YOSHITSUGU MATSUURA, PETITIONER, V. HON. CESAR O. UNTALAN, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY, BRANCH CXLIX (149), PHILIPPINE OPPORTUNITIES FOR GROWTH AN…
ELBINIAS, J.:
dated March 15, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (“respondent court”
for brevity), Branch 149, Makati City in SP. PROC. NO. M-6384.
In his Petition, petitioner Yoshitsugu Matsuura (“petitioner” for brevity) averred the following, among others:
“xxx TF Ventures, Inc. is a domestic corporation duly organized
under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines with an initial
authorized capital stock of Php10Million.xxx On October 8, 1996, under suspicious circumstances which
will be shown later, the SEC approved the amended Articles of
Incorporation of T.F. Ventures, Inc. increasing the authorized
capitalization from P10,000,000 to P100,000,000. xxxxxx
xxx On November 21, 1997, petitioner Matsuura filed a request
for investigation by the Prosecution and Enforcement Department (PED) of
the SEC xxxxxx On May 22, 2001, the SEC rendered a resolution in PED Case
No. 98-2231, (1) finding that there was serious misrepresentation
committed in the application for increase in capitalization of TF
Ventures, Inc.; (2) setting aside the increase in authorized capital
stock from P10,000,000.00 to P100,000,000.00; and (3) ordering the
immediate revocation and cancellation of the certificate of increase in
capitalization.xxx
xxx TF Ventures was then the registered owner of a hotel
building xxx known as the ‘Best Western/Astor Hotel’ (formerly known as
‘Makati Sunrise Towers Hotel Condominium’) xxxxxx
xxx [the] hotel project xxx have been unlawfully assigned and
transferred by respondents TF Ventures and Morato to respondents Perdana
Hotel xxx and Perdana Land xxx, wherein new TCT Nos. 227564 and 227563
were issued to respondent Perdana Land xxxxxx
xxx On December 21, 2006 Philippine Opportunities for
Growth and Income (SPV-AMC), Inc. (POGI) filed a creditor-initiated
Petition for Rehabilitation of respondent TF Ventures, [Inc.], in its
capacity as the assignee of the Land Bank of the Philippines to the loan
obligation of respondent TF Ventures xxx (Special Purpose Vehicle Act
of 2002 under RA No. 9182) xxx SP Case No. M-6384 and subject matter of
the present petition. xxxxxx The main aim of the aforesaid Petition for
Rehabilitation was to prohibit respondent TF Ventures from selling,
encumbering, transferring or disposing in any manner any of its
properties and for the Rehabilitation Court to approve the
petitioner-creditor’s Rehabilitation Plan;xxx petitioner was not notified in writing by the Land
Bank of the Philippines of such assignment to POGI of the loan
obligation of respondent TF Ventures, [Inc.] as required by R.A. No.
9182. This despite the fact that petitioner is twenty (20) percent owner
of the corporation’s stockholdings.xxx Neither was the petitioner ever been notified of the
filing of the aforesaid Petition for Rehabilitation of respondent TF
Ventures, thereby denying to petitioner his constitutional right to due
process, as the stockholder of respondent TF Ventures holding 20% of the
outstanding capital stock thereof;xxx On December 2009, petitioner POGI was substituted by
respondent Prime Gaming allegedly pursuant to the Deed of Assignment
executed by and between the xxx parties;xxx On 13 June 2008, respondent Judge, as the Rehabilitation
Court, issued a RESOLUTION approving the Revised Rehabilitation Plan as
recommended by the Rehabilitation Receiver, respondent Buencamino. The
aforesaid Rehabilitation Plan calls for a Debt Service Plan of eight (8)
years, subject to review not later than 31 May 2016. xxxxxx The aforesaid RESOLUTION dated 13 June 2008 xxx prohibits
the Board of Directors and Stockholders of respondent TF Ventures from
declaring dividend during the period of rehabilitation, and from
encumbering, transferring or disposing any asset of respondent TF
Ventures;
xxx
xxx The aforesaid Revised Rehabilitation Plan xxx was
not complied with. Instead, in a Joint Motion to Approve Sale of Assets
