IN THE MATTER OF THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR TO THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF HENRY L. POOLE, DECEASED,
PEREZ, J.:
Lodelina G. Poole, widow of the late Henry L. Poole, appeals the August 3, 2010[1] and October 4, 2010[2] Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch 12 (court a quo) in Special Proceedings No. 3773 entitled “In the Matter of the Appointment of an Administrator to the Intestate Estate of Henry Poole, deceased Alfredo C. Sebastian, petitioner.” The fallo of the August 3, 2010 Order, reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Possession dated June 25, 2010 is hereby GRANTED. Let therefore a writ of possession be issued in the herein case directing the Sheriff of this Court to place the movant, Jeffrey C. Wee in physical possession of that property known as Lot No. 583-A-1 situated at barangay Sta. Maria covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-218, 498 registered in his name, including the improvements found and existing thereon and to eject the oppositor, Lodelina G. Poole, and all those other persons claiming rights under her therefrom.
The appearance of Atty. Quirino G. Esguerra, Jr., for the oppositor is hereby NOTED.
SO ORDERED.[3]
The Facts:
Appellant is the surviving spouse of the late Henry Poole (Henry), an American national engaged in logging and lumber business in the Philippines in the 1990’s.
The controversy in the instant case began when Henry died intestate on May 6, 1991 allegedly leaving unpaid obligations to his creditors. One of the creditors claiming payment is appellee Alfredo S. Sebastian (Sebastian), who earlier filed an ordinary civil action against the surviving spouse Lodelina in Civil Case No. 360 (3980) before the RTC, Zamboanga City, Branch 16. That action was however dismissed after the court where the action was file ruled that Sebastian’s claims should be made in the settlement of Henry’s estate. [4]
On August 2, 1993, Sebastian initiated a petition[5] before the court a quo a for his appointment as administrator of the estate of Henry docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3773. The petition substantially alleged: that he is of legal age, married, a businessman and a resident of General Vicente Alvarez St., Zamboanga City; that as a businessman, he had done business with Henry L. Poole, an American businessman, from December 4, 1990 up to April 13, 1991; that in the course thereof, petitioner extended cash credits to said Henry L. Poole in the amount of Php 869,865.00; that said Henry L. Poole died on May 6, 1991 in the City of Zamboanga without leaving any will and last testament nor paying or settling his obligation to petitioner; that Henry’s surviving spouse Lodelina G. Poole and his son James L. Poole have not filed a petition for the administration of Henry’s estate although he learned that Lodelina sold some equipments of the estate worth P1,000,000.00 to one Wee Dee Ping; that he tried to recover payment from Lodelina for recovery of a sum of money with preliminary attachment but the same was dismissed by the court; that Henry left six (6) parcels of land all situated in Zamboanga City which are all conjugal properties of the late Henry and herein appellant Lodelina; that he is willing, competent, and able to serve the trust as administrator of the estate of Henry; that he is ready and willing to post the bond as the Court may require him.
On September 28, 1993, the court a quo issued an Order[6] finding the petition sufficient in form and substance. The initial hearing was set on November 5, 1983. The court a quo directed Sebastian to publish the order in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks and directed the court’s sheriff to cause the notice to be served on appellant and to be posted in three (3) conspicuous public places.
At the initial hearing, only Sebastian appeared despite due notice to appellant. Consequently, after complying with the jurisdictional requirements of publication and notice,[7] on February 16, 1994, the court a quo issued an Order[8] appointing Sebastian as regular administrator of the estate of the late Henry Poole. The validity of Sebastian’s appointment as administrator is the subject of a separate case pending before this Court.[9]
On April 29, 1994, Sebastian submitted to the court a quo an Inventory of the Estate of Henry Poole[10] consisting of real and personal properties. The inventory included Lot 583-A-1 covered by TCT No. T-91,470 of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City registered in the name of “Lodelina G. Poole, Filipino, of legal age, married to Henry L. Poole, an American citizen”. The possession of this property is the subject of this appeal.
