QUIRICO CAMUS, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. THE CIVIL SERVICE BOARD OF APPEALS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.

The case was submitted on a stipulation of facts, with the pertinent
documents and papers thereon.

Petitioner Quirico Camus was a Civil Service eligible and discharging the
duties of Administrative Officer of the Bureau of Public Works at P6,000 yearly
salary since January 1, 1951. On September 13, 1952, administrative charges were
filed against him and on December 12, 1952, the Commissioner of Civil Service
rendered the following decision:

“It appears that on May 13, 1952 and June 12, 1952, the respondent signed for
the Bureau of Public Works, applications Nos. 003733 and 004804 to import 1,000
and 500 tons of petroleum asphalt, respectively. In addition, he also signed at
a later date, an application to the Philippine National Bank for the opening of
a letter of credit in favor of Florentino Reyes and Company as guarantor to
finance said importation. On the strength of these papers, the Import Control
Commission approved the application alluded, to and issued the necessary
licenses on May 21 and June 16, 1952. The Philippine National Bank, likewise,
approved the establishment of a letter of credit in the name of Florencio Reyes
and Company and the transaction was approved by the Central Bank of the
Philippines. It further appears that in the applications to import, the
consignee was to be, and is, the Bureau of Public Works and the dollars were to
be provided by the Bureau. In both cases, however, the dollars were not made
available by the said Bureau. Most, if not all, of the asphalt arrived in Manila
either partially or fully unloaded in the piers the shipments being cleared by
Florencio Reyes and Company from the Customs House by virtue of an authority
signed by the respondent authorizing said Company to take ‘shipside delivery’ of
the material.

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“Considering that he is a responsible government official, this Office finds
him guilty of gross misconduct for which he merits a severe penalty. However, in
view of his length of service to the government, and his otherwise unblemished
record, he is hereby merely suspended for two (2) months without pay, in the
computation of which, the preventive suspension already suffered by him shall be
taken into account. Moreover, he should be demoted to a lower position, with
warning that his commission of another offense will be dealt with more
drastically.”

The above decision was modified in a Resolution, of the Commissioner of the
Civil Service on November 5, 1953 to wit:

“Following the decision of this Office dated December 12, 1952,
respondent-petitioner Camus was reinstated as Chief of Water Rights at P5,400.00
per annum. He was also paid his salary at P500 per month corresponding to the
period from September 13, 1952 to June 19, 1953 minus his two months’ pay
corresponding to his two months suspension without pay.

In view of all the foregoing, respondent petitioner Quirico Camus may now be
reinstated to his former position.”

Upon receipt of the foregoing resolution, the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications indorsed the matter to the President of the Philippines for final
decision on December 10, 1953, stating, among others, that said resolution might
adversely affect the morale and discipline among the employees of the Bureau of
Public Works.

On December 21, 1953, the said communication was referred by the Office of
the President to the Commissioner of Civil Service, who in his reply dated
January 16, 1954, made the following recommendations:

“A careful study of the case of Mr. Camus, former Administrative Officer, now
Chief of Water Rights in the Bureau of Public Works, shows that, although he
committed a serious error of judgment in exceeding his authority by presuming to
sign application to import a large quantity of asphalt with a private importer
as guarantor without the knowledge or approval of his superiors, the Director of
Public Works or the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, his acts were
not motivated by any ulterior or selfish purpose, but by the belief that the
importation would ultimately redound to the public benefit. The record does not
reveal bad faith on the part of Mr. Camus, nor evidence tending to show intent
to, or actual profit in the transaction.”

“It appears that Mr. Camus had already satisfied the first portion of the
decision against him dated December 12, 1952, i.e., suspension without pay for
two months. The second portion thereof which calls for his demotion is
considered satisfied in his having served for a period of over six months as
Chief, Water Rights, the position to which he was demoted. For purposes of
administrative discipline, such a temporary reduction in rank and salary is
considered a sufficient deterrent to the commission of another offense.
Moreover, after he had served six months in the position to which he was
reduced, Mr. Camus is already eligible for promotion under Sec. 11 of Executive
Order No. 94, series of 1947,

“For all the foregoing considerations, this Office feels that Mr. Camus ‘may’
be returned to his former position at the discretion of the appointing officer,
if circumstances warrant, such as final disposition of the court case against
him which has been provisionally dismissed.”

On October 14, 1954, petitioner Camus appealed the decision of the
Commissioner of Civil Service to the Civil Service Board of Appeals, which
handed a decision on January 16, 1956, of the following tenor:

“* * *. However, respondent merely committed an error of judgment when he
signed the two applications to import asphalt under the belief that such act was
authorized under his general authority provided for in the Bureau of Public
Works Circular No. 6, series of 1952 111 (h) and (g). The
Government did not suffer any loss in the importation or for any unpaid
taxes.”

A judicial review of the above decision was instituted with the Court of
First Instance of Manila (Certiorari with Mandamus, Civ. Case No. 28928) under
three (3) causes of action, namely: (a) that the acts committed by Camus,
in the light of the findings of the Commissioner of Civil Service cannot be
considered as ground for taking disciplinary administrative action, same having
been done in good faith and constituted only error in judgment; (b) that
if the acts were ever punishable, they can be no more than simple negligence,
for which admonition and/or reprimand would be the proper imposable penalty; and
(c) that having imposed the penalty of two months suspension without pay
(which has already been served out), the imposition of the additional penalty of
demotion finds no sanction in the law (sec. 695 of the Revised Adm. Code, as
amended). In his prayer, he asked that the decision of the Civil Service Board
of Appeals finding him guilty of gross misconduct be voided, since the acts, at
most, constitute only simple negligence and admonition and/or reprimand being
the appropriate penalty; that the Civil Service Board of Appeals be declared in
error in having affirmed sub-silencio the portion of the decision of the
Commissioner of Civil Service imposing the additional penalty of demotion, and
to compel the Secretary of Public Works to reinstate him to his former position
and the refund to him of all the amounts deducted from his salary as a result of
the suspension and/or demotion. This last prayer, however, has become moot in
view of his reinstatement and payment of the difference between his original pay
and the reduced salary.