and Pay Creditors filed on 23 December 2009, respondents Prime Gaming
and TF Ventures have asked the respondent Judge to allow the sale by
respondent TF Ventures of all its rights, titles and interests over the
whole hotel project, consisting of the Best Western Astor Hotel,
including the xxx three (3) parcels of land, building and all
improvements xxx to the nominee of respondent Prime Gaming xxxxxx The consent and approval of petitioner, as
stockholder, to the xxx Joint Motion to Approve Sale of Assets xxx of
respondent TF Ventures was not obtained by the latter, and neither by
respondent Morato;xxx On 11 March 2010, respondent Buencamino, as the
Rehabilitation Receiver, has filed a Compliance recommending approval of
the xxx Joint Motion to Approve Sale of Assets and Pay Creditors. xxx”[3] (Emphasis Supplied)
On March 15, 2010, respondent court, in the rehabilitation proceedings, issued the assailed Order[4], the dispositive portion of which decreed:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion being reasonable,
just, equitable and feasible, the same is hereby GRANTED, subject to
the following conditions:1. Upon execution of the dacion agreement, under those agreed
terms and conditions, by and between TF Ventures and Prime Gaming, the
money claim of employees and other statutory money claims against TF
Ventures, shall be paid and settled within thirty (30) days thereof; and
the operations of the Hotel by Best Western/Astor Hotel ceases.2. All withdrawals from the proceeds of the sale of the assets
of TF Ventures shall be with the conformity of the Receiver and the
Chief Executive Officer of TF Ventures, with proper documentation that
every money claim of creditor shall be treated as fully paid with
corresponding quitclaim.3. Prime Gaming shall open letters of credit with a refutable
(sic) commercial bank within thirty (30) days from the execution of the
dacion agreement for creditors who choose to be paid under the approved
rehabilitation plan, subject to the shave off percentage of 55.11% with
interest at 3% per annum for the first 4 years and 5% per annum for the
remaining years of payment until fully paid. If any of the remaining
creditor[s] chose to be paid earlier than the term of payment under the
approved rehabilitation plan, the money claim, however shall further be
subjected to a 50% discount.4. Any creditor who refused to be included and/or put under
the approved rehabilitation plan or this payment arrangement is hereby
given up to the deadline set forth by the Receiver, which is not later
than January 31, 2010, shall be considered excluded and his money claim
against TF Ventures, Inc. deemed abandoned, barred and lost forever.5. TF Ventures and Prime Gaming shall pay all outstanding
payables for administrative expenses, maintenance and repair of the
hotel and its facilities including the allowance of the Receiver until
this payment arrangement for creditors had been fully accomplished.6. This sale transaction of the assets of TF Ventures to Prime
Gaming under the dacion agreement contemplated by the herein parties is
hereby exempt from the payment of the capital gains tax for the simple
reason the subject assets of TF Ventures are not being held for sale.
These assets are ordinary assets being used in the business.SO ORDERED.”[5] (Emphasis was made in the original)
On September 25, 2013, petitioner filed the Petition[6] at bench, praying as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed (sic)
the Order of the Makati, RTC, Branch 149, dated March 15, 2010 be
declared NULL and VOID.Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.”[7]
A reading of the Petition[8] reveals that the grounds relied upon by petitioner were based on lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, as follows:
“I.
THE ASSAILED ORDER DATED 15 MARCH 2010 OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY, BRANCH 149 GRANTING THE SALE AND CONVEYANCE
OF THE WHOLE ASSETS OF RESPONDENT TF VENTURES IS NULL AND VOID AS IT WAS
RENDERED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONER WHO IS A STOCKHOLDER