On January 14, 1998, the court a quo issued an Order granting Sebastian authority to sell certain properties under his administration including the property covered by TCT No. T-91740 for the satisfaction of his unpaid claims amounting to Php869,865.00 and the unpaid labor claims of Henry’s employees pursuant to the final decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case Nos. 09-06-00164, 09-06-00166-91, 09-06-00172-91 and 09-06-00176-91, RAB No. 91, Zamboanga City.[11]
On May 3, 1999, or after six (6) years from the time Sebastian was appointed administrator of the estate of Henry, appellant appeared for the first time before the court a quo opposing the appointment of Sebastian as administrator.[12] She also averred that the properties included in the inventory submitted by Sebastian are her paraphernal properties. As such, Sebastian has no right to place them under his administration.
Sebastian maintains that his appointment as administrator was done in conformity with Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court. He argues that it has been six (6) years before appellant came to court to oppose his appointment. Sebastian avers that the Notice of Hearing of the petition was duly published in a paper of general circulation as mandated by Section 3, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and said publication is a notice in rem or one addressed to the whole world. Further, while it is true that the properties are registered in the name of appellant married to Henry Poole, these properties were acquired during the marriage and as such are presumed to be conjugal properties of the spouses.[13]
A hearing was set to hear the respective positions of the parties.
On January 18, 2000, the court a quo issued an Order maintaining that the appointment of Sebastian as administrator was in order.[14] The court a quo noted that the petition complied with the jurisdictional facts, and Sebastian complied with the publication requirement when he caused the notice of hearing to be published in a newspaper of general circulation. Moreover, notice thereof was served on appellant at her known address per Receipt No. 0107. The court a quo agreed that compliance with the publication requirement is a notice in rem, one which is addressed to the whole world including appellant, but despite such notice, no opposition oral or written was filed by appellant until after six (6) years after the notice was published. Hence, the opposition filed by appellant after the period within which to file the same had long lapsed. Furthermore, the court a quo held that the claim of appellant that the properties subject of the petition for administration are her paraphernal properties have not been substantiated.
No motion for reconsideration was filed by appellant from the January 18, 2000 Order.
Consequently, Sebastian proceeded to cause the publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Zamboanga City for sale to interested buyers five (5) parcels of land belonging to the estate of Henry L. Poole including improvements. Appellee Jeffrey C. Wee (Wee) offered to buy the property subject of this case, to wit:
Lot No. 583-A-1, PSD 56412, being a portion of Lot 583-A-1, ZT, located at Sta. Maria, Zamboanga City, residential, containing an area of 1,923 square meters covered by TCT No. T-91,470[15] for the sum of Php2,401,855.13.
On July 15, 2008, Sebastian as administrator executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered Land[16] in favor of appellee Wee over the subject property. On March 20, 2009, the court a quo issued an Order approving the sale of the subject property in favor of Wee for the amount of Php2,401,855.13 representing the judgment claim in NLRC Case Nos. 09-06-00164, 09-06-00166-91, 09-06-00172-91 and 09-06-00176-91, RAB No. 91, Zamboanga City in the amount of Php231,365.00 and Sebastian’s claim in the total amount of Php1,674,490.13.[17]
On September 24, 2009, the court a quo issued an Order directing the Office of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City to cause the registration of subject property in the name of appellee Wee pursuant to Section 7, paragraph (f) of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, and the cancellation of TCT No. T-91,470 registered in the name of Henry L. Poole covering Lot No. 583-A-1, PSD 56412.
On October 30, 2009, the above Order became final and executory.[18] As a result, on November 13, 2009, appellee Wee successfully caused the cancellation of TCT No. T-91470 and a new one (TCT T-218,498)[19] was issued in the name of Jeffrey C. Wee married to Susanne Go Wee.
