G.R. No. L-1648. August 17, 1949
PEDRO SYQUIA, GONZALO SYQUIA, AND LEOPOLDO SYQUIA, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIVIDAD ALMEDA LOPEZ, JUDGE OF MUNICIPAL COURT OF MANILA, CONRADO V. SANCHEZ, JUDGE OF COURT OF FIRST INSTA…
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
from and based on the pleadings, may be stated. The plaintiffs named Pedro,
Gonzalo, and Leopoldo, all surnamed Syquia, are the undivided joint owners of
three apartment buildings situated in the City of Manila known as the North
Syquia Apartments, South Syquia Apartments and Michel Apartments located at 1131
M. H. del Pilar, 1151 M. H. del Pilar and at 1188 A. Mabini streets,
respectively.
About the middle of the year 1945, said plaintiffs executed
three lease contracts, one for each of the three apartments, in favor of the
United States of America at a monthly rental of P1,775 for the North Syquia
Apartments, P1,890 for the South Syquia Apartments, and P3,335 for the Michel
Apartments. The term or period for the three leases was to be “for the duration
of the war and six months thereafter, unless sooner terminated by the United
States of America.” The apartment buildings were used for billeting and
quartering officers of the U. S. armed forces stationed in the Manila area.
In March, 1947, when these court proceedings were commenced,
George F. Moore was the Commanding General, United States Army, Philippine
Ryukus Command, Manila, and as Commanding General of the U. S. Army in the
Manila Theatre, was said to control the occupancy of the said apartment houses
and had authority in the name of the United States Government to assign officers
of the U. S. Army to said apartments or to order said officers to vacate the
same. Erland A. Tillman was the Chief, Real Estate Division, Office of the
District Engineers, U. S. Army, Manila, who, under the command of defendant
Moore was in direct charge and control of the lease and occupancy of said three
apartment buildings. Defendants Moore and Tillman themselves did not occupy any
part of the premises in question.
Under the theory that said leases terminated six months after
September 2, 1945, when Japan surrendered, plaintiffs sometime in March, 1946,
approached the predecessors in office of defendants Moore and Tillman and
requested the return of the apartment buildings to them, but they were advised
that the U. S. Army wanted to continue occupying the premises. On May 11, 1946,
said plaintiffs requested the predecessors in office of Moore and Tillman to
renegotiate said leases, execute lease contracts for a period of three years and
to pay a reasonable rental higher than those payable under the old contracts.
The predecessor in office of Moore in a letter dated June 6, 1946, refused to
execute new leases but advised that “it is contemplated that the United States
Army will vacate subject properties prior to 1 February 1947.” Not being in
conformity with the continuance of the old leases because of the alleged
comparatively low rentals being paid thereunder, plaintiffs formally requested
Tillman to cancel said three leases and to release the apartment buildings on
June 28, 1946. Tillman refused to comply with the request. Because of the
alleged representation and assurance that the U. S. Government would vacate the
premises before February 1, 1947, the plaintiffs took no further steps to secure
possession of the buildings and accepted the monthly rentals tendered by the
predecessors in office of Moore and Tillman on the basis of a month to month
lease subject to cancellation upon thirty (30) days notice. Because of the
failure to comply with the alleged representation and assurance that the three
apartment buildings will be vacated prior to February 1, 1947, plaintiffs on
February 17, 1947, served formal notice upon defendants Moore and Tillman and 64
other army officers or members of the United States Armed Forces who were then
occupying apartments in said three buildings, demanding (a) cancellation
of said leases; (b) increase in rentals to P300 per month per apartment
effective thirty days from notice; (c) execution of new leases for the
three or any one or two of the said apartment buildings for a definite term,
otherwise, (d) release of said apartment buildings within thirty days of
said notice in the event of the failure to comply with the foregoing demands.