OWNING 20% OF THE AUTHORIZED CAPITAL STOCK OF TF VENTURES.A. PETITIONER’s STOCKHOLDINGS TO THE EXTENT OF 20% OF
THE AUTHORIZED CAPITAL STOCK (ACS) OF TF VENTURES WAS AFFIRMED IN THE
DECISION DATED NOVEMBER 26, 2012 in Civil Case No. 01-207 entitled ‘TF
Ventures, Inc., Manuel L. Morato, Truman E. Becker, Jose Thomas Beldia,
Antonio I. Tan, Jr. and Dennis G. Manicad, Petitioners versus Alexander
Poblador, Yoshitsugu Matsuura, Romeo F. Gaza, Yusuke Fukuzumi, Florence
R. Valmonte, Virgilio R. Lazaga, Reza M. Arabpour, and Ruben P.
Jacinto, Respondents,’ issued by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149.B. THE SUPREME COURT RENDERED A DECISION IN THE CASE ENTITLED
TF VENTURES, INC., MANUEL L. MORATO, ANTONIO L. TAN, JR., TRUMAN E.
BECKER AND JOSE THOMAS D. BELDIA VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIMEON
P.BALDILLO AND YOSHITSUGU MATSUURA, (G.R. NO. 141510, AUGUST 13, 2004)
& TF VENTURES ET. AL. VS. YOSHITSUGU MATSUURA ET. AL. (G.R. NO.
154177, JUNE 9, 2004) WHICH AFFIRMED PETITIONER’S 20% STOCKHOLDING.C. DESPITE THE FACT THE PETITIONER HAS 20% SHARE, HE
WAS NOT IMPLEADED AS A PARTY TO THE REHABILITATION CASE AND HENCE, THE
COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER HIM.
II.
THE AFORESAID ORDER DATED 15 MARCH 2010 OF MAKATI
RTC-BRANCH 149 IS NULL AND VOID AS IT WAS RENDERED WITHOUT JURISDICTION
FOR FAILURE TO OBSERVE THE PROVISIONS OF R.A. NO. 4726, OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS THE CONDOMINIUM LAW.III.
THE ASSAILED ORDER IS NULL AND AVOID (sic) SINCE EXTRINSIC FRAUD WAS COMMITTED:
A. WHEN RESPONDENTS, BY THEIR FRAUDULENT COLLUSION,
CONVEYED AND DISPOSED THE WHOLE ASSET (LAND AND HOTEL) OF RESPONDENT TF
VENTURES, WITHOUT NOTIFYING AND SECURING THE APPROVAL OF PETITIONER, A
STOCKHOLDER OWNING 20% OF THE AUTHORIZED CAPITAL STOCK OF THE
CORPORATION.B. WHEN THE WHOLE HOTEL PROJECT INCLUDING THE COMMON
AREAS IN THE CONDOMINIUM PROJECT WAS SOLD, THEREBY DENYING TO
PETITIONER, AS STOCKHOLDER AND MEMBER OF THE CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION,
HIS RIGHT UNDER THE PROVISION OF R.A. NO. 4726.
IV.
RESPONDENT MORATO WHO SIGNED THE DEED IS NOT A
STOCKHOLDER OF RECORD; HENCE, HIS ACTIONS IN CONVEYING THE HOTEL PROJECT
ARE NULLITY. THE REHABILITATION COURT HAD THEREFORE GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED THE ASSAILED
ORDER.
V.
THE LOWER COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE SALE,
CONVEYANCE AND DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM PROJECT (HOTEL) SINCE THIS
WOULD RESULT TO THE DEMISE OF THE CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, WITHOUT
OBSERVING THE PROCEDURES REQUIRED BY LAW FOR ITS INVOLUNTARY
DISSOLUTION, AMONG WHICH, IS A PRIOR NOTICE TO PETITIONER WHO IS A MAJOR
STOCKHOLDER THERETO.”[9] (Emphasis and Italics were made in the original)
At the outset, contrary to petitioner’s grounds II and V, respondent court exercised jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
In claiming that respondent court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, petitioner had argued as follows:
“Non-application of special law
governing condominium ousts
the rehabilitation court of its
jurisdiction.xxx Special law that governs the disposition of condominium was
not observed by the rehabilitation court. Section 16 of Republic Act No.