Now claiming ownership, Wee, on June 24, 2010, filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession to place him in physical possession of the subject property.[20]
A hearing was conducted on July 2, 2010, but only appellees Wee and Sebastian appeared. A copy of the motion was served on appellant, but no opposition or objection was filed by appellant. Hence, appellee’s motion was submitted for the court’s resolution.[21]
On July 6, 2010, after the motion was submitted for resolution, a new counsel for the appellant entered his appearance and filed an Opposition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession,[22] reiterating his previous objection that the parcel of land subject of the case is the paraphernal property of appellant alone.
Appellees commented that the claim of appellant that the subject property is paraphernal is not supported by evidence.[23]
After due proceedings, the court a quo on August 3, 2010, issued the first assailed Order in favor of appellee Wee directing the Sheriff to place appellee Jeffrey C. Wee in physical possession of the property known as Lot No. 583-A-1 situated at barangay Sta. Maria covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-218, 498, including the improvements found and existing thereon and to eject appellant and all those other persons claiming rights under her therefrom. [24]
Thereafter, a Notice To Vacate was issued by the Sheriff to appellant Lodelina and all persons claiming right under her to vacate and surrender possession of the property covered by TCT T-218,498 (formerly TCT No. T-91470).[25]
In issuing the writ of possession the court a quo held –
xxx the records will show that the movant Jeffrey C. Wee is the purchaser of the Court approved sale of a parcel of land belonging to the Estate of the Deceased, Henry L. Poole which sale was conducted for the purpose of settling legitimate monetary claims against the said estate. It would appear that the oppositor herein, Lodelina G. Poole was duly notified of the proceedings undertaken herein from the start as she in fact filed a written opposition to the appointment of petition, Alfredo C. Sebastian as administrator hereof on July 14, 1999. Worthy of note is that, the said written opposition was filed after the Court issued the Order of January 14, 1998, authorizing the Court Appointed, Alfredo C. Sebastian to sell the properties or portions thereof under his administration, to include the property sold to the movant, Jeffrey C. Wee and now registered in the latter’s name, for the purpose of satisfying the said claims against the estate. As rightfully raised by the movant in its comment to the opposition of the oppositor, Leodelina G. Poole to his motion for writ of opposition, the Court had, in its Order dated January 18, 2000 denying the said oppositor’s opposition, already ruled that no evidence has been presented by the oppositor herein that the properties being made subject of the administration is truly paraphernal in nature. No motion for reconsideration or appeal on the same ruling of this Court appears to have been filed by the oppositor, thus, the same became final. This Court at this time therefore, could no longer entertain the reiterated opposition of oppositor that the property in contention is her paraphernal property on the simple ground that the same has been already previously passed upon by this Court in its Order dated January 18, 2000.
All in all therefore, this Court finds no convincing and justifying reasons why it should not grant the movant, Jeffrey C. Wee’s motion for the issuance of a writ of possession in his favor. Having parted with a substantial amount of money to pay for the purchase price of the property sold to him pursuant to this Court’s Order for the purpose of satisfying the legitimate monetary claims against the Estate of the late Henry L. Poole, with apparent notice to the oppositor herein and the sale thereof having been approved by this Court, equity dictates that he be granted immediate possession thereof.[26]
The subsequent motion for reconsideration of appellant was denied in the second assailed Order dated October 4, 2010.
On October 22, 2010, appellant filed a notice of appeal before the court a quo.[27] Consequently, the entire records of the case was transmitted to the Court on November 5, 2010.
This Court in the Resolution dated 4 July 2012 denied appellant’s prayer for provisional injunctive relief[28], and the Supreme Court dismissed a petition on the same issue.[29]
Assignment of Errors:
In her appeal, appellant raised a lone assigned error, thus:
THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO ERRED WHEN IT ISSUED ITS OCTOBER 4, 2010 ORDER MAINTAINING ITS ORDER OF ENFORCING THE WRIT OF POSSESSION OVER THE PARCEL OF LAND COVERED BY TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-218,498 FORMERLY REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF THE APPELLANT.[30]
The Court’s Ruling:
On Procedural Grounds
Before going into the merits of the case, We first determine whether or not the notice of appeal filed by appellant in this case is the proper remedy.
