TROPICAL BUILDING SPECIALTIES, INC., PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JAIME NUEVAS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Tropical Building Specialties versus Nuevas

The Case

Tropical Building Specialties, Incorporated, sued Jaime Nuevas to recover the price of construction materials it says it delivered to him from 1961 to 1964. The municipal court ruled for the corporation, and Nuevas appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila. That court, after a long train of postponements, dismissed his appeal and sent the case back for execution. Nuevas now asks the Supreme Court to reverse that dismissal. The case matters because it fixes the standard of review for one of the most common procedural rulings in litigation: the grant or denial of a postponement, and the dismissal of an appeal for failure to prosecute.

Procedural History

The action began in the Municipal Court of Manila, which rendered judgment for the plaintiff corporation. It ordered Nuevas to pay the sum claimed, with interest at twelve percent per annum from May 1964 until fully paid, plus five hundred pesos in attorney's fees, apart from costs. The municipal court had reduced the attorney's fees from nine hundred fifty pesos to five hundred pesos in the exercise of its discretion.

Nuevas appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila. The record was forwarded, and the case was set for pre-trial. On motion of the defendant, the pre-trial and the hearing were postponed several times on the ground that he was making efforts at an amicable settlement. After a final warning that no further postponement would be countenanced, Nuevas again failed to appear, and the court allowed the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte. On the defendant's motion, the court reconsidered and set a new hearing. On the eve of that hearing, Nuevas filed an unverified petition to transfer it. The Court of First Instance denied the petition and dismissed the appeal, ordering the case remanded to the court of origin for execution of the judgment. Nuevas brought the matter to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the order of dismissal.

Facts

Tropical Building Specialties sought to recover the price of materials it allegedly delivered to Nuevas from 1961 to 1964. In his answer, Nuevas admitted the deliveries made up to June 23, 1961, without specifying the goods or their value. As to deliveries in 1962, 1963 and 1964, he alleged that he had no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief. He did not apply for a bill of particulars, although, as a member of the Bar, he knew he could have done so. He also averred that he had a subsequent agreement with the plaintiff to liquidate his account, if any, by partial payments. The municipal court granted the relief prayed for, reducing only the attorney's fees.

On appeal, the Court of First Instance set the case for pre-trial. On the defendant's motion, the proceeding and the hearing were postponed first to December 1, 1965, then to January 13, 1966, then to February 16, and still later to March 15, each time on the ground that he was making efforts at an amicable settlement. On March 15, 1966, the court granted a last postponement to April 21, 1966, a date selected by the parties, and warned that no further postponement would be countenanced.

Despite the warning, Nuevas did not appear on the scheduled date, and the court authorized the plaintiff to present its evidence ex parte. On his motion, and over the plaintiff's objection, the court reconsidered and set the case for hearing on July 7, 1966. On July 6, 1966, Nuevas filed an unverified petition to transfer the hearing to a later date, preferably in the latter part of August, on the ground that he had a hearing on July 7 in a case in the Court of First Instance of Cavite which, he said, had been set first. The Court of First Instance denied the petition and dismissed the appeal.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of First Instance acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the defendant's petition to postpone the hearing and in dismissing his appeal.
• Whether or not the dismissal of the appeal was proper given the defendant's repeated postponements and his failure to appear at the scheduled hearing.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote any statutory provision. It rests on the settled rule that postponements of hearings are matters primarily addressed to the discretion of the court. The Court states the governing principle in its own words:

Postponements of hearings are matters primarily addressed to the discretion of the Court, the exercise of which should not be interfered with on appeal, in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion.

This principle bears on the case because it supplies the standard by which the Supreme Court reviews the trial court's refusal to grant another postponement and its consequent dismissal of the appeal.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that there was no abuse of discretion, much less a manifest one. It counted that the hearing in the Court of First Instance had been postponed five times on the defendant's motion. The order of March 15 expressly stated that the postponement to April 21 was the last and that no further postponement would be countenanced. Despite the defendant's failure to appear on April 21, the court granted him another opportunity to be heard on July 7. Although the defendant claimed that his Cavite hearing had been set first, he had ample time to make representations to that effect before July 1966, but did so only on July 6, on the eve of the hearing. The Court also noted that the defendant had secured several postponements by giving the impression that he was trying to settle the case amicably, which he never did.

On the second issue, the Court held that the dismissal was proper. The record suggested that the defendant had no valid defense and that the appeal was purely dilatory in nature. Since postponements are addressed to the discretion of the court and that discretion should not be interfered with on appeal absent a manifest abuse, and since no such abuse existed, the order appealed from had to be sustained.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, the grant or denial of a postponement of a hearing is a matter primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Second, that discretion will not be interfered with on appeal in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion. Third, a party who repeatedly seeks postponements on the pretext of an amicable settlement he never pursues, and who fails to appear after a final warning, risks the dismissal of his appeal as dilatory. Fourth, a party who needs particulars of the complaint should apply for a bill of particulars; he cannot later complain of lack of knowledge where he had the remedy and did not use it.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Court of First Instance dismissing the appeal and remanding the case for execution, with costs against the defendant-appellant, Jaime Nuevas.

Remember This

Memorize this line: postponements of hearings are matters primarily addressed to the discretion of the court, and that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse. Examiners use this case in civil procedure and remedial law to test the standard of review for discretionary rulings and the consequences of a dilatory appeal.