The thirty day period having expired without any of the defendants having
complied with plaintiffs’ demands, the plaintiffs commenced the present action
in the Municipal Court of Manila in the form of an action for unlawful detainer
(desahucio) against Moore and Tillman and the 64 persons occupying apartments in
the three buildings for the purpose of having them vacate the apartments, each
occupant to pay P300 a month for his particular apartment from January 1, 1947
until each of said particular defendant had vacated said apartment; to permit
plaintiffs access to said apartment buildings for the purpose of appraising the
damages sustained as the result of the occupancy by defendants; that defendants
be ordered to pay plaintiffs whatever damages may have been actually caused on
said property; and that in the event said occupants are unable to pay said P300
a month and/or the damages sustained by said property, the defendants Moore and
Tillman jointly and severally be made to pay said monthly rentals of P300 per
month per; apartment from January 1, 1947 to March 19, 1947, inclusive, and/or
the damages sustained by said apartments, and that defendants Moore and Tillman
be permanently enjoined against ordering any additional parties in the future
from entering and occupying said premises.
Acting upon a motion to dismiss filed through the Special
Assistant of the Judge Advocate, Philippine Ryukus Command on the ground that
the court had no jurisdiction over the defendants and over the subject matter of
the action, because the real party in interest was the U. S. Government and not
the individual defendants named in the complaint, and that the complaint did not
state a cause of action, the Municipal Court of Manila in an order dated April
29, 1947, found that the war between the United States of America and her allies
on one side and Germany and Japan on the other, had not yet terminated and,
consequently, the period or term of the three leases had not yet expired; that
under the well settled rule of international law, a foreign government like the
United States Government cannot be sued in the courts of another state without
its consent; that it was clear from the allegations of the complaint that
although the United States of America has not been named therein as defendant,
it is nevertheless the real defendant in this case, as the parties named as
defendants are officers of the United States Army and were occupying the
buildings in question as such and pursuant to orders received from that
Government. The Municipal Court dismissed the action with costs against the
plaintiffs with the suggestion or opinion that a citizen of the Philippines, who
feels aggrieved by the acts of the Government of a foreign country has the right
tc demand that the Philippine Government study his claim ana if found
meritorious, take such diplomatic steps as may be necessary for the vindication
of the rights of that citizen, and that the matter included or involved in the
action should be a proper subject matter of representations between the
Government of the United States of America and the Philippines. Not being
satisfied with the order, plaintiffs appealed to the Court of First Instance of
Manila, where the motion to dismiss was renewed.
The Court of First Instance of Manila in an order dated July
12, 1947, affirmed the order of the municipal court dismissing plaintiffs’
complaint. It conceded that under the doctrine laid down in the case of U. S.
vs. Lee, 106 U. S. 196 and affirmed in the case of Tindal vs. Wesley, 167 U. S.,
204, ordinarily, courts have jurisdiction over cases where private parties sue
to recover possession! of propa?ty being held by officers or agents acting in
the name of the U. S. Government even though no suit can be brought against the
Government itself, but inasmuch as the plaintiffs in the present case are
bringing this action against officers and agents of the U. S. Government not
only to recover the possession of the three apartment houses supposedly being
held illegally by them in the name of their government, but also to collect back
rents, not only at the rate agreed upon in the lease contracts entered into by
the United States of America but in excess of said rate, to say nothing of the
damages claimed, as a result of which, a judgment in these proceedings may
become a iharge against the U. S. Treasury, then under the rule laid down in the
case of Land vs. Dollar, 91 Law. ed., 1209, the present suit must be regarded as
one against the United States Government itself, which cannot be sued without
its consent, specially by citizens of another country.
The plaintiffs as petitioners have brought this case before us
on a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to order the Municipal Court of
Manila to take jurisdiction over the case. On October 30, 1947, counsel for
respondents Almeda Lopez, Sanchez, Moore and Tillman filed a motion to dismiss
on several grounds. The case was orally argued on November 26, 1947. On March 4,
1948, petitioners filed a petition which, among other things, informed this
Court that the North Syquia Apartments, the South Syquia Apartments and Michel
Apartments would be vacated by their occupants on February 29, March 31, and May
31, 1948, respectively. As a matter of fact, said apartments were actually
vacated on the dates already mentioned and were received by the
plaintiffs-owners.