An ordinary appeal from a final judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court acting in its original jurisdiction may be taken in one of two ways. Section 2 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, reads:
Section 2. Modes of appeal.—
(a) Ordinary appeal.— The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
xxx
(emphasis supplied)
The foregoing rules indicate that a judgment or final order in special proceedings and other cases of multiple and separate appeals is appealed by record on appeal. In Spouses Lebin v. Mirasol,[31] the Supreme Court explained that a judgment or final order determining and terminating a particular part is usually appealable, because it completely disposes of a particular matter in the proceeding, unless otherwise declared by the Rules of Court.
In appeals by record on appeal, the form and contents thereof must conform to Rule 41, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.[32]
The reason for requiring a record on appeal instead of only a notice of appeal is the multi-part nature of nearly all special proceedings, with each part susceptible of being finally determined and terminated independently of the other parts. An appeal by notice of appeal is a mode that envisions the elevation of the original records to the appellate court as to thereby obstruct the trial court in its further proceedings regarding the other parts of the case. In contrast, the record on appeal enables the trial court to continue with the rest of the case because the original records remain with the trial court even as copies of the relevant record afford the appellate court the full opportunity to review and decide only the appealed matter.
Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court underscores the multi-part nature of special proceedings by enumerating the particular judgments and final orders already subject of appeal by any interested party despite other parts of the proceedings being still untried or unresolved, to wit:
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. – An interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment:
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the person appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.
A close scrutiny of the instant case shows that the Orders assailed by appellant are but offshoots of the final order of the court a quo dated March 20, 2009, which allowed in part the sale of certain properties in the estate of the deceased Henry Poole for the satisfaction of claims against the estate of Henry for the amount of Php2,401,855.13 representing the judgment claim in NLRC Case Nos. 09-06-00164, 09-06-00166-91, 09-06-00172-91 and 09-06-00176-91, RAB No. 91, Zamboanga City in the amount of Php231,365.00 and Sebastian’s claim in the total amount of Php1,674,490.13 falling under Section 1(c), Rule 109 of the Rules of Court stated above. Necessarily, to perfect an appeal therefrom a record on appeal should be timely filed and court-approved so that copies of the pertinent records sufficient for appellate review may be elevated without the RTC being deprived of the original records, and the proper remedy is to file a record on appeal and not a mere notice of appeal, as petitioner erroneously did in this case.
On this ground alone therefore this appeal wrongly taken by notice of appeal may already be dismissed.
On Substantive Grounds
In assailing the issuance of the writ of possession, appellant argues in the main that the property subject of this appeal is her paraphernal property, hence should not be included in the inventory of properties of her late husband, who in the first place is a foreigner prohibited to own lands in the Philippines.
Appellee on the other hand countered that the claim of appellant that the subject property is paraphernal is merely an afterthought, in fact even a veiled attempt to remove the property from the reach of the creditors of the deceased as shown by the provenance of the property from the deceased to his daughter until it came to be registered in the name of appellant by way of donation. Appellee argued that appellant was given ample opportunity to present evidence to support the claim that the subject property is paraphernal however, appellant slept on her supposed right, took an unreasonable length of time to assert it and thus she is now barred to raise these issues at this very late stage as laches has set in.
The records do show that appellant appeared for the first time to assert sole ownership of the contested property only after the lapse of ten (10) years from the time letters of administration was granted in favor of Sebastian despite notice of publication and service of notice at her last known address. She claims that she had been in the United States the whole time and was unaware of the developments in the case. Notably, on January 18, 2000, the court a quo issued an Order maintaining that the appointment of Sebastian as administrator was in order. Thereafter, no subsequent pleading assailing the same was filed by appellant.[33]
The court a quo thus cannot be faulted with error when it made the following ruling –
… Oppositor-movant had her opportunity to question the actions taken by this Court in the herein case which has been pending before this Court since 1993 after her petition to the herein petition was denied by this Court wherein oppositor herein raised the same issues being raised now and oppositor did not even file any motion for reconsideration nor did she file any appeal therefrom.
