FELICIDAD JAVIER, PETITIONER, VS. HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH I, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBALES AND REINO ROSETE, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner Felicidad Javier questions before us the order of a
regional trial court citing the final decision of the city court previously
dismissing her complaint for forcible entry, and on the basis thereof, dismissed her petition to quiet title on the ground of res judicata. We summon
the time-honored remedies accion
interdictal, accion publiciana
and accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion to resolve the issues presented in the petition.

It appears that on 25 January 1963, petitioner filed a
Miscellaneous Sales Application for Lot No. 1641, Ts-308 of the Olongapo
Townsite Subdivision, Lower Kalaklan, Olongapo City, with the District Land
Officer, Bureau of Lands, Olongapo City. Sometime in December 1970, alleging that she was forcibly dispossessed
of a portion of the land by a certain Ben Babol, she instituted a complaint for
forcible entry before the City Court of Olongapo City, docketed as Civil Case
No. 926, stating in pars. 2 and 3 therein that –

x x x plaintiff is the true, lawful and in actual, prior physical
possession of a certain parcel of land situated at Lower Kalaklan, City of
Olongapo, said lot being designated as Lot No. 1641, Ts-308 of the Olongapo
Townsite Subdivision since 1961 and up to the present time, until the day and
incidents hereinafter narrated x x x x Sometime on December 12, 1970, the defendant, without express consent of
plaintiff and without lawful authority, through scheme, strategy and stealth,
forcibly entered a portion on the southwestern part of Lot No. 1641, Ts-308,
with the assistance of hired helpers, started construction of riprap along the
Kalaklan River perimeter of said portion of land; said entry was further
augmented by removing plaintiff’s chain link, fence with galvanized iron posts
embedded in concrete, likewise destroying plants introduced by plaintiff by
removing existing BL (Bureau of Lands) monuments thereon, and by these actions,
defendant started exercising illegal possession of said portion of land which
contains an area of 200 square meters, more or less.”^[1]

On 7 November 1972 the City Court of Olongapo City, Br. 4,^[2]
dismissed Civil Case No. 926 on the ground that “it appears to the Court
that the Bureau of Lands has considered the area in question to be outside Lot
1641 of the plaintiff x x x x”^[3] The
Decision of the City Court of Olongapo City became final and executory on 30
April 1973 when the then Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City,
Br. 3,^[4]
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the findings and conclusions of the City
Court holding that appellant (herein petitioner) failed to give sufficient
evidence to prove that the area in question was within the boundaries of Lot
No. 1641.^[5]

Subsequently, on 17 December 1973, petitioner was granted
Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 5548 and issued Original Certificate of Title
No. P-3259 covering Lot No. 1641. Meanwhile, Ben Babol who was the defendant and appellee in the complaint
for forcible entry had sold the property he was occupying, including the
portion of about 200 square meters in question, to a certain Reino Rosete. Thus petitioner demanded the surrender of
the same area in dispute from Reino Rosete who repeatedly refused to comply
with the demand.

On 29 June 1977, or after about four (4) years from the finality of the dismissal of Civil Case No.
926, petitioner instituted a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of
possession with damages against Ben Babol and Reino Rosete before the then
Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, docketed as Civil Case
No. 2203-0, alleging in pars. 2 and 3 therein that –

x x x plaintiff is the absolute owner in fee simple of a parcel of
land identified as Lot No. 1641, Ts-308, Olongapo Townsite Subdivision x x x covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. P-3259, issued by the Register of Deeds for the province of Zambales
x x x x Sometime in December, 1970, and
until present, defendants, relying on an application filed on December 23,
1969, with the Bureau of Lands, however have squatted, illegally occupied and
unlawfully possessed the southwestern portion of plaintiff’s above-described
property of about 200 square meters, then by defendant BEN BABOL and now by
defendant REINO ROSETE, the former having sold the entirety of his property to
the latter, including the portion in question x x x x^[6]

Instead of filing a responsive pleading, therein defendant Reino
Rosete (private respondent herein) moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
of res judicata. Defendant Ben Babol
did not file any pleading.