On the basis of this petition and because of the return of the
three apartment houses to the owners, counsel for respondents Almeda Lopez,
Sanchez, Moore and Tillman filed a petition to dismiss the present case on the
ground that it is moot. Counsel for the petitioners answering the motion,
claimed that the plaintiffs and petitioners accepted possession of the three
apartment houses, reserving all of their rights against respondents including
the right to collect rents and damages; that they have not been paid rents since
January 1, 1947; that respondents admitted that there is a total of P109,895, in
rentals due and owing to petitioners; that should this case be now dismissed,
the petitioners will be unable to enforce collection that the question of law
involved in this case may again come up before the Courts when conflicts arise
between Filipino civilian property owners and the U. S. Army authorities
concerning contracts entered into in the Philippines between said Filipinos and
the U. S. Government. Consequently, this Court, according to the petitioners,
far from dismissing the case, should decide it, particularly the question of
jurisdiction.
On June 18, 1949, through a “petition to amend complaint”
counsel for the petitioners informed this court that petitioners had already
received from the U.S. Army Forces in the Western Pacific the sum of P109,895
as rentals for the three apartments, but with the reservation that said
acceptance should not be construed as jeopardizing the rights of the petitioners
in the case new pending in the courts of the Philippines or their rights against
the U.S. Government with respect to the three apartment houses. In view of this
last petition, counsel for respondents alleging that both respondents Moore and
Tillman had long left the Islands for other Army assignments, and now that both
the possession of the three, apartments in question as well as the rentals for
their occupation have already been received by the petitioner renew their motion
for dismissal on the ground that this case has now become moot.
The main purpose of the original action in the municipal court
was to recover the possession of the three apartment houses in question. The
recovery of rentals as submitted by the very counsel for the petitioner was
merely incidental to the main action. Because the prime purpose of the action
had been achieved, namely, the recovery of the possession of the premises, apart
from the fact that the rentals amounting to P109,895 had been paid to the
petitioners and accepted by them though under reservations, this Court may now
well dismiss the present proceedings on the ground that the questions involved
therein have become academic and moot. Counsel for the petitioners however,
insists that a decision be rendered, on the merits, particularly on the question
of jurisdiction of tie Municipal Court over the original action, not only for
the satisfaction of the parties involved but also to serve as a guide in future
cases involving cases of similar nature such as contracts of lease entered into
between the Government of the United States of America on one side and Filipino
citizens on the other.regarding properties of the latter. We accept the
suggestion of petitioners and shall proceed to discuss the facts and law
involved and rule upon them.
We shall concede as correctly did the Court of First Instance,
that following the doctrine laid down in the cases of U. S. vs. Lee and U. S.
vs. Tindal, supra, a private citizen claiming title and right of
possession of a certain property may, to recover possession of said property,
sue as individuals, officers and agents of the Government who are said to be
illegally withholding the same from him, tho in doing so, said officers and
agents claim that they are acting for the Government, and the courts may
entertain such a suit altho the Government itself is not included as a
party-defendant. Of course, the Government is not bound or concluded by the
decision. The philosophy of this ruling is that unless the courts are permitted
to take cognizance and to assume jurisdiction over such a case, a private
citizen would be helpless and without redress and protection of his rights which
may have been invaded by the officers of the government professing to act in its
name. In such a case the officials or agents asserting rightful possession must
prove and justify their claim before the courts, when it is made to appear in
the suit against them that the title and right of possession is in the private
citizen. However, and this is important, where the judgment in such a case would
result not only in the recovery of possession of the property in favor of said
citizen but also in a charge against or financial liability to the Government,
then the suit should be regarded, as one against the government itself, and,
consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the courts except
with the consent of said Government. (See case of Land vs. Dollar, 91 Law
ed., 1209.)
From a careful study of this case, considering the facts
involved therein as well as those of public knowledge of which we take judicial
cognizance, we are convinced that the real party in interest as defendant in the
original case is the United States of America. The lessee in each of the three
lease agreements was the United States of America and the lease agreements
themselves were executed in her name by her officials acting as her agents. The
consideration or rentals was always paid by the U. S. Government. The original
action in the Municipal Court was brought on the basis of these three lease
contracts and it is obvious in the opinion of this court that any back rentals
or increased rentals will have to be paid by the U. S. Government not only
because as already stated, the contracts of lease were entered into by such
Government but also because the premises were used by officers of her armed
forces during the war and immediately after the termination of hostilities.
