MARIA C. RAMOS, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE JESUS R. DE VEGA OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, MALOLOS BRANCH II AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN, R…

This case is about the legality of a municipality’s hiring of
private counsel to file a suit in its behalf. 
The municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, through the law firm of Cruz Durian & Academia
(now Cruz Durian Agabin Atienza
& Alday), sued in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Marciano Domingo, Leonila Guzman, Maria C. Ramos and Consorcio
Cruz for the recovery of its 74-hectare fishpond (Civil Case No. 5095-M).

In paragraph 19 of the complaint it was alleged that the
municipality had obligated itself to pay Cruz Durian & Academia as
attorney’s fees not less than twenty percent of the amount to be recovered by
the plaintiff (p. 44, Rollo).

The provincial fiscal of Bulacan and
the municipal attorney of Hagonoy entered their
appearance as counsel for the municipality with the manifestation that its
private counsel would be under the control and supervision
of those officials.  Notwithstanding that
appearance, Domingo and Maria C. Ramos (lessee and sublessee
of the fishpond) moved to disqualify the Cruz law firm from serving as counsel
of the municipality.

The trial court denied the motion.  It found that Angel Cruz, the head of the law
firm, volunteered to act as coun­sel for the municipality because he desired to
serve his native town.

Ramos and Domingo assailed that order by means of certiorari
in the Court of Appeals which in a decision dated February 15, 1979 sustained the trial court (Ramos vs.
Judge Jesus R. de Vega, et al., CA-G.R. No. SP-7728-R).  Ramos
brought the case to this Court.

We hold that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in
allowing the Cruz law firm to act as counsel for the municipality in
collaboration with the fiscal and the munici­pal attorney.

That ruling constitutes a grave abuse of discretion because it is
manifestly a transgression of section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code
which provides that “the provincial fiscal shall represent the province
and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is
vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal dis­trict
in question is a party adverse to the provincial govern­ment or to some other
municipality or municipal district in the same province.  When the interests of a provincial govern­ment
and of any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall
act on behalf of the province.  When the
provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political
subdivision of a province, a special attor­ney may be employed by its
council.”

The legislative intent to prohibit a municipality from employing
private counsel in its lawsuits is further imple­mented by section 3 of the
Local Autonomy Act, Republic Act No. 2264, which provides that the municipal
attorney, as the head of the legal division or office of a municipality,
“shall act as legal counsel of the municipality and perform such duties
and exercise such powers as may be assigned to him by the council.” The
municipal attorney is paid out of municipal funds (Sec. 4, Republic Act No.
5185, Decen­tralization Act of 1967).  He
can represent the municipality even without the fiscal’s
collaboration (Calleja vs. Court of Appeals, L-22501, July
31, 1967, 20 SCRA 895).

The questioned ruling of the two courts also contra­venes settled
jurisprudence.  Applying section 1683, it
was held that the municipality’s authority to employ a private lawyer is
expressly limited only to situations where the pro­vincial fiscal is
disqualified to represent it (De Guia vs. Auditor
General, L-29824, March 29, 1972, 44 SCRA 169.  See Reyes vs. Cornista, 92 Phil. 838, Municipality of Bocaue vs. Manotok, 93 Phil. 173; Enriquez vs. Gimenez, 107 Phil. 932).

Evidently, the lawmaker in requiring that the munici­pality
should be represented in its court cases by a govern­ment lawyer like its
municipal attorney and the provincial fiscal intended that the municipality
should not be burdened with the expenses of hiring a private lawyer.  The lawmaker also assumed that the interests
of the municipality would be best protected if a government lawyer handles its
litigations.

It is to be expected that the municipal attorney and the fiscal
would be faithful and dedicated to the municipa­lity’s interests and that, as
civil service employees, they could be held accountable for any misconduct or
derelic­tion of duty.

The Court of Appeals perceived nothing illegal in allowing the
Cruz Law Office to represent the municipality
of Hagonoy
because lawyer Cruz offered his legal services gratis.  Petitioner Ramos in her second motion for
recon­sideration called the Court’s attention
to paragraph 19 of the complaint wherein the Cruz law firm alleged that the
municipality had contracted to pay its lawyer a 20% contin­gent fee.

The Court of Appeals in a resolution dated December 6, 1979 said
that there was no cogent reason to reconsider its decision but at the same time
it gave the Cruz law firm fifteen days from notice within which “to amend
the answer” (should be complaint) in the trial court by “deleting there­from the claim for attorney’s fees” and to
report such amendment to the Court of Appeals; otherwise, it would “motu proprio
reconsider its decision”.