4726 (otherwise known as AN ACT TO DEFINE CONDOMINIUM, AND GOVERN ITS
INCIDENTS), provides:Sec. 16. A condominium corporation shall not, during its
existence, sell, exchange, lease or otherwise dispose of the common
areas owned or held by it in the condominium, project unless authorized
by the affirmative vote of all the stockholders or members.xxx The court did not take into consideration this provision of
law having approved the sale and disposition of the land and improvement
without securing the affirmative vote of all stockholders, especially
petitioner Matsuura. Hence, without the affirmative vote of all members,
the rehabilitation court has no power to approve the sale of the
condominium project. In other words, it has no jurisdiction to issue the
assailed Order.xxx TF Ventures is a condominium corporation as contemplated
under Republic Act No. 4726. Respondent TF Ventures was envisioned to be
a condominium corporation, the principal purpose for which is the
construction and operation of a condominium hotel. In fact, the only
project of TF Ventures was the construction of a condominium hotel.
Thus, the court was bound to observe the exacting provision of Republic
Act No. 4726 in the disposition of the entire project, which is the
affirmative vote of all members, including petitioner, as required for
the sale and conveyance of the project.
xxx
xxx The sale, conveyance and disposition of the entire
condominium project (hotel) as enunciated in the assailed Order dated 15
March 2013 would have the effect of terminating the life of respondent
TF Ventures, as a condominium corporation, considering that the
condominium corporation will have no more condominium project to hold,
use, and occupy.xxx Without the condominium project, respondent TF Ventures is
deemed dissolved, albeit involuntarily – – the term of the condominium
corporation being coterminous with the duration of the condominium
project xxxxxx
xxx The failure by the lower court to give to the petitioner, as
indispensable party, the opportunity to controvert or oppose the
subject Joint Motion to Approve Sale of Assets xxx did not vest to the
lower court the jurisdiction to rule on the same. It has been ruled that
‘a court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be
waived by the parties or cured by their acquiescence or even express
consent’ xxx”[10] (Emphasis was made in the original)
Defeating petitioner’s arguments however, is that as is the
settled rule, “a court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action is conferred only by the Constitution or by statute”[11].
Here, the applicable law is not, as contended by petitioner, Republic
Act No. 4726 (“R.A. No. 4726” for brevity), otherwise known as “An Act
to Define Condominium, Establish Requirements for its Creation, and
Govern its Incidents”, but Republic Act No. 8799 (“R.A. No. 8799” for
brevity), otherwise known as “The Securities Regulations Code”, in
relation to the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation[12].
To begin with, petitioner failed to provide evidentiary
support that private respondent TF Ventures, Inc. was constituted as a
condominium corporation under R.A. No. 4726. Petitioner merely alleged
that private respondent TF Ventures, Inc. was “envisioned to be [a]
condominium corporation”[13].
However, private respondent TF Ventures, Inc.’s own document attached as
Annex “B”, which was the corporation’s General Information Sheet[14], revealed that the primary purpose for which the corporation was organized was for a “hotel and resort business”[15]. That same document also showed that there were only seven (7) stockholders[16].
Furthermore, no showing was made by petitioner that the
ownership of shares of stocks in private respondent TF Ventures, Inc.
also included the ownership of condominium units, which in turn, would
support petitioner’s claim that private respondent TF Ventures Inc. was a
condominium corporation.[17]
This is because the shares of stock in a condominium corporation are
inseparable from the condominium units of such corporation or vice
versa. That this is to be so, is in accordance with the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Jacobus Bernhard Hulst vs. PR Builders, Inc.[18], to wit:
“The law provides that no condominium unit can be sold without
at the same time selling the corresponding amount of rights, shares or
other interests in the condominium management body, the Condominium
Corporation; and no one can buy shares in a Condominium Corporation without at the same time buying a condominium unit. xxx” (Emphasis Supplied)
Consequently, private respondent TF Ventures, Inc. was a
corporation subject to the provisions of R.A. No. 8799 and the Interim
Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation[19],
which the proceeding below was. As such, jurisdiction over all those
affected by the proceedings, such as over petitioner, contrary to
petitioner’s assigned ground I that he “was not duly notified
or informed of the causes of such involuntary dissolution, thereby
violating [his] right to due process and depriving [him] his property
right as a stockholder of respondent TF Ventures”[20] – was acquired upon publication of the notice of the commencement of the proceedings in a newspaper of general circulation.[21]
That jurisdiction over all those affected by the
rehabilitation proceedings was acquired upon publication of the notice
of the commencement of the proceedings in a newspaper of general
circulation is as provided for under Section 1, Rule 3 of the Interim
Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, which states:
“Section 1. Nature of Proceedings. – Any proceeding
initiated under these Rules shall be considered in rem. Jurisdiction
over all those affected by the proceedings shall be considered as
acquired upon publication of the notice of the commencement of the
proceedings in any newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines in the manner prescribed by these Rules.The proceedings shall also be summary and non-adversarial in nature. xxx” (Emphasis Supplied)
Thus, because the rehabilitation proceeding below was in rem, summary, and non-adversarial, then petitioner was bound by such proceeding in rem.
