GLENN BASILIO PALUBON MARRIED TO DR. CONCEPCION BERNABE-PALUBON, PETITIONERS, VS. VICENTE BALAGTAS, SPOUSES ARIEL BALAGTAS, SPOUSES ARIES BALAGTAS AND ALL PERSONS WHO CLAIM RIGH…
REYES, JR., J.C., J.:
a) The Decision (Rollo, pp. 19-24) dated May 28, 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court of the City of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 14 in Civil
Case No. 05-M-2012; andb) The Order (Rollo, p. 44) dated July 19, 2012 which denied
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration likewise issued by the Regional
Trial Court of the City of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 14.
The facts:
On December 7, 2009, petitioner Glen Basilio
Palubon filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer with Damages against
respondents Vicente Balagtas, Spouses Ariel Balagtas, Spouses Aries
Balagtas and all persons claiming rights under them with the Municipal
Trial Court of Calumpit, Bulacan.
Petitioner Glenn Basilio
Palubon alleged in his complaint that he is the registered owner of a
residential parcel of land referred to as Lot 13 PCS-03-010515 with an
area of 161 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-232384 located at Barangay Frances, Calumpit, Bulacan. Petitioner
claimed that said property was purchased from Maria C. Santiago and
Simeona Santiago-Jumaquio married to Joaquin Jumaquio. After the sale
and transfer of ownership of the property, petitioner settled the realty
tax and he was issued Tax Declaration/ARP No. 2006-07010-01916 in his
name married to Dr. Concepcion B Palubon.
Petitioner averred that
herein respondents, Vicente Balagtas, Spouses Ariel Balagtas and
Spouses Aries Balagtas were occupying their property and built a house
thereon, not as lessees and without paying rental but by mere tolerance
of the previous owners. Respondents continue to use and occupy the
subject property even after the sale and transfer of ownership in the
name of petitioner, also by mere tolerance of the latter. Petitioner is
now subrogated to the rights and interests over the said parcel of land ,
including the right to recover possession through judicial action, in
order to enforce his rights as new owner of the property.
Petitioner further alleged that prior to the filing of the complaint or
on February 27, 2009, he sent a Formal Demand for herein respondents to
vacate and deliver peaceful possession of the subject property. Aside
from the notice to vacate, petitioner sent an offer for respondents to
either lease or purchase the property at the prevailing market value of
Php 2,000.00 per square meter. Petitioner claimed that respondents
ignored the same without lawful and justifiable cause. Also, both
parties met at the Barangay Office to amicably settle the issue at hand
however, all efforts remained futile as evidenced by the “Certification
to File Action” dated June 11, 2009. Hence, this Complaint for unlawful
detainer.
On the other hand, respondents in their Answer denied
petitioner’s allegations and by way of a special and affirmative defense
claimed that the said property was not owned by Simeona
Santiago-Jumaquio and Maria C. Santiago from whom the petitioner
allegedly purchased the same. The subject property occupied by
respondents was previously owned by Domingo de Leon, and his legal
surviving heir, Teresita M. Macapugay who sold it to them. They had with
them as evidence the Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman na may Bilihan and a
Cadastral Survey Plan.
Respondents further claimed that the lot
being claimed by the petitioner has no supporting survey and there is no
clear showing that the lot being claimed by the petitioner is the lot
being occupied by the respondents.
On May 6, 2010, a hearing was
held where both parties agreed to have the property surveyed. On
September 2, 2010, the relocation survey was conducted by the Land
Management Bureau headed by Librado F. Gellez, Jr.
On October 7,
2010, the Relocation Plan and Report were submitted to the Court which
stated that “the property of the [petitioner] Lot 13, Pcs-03-010515 is
entirely occupied by the respondents with their existing house partly
falling on the said property”.
The Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Calumpit, Bulacan decided the case in favor of petitioner. The MTC
ruled that it finds credence to the survey report submitted by Librado
F. Gellez and the Sketch Plan submitted to the MTC clearly shows that
the respondents are occupying the entire property of the petitioner and
that Lot 5488, with an area of 434 square meters which the respondents
claim is the lot they own and presently occupying, is in fact adjacent
to lot 13 of the petitioner. Hence, the lot owned by the petitioner is
being occupied by the respondents. (MTC Decision, Rollo, p. 17) The
dispositive portion of the said decision states:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and hereby orders as follows:1. Ordering the defendants and all persons who claim rights
under them to vacate the subject premises, remove the structures erected
thereon and restore peaceful physical possession and use thereof to the
plaintiff;2. To pay the reasonable rental value of the subject property
at One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) per month, from February 27, 2009
until they fully surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff;3. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, p.19)
Respondents filed an appeal before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
On May 28, 2012, the RTC reversed the MTC decision stating that an
unlawful detainer case meant that petitioner’s supposed act of tolerance
must be present from the beginning. The claim of tolerance of the
petitioner was not proven. The dispositive portion of the said decision
reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Decision dated September 20, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court of
Calumpit, Bulacan in SCAN 175 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint for unlawful detainer is hereby DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, p. 24)
Dissatisfied, petitioner, plaintiff therein, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied on July 19, 2012. Hence, this Petition
before Us with the following issues.
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 14, Malolos City erred in
dismissing on appeal in Civil Case No. 05-M-2012 the complaint for
unlawful detainer;
of Bulacan, Branch 14, Malolos City erred in not affirming in toto the
appealed decision in Special Civil Action No.175;
of Bulacan, Branch 14, Malolos City erred in finding that the demand
letter dated February 27, 2009 does not clearly show tolerated
possession.” (Rollo, p. 9)
Petitioner alleges that the RTC erred in reversing the decision of
the MTC thereby dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer on the
ground that petitioner was not able to prove tolerated possession.
