THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. AMADA REYES DE HERNANDEZ, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

The present appeal was interposed by the City Attorney of Quezon City from
the order of the Court of First Instance dated December 8, 1953, dismissing the
case against Amada Reyes de Hernandez, Ricardo and Teofilo Reyes, and Solano
Hernandez.

It appears from the record that on April 24, 1953, an information for
qualified theft was filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (Case
No. Q-972), couched in the following terms:

“The undersigned City Attorney of Quezon City accuses Anselmo Reyes y Barican
as principal, and accused Amada Reyes de Hernandez, Solano Hernandez, Ricardo
Reyes, Teofilo Reyes and others who are still unidentified as accessories after
the fact of the crime of qualified theft, committed as follows:

‘That on or about the 19th of April, 1953, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
accused Anselmo Reyes Y Barican, who at the time was then the trusted driver of
Mr. and Mrs. Lucas Paredes and has been especially assigned to take charge and
drive a Cadillac car for the Governor of Abra wherein the jewelries belonging to
Mr. and Mrs. Paredes were being kept and while said car was under the care and
custody of Anselmo Reyes y Barican, said accused, without the consent of the
owner thereof, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with
intent of gain and with grave abuse of confidence, open the baggage compartment
of said Cadillac car and take, steal, and carry away the following jewelries
belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Lucas Paredes:

‘(List of Jewelries)

“That the accused Amada Reyes de Hernandez, Solano Hernandez, Ricardo Reyes
and Teofilo Reyes, having knowledge of the commission of the above described
crime of qualified theft, and without having participated therein either as
principals or as accomplices took part in said offense subsequent to its
commission by then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously concealing
the aforementioned pieces of jewelry after receiving same from the principal
accused Anselmo Reyes y Barican, in order to conceal the crime, to the damage
and prejudice of the said owners thereof in the aforementioned sum of P227,190,
Philippine currency.” (Appellant’s Brief, pp. 2-3).

The principal accused, Anselmo Reyes, pleaded guilty to simple theft, and was
sentenced accordingly. Those charged as accessories after the fact (now
appellees herein) pleaded not guilty, and later filed a motion to quash (Rec.,
p. 58) on the ground that being brothers and sisters of the accused, they were
exempt of criminal responsibility for the acts charged against them in the
information, invoking Art. 20 of the Revised Penal Code and submitting evidence
of the relationship. Thereupon, the prosecution moved (Rec. p. 77) to be allowed
to clarify the information by adding thereto an allegation that the accused
Ricardo, Teofilo, and Amada Reyes, and the latter’s husband Solano Hernandez,
profited from the effects of the crime committed by the principal
accused. In view of this move, counsel for the accused moved to withdraw their
motion to quash, and objected to the proposed amendment of the information, on
the ground that it was a material change not allowable after plea without
consent of the accused (Rec, pp. 79, 86). , On June 15, 1953, the Court issued
an order denying the motion to amend the information, because it would
substantially affect the fundamental rights of the accused, who were exempt from
criminal responsibility under the original information, in view of their
relationship with the principal accused (Rec, p. 102), but without acting on*
the motion for the withdrawal of the motion to quash. Then the prosecution.
moved to dismiss the case against the alleged accessories, with reservation of
the right to file another information; and the court ordered the dismissal on
August 26, 1953 (Rec. p. 155), without ruling on the reservation made by the
prosecution because any such ruling would be, in its opinion, premature.

A new information was then filed (Crim. Case No. Q-1064) in the same Court,
virtually reproducing the pre- vious one in case Q-972, except for the
allegation that—

“Amada Reyes de Hernandez, Solano Hernandez, Ricardo Reyes and Teofilo Reyes
received the following pieces of jewelry and with intent of gain willfully
unlawfully and feloniously kept them for the purpose of profiting themselves and
assisting Anselmo Reyes to profit by the effects of the crime above mentioned to
the damage and prejudice of the above-mentioned owner in the sum of P162,180
Philippine currency. * * *”.

The accused moved to quash the second information on the ground that it would
place them twice in jeopardy for the same offense; and the motion was granted by
the Court below. Thereupon, the prosecution appealed to this Court.

The Solicitor General argues that there could be no second jeopardy for the
accused because (1) they could not be convicted under the first information, in
view of their relationship with the accused; and (2) that the second information
requires evidence (of intent of gain) that could not be admitted under the first
information, since it charged merely intent to conceal the crime.

We are of the opinion that the plea of double jeopardy was erroneously
sustained. In the first place, the accused- appellees herein filed a motion to
quash on the ground that tney incurred no criminal liability under the facts
alleged in the information in the preceding case, No. Q-972, and the trial
Court, instead of allowing the withdrawal of the motion to quash, virtually
sustained the same when it denied the fiscal’s motion to amend, thereby forcing
the latter to dismiss the case; hence, it can not be held that the former case
was terminated without the express consent of the accused. Secondly, the
defendants themselves showed that the information in case No. Q-972 was
insufficient to charge them with any criminal offense, in view of their
relationship with the principal accused; and it is well established doctrine
that for jeopardy to attach, there must be an information sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction (Rule 113, sec. 9). Lastly, the herein accused
having successfully contended that the information in case No. Q-972 was
insufficient to sustain a conviction, they can not turn around now and claim
that such information was after all, sufficient and did place them in danger or
jeopardy of being convicted thereunder. If, as they formerly contended, no
conviction could be had in the previous case, they are in estoppel to contend
now that the information in the second case (Q-1064) places them in jeopardy for
the second time. Their case comes within the spirit of the rule laid
down in People vs. Acierto, (92 Phil., 534):

“Irrespective of the correctness of the views of tbe Military authorities,
the defendant was estopped from demurring to the Philippine court’s jurisdiction
and pleading double jeopardy on the strength of his trial by the court
martial. A party will not be allowed to make a mockery of justice by taking
inconsistent positions which, if allowed, would result in brazen
deception. It is trifling with the courts, contrary to the elementary
principles of the right dealing and good faith, for an accused to tell one court
that it lacks authority to try him and, after he has succeeded in his effort, to
tell the court to which he has been turned over that the first has committed
error in yielding to his plea.” (Italics supplied).

The order of dismissal appealed from is reversed and set aside, and the case
ordered remanded to the Court of origin with instructions to proceed with the
case. Costs against accused-appellees.

Pablo, Acting C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo,
Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Judgment reversed.