Accordingly, whether or not he was one of the stockholders of private
respondent TF Ventures, Inc., then contrary to petitioner’s assigned grounds I and II, there was no need to notify petitioner in person.
That an in rem proceeding, such as the rehabilitation proceeding below, binds the entire world, was as declared by the Supreme Court in Milagros M. Barco vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.[22], to wit:
“xxx an action in rem, an action against a thing and not
against a person. The decision on the petition binds not only the
parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated
essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole
world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who
might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right
sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that
brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court
with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.” (Emphasis Supplied)
Given therefore the fact that the proceeding below was in rem, then, petitioner could not also properly argue in his assigned ground III that respondent court’s issuance of the Order[23]
dated March 15, 2010 was attended by “extrinsic fraud” on ground that
petitioner was unlawfully deprived of being able to participate in the
rehabilitation proceedings.
Petitioner had argued as follows:
“xxx The issuance of the assailed Order was attended by
extrinsic fraud. Petitioner was EXCLUDED from the entire proceedings,
and especially in the sale and conveyance of the land and hotel to the
respondents. Respondents Morato, et al. in collusion with Prime Gaming
succeeded in excluding petitioner from the dacion en pago arrangement
which was granted by the respondent Judge in the Order dated March 15,
2010. Clearly, extrinsic fraud is present when thru the malicious
machinations of the respondent Morato and other respondents: i)
petitioner Matsuura was prevented to present (sic) protect his claim and
interest in TF Ventures; ii) when he was not involved in the
rehabilitation plan although he is a valid stockholder with a
substantial holdings of 20% control of the company; iii) depriving
petitioner of due process when he was excluded from the dacion en pago.
Thus, petitioner was deprived of his interest/property rights in TF
Ventures without due process of law in clear violation of the Bill of
Rights.”[24] (Italics was made in the original)
However, because petitioner was deemed to have been notified by publication[25], then extrinsic fraud could not have been committed upon him.
Moreover, extrinsic fraud, in order to be availed of as a
ground for an Action for Annulment of Judgment, refers to any fraudulent
scheme of the prevailing litigant which prevented a party from having
his day in court, as is pursuant to the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in
Pablo T. Tolentino and Tempus Place Realty Management Corporation vs. Hon. Oscar Leviste, et. al.[26], to wit:
“Under the Rule, an action for annulment of judgments may only
be availed of on the following grounds: (1) extrinsic fraud and (2) lack
of jurisdiction.Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the
prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the
trial of the case, whereby the unsuccessful party has been prevented
from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him
by his opponent. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a
party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the
court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment
itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding
consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent
scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day
in court.Petitioners in this case did not allege nor present evidence of
fraud or deception employed on them by the respondents to deprive them
of opportunity to present their case to the court. xxx” (Emphasis Supplied)
Petitioner also failed to properly support by evidence, his
allegation that “extrinsic fraud”, or that deception was employed on him
by the respondents so as to properly consider him to have been deprived
of the opportunity to present his case before respondent court.
