PHILIPPINE MANUFACTURING COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. ANG BISIG NG PMC, ALBERTO TEODORO, ALEJANDRO JOAQUIN AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS.

It appears that during the period 1947 to August 3, 1953, the
schedule of shifts in the production department of the Philippine
Manufacturing Company was from 7 a.m. to 3 p.m.; from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m.
and from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. According to the stipulation of facts of the
parties, this schedule was adopted by the company and the employees,
who are members of respondent Ang Bisig ng PMC, agreed to the same and
worked in the shifts during the period mentioned.

In a petition filed in case No. 364-V(5) on April 25,1955, the union
asked the Court of Industrial Relations to order the company to pay 50
per cent extra compensation for work done from 12:01 a.m. to 7 a.m.
from 1947 to August 3, 1953, whenever the period mentioned fell on a
Sunday or a legal holiday.

On the other hand, the company contained in its answer that since
the company and the union had agreed on a workday that began at 7 a.m.
of one day and lasted until 7 a.m. of the following day, the period
between 12:01 a.m. and 7 a.m. of Sunday should be considered a part of
the Saturday workday and therefore work done during that period was not
entitled to any extra pay.

After trial, Presiding Judge Jose S. Bautista rendered 2l decision,
ordering the company “to pay all its workers involved herein 50%
additional compensation for work rendered from 12:01 A.M. to 7:00 A.M.
on Sundays and legal holidays.”

The company filed a motion for reconsideration and asked that the
same be set for hearing before the Court of Industrial Relations en
bane. Without hearing the company in oral argument, the Court of
Industrial Relations en bane denied the motion for reconsideration in a
resolution dated January 1, 1961. Hence, this appeal.

In its first and second assignment of errors, the company complains
that the Court of Industrial Relations “ignored the Motion for oral
argument, and without further ado, the Presiding Judge of the
respondent Court whose order was sought to be reconsidered proceeded to
write the minute resolution of the Court en bane denying the Motion for
reconsideration” and “the resolution was (then) passed from judge to
judge for their signature.” It is contended that petitioner was thereby
denied due process in violation of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
103 which provides in part that—

“* * * Should any party aggrieved by a ruling or decision of any of
the judges, request a reconsideration thereof, or at the request of any
of them, the judges shall sit together, and the concurrence of at
least three of the five judges shall be necessary for the pronouncement
of a decision, order or award.”

The hearing of a motion for reconsideration in oral argument is a
matter which rests upon the sound discretion of the Court of Industrial
Relations. Its refusal does not constitute a denial of due process in
the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion. (See Manila Trading
& Supply Co. vs. Philippine Labor Union, 71 Phil. 124 and Koppel
[Phil]., Inc. contra El Tribunal de Relaciones Industrials, et al.,.98
Phil., 80; 51 Off. Gaz., No. 5, 2376).

Neither may it be said that the judges of the Court of Industrial
Relations did not, as required by law, “sit together” in resolving the
Company’s motion for reconsideration, because as held in Tolentino, et
al., vs. Angeles, et al.,99 Phil., 309; 52 Off. Gaz., No. 9,
4262, “the fact that they (the judges) signed the resolution means that
they sat together in consultation and in passing upon the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners.” More recently, this Court ruled
that “the requirement that a motion for reconsideration shall be
resolved by the court en bane, the judges sitting together, simply
demands that all the available judges shall take part, for as long as
three at least of the judges attending concur, it is enough for the
pronouncement of the decision or award (C.A. 595).” (San Miguel Brewery
Inc., et al. vs. Santos, et al., G. R. No. L-12682, August 31, 1961).

For while the resolution may have been prepared by one judge, yet it
cannot be inferred from this circumstance, alone that no previous
deliberation was held. On the contrary, it is safe to assume that the
resolution was the result of a previous consultation among the judges.

In its third, fourth and fifth assignments of errors, the company
contends that its “agreement (with the employees) was to the effect
that the hours of the arbitrary workday which might overlap into the
calendar Sunday or holiday would be treated as part of the workday and
paid accordingly.” The company, therefore, concludes that in ordering
that work done between 12:01 a.m. and 7 a.m. of a calendar Sunday be
paid extra compensation the Court of Industrial Relations in effect
invalidated the agreement of the parties. It is also claimed that
having entered into this agreement, the employees concerned are stopped
from claiming extra pay.

The contention is without merit. The validity of the agreement of
the parties to work between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. of the third shift is
not the issue in this case. The issue is whether, assuming the
agreement to be valid, work done on Sunday or legal holiday as a result
of the agreement is to be paid extra compensation. In ordering the
payment of extra compensation for work done on Sunday and legal
holidays, the Court of Industrial Relations did not invalidate the
agreement of the parties. It merely enforce the law. For what the
parties agreed upon was the third shift should be from 11 p.m. of one
day until 7 a.m. of the following day. As to whether work done during
this shift was to be paid only the ordinary rate or the Sunday rate
whenever the shift fell on a Sunday or a legal holiday was something else upon which the parties did not agree. Indeed, they did not have to, because the matter is governed by law.

Thus, Section 4 of the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Com. Act No. 444, as amended) provides that—

“No person, firm or corporation, business
establishment or place or center of labor shall compel an employee or
laborer to. work during Sundays and legal holidays, unless he is paid
an additional sum of at least twenty-five per centum of his regular
remuneration: * *. * and Section 6 of the same expressly states that—

“Any
agreement or contract between the employees and the laborer or employee
contrary to the provisions of this Act shall be null and void ab
initio.“

This is the reason why in Elks Club vs. Rovira, 80 Phil. 272,
we held that contracts between an employer and his employees, which
call for seven day-3 service a week on a monthly salary basis, cannot
be renewed after the enactment of the Eight-Hour Labor Law.

Lastly, it is contended that the Court of Industrial Relations erred
in ordering the company to pay 50 per cent extra compensation, pursuant
to the collective bargaining agreement of the parties, because “the
employees cannot in one action destroy the validity of their agreement
to the effect that the first 7 hours of a calendar Sunday is part of
the contractual Saturday workday, and in the same action enforce the
50% additional compensation stipulated for ‘Sunday work’ provided in
the same agreement sought to be rendered void.” It is contended that
the company should be required to pay only 25 per cent as provided by
law.

As already stated, the validity of the agreement of the parties is
not the issue here. The point rather is whether, on the assumption that
the agreement is valid, work done on Sunday or legal holiday as a
result of the schedule is to be paid extra