THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. EDILBERTO GOMEZ, PRUDENCIO N. CICHON, CESAR V. CASTILLO, PEDRO CUENTO AND JOHN DOE, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

People versus Gomez

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Edilberto Gomez, Prudencio Cichon, Cesar Castillo, Pedro Cuento, and several unnamed persons, decided by the Supreme Court in September 1982. The action began as four separate criminal cases for estafa through falsification of public or official documents, filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City. The trial court dismissed all four cases on a procedural ground, and the prosecution appealed. The case matters because it settles two enduring rules of criminal procedure: that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction and does not invalidate the information, and that the right to a preliminary investigation is waived if it is not invoked before the accused enters a plea.

Procedural History

In 1962, the prosecuting fiscals of Zamboanga City filed four informations for estafa through falsification of public or official documents. The accused were arraigned and each pleaded not guilty. More than a year after those pleas, the accused filed a motion to declare the informations and the warrants of arrest null and void, on the ground that the prosecution had failed to observe the requirements on preliminary investigation under the old Rules of Court. The trial court first denied the motion for lack of merit. On reconsideration, however, the trial court reversed itself and ordered the dismissal of all four cases, without prejudice to refiling, and ordered the cancellation of the bonds. The prosecution then appealed directly to the Supreme Court, assigning as error the dismissal of the cases on the ground that the preliminary investigations were not conducted in accordance with the Rules.

Facts

On May 24, 1962, four informations were filed before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City. The first, against Gomez, Cichon, Castillo, Cuento, and one John Doe, and the second, against Lorenzo Delantar, Cichon, Jesus Atilano, and two unidentified persons, each carried the sworn certification of the state prosecutors that a preliminary investigation had been conducted in accordance with law and that the accused were probably guilty. Warrants of arrest were issued, and the accused posted bail for provisional liberty. A third information, against Cichon and Paulino Duma, likewise carried the prosecutors' certification. In a fourth case, filed on October 1, 1962, the information carried no such certification, so the district judge himself conducted the preliminary investigation, found a prima facie case, and issued the warrants of arrest on the same day.

The accused were arraigned on various dates and each entered a plea of not guilty. It was only on June 22, 1966, more than a year after the pleas, that the accused filed a motion to declare the informations and warrants of arrest null and void, invoking the requirements on preliminary investigation under the old Rules of Court.

The trial court initially denied the motion, but on reconsideration it reversed itself on November 2, 1966, dismissed all four cases without prejudice to refiling, and cancelled the bonds. The prosecution appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the criminal cases on the ground that the preliminary investigations were not conducted in accordance with the Rules of Court.
• Whether or not the absence of a preliminary investigation, or of the certification that one was held, affects the court's jurisdiction over the case or the validity of the information.
• Whether or not the accused waived their right to a preliminary investigation by entering a plea of not guilty before raising the objection.

Applicable Provisions

Section 13 of Rule 112 of the old Rules of Court, on preliminary examination and investigation by the judge of the Court of First Instance, provides:

Upon complaint filed directly with the Court of First Instance, without previous preliminary examination and investigation conducted by the fiscal, the judge thereof shall either refer the complaint to the municipal judge referred to in the second paragraph of section 2 hereof for preliminary examination and investigation, or himself conduct both preliminary examination and investigation simultaneously in the manner provided in the preceding sections, and should he find reasonable ground to believe that the defendant has committed the offense charged, he shall issue a warrant for his arrest, and thereafter refer the case to the fiscal for the filing of the corresponding information.

This provision governs the situation in the fourth case, where the district judge himself conducted the preliminary investigation before issuing the warrants of arrest.

Section 14 of Rule 112, on preliminary examination and investigation by the provincial or city fiscal or state attorney in cases cognizable by the Court of First Instance, provides:

Except where an investigation has been conducted by a judge of first instance, municipal judge or other officer in accordance with the provisions of the preceding sections, no information for an offense cognizable by the Court of First Instance shall be filed by the provincial or city fiscal, or state attorney, without first giving the accused a chance to be heard in a preliminary investigation conducted by him or by his assistant by issuing a corresponding subpoena. If the accused appears the investigation shall be conducted in his presence and he shall have the right to be heard, to cross-examine the complainant and his witnesses, and to adduce evidence in his favor. If he cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed he does not appear before the fiscal, the investigation shall proceed without him.

The fiscal or state attorney shall certify under oath in the information to be filed by him that the defendant was given a chance to appear in person or by counsel at said examination and investigation.

This provision supplies the certification requirement that the accused claimed had been violated, and it frames the Court's discussion of whether the omission of the certification is fatal.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court sustained the People's appeal and held that the trial court's order of dismissal was erroneous. The preliminary investigations in the four cases were terminated in 1962, before the new Rules of Court took effect on January 1, 1964, so those Rules could not apply to the cases. In any event, the required investigations were in fact complied with: in three of the cases the prosecutors certified under oath that they had conducted a preliminary investigation, and in the fourth the district judge himself conducted the investigation and found a prima facie case before ordering the arrest.

On the second issue, the Court held that even assuming the informations lacked the requisite certifications, the omissions are not necessarily fatal. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case, nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. If there was no preliminary investigation and the accused, before entering a plea, invites the attention of the court to its absence, the court should not dismiss the information but should conduct the investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it, or remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted.

On the third issue, the Court held that the accused waived their right to a preliminary investigation. When they entered a plea of not guilty, they waived all objections that are grounds for a motion to quash, except lack of jurisdiction or failure of the information to charge an offense. They raised the objection only more than a year after their pleas. The Court quoted with approval the settled doctrine:

Inasmuch as the settled doctrine in this jurisdiction is that the right to the preliminary investigation itself must be asserted or invoked before the plea, otherwise, it is deemed waived, it stands to reason, that the absence of the certification in question is also waived by failure to allege it before the plea.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain three rules. First, the absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case and does not impair the validity of the information or render it defective. Second, the right to a preliminary investigation must be asserted before the plea; otherwise it is deemed waived, and the same waiver applies to the absence of the certification required by Section 14 of Rule 112. Third, upon a plea of not guilty, the accused waives all objections that are grounds for a motion to quash, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged or failure of the information to charge an offense. Where the objection is timely raised, the remedy is not dismissal but an order to conduct the preliminary investigation or a remand for that purpose.

Disposition

The Supreme Court set aside the order of dismissal and ordered the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City to proceed with the trial of the criminal cases. The People won the appeal.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the right to a preliminary investigation must be invoked before the plea, otherwise it is waived, and its absence never affects jurisdiction or the validity of the information. Examiners use this case to test waiver of the right to preliminary investigation and the effect of a missing certification in the information.