Petitioner insists that he and the previous owners of the subject land
only tolerated the possession of the respondents of the subject
property. Hence, the principal issues are: a)whether petitioner
tolerated the possession of the respondents over the subject property;
and b) whether an action for unlawful detainer is the proper remedy.
The petition is without merit.
Unlawful detainer is a
summary action for the recovery of possession of real property. This
action may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld
after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by
virtue of any contract, express or implied. In unlawful detainer, the
possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his possession was
permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract
between them. However, the defendant’s possession became illegal when
the plaintiff demanded that the defendant vacate the subject property
due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess under the
contract, and the defendant refused to heed such demand. A case for
unlawful detainer must be instituted one year from the unlawful
withholding of possession. (Jose v. Alfuerto, 686 SCRA 323 [2012])
Thus, a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for
unlawful detainer if it recites that: (a) initially, possession of the
property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff; (b) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by
plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of
possession; (c) thereafter, defendant remained in possession of the
property and deprived plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (d) within
one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property,
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. Corollarily, the only
issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer case is physical or
material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim
of ownership by any of the parties involved. (Optimum Development Bank v. Spouses Jovellanoso, G.R. No. 189145. December 4, 2013)
The allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of
the action and the jurisdiction of the court. The complaint must
specifically allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer. In the
absence of these allegations of facts, an action for unlawful detainer
is not the proper remedy and the municipal trial court or the MeTC does
not have jurisdiction over the case.
In the case at bench,
petitioner was trying to make out a case for unlawful detainer by
invoking tolerance. However, the element of tolerance in unlawful
detainer was not proven other than the self-serving allegation in the
complaint that they tolerated the respondents to occupy the subject
property. The complaint is silent regarding the factual circumstances
surrounding the alleged tolerance. A perusal of the records of the case
would show that no supporting evidence on how and when the respondents
entered the property or who had granted them permission to occupy and
build a house on the premises. Without these allegations and evidence,
the bare claim regarding “tolerance” cannot be upheld.
The claim
that the respondents’ possession was merely tolerated by petitioner was
contradicted by the petitioner’s allegation in the demand letter that
the occupation and the building of the residential house in the subject
property was unlawful from the very beginning since it is without the
knowledge of the previous owner as well as their predecessor in
interest. The demand letter states:
“xxx xxx xxx
You and all persons who live with you or who claim rights under
you on the said parcel of land have used and occupied the said parcel of
land, and you erected a residential house thereon, without any right
therefor either as lessee or otherwise, and without the
knowledge or consent of the previous owners of the lot, the Spouses
Joaquin and Simeona Jumaquio and Maria Santiago, as well as their
predecessors-in-interest.xxx xxx xxx” (Rollo, p. 45)
It is to be noted that tolerance or permission must have been
present at the beginning of possession; if the possession was unlawful
from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would not be the proper
remedy and should be dismissed. (Ten Forty Realty and Development Corporation v. Cruz, 457 Phil. 603, 610 (2003); and Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 172, 185 (2001). In this case, the alleged tolerance was not present at the beginning.
Also, in the case of Jose v. Alfuerto, (686 SCRA 323 [2012]), the Supreme Court ruled:
“It is not the first time that this Court adjudged contradictory
statements in a complaint for unlawful detainer as a basis for
dismissal. In Unida v. Heirs of Urban, the claim that the defendant’s
possession was merely tolerated was contradicted by the complainant’s
allegation that the entry to the subject property was unlawful from the
very beginning. The Court then ruled that the unlawful detainer action
should fail.The contradictory statements in the complaint are further deemed
suspicious when a complaint is silent regarding the factual
circumstances surrounding the alleged tolerance. In Ten Forty Realty
Corporation v. Cruz, the complaint simply stated that: “(1) [defendant]
immediately occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an
action merely tolerated by [the plaintiff]; and (2) [the respondent’s]
allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance.” The
Court expressed its qualms over these averments of fact as they did not
contain anything substantiating the claim that the plaintiff tolerated
or permitted the occupation of the property by the defendant:These allegations contradict, rather than support,
[plaintiff’s] theory that its cause of action is for unlawful detainer.
First, these arguments advance the view that [defendant’s] occupation of
the property was unlawful at its inception. Second, they counter the
essential requirement in unlawful detainer cases that [plaintiff’s]
supposed act of sufferance or tolerance must be present right from the
start of a possession that is later sought to be recovered.As the bare allegation of [plaintiff’s] tolerance of
[defendant’s] occupation of the premises has not been proven, the
possession should be deemed illegal from the beginning. Thus, the CA
correctly ruled that the ejectment case should have been for forcible
entry — an action that had already prescribed, however, when the
Complaint was filed on May 12, 1999. The prescriptive period of one year
for forcible entry cases is reckoned from the date of [defendant’s]
actual entry into the land, which in this case was on April 24, 1998.”
Even if petitioner is the owner of the property, possession
thereof cannot be taken from another who has been in physical possession
for more than one year by resorting to a summary action for ejectment.
The cause of action in ejectment is different from that in an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. Possession in ejectment suits
refers only to possession de facto, or actual or material possession,
and not possession flowing out of ownership; these are different legal
concepts for which the law provides different remedies for recovery of
possession. An ejectment suit is brought before the proper inferior
court to recover physical possession only or possession de facto, not
possession de jure. Unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases are not
processes to determine actual title to property. (Barrientos vs. Rapal, 654 SCRA 461 [2011])
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the Regional Trial Court’s Decision dated May 28, 2012 and Order dated July 19, 2012 in Civil Case No. 05-M-2012.
SO ORDERED.
Lopez and Inting, JJ., concur.