G.R. No. L-27166. March 25, 1970
GERMAN CRISOSTOMO, AS HEIR OF QUITERIO CRISOSTOMO; FELIPA CRISOSTOMO; PEREGRINA FLORES DIMAGUIBA, AS HEIRESS OF POTENCIANA CRISOSTOMO; AND PURIFICACION CRISOSTOMO-REYES, AS HEIR…
CASTRO, J.:
The essential facts upon which the issues posed in this petition
rest are not controverted.
After proceedings duly had in Registration Case 1183, the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan decreed the registration
of a parcel of land situated in the municipality
of Hagonoy
of the same province in the name of the estate of the late Laureano
Marquez. On November 29, 1956, however,
before the decree of registration could issue, the petitioners German Crisostomo, et al. sought a review of the judgment rendered
in that case and prayed the court that issued the decree of registration to
order its transfer in their names. After
a protracted hearing, the petitioners lost out to the respondents heirs of
Marquez, per the order of the court dated April 26, 1960.
In due time, the petitioners gave notice to the trial court that
they were appealing its order to the respondent Court of Appeals, and
subsequently, on May 20, 1960, they moved the lower court for approval of their
record on appeal and appeal bond and, further, for transmittal of these,
together with the evidence presented, at the trial, to the respondent Court of
Appeals.
On July 14, 1961, after the contending parties had submitted
their printed briefs to the respondent appellate court (CA-G.R. 28678-B), the respondents
heirs of Marquez, then appellees, moved that court to
forward the case to this Court for the reason that the value of the land under
litigation, something in excess of P200,000, placed the matter within this
Court’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
Asked for comment, the petitioners, then appellants, braced to block the
move for a change of forum and filed on July 18, 1961 an opposition secured on
the arguments that the valuation of the property submitted by the heirs of
Marquez was based on self-serving and unreliable affidavits and that, moreover,
the best evidence of the true valuation of the property was the amount
certified by the provincial assessor which stood at only P29,170 — an amount
which placed the controversy within the exclusive reviewing power of the
respondent Court of Appeals on questions of law and fact.[1]
The matter of jurisdiction was calendared for oral argument, but
on the date set therefor, the respondent court
instead required the parties to submit their respective memoranda on the
matter, after which the case was to be deemed submitted for decision. Opposing
memoranda were thus submitted. The
respondents heirs of Marquez insisted that the amount in controversy based on
the affidavits submitted justified the elevation of the appeal to this Court
whereas the petitioners German Crisostomo, et al.,
defended the exclusive authority of the respondent Court of Appeals to review
the case.
On November 8, 1966,
about five years after the appeal and its incidents were submitted for
consideration, the respondent appellate court rendered a decision on the merits
of the appeal, upholding the judgment of the trial court. Although it did not expressly pass upon the
question of jurisdiction raised by the respondents heirs of Marquez, it is to
be assumed that the respondent Court of Appeals considered itself possessed of
jurisdiction over the appeal.
The petitioners who received a copy of the adverse decision on November 9, 1966, filed, thirteen
days thereafter, or on November 23,
1966, a one-sentence “motion for reconsideration” on the
ground that the decision was “contrary to law and evidence.” In
addition, they asked for 15 days within which to file their memorandum in
support of the general ground alleged.
Acting on their motion, the respondent court granted them “15 days
from November 22, 1966
within which to file motion for reconsideration.” At the end of the 15-day
period, however, or on December 7,
1966, they moved the respondent court for another extension, this
time 30 days, within which to submit their “memorandum.” The following day, December 8, the
respondent court resolved to deny the extension of time asked for and declared
that its decision had become final.
The petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of this last order was
summarily denied on December 21, 1966.
Hence, this petitioner for certiorari and mandamus
which raises two issues, namely, first, the value of the property under
litigation and whether the same removed the controversy from the jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals, and second, whether the respondent Court of
Appeals abused its discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion for 30 day
extension within which to file their “memorandum” and in declaring
its decision final.
The records of this case clearly demonstrate, as pointed out by
the respondents heirs of Marquez, that it was the petitioners themselves who
urged the trial court to transmit the records of the case to the respondent
Court of Appeals for review. The Court
of Appeals was thus the petitioners’ own choice of tribunal, pursued by them at
the precise time[2]
when the jurisdictional amount should have been determined. It happened that none of the parties, and
surely not the petitioners, raised the issue of the value of the controversy
before the trial court. It is therefore
to be assumed that the latter court, in transmitting the case to the respondent
Court of Appeals, was guided principally by petitioners’ own written
manifestation of their desire to invoke the jurisdiction of that particular appellate
court. And as we have previously quoted
approvingly,[3]
“a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such
relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.” While the
jurisdiction of a tribunal may be challenged at any time, sound public policy
bars the petitioners from so doing after their having procured that
jurisdiction themselves, speculating on the fortunes of litigation.
More, when the respondents heirs of Marquez challenged, for the
first time, the jurisdiction of the respondent Court of Appeals, the
petitioners were the very ones to rush to the defense of that court. They went a long way to convince the
respondent court – and they succeeded – that it had the power and authority to
pass judgment upon the appeal. The
petitioners had stood fast with the respondent court, so that not even their
abbreviated motion for reconsideration of the decision of November 8, 1966 nor their motion for reconsideration
of the order of December 8, 1966
declaring the court’s decision final, hinted at any objection to that court’s
jurisdiction.
Overnight, the petitioners’ position has assumed a deep contrast
color, revealed for the first time when they came up to this Court on certiorari
and mandamus – obviously a weak attempt to replace by certiorari
the remedy of ordinary appeal which was foreclosed by the respondent court’s
order of December 8, 1966 declaring its decision final.