In its Order dated 27 January 1978,^[7] the
then Court of First Instance of Zambales, Br. 1,^[8]
sustained the argument of Rosete and granted his motion to dismiss. Thereafter, petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied.^[9]
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner contends that res judicata cannot
apply in the instant case since there is no identity of parties and causes of
action between her complaint for forcible entry, which had long become final
and executory, and her subsequent petition for quieting of title. She argues that private respondent Reino
Rosete, who invokes the defense of res judicata, was never impleaded in the forcible entry
case, which is an action in personam; neither was he a purchaser pendente lite who,
perhaps, could have validly invoked the defense of res judicata. With regard to the cause of action, she
maintains that there is no identity of causes of action since the first case
was for forcible entry, which is merely concerned with the possession of the
property, whereas the subsequent case was for quieting of title, which looks
into the ownership of the disputed land.

Private respondent
however submits that there is identity of parties in the two cases since he is a successor in interest by title of the defendant in the first case after the
commencement of the first action. On
the issue of identity of causes of action, he simply states that neither of the
two cases, i.e., the complaint for forcible entry and the subsequent petition
for quieting of title, alleges a cause of action. Thus, private respondent continues, both cases have to be
dismissed.

Time and again it has been said that for res judicata to bar
the institution of a subsequent action the following requisites must
concur: (1) There must be a final
judgment or order; (2) The court rendering the judgment must have jurisdiction
over the subject matter; (3) The former judgment is a judgment on the merits;
and, (4) There is between the first and second actions identity of parties, of
subject matter and of causes of action.^[10] The
presence of the first three requirements and the identity of subject matter in
the fourth requirement are not disputed. Hence, the only issues remaining are whether as between Civil Case No.
926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0 there is identity of parties and of causes of
action which would bar the institution of Civil Case No. 2203-0.

Petitioner’s argument that there is no identity of parties
between the two actions is without merit. We have repeatedly ruled that
for res judicata to apply, what is required is not absolute but only substantial
identity of parties.^[11] It is fundamental that the application of
res judicata may not be evaded by simply including additional
parties in a subsequent litigation. In
fact we have said that there is still identity of parties although in the
second action there is one party who was not joined in the first action, if it
appears that such party is not a necessary party either in the first or second
action,^[12] or is a mere nominal party.^[13] Thus, Sec. 49, par. (b), Rule 39, Rules of
Court, provides that “x x x
the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to
any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating
for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity.”

In the case at bench, it is evident that private respondent Reino
Rosete is a successor in interest of Ben
Babol by title subsequent to the commencement and termination of the first
action. Hence, there is actual, if not
substantial, identity of parties between the two actions. But, there is merit in petitioner’s argument
that there is no identity of causes of action between Civil Case No. 926 and
Civil Case No. 2203-0.

Civil Case No. 926 is a
complaint for forcible entry, where what is at issue is prior possession,
regardless of who has lawful title over the disputed property.^[14] Thus, “[t]he only issue in an action
for forcible entry is the physical or material possession of real property,
that is, possession de facto and
not possession de jure. The philosophy underlying this remedy is that
irrespective of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in
peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or
terror.”^[15] And, a judgment rendered in a case for
recovery of possession is conclusive only on the question of possession and not
on the ownership. It does not in any
way bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building.^[16]

On the other hand, Civil
Case No. 2203-0 while inaccurately captioned as an action for “Quieting of
Title and Recovery of Possession with Damages” is in reality an action to
recover a parcel of land or an accion reivindicatoria under Art. 434^[17] of the Civil Code, and should be
distinguished from Civil Case No. 926, which is an accion interdictal. From
the averments of the complaint in Civil Case No. 2203-0, plaintiff therein
(petitioner herein) clearly sets up title to herself and prays that respondent
Rosete be ejected from the disputed land and that she be declared the owner and
given possession thereof. Certainly,
the allegations partake of the nature of an accion reivindicatoria.^[18]

The doctrine in Emilia v. Bado,^[19] decided
more than twenty-five years ago, is still good law and has preserved the
age-old remedies available under existing laws and jurisprudence to recover
possession of real property, namely, accion interdictal, which is the summary action for forcible
entry (detentacion) where
the defendant’s possession of the property is illegal ab initio,
or the summary action for unlawful
detainer (desahuico) where
the defendant’s possession was originally lawful but ceased to be so by the
expiration of his right to possess, both of which must be brought
within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible
entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer, in the
proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court;^[20] accion publiciana which is a plenary action for recovery of the
right to possess and which should be brought in the proper regional trial court
when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and, accion
reivindicatoria or accion
de reivindicacion which seeks the
recovery of ownership and includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi brought in the proper regional trial court.

Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is thus an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of
land and seeks recovery of its full
possession.^[21] It is different from accion
interdictal or accion
publiciana where plaintiff merely
alleges proof of a better right to possess without claim of title.^[22]

In Civil Case No. 926 petitioner merely claimed a better right or
prior possession over the disputed area without asserting title thereto. It should be distinguished from Civil Case
No. 2203-0 where she expressly alleged ownership, specifically praying that she
be declared the rightful owner and given possession of the disputed
portion. Hence, in Civil Case No. 926
petitioner merely alleged that she was “the true, lawful (possessor) and
in actual, prior physical possession” of the subject parcel of land,
whereas in Civil Case No. 2203-0 she asserted that she was “the absolute
owner in fee simple” of the parcel of land “covered by Original
Transfer Certificate of Title No. P-3259.” The complaint in Civil Case No.
2203-0 definitely raises the question of ownership and clearly gives defendants
therein notice of plaintiff’s claim of exclusive and absolute ownership,
including the right to possess which is an elemental attribute of such
ownership. Thus, this Court has ruled
that a judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue
than possession and declares only who has the right of possession, but by no
means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or
title of ownership.^[23]

And, applying the ruling of the Court En Banc in Quimpo
v. De la Victoria,^[24] even if we treat Civil Case No.
2203-0 as a petition to quiet title, as its caption suggests, still it has a
cause of action different from that for ejectment. Consequently, there being no identity of causes of action between
Civil Case No. 926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0, the prior complaint for ejectment
cannot bar the subsequent action for recovery, or petition to quiet title.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated
27 January 1978 of the then Court of First Instance of Zambales, Br. I, with
station in Olongapo City, dismissing Civil Case No. 2203-0, and its subsequent
Order denying reconsideration of the dismissal are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The Clerk of Court is directed to remand the records immediately
to the court a quo and the latter to proceed with the
trial of Civil Case No. 2203-0 with deliberate dispatch. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

^[1]
See Complaint for Forcible Entry dated 15 December 1970; Rollo, pp.
89-90.

^[2]
Judge Benjamin A.G. Vega, presiding.

^[3]
Decision of the City Court of Olongapo City, Br. 4, p. 13; Rollo, p.
107.

^[4]
Judge Bernardo P. Fernandez, presiding.

^[5]
Rollo, pp. 109-120.

^[6]
See Complaint for Quieting of Title; Rollo, pp. 121-123.

^[7]
Rollo, pp. 45-49.

^[8]
Judge Regino T. Veridiano II, presiding.

^[9]
Rollo, p. 31.

^[10]
Mesina v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100228, 13 July 1994, citing Meliton
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101833, 11 December 1992, 216 SCRA 485; Baquioro
v. Basa, Jr., G.R. No. 83369, 2 October 1992, 214 SCRA 437; De
Ramos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86844, 1 September 1992, 213 SCRA 207; De
la Rosa v. Mercado, G.R. No. 101703, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 236.

^[11]
Esperanza Development Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
97197, 3 February 1993, 218 SCRA 401; Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Judge Pundogar, G.R. No. 96921, 29 January 1993; See also Lim Toco v. Go
Fay, 81 Phil. 258 (1948).

^[12]
Mallari v. Court of Appeals, No. L-26467, 15 July 1981, 105 SCRA 430,
citing Juan v. Go, 26 Phil. 328 (1913).

^[13]
Medija v. Patcho, No. L-30310, 23 October 1984, 132 SCRA 540.

^[14]
Villaluz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100571, 26 June 1992, 210
SCRA 540.

^[15]
Joven v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 80739, 20 August 1992, 212 SCRA 700.

^[16]
Manlapaz v. Court of Appeals, No.
L-39430, 3 December 1990, 191 SCRA 795, citing Bernal v. Judge Valdellon, No.
L-38510, 25 March 1975, 63 SCRA 278.

^[17]
Art. 434 of the Civil Code provides that “[i]n an action to recover, the
property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his
title and not on the weakness of the defendant’s claim.”

^[18]
Ledesma v. Marcos, 9 Phil. 620 (1908)

^[19]
No. L-23685, 25 April 1968, 23 SCRA 183.

^[20]
Pharma Industries, Inc. v. Judge Pajarillaga, G.R. No. 57388, 17 October
1980, 100 SCRA 339; Sarona v. Villegas, No. L-­22984, 27 March 1968, 22
SCRA 1257.

^[21]
See Note 18.

^[22]
Ibid.

^[23]
Bautista v. Fernandez, No. L-24062, 30 April 1971, 38 SCRA
548.

^[24]
No. L-31822, 31 July 1972, 46 SCRA 139.