciary.”

(1 and 2) These objections go to the wisdom of the law and to matters of
policy. This1 being so, it is enough that the Congress deemed it necessary to
incorporate these provisions in Commonwealth Act No. 682. It is not the province
of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of
propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative
concern. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 661.)

(3) This proposition is covered by and answered in our comment on paragraph
(d) of the brief.

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed with costs against the
appellant.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ.,
concur.
Hontiveros, and Padilla, JJ., concur in the result.

PARAS, J.:

I reserve my vote, the decision in the Laurel
case is not as yet final.

---

PERFECTO, J.:

The appeal in this case raises only questions of law. Of the four assignments
of error made in appellant’s brief, the first three are premised on the theory
of suspended allegiance, and the last is premised on the theory that the law
creating the People’s Court is unconstitutional.

The question of suspended allegiance was already rejected by a majority of
this court in the case of Laurel vs. Misa, in a resolution dated January
30, 1947 (77 Phil., 856), and our reasons for voting for the rejection are
expressed in our written opinion in said case.

We do not see in appellant’s brief any argument which may justify the
changing of our opinion in the Laurel case where, by the way, the question of
suspended allegiance appears to have been discussed, perhaps, thoroughly and
exhaustibly.

Regarding the fourth assignment of error, appellant advances the following
proposition: “The People’s Court Law (Commonwealth Act No. 682) is
unconstitutional and void in many parts and as a whole because:

“(a) It contains provisions which deal on matters entirely foreign to
the subject matter expressed in its title;

“(b) It deprives persons similarly situated of the equal protection of
the laws;

“(c) It is a bill of attainder in that it virtually imposes upon
specific, known, and identified individuals or group of individuals, the penalty
of detention and imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months without any
form of judicial trial or procedure;

“(d) Section 2 thereof constitutes an invalid and void delegation of
legislative power, in so far as it virtually leaves unqualifiedly in the
discretion of the Solicitor General and/or the Office of Special Prosecutors the
power to determine the actual case over which the People’s Court shall have
jurisdiction;

“(e) Sections 1, 4, and 18 thereof abridge, limit and curtail the
power of appointment of the President;

“(f) It provides for the designation and/or transfer of judges
appointed for particular districts to another place outside of their respective
districts without the consent of the Supreme Court;

“(g) Sections 13 and 19 thereof prescribed rules of procedure
regarding appeal and bail which violate the rule of uniformity of rules for all
courts of the same grade established in the Constitution;

“(h) It is destructive of the independence of the judiciary and
thereby violates the constitutional provision that the Philippines is a
republican state;

“(i) Section 14 providing for disqualification of some Justices of the
Supreme Court is unreasonable in its operation.”

Although it is regrettable that appellant failed to elaborate on the several
grounds upon which he impugns the validity of the law in question, upon which
theory he seeks reversal of the decision of the People’s Court and his acquittal
from the treason charge, such failure does not relieve us from the duty of
passing upon the questions raised, much more because they are not of passing
importance. Our opinion on the several grounds relied upon by appellant to
attack the validity of Commonwealth Act No. 682 is as follows:

(a) MULTIPLICITY OF SUBJECT MATTER

On the first ground, appellant undoubtedly relies on the following provision
of the Constitution:

“No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject
which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.” (Section 21 [1], Article
VI.)

Five reasons are advanced by appellant to show that the act violates the
constitutional prohibition against multiplicity of subject matter. We are going
to deal with them separately.

(1) It is alleged that, although the People’s Court has been created
precisely to try crimes against national security with jurisdiction impliedly
exclusive, section 2 thereof retains the jurisdiction of courts of first
instance to try and decide cases not filed within six months. We do not believe
that the provision violates the constitutional inhibition. There should not be
any question that the creation of the People’s Court was an answer to an unusual
situation, created by the extraordinary social upheaval provoked by the last
war, demanding an uncommon solution, compatible with the tenets of our
democracy, with the provision of the Constitution, and with the noble aims of
justice. The several thousands of persons detained upon liberation charged with
treason and other crimes against national security, needed the creation of a
judicial machinery for the prompt disposal of their cases so as not to violate
their constitutional right to a speedy trial. It was admitted that the inferior
courts then existing were not enough to cope with the situation. Those who are
guilty, should be sentenced as soon as possible, so they may expiate for the
wrongs that they have committed, and those who are innocent are entitled to be
cleared without any delay. The People’s Court was, therefore, created to
shoulder the burden that the courts of first instance could not bear. Congress
estimated that six months was enough time for the cases of the thousands of
detainees to be filed with the People’s Court, while the cases of those who have
not yet been detained, on the assumption that they will be few, there was no
reason why these should not be disposed of by the courts of first instance as is
declared in the proviso of section 2. The proviso is germane with the subject
matter of the law and does not violate the prohibition against multiplicity of
subject matter.