Whereas the petitioners at one time persuaded the respondent
Court of Appeals with these words:
“x x x we
submit that the most competent proof to show the valuation of the land is the
corresponding certification of the proper assessor of the province where it is
situated. For the convenience of this
Honorable Court, we are submitting herewith, marked as Annex ‘A’, the tax
declaration of the property in question showing that the assessed value of
said land is only P29,170. Although,
said amount merely represent the assessed value of the property, nevertheless
the same is material to disprove the valuation made by oppositors-appellees
in their affidavits. If we compare this
assessed value of P29,170 to the claim of oppositors-appellees
that the value of the land in dispute is more than P200,000 we can easily see
that they have over inflated the actual value of the property by more than nine
times its assessed value,”
now that the respondent court’s decision
is adverse to them, they would attempt to convince us that:
“The Court of Appeals in deciding Civil Case CA-G.R. No.
28678-R, entitled Vicente Valencia vs. Heirs of Laureano
Marquez; German Crisostomo, et al., had no, or
lacked, jurisdiction over the same for the reason that the value of the real
estate involved in the cause or controversy exceeded the amount of
P200,000.00. Said respondent Court of
Appeals was propitiously informed of such matter by none other than the appellees themselves in their memorandum and in AFFIDAVITS
executed by Felimon Marquez, son and one of the heirs
of the late Laureano Marquez, hence a party to [the]
cause.”
Whereas before their receipt of the
adverse decision, they implored the respondent Court of Appeals in this
fashion:
“WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the motion of oppositors-appellees, dated July 14, 1961, seeking the elevation of the case to the
Supreme Court be denied for lack of merit,”
now in their prayer, they would want us
to do no less than:
“b) To set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on November 22,
1966 being sought to be vacated as the same was rendered without
said court’s authority and jurisdiction, then
“c) [To order] the Court of Appeals to forward
to this Honorable Court the record of Civil Case CA-G.R. No. 28678-R, entitled
Vicente Valencia vs. The Heirs of Laureano Marquez;
German Crisostomo, et al., for its exclusive review
as if directly appealed to it from the Court of First Instance.”
In short, now that the respondent court
has decided against them, the petitioners, who had induced the same court to
believe that it was clothed with power to decide the appeal, would now want us
to declare it to have acted without authority.
The petitioners, to borrow the language of Mr. Justice Bautista
Angelo,[4]
“cannot adopt a posture of double-dealing without running afoul of the
doctrine of estoppel.” The principle of estoppel is in the interest of a sound administration of
the laws.[5]
It should deter those who are disposed to trifle with the courts by taking
inconsistent positions contrary to the elementary principles of right dealing
and good faith.[6]
For this reason, this Court closes the door to the petitioners’ challenge
against the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and will not even honor the
question with a pronouncement.
The remaining issue raised by the petitioners centers on the
resolution of the respondent court dated December 8, 1966.
This resolution denied their motion for extension of time to file their
“memorandum” and, furthermore, declared the decision of November 8, 1966 final and executory.
The petitioners argue that the decision of the respondent court
could not have become final and executory for the
reason that they had filed on November
23, 1966 a motion for reconsideration which should suspend the
tolling of the period to take an appeal.
It follows, continue the petitioners, that until the respondent court
has acted on that motion, the decision can never attain finality.
The petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, a one-sentence
affair, reads:
“COMES NOW the petitioners-appellants in the above entitled
case and to this Honorable Court respectfully move for the reconsideration of
the decision promulgated on November
8, 1966, copy of which was received by the undersigned on November 9, 1966, on the ground that
the same is contrary to law and the evidence.”
This, if ever there was one, is a pro
forma motion for reconsideration; it does not specify the findings or
conclusions in the decision which are not supported by the evidence or which
are contrary to law. A mere scrap of
paper, it cannot stay the period for taking an appeal.[7]
The records show that the land subject of this petition has been
under litigation for the last three and a half decades. Three times the respondent Court of Appeals
had been asked to review the various judgments of the lower court relating to
the ownership of the land in question.
The matter is at present with us also for the third time. The long delay in the final termination of
the contest between the parties should have placed the petitioners on guard
against further prorogation in the case.
Thirteen days after they had received a copy of the decision of the
respondent court, they asked that court, and were granted, 15 days extension
within which to file their “memorandum,” nay, their motion for
reconsideration. They allowed this extension to lapse, and at the eleventh
hour, they asked the respondent court anew for a longer additional extension of
30 days. Their error was in taking for
granted, that the court would approve their motion for extension. They merely filed it and did nothing
else. The risk of denial was theirs.[8]
Moreover, the respondent court premised its denial of the application for
extension of time on their manifest intention to delay the proceedings. Considering the history of this case, we
cannot find any reason to state that it was not so.
ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is denied, with treble
costs against petitioners, to be paid by their counsel.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, and Villamor, JJ., concur.
[1]
The law has already been amended so that all appeals from CFI decisions in
civil cases involving property or money claims, regardless of the value or
amount in controversy, must now be taken to the Court of Appeals, provided
that such appeals do not pose only errors or questions of law (see Republic Act
5440).
[2]
Immediately prior to or simultaneously with the approval of the record on
appeal, as we held in Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L-29264, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 419.
[3] Serafin Tijam, et al. vs. Magdaleno Sibonghanoy, et al.,
L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23
SCRA 29, 35-36.
[4]
People vs. Archilla, L-15632, February 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 699,
700-701.
[5]
Perkins vs. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,
et al., 93 Phil. 1034, 1058.
[6]
People vs. Acierto, 92 Phil. 534, 541.
[7] Arnaldo vs. Bernabe, 87
Phil. 379.
[8]
King vs. Joe, L-23617, August
23, 1967, 20 SCRA 1117, 1119-1120.