G.R. No. L-21623. April 30, 1966

RIZAL SURETY & INSURANCE COMPANY, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions April 30, 1966 BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
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BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:


On March 16, 1962, Cargill, Inc. shipped on board the vessel “SS
EURYALUS/EURADAMAS” at New Orleans, Louisiana, consigned to the
Superior Feed Mills, Inc. in Manila, 6,000 sacks of soybean meals
weighing 604,481 lbs. which was insured with the Rizal Surety &
Insurance Company. Upon arrival of the shipment it was unloaded and
placed under the custody of the Manila Port Service, which is a
subsidiary of the Manila Railroad Company. When the cargo was
subsequently delivered to the consignee, it was found that 106 sacks
were shortweighed by 7,526 lbs. by reason of which the surety company
paid to said consignee their value amounting to P1,158.93. As a
consequence, the insurance company filed a claim with both the vessel
and the arrastre operator for reimbursement of said amount and when
both refused it instituted the present action on March 13, 1963 before
the Court of First Instance of Manila making as alternative defendants
the Delgado Shipping Agencies, Inc., agent of the vessel that brought
the shipment, on one hand, and the Manila Railroad Company and Manila
Port Service, on the other, seeking to recover from either the value of
the short-delivered cargo in the amount of P1,158.93, with legal
interest thereon from the filing of the complaint, plus attorney’s
fees, and the costs of action.

Defendants Manila Railroad Company and Manila Port Service filed a
motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction for the reason that the
action is not one of admiralty and the amount sought to be recovered is
not more than P2,000.00 thereby placing it within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the municipal court. The court a quo granted
the motion stating that since the action is based on the arrastre
contract and the amount involved is less than P5,000.00 it has no
jurisdiction over the case.

Plaintiff interposed the present appeal.

Considering that the action against Delgado Shipping Agencies, Inc.
is one of admiralty and belongs to the jurisdiction of the court of
first instance while the action against the Manila Port Service and the
Manila Railroad Company is based on the arrastre contract which,
because of the amount involved, comes under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the municipal court, can the instant case be taken cognizance of by
the former upon the theory that both defendants are sued in the
alternative?

The answer must be in the affirmative bearing in mind that the cause
of action against the alternative defendants arises out of the same
transaction which is the recovery of the value of the lost merchandise
and the nature of the loss could not be determined at the moment. This
view finds support in Section 5 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court which
provides:

“SEC. 5. Joinder of causes of action.—Subject
to rules regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties, a party
may in one pleading state, in the alternative or otherwise, as many
causes of action as he may have against an opposing party (a) if the
said causes of action arise out of the same contract, or transaction or
relation between the parties, or (b) if the causes of action are for
demands for money, or are of the same nature and character.

“In
the cases falling under clause (a) of the preceding paragraph, the
action shall be filed in the inferior court unless any of the causes
joined falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, in
which case it shall be filed in the latter court.

“In the
cases falling under clause (b) the jurisdiction shall be determined by
the aggregate amount of the demands, if for money, or by their nature
and character, if otherwise.”

As may be seen, the instant case comes within the purview of the
rule abovequoted for therein it is postulated that a party may in one
pleading state in the alternative as many causes of action as he may
have against an opposing party if they arise from the same transaction
with the particularity that the case may be filed in the court of first
instance if any of said causes of action falls exclusively within its
jurisdiction. This is precisely what was done in this particular case.
Because of the uncertainty of the place where the disappearance of the
shipment occurred, plaintiff brought the case in the alternative before
the court of first instance upon the theory that it may have occurred
while the shipment was in transit or while in the custody of the
arrastre operator.

This case also finds support in International Harvester Company of the Philippines vs.
Aragon, et al., 84 Phil., 363. In said case, the complaint was filed in
the municipal court against both the shipping company as agent of the
vessel on which the shipment was loaded and the Manila Terminal
Company, Inc. as alternative defendants, seeking to recover the sum of
P200.00 as value of the undelivered goods, it being uncertain whether
said cargo was lost at sea or while in storage at the Port of Manila.
In affirming the dismissal of the case this Court stated that the
municipal court had no jurisdiction over the same because it is
predicated on the contract of carriage by sea which falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the court of first instance. And reasoning by
analogy, we may say that the instant case also falls exclusively within
the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila upon the
theory that the loss or disappearance of a portion of the shipment may
have taken place during the voyage and hence it involves a maritime
case which falls within the original jurisdiction of said court. The
fact that the amount sought to be collected is less than its
jurisdictional limit is of no moment, because the cause of action being
indivisible, covering as it does laws co ordinary as well as maritime
contract, such jurisdictional limitation as to amount must yield to the
greater jurisdiction of the court as to subject matter for reasons of
expediency and convenience.

“Constitutional and statutory provisions conferring
jurisdiction on the inferior courts of demands below certain amounts do
not forbid determination of said demands in the superior court where
they are connected with larger claims or with a type of demand solely within the jurisdiction of the superior court.” (21 C.J.S., p. 81, italics supplied)

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside, and the case is ordered remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. No costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.