If anything, petitioner should have earlier availed of remedies
such as a New Trial, Appeal, Petition for Relief or other appropriate
remedies, all of which petitioner was required to do, pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.[27]
Given petitioner’s allegations, especially regarding his
ownership of shares of stocks of private respondent TF Ventures, Inc.,
petitioner should have been aware or should have made himself aware of
the developments of private respondent TF Ventures, Inc. Therefore,
petitioner slept on his rights, and is in estoppel.
As to petitioner’s ground IV that respondent court “gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction”[28] in issuing its Order[29] dated March 15, 2010, such could not be a proper ground to annul respondent court’s Order.[30]
This is because an action for Annulment of Judgment can only be based
on “extrinsic fraud” and “lack of jurisdiction” and can not prosper on
the basis of “grave abuse of discretion.” This is as is pursuant to the
following declaration of the Supreme Court in Antonino vs. The Register of Deeds of Makati City and Tan Tian Su:[31]
“xxx [A] petition for annulment of judgment can only be
based on ‘extrinsic fraud’ and ‘lack of jurisdiction’ and cannot prosper
on the basis of ‘grave abuse of discretion’. By anchoring her
petition on the alleged grave abuse of discretion that attended the
dismissal of her complaint and the denial of her two (2) motions for
reconsideration, Antonino, is, in effect, enlarging the concept of ‘lack
of jurisdiction’. As this Court previously clarified in Republic of the Philippines v. ‘G’ Holdings, Inc.,
‘lack of jurisdiction’ as a ground for the annulment of judgments
pertains to lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party
or over the subject matter of the claim. It does not contemplate ‘grave
abuse of discretion’ considering that ‘jurisdiction’ is different from
the exercise thereof. As ruled in Tolentino v. Judge Leviste:Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As
distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the
authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein.
Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the
decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise
of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the
exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the
proper subject of an appeal.” (Emphasis supplied)
The rule is settled that an action for Annulment of Judgment is
“an extraordinary remedy, which is not to be granted indiscriminately by
the court”[32]. This is especially so, considering that “[i]t is a recourse equitable in character and allowed only in exceptional cases.”[33]
For all these reasons, the Petition at bench was not shown to be prima facie meritorious[34], and, is therefore DENIED DUE COURSE.
SO ORDERED.
Dicdican (Chairperson) and Dimagiba,[*] JJ., concur.
[*] Vice J. Paredes per Office Order No. 34-14-RSF
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-30
[2] Rollo, pp. 32-38
[3] Rollo, pp. 6-12
[4] Rollo, pp. 32-38
[5] Rollo, pp. 37-38
[6] Rollo, pp. 3-30
[7] Rollo, p. 25
[8] Rollo, pp. 3-30
[9] Rollo, pp. 14-17
[10] Rollo, pp. 20-24
[11] Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) vs. Fontana Development Corporation,
G.R. No. 187972, June 29, 2010; Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Eguardo Hong, et. al., G.R. No.
161771, February 15, 2012
[12] A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC dated November 21, 2000
[13] Rollo, p. 9
[14] Rollo, p. 39
[15] Rollo, p. 39
[16] Rollo, p. 40
[17] Jacobus Bernhard Hulst vs. PR Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 156364, September 25, 2008
[18] G.R. No. 156364, September 25, 2008
[19] A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC dated November 21, 2000
[20] Rollo, p. 24
[21] Rollo, p. 122
[22] G.R. No. 120587, January 20, 2004
[23] Rollo, pp. 32-38
[24] Rollo, pp. 21
[25] Rollo, p. 122
[26] G.R. No. 156118, November 19, 2004
[27] Section 1, Rule 47. Coverage. – This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of
judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.
[28] Rollo, pp. 16, 23.
[29] Rollo, pp. 32-38
[30] Rollo, pp. 32-38
[31] G.R. No. 185663, June 20, 2012.
[32] Andrew B. Nudo vs. Hon. Amado S. Caguioa, et. al., G.R. No. 176906, August 4, 2009
[33] Republic of the Philippines vs. Technological Advocates for Agro-Forest Programs Association, Inc.,
G.R. No. 165333, February 9, 2010
[34] Section 5, Rule 47