We cannot see how the defendants and respondents Moore and
Tillman could be held individually responsible for the payment of rentals or
damages in relation to the occupancy of the apartment houses in question. Both
of these army officials had no intervention whatsoever in the execution of the
lease agreements nor in the initial occupancy of the premises both of which were
effected thru the intervention of and at the instance of their predecessors in
office. The original request made by the petitioners for the return of the
apartment buildings after the supposed termination of the leases, was made to,
and denied not by Moore and Tillman but by their predecessors in office. The
notice and decision that the U. S. Army wanted and in fact continued to occupy
the premises was made not by Moore and Tillman but by their predecessors in
office. The refusal to renegotiate the leases as requested by the petitioners
was made not by Moore but by his predecessors in office according to the very
complaint filed in the Municipal Court. The assurance that the U. S. Army will
vacate the premises prior to February 29, 1947, was also made by the
predecessors in office of Moore.
As to the defendant Tillman, according to the complaint lie was
Chief, Real Estate Division, Office of the District Engineer, U. S. Army, and
was in direct charge and control of the leases and occupancy of the apartment
buildings, but he was under the command of defendant Moore, his superior
officer. We cannot see how said defendant Tillman in assigning new officers to
occupy apartments in the three buildings, in obedience to order or direction
from his superior, defendant Moore, could be held personally liable for the
payment of rentals or increase thereof, or damages said to have been suffered by
the plaintiffs.
With respect to defendant General Moore, when he assumed his
command in Manila, these lease agreements had already been negotiated and
executed and were in actual operation. The three apartment buildings were
occupied by army officers assigned thereto by his predecessors in office. All
that he must have done was to assign or billet incoming army officers to
apartments as they were vacated by outgoing officers due to changes in station.
He found these apartment buildings occupied by his government and devoted to the
use and occupancy of army officers stationed in Manila under his command; and he
had reason to believe that he could continue holding and using the premises
theretofore assigned for that purpose and under contracts previously entered
into by his government, as long as and until orders to the contrary were
received by him. It is even to be presumed that when demand was made by the
plaintiffs for the payment of increased rentals or for vacating the three
apartment buildings, defendant Moore, not a lawyer by profession but a soldier,
must have consulted and sought the advice of his legal department, and that his
action in declining to pay the increased rentals or to eject all his Army
Officers from the three buildings must have been in pursuance to the advice and
counsel of his legal division. At least, he was not in a position to pay
increased rentals above those set and stipulated in the lease agreements,
without the approval of his government, unless he personally assumed financial
responsibility therefor. Under these circumstances, neither do we believe nor
find that defendant Moore can be held personally liable for the payment of back
or increased rentals and alleged damages.
As to the army officers who actually occupied the apartments
involved, there is less reason for holding them personally liable for rentals
and supposed damages as sought by the plaintiffs. It must be remembered that
these army officers when coming to their station in Manila were not given the
choice of their dwellings. They were merely assigned quarters in the apartment
buildings in question. Said assignments or billets may well be regarded as
orders and all that those officers did was to obey them, and, accordingly,
occupied, the rooms assigned to them. Under such circumstances, can it be
supposed or conceived that such army officers would first inquire whether the
rental being paid their government for the rooms or apartments assigned to them
by order of their superior officer was fair and reasonable or not, and whether
the period of lease between their government and the owners of the premises had
expired, and whether their occupancy of their rooms or apartments was legal or
illegal? And if they dismissed these seemingly idle speculations, assuming that
they ever entered their minds, and continued to live in their apartments unless
and until orders to the contrary were received by them, could they later be held
personally liable for any back rentals which their government may have failed to
pay to the owners of the buildings, or for any damages to the premises incident
to all leases of property, specially in the absence of proof that such damages
to property had been caused by them and not by the previous occupants, also army
officers who are not now parties defendant to this suit? Incidentally it may be
stated that both defendants Moore and Tillman have long left these Islands to
assume other commands or assignments and in all probability none of their 64
co-defendants is still within this jurisdiction.