On October 10, 1956, the lower court rendered judgment, dismissing the
petition, after finding that the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service had
the power to impose the penalties and that petitioner Camus had been barred from
bringing the action.

In the appeal the petitioner prays for a reversal of the decision of the
lower court on five (5) alleged errors, all of which boil down to just two
propositions—(1) Whether the respondent-appellee Civil Service Board of Appeals
erred in finding petitioner guilty of gross misconduct; and (2) Whether the
penalty of suspension for 2 months without pay was authorized or legal.

The Commissioner of Civil Service in his 3rd indorsement dated January 16,
1954, contained the following: “A careful study of the case of Mr. Camus, * * *
shows that, although he committed a serious error of judgment * * *, his acts
were not motivated by an alterior or selfish purpose, but by the belief that the
importation would ultimately redound to the public benefit. The record does not
reveal bad faith on the part of Mr. Camus, nor.evidence tending to show intent
to, or actual, profit in the transaction”. Likewise, the respondent-appellee
Civil Service Board of Appeals, in its decision affirming the decision, as
modified by the subsequent resolution, of the Commissioner of Civil Service,
said: * * *. “However, respondent merely committed an error of judgment when he
signed the two applications to import asphalt under the belief that such act was
authorized under his general authority * * *”. Considering the above findings,
the petitioner-appellant poses the following queries: Where is misconduct in an
act characterized * * * as ‘an error of judgment’ done under the belief that
such act was authorized? Where is the misconduct in acts found not to have been
motivated by any ulterior or selfish purpose, but by the belief that the
importation would ultimately redound to the public benefit? Is the finding that
the record does not reveal bad faith on the part of the appellant or show intent
to, or actual, profit in the transaction, consistent with the conclusion of
“gross misconduct”?

Misconduct has been defined as ‘wrong or improper conduct’ and ‘gross’ has
been held to mean ‘flagrant; shameful’ (Webster). This Court once held that the
word misconduct implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment
(In re Morrilleno, 43 Phil., 212, 214). With the above concept, it would appear
that the findings of the Commissioner of Civil Service and the appellee Civil
Service Board of Appeals, were inconsistent with the conclusions arrived at by
them. We fail to see how an act done in good faith, which constitutes only an
error of judgment and for no ulterior motives and/or purposes, satisfy the
definition of “gross misconduct”. The petitioner should, therefore, be held
guilty of simple negligence only.

Anent the propriety of the penalty imposed, the appellant contends that not
having committed acts which could be properly dubbed as “gross misconduct”, the
penalty imposed by the respondent Civil Service Board of Appeals becomes
excessive and constitutes a violation of the power granted by law. What he
questions is the proper exercise of that power, not the lack of it. The law
provides:

“Administrative discipline of subordinate officers and employees.—The
Commissioner of Civil Service shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the
removal, separation and suspension of subordinate officers and employees in the
Civil Service and over all other matters relating to the conduct, discipline,
and efficiency of such subordinate officers and employees, and all shall have
exclusive charge of all formal administrative investigations against them. He
may, for neglect of duty or violation of reasonable office regulations, or in
the interest of the public service, remove any subordinate officer or
employee from the service, suspend him without pay for not more than two months,
reduce his salary or compensation, or deduct therefrom any sum not exceeding one
month’s pay. * * *” (Sec. 695, Revised Adm. Code).

It will thus be seen that the Commissioner of Civil Service is given a great
latitude in the imposition of penalties. And as well observed by the Solicitor
General—

“It will be noted that not only does the law fail to specify that one
particular penalty should be imposed upon a particular offense but that the
description of the offenses are couched in such general terms as to include a
variety of acts such as ‘incompetency’, ‘inefficiency’, ‘conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service’ (Rule XIII, par. 6 Civ. Service Rules)
enumerated in the various executive memoranda and administrative orders
comprising the Civil Service Rules, which acts, ‘may be considered reasons
demanding proceedings to remove for cause, reduce in the class or grade; or to
inflict other punishment as provided by law’ (Rule XIII, par. 6, Civil Service
Rules; see Lacson vs. Romero, 84 Phil., 740; 47 Off. Gaz.,
1778.)”

The appellee alleged that petitioner had failed to appeal from the decision
of the Civil Service Board of Appeals to the President of the Philippines, as
provided for in section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 598, and, therefore, the
filing of the present action was premature, for it has been held that “the
petitioner had no right to appeal to the court, even admitting that there was an
abuse of authority, until he had exhausted the remedies afforded him by the
executive branch of the government. The administrative remedies must first be
exhausted before resort can be had to the court” (Lo Po vs. M’Coy, 8
Phil., 343). It appears, however, that two letters of petitioner were sent to
the President appealing for reinstatement and on June 30, 1955, the Assistant
Executive Secretary answered petitioner, stating “the matter was submitted to
the Cabinet for decision and the said body, at its meeting held on June 2, 1955,
decided to deny your request”. The assertion of appellee that the filing of the
present action is premature finds no factual or legal basis.

In view hereof, we declare that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction to
try the case and hold that the petitioner-appellant is guilty of simple
negligence only. Such portions of the decision appealed from not incompatible
with the findings and conclusions of this Court, are hereby affirmed. No
costs.

Paredes, Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, De Leon, and Natividad, JJ., concur.