Obviously, the Appellate Court wanted the complaint to conform to
its erroneous factual finding that the Cruz law firm was serving as counsel
without compensation.  It did not notice
that its resolution was ambivalent because while it denied the second motion for reconsideration, in the same
breath it threatened to “reconsider its decision” if the complaint
was not amended.

Following that directive, the Cruz law firm filed in the trial
court an amended complaint dated December 31, 1979 containing the allegation in
paragraph 19 thereof that the municipality was forced to retain the Cruz law
firm “as additional counsel under the control and supervision of
plaintiff’s principal attorneys and/or the Provincial Fiscal without any
obligation to pay attorney’s fees”. 
The prayer for the payment of attorney’s fees in the original complaint
was eliminated in the amended complaint.

Ramos contended in the
trial court and in the Court of
Appeals that the trial court could not admit the amended complaint because it
was immobilized by the restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals.  The Court of Appeals did not resolve that
contention.

On May 7, 1980, Ramos filed in this Court her petition for certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition wherein she prayed that the Court of Appeals be
directed to resolve the issue raised in her second motion for reconsideration
and that the amended complaint should not be taken into consideration because
it was improperly admitted by the trial court.

Although the Court of Appeals was furnished on May 7, 1980 with a
copy of that petition, it nevertheless, issued a resolution dated May 22, 1981
requiring the Cruz law firm to inform it of “the further development on
the matter” (p. 113, Rollo).

This Court treated Ramos’ petition as an appeal from the
Appellate Court’s decision.  Ramos was
confused as to when she would appeal from that decision because, as noted
earlier, while the Appellate Court denied her second motion for
reconsideration, the denial was not final since it was accompanied by the
warning that it would “reconsider its decision” if the complaint was
not amended to eliminate the claim of the Cruz law firm for attorney’s
fees.  Hence, the alleged tardiness of
the petition was excusable.

The fact that the municipal attorney and the fiscal are supposed
to collaborate with a private law firm does not legalize the latter’s
representation of the municipality of
Hagonoy
in Civil Case No. 5095-M.  While a
private prosecutor is allowed in criminal cases, an analogous arrangement is
not allowed in civil cases wherein a muni­cipality is the plaintiff.

Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code, as complemented
by section 3 of the Local Autonomy Law, is clear in providing that only the
provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a municipality in
its law­suits.  That provision is
mandatory.

The law being clear and unmistakable, there is no room for
interpretation or for engrafting upon it exceptions or qualifications not
contemplated therein.  As observed by
Justice Moreland:

“Where language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge words
so as to give them the color of a particular judicial theory are not only
unnecessary but decidedly harm­ful.  That
which has caused so much confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult
for the public to understand and know what the law is with respect to a given
matter, is in considerable measure the unwarranted interference by judicial
tribunals with the English language as found in statutes and contracts, cutting
out words here and inserting them there, making them fit personal ideas of what
the legis­lature ought to have done or what parties should have agreed upon,
giving them meanings which they do not ordinarily have, cutting, trimming,
fitting, changing and coloring until law­yers themselves are unable to advise
their clients as to the meaning of a given statute or contract until it has
been sub­mitted to some court for its ‘interpretation and construction’.”
(Yangco vs. Court of First Instance of Manila,
29 Phil. 183, 188).

“Construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is
impossible or inadequate without them. 
They are the very last functions which a court should exercise.  The majority of the laws need no
interpretation or construction.  They require only application, and if there were more application
and less construction, there would be more stability in the law, and more
people would know what the law is.” (Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tico,
24 Phil. 504, 513).

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed and set aside.  We hereby declare
that the appearance in the aforementioned case of Cruz Dorian Agabin Atienza & Alday as counsel for the municipality of Hagonoy is contrary to law. 
The municipality should be represented by its municipal attorney and by
the pro­vincial fiscal of Bulacan.  The restraining order is lifted.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, Jr., and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., (Chairman), concurs on the strictly technical grounds stated in
the main opinion. He feels however, that a municipality or province should be
able to seek the help of competent counsel, if it feels its case is of such
importance that the services of the fiscal and the municipal attorney would be
inadequate and the assistance of private counsel is offered gratis. Anyway,
the Cruz Law office can very well help the government lawyers without having to
make any formal appearance. Withal, perhaps permission by the Minister of
Justice may solve the situation of the municipality.

Abad Santos, J., in the result.