On the basis of the foregoing consideration, we are of the
belief and we hold that the real party defendant in interest is the Government
of the United States of America; that any judgment for back or increased rentals
or damages will have to be paid not by defendants Moore and Tillman and their 64
co-defendants but by the said U. S. Government. On the basis of the ruling in
the case of Land vs. Dollar already cited, and on what we have already stated,
the present action must be considered as one against the U. S. Government. It is
clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila
have no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The question
of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the
action. The U. S. Government has not given its consent to the filing of this
suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not
only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the
latter’s consent but it is of citizen filing an action against a foreign
government without said government’s consent, which renders more obvious the
lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of law behind
this rule are so elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it
unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof.
In conclusion we find that the Municipal Court of Manila
committed no error in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction and that the
Court of First Instance acted correctly in affirming the municipal court’s order
of dismissal. Case dismissed, without pronouncements as to costs.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Tuason, and
Reyes, JJ., concur.
DISSENTING
PERFECTO, J.:
The petition must be granted. This is the conclusion we have
arrived at long ago, soon after this case had been submitted for our decision.
We regret that, to avoid further delay in the promulgation of the decision in
this case, we are constrained to limit ourselves, to a synthesis of the reasons
for our stand. So that this opinion may be released immediately, we are making
it as short as possible. To said effect we have to waive the opportunity of
elaborating on our arguments.
We are of the opinion that both the municipal court and the
Court of First Instance of Manila erred in dismissing petitioners’ complaint and
the majority of the Supreme Court have given their exequatur to such grievous
error.
‘There is no question that the Municipal Court of Manila had
and has complete jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide the case
initiated by petitioners. That jurisdiction is the same whether the true
defendants are those specifically mentioned in the complaint or the Government
of the United States.
The contention that the Government of the United States of
America is the real party defendant does not appear to be supported either by
the pleadings or by the text of the contract of lease in question. If said
government is the real party defendant and had intended to impugn the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Manila, it must have done so through its
diplomatic representative in the Philippines, i.e., the American Ambassador. It
does not appear that the American Ambassador had intervened in the case in any
way and we believe no one appearing in the case has the legal personality to
represent said government.
In the hypothesis that the government of the United States of
America is the lessee in the contract in question and, therefore, should be
considered as the real party defendant in the ejectment case, that simple fact
does not deprive our courts of justice of their jurisdiction a to try any
litigation relating to said contract of lease. The very fact that the government
of the United States of America had entered into a private contract with private
citizens of the Philippihes and the deed executed in our country concerns real
property located in Manila, places said government, for purposes of the
jurisdiction of our courts, on the same legal level of the lessors.
Although, generally, foreign governments are beyond the
jurisdiction of domestic courts of justice, such rule is inapplicable to cases
in which the foreign government enters into private contracts with the citizens
of the court’s jurisdiction. A contrary view would simply run against all
principles of decency and violative of all tenets of morals.
Moral principles and principles of justice are as valid and
applicable as well with regard to private individuals as with regard to
governments either domestic or foreign. Once a foreign government enters into a
private contract with the private citizens of another country, such foreign
government cannot shield its nonperformance or contravention of the terms of the
contract under the cloak of non-jurisdiction. To place such foreign government
beyond the jurisdiction of the domestic courts is to give approval to the
execution of unilateral contracts, graphically described in Spanish as
“contratos leoninos,” because one party gets the lion’s share to the detriment
of the other. To give validity to such contract is to sanctify bad faith,
deceit, fraud. We prefer to adhere to the thesis that all parties in a private
contract, including governments and the most powerful of them, are amenable to
law, and that such contracts are enforceable through the help of the courts of
justice with jurisdiction to take cognizance of any violation of such contracts
if the same had been entered into only by private individuals.
To advance the proposition that the government of the United
States of America, soon after liberating the Philippines from the invading
Japanese forces, had entered with the petitioners into the lease contract in
question with the knowledge that petitioners could not bring an action in our
courts of justice to enforce the terms of said contract is to hurl against said
government the blackest indictment. Under such situation, all the vociferous
avowals of adherence to the principles of justice, liberty, democracy, of said
government would appear as sham. We cannot believe that the government of the
United States of America can in honest conscience support the stand of
respondents in this case. We cannot believe that said government is so callous
as not to understand the meaning of the shame entailed in the legal stand of
non-jurisdiction intended to place said government beyond the reach of our
courts of justice.