(2) The second objection is raised against the proviso authorizing the
People’s Court to convict and sentence those accused for any crime included in
the acts alleged in the information and established by the evidence, although
they are not classified as among those committed against national security. The
objection cannot be entertained. The proviso is within the logical purview of
the creation of the People’s Court. The lawmaker must have had in mind the fact
that among the thousands of detainees which motivated the creation of the court
there were persons who had committed crimes other than those against national
security.

Although these are the crimes primarily in the minds of those who arrested
said detainees, there is nothing unnatural that those who committed said crimes
may have also committed offenses of different nature either in connection with
the first ones or independently, and if said other offenses are included among
the facts alleged in the information filed with the People’s Court and proved by
the evidence, there is no reason why said court should not punish them as a
court of first instance would, it appearing that the People’s Court is but a
special court of first instance.

(3) The third objection points to the disqualification of certain Justices of
the Supreme Court and the procedure of their substitution as provided in section
14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682. Although said section is, in effect, null and
void as unconstitutional, it is not enough ground to hold the whole act as
unconstitutional, as said section can be eliminated without affecting the
remaining provisions of the act.

(4) The fourth objection points to the proviso of section 19, which provides
for an exception concerning political offenders in the existing rules of court
on the subject of bail. Whether the proviso is valid or not, it cannot affect
the constitutionality of the whole act. If it is valid, it is within the purview
of the creation of the People’s Court. If it is invalid, it can be discarded
without affecting the other provisions of the law.

(5) The fifth objection points to the second proviso of section 19,
suspending the provisions of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. The proviso
is evidently unconstitutional. It is not within the purview of the creation of
the People’s Court. It creates a discrimination violative of the constitutional
guarantee of the equal protection of the laws. In effect, it authorizes
deprivation of liberty of the political prisoners for a period of six months,
which is violative of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be
deprived of his liberty without due process of law. But the proviso may be
eliminated without affecting the remaining portions of the act and, therefore,
is not enough ground for declaring the whole act null and void.

Our conclusion is that the first ground attacking the validity of the law is
without merit.

(b) EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS

Appellant advances six reasons to show that the act violates the
constitutional guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.

(1) The first reason is that, under section 2, the People’s Court is only to
try the cases of political offenders against whom the information has been filed
within six months, while others shall be tried in a Court of First Instance. We
believe that there is no unjust discrimination in it. Those who will be tried by
courts of first instance cannot complain of any unjust discrimination. They will
be tried by the regular tribunals created to try all other offenses. Those who
are to be tried by the People’s Court cannot complain either, because said court
is but another court of first instance, although especially created for the
prompt disposal of the cases of political detainees. Congress made it collegiate
as a guarantee against possible miscarriage of justice due to popular excitement
during the first months after the liberation. Congress believed that a
three-person tribunal can defend itself better against any outside pressure than
a one-man tribunal.

(2) The second reason is that political offenders accused in the People’s
Court are denied the preliminary investigation accorded to those who may be
accused in the court of first instance. We are of opinion that the allegation is
groundless. There is nothing in the act in question depriving political
offenders accused in the People’s Court of the preliminary investigation as
provided by Rule 108.

(3) The third reason is that political offenders accused in the People’s
Court have limited right to appeal, while those who may be accused of the same
crime in a court of first instance have absolute right to appeal. The allegation
is partly true. There appears a discrimination against those who may be
convicted by the People’s Court in banc, by providing that they can only
appeal in accordance with Rule 46, under which only questions of law may be
raised. We are of opinion that the discrimination is violative of the guarantee
of the equal protection of the laws, and should not be given effect. But the
unconstitutional provision may be eliminated, without annulling the whole act.
In practice, the invalid discriminating provision seems to have become obsolete
as all cases in the People’s Court are tried and decided in division and not
in banc.

(4) The fourth reason is that appeals in cases involving persons who held any
office under the governments established by the Japanese during the occupation
are to be heard and decided by a substantially different Supreme Court. The
allegation is correct by virtue of the provisions of section 14 which is
flagrantly unconstitutional because (a) the disqualification of some
members of the Supreme Court provided therein constitutes in effect partial
removal from office in open violation of the guarantees and procedure provided
by Article IX of the Constitution, (b) it provides for sitting in the
Supreme Court of persons not appointed in accordance with section 5 of Article
VIII of the Constitution and without the qualifications provided in section 6 of
the same article, and (c) it provides for the existence of a second
Supreme Court in violation of section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution
which provides for only “one Supreme Court.” But, as we have already stated,
section 14 can be eliminated from Commonwealth Act No. 682, without declaring
the act wholly unconstitutional.