This Court cannot likewise be swayed by the oppositor’s protestations that she was not duly furnished with the orders of this Court in the herein case as she was most of the time, accordingly out of the country. Records will show that attempts to serve her at her given address before this Court proved futile as nobody thereat would like to accept the same. This Court after going over the records hereof did not find any manifestation from the oppositor that she has in fact left for abroad and no evidence thereof was presented. Thus, the Court cannot be faulted for the oppositor’s belated protest. Moreover, as the oppositor in this petition, she appears not to have the slightest of interest over the outcome of the herein petition as after her opposition was denied oppositor never filed any other pleadings until after the motion for the issuance of the writ of possession over the property subject hereof came into view which is more than ten (10) long years from the time the Order dated January 18, 2000 denying his opposition to the herein petition was denied. This Court is no longer in the position to entertain and revive issues already raised by the very same oppositor, more than ten (10) years ago and was already ruled upon by this Court.[34]
Even if we are to concede that the true character of the disputed property whether it is paraphernal of the appellant or conjugal of the spouses may still be in dispute, we are at this point constrained to assume that by law these properties shall be presumed to be conjugal as they are in the name of appellant married to the late Henry Poole until convincing evidence to the contrary has overturned this presumption.
It must be reckoned that as a general rule, all property acquired by the spouses, regardless of in whose name the same is registered, during the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.[35] To rebut this presumption of the conjugal nature of the property, the party asserting it has the burden of proving with strong, clear and convincing evidence that the property belongs exclusively to either spouse. In Spouses Go v. Yamane,[36] the Court ruled that petitioners’ failure to adduce strong, clear and convincing evidence that one spouse bought the property with her exclusive funds and for utter lack of evidence thereof, the presumption cannot be overthrown and the conclusion that the contested land remains conjugal should be upheld.
Rule 73, Section 2 of the Rules of Court state that when the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. What this means is that the entirety of the conjugal community shall be made available for the payment of valid conjugal debts in the course of the testate or intestate settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse.
As such, the court a quo did not commit error when in the absence of contrary evidence that the disputed property which was included in the inventory of the estate of the appellant’s deceased spouse Henry Poole did not form part of said estate, it then authorized the sale thereof in settlement of claims against the estate.
It then follows that the issuance of the writ of possession over the property covered by TCT No. T-218,498 (formerly TCT No. T-91470) in favor of the purchaser appellee Jeffrey Wee which is a mere consequence and necessary enforcement of the court-approved sale is likewise not an error that We should correct.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The August 3, 2010 and October 4, 2010 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch 12 in Special Proceedings No. 3773 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Camello, J., Ch., and Inting, JJ., concur.
[1] Records, p. 679.
[2] Records, p. 375.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Rollo, p. 13.
[5] Records, p. 1.
[6] Records, p. 6.
[7] Records, p. 8.
[8] Records, pp. 31-32.
[9] CA-G.R. SP No. 06372-MIN .
[10] Records, pp. 33-34.
[11] Records, p. 226.
[12] Records, p. 227.
[13] Records, p. 231.
[14] Records, p. 238.
[15] Records, p. 291.
[16] Records, p. 295.
[17] Records, p. 302.
[18] Records, p. 318.
[19] Records, p. 322.
[20] Records, p. 337.
[21] Records, p. 339.
[22] Records, p. 341.
[23] Records, p. 354.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Rollo, p. 94.
[26] Records, pp. 362-363.
[27] Records, p. 377.
[28] Rollo, pp. 183-184.
[29] G.R. CV No. 62502.
[30] Rollo, p. 17.
[31] G.R. No. 164255, September 7, 2011.
[32] Rule 41, Section 9, Rules of Court.
[33] Rollo, pp. 112-117.
[34] Records, pp. 375-376.
[35] Titan Construction v. David, G.R. No. 169548, 15 March 2010.
[36] G.R. No. 160762, 3 May 2006.