(5) The fifth reason is that there is discrimination in the first proviso of
section 19 as to the granting of release on bail. We are of opinion that there
is no substantial discrimination.

(6) The sixth reason is the discrimination provided in the second proviso of
section 19. The proviso is null and void, but it can be eliminated without
annulling the whole act. It is a denial of the equal protection of the laws and
is violative of the constitutional guarantee against deprivation of liberty
without due process of law. The proviso should not be given effect, without
annulling the whole act.

(c) BILL OF ATTAINDER

Appellant alleges that Commonwealth Act No. 682 is a bill of attainder in
that it virtually imposes upon specific, known and identified individuals or
group of individuals, the penalty of detention and imprisonment for a period not
exceeding six months without any form of judicial trial or procedure.

The allegation is justified by the second proviso of section 19 of the act.
But it cannot affect it in whole as said proviso can be eliminated without
impairing the remaining proviso of the law.

(d) DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER

Appellant alleges that section 2 constitutes an invalid and void delegation
of legislative power in so far as it virtually leaves unqualifiedly in the
discretion of the Solicitor General and/or the Office of Special Prosecutors the
power to determine the actual cases over which the People’s Court shall have
jurisdiction. There is no such delegation. The People’s Court is substantially
but one court of first instance, only with limited jurisdiction. Whether a case
is to be tried by the People’s Court or by an ordinary court of first instance,
there is no substantial difference for purposes of the administration of justice
and the jurisdictions of both courts are specifically provided in the law.

(e) CURTAILMENT OF THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT OF THE
PRESIDENT

Appellant’s objection is directed against sections 1, 4, and 18. The
objection is untenable. Congress may validly provide for the qualifications of
the members of the People’s Court. Section 8 of Article VIII of the Constitution
expressly grants that authority.

(f) TRANSFER OF JUDGES WITHOUT APPROVAL OF THE SUPREME
COURT

Appellant alleges that Commonwealth Act No. 682 provides for the designation
and/or transfer of judges to another place outside of their respective districts
without the consent of the Supreme Court, implying that section 7 of Article
VIII of the Constitution is violated. The allegation is untenable. The fact that
the act authorizes the appointment of persons already holding positions in the
judiciary to be members of the People’s Court is no violation of the
constitutional mandate. What the authors of the Constitution contemplated were
transfers from one district to another, but not appointment of those already
holding positions to other positions.

(g) UNIFORMITY OF LAWS

The objections of appellant in paragraph (g) is but a repetition of
his objections in paragraph (b) already dealt with above.

(h) INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY

Appellant sets the following propositions:

1. By creating a special court with jurisdiction over cases which were already
   within the jurisdiction of the existing courts of first instance, considering
   that the persons involved in said cases were more or less known and identified
   at the time of the creation of said court, the law establishes a precedent under
   which Congress may at any time remove from the jurisdiction of existing court
   cases involving definite or specific individuals or groups of individuals to
   serve any purpose which the members of Congress may wish to accomplish, either
   to the benefit or damage of said individuals.

2. By limiting the choice of the judges to compose the People’s Court, the law
   makes a classification that has absolutely no rational basis.

3. In leaving to the hands of the Solicitor General the absolute right to
   choose in which court he shall prosecute the cases contemplated by the law and
   in providing that the judges of the People’s Court shall be chosen from a
   limited groups of individuals, etc., the law does not leave a wide room for the
   play of external factors in the administration of justice to those concerned but
   also destroys the confidence of the people in the judiciary.

The
questions raised in the above three propositions are serious but none of them
amounts to a violation of the fundamental law that may nullify the law in
question, as they involve a matter of public policy, although the first one
points to a situation bordering into a transgression of the guarantee of the
equal protection of the laws. If the provisions of the law creating the special
court should show a clear purpose of making a discrimination, pro or against
those who may be tried under it, then the law must be declared null and void
in toto. Such is not the case of the law under discussion. Matters of
public policy not involving a violation of the fundamental law are within the
province of Congress to legislate, subject only to the control of the people
through the electorate.

For all the foregoing, we vote to affirm the decision rendered by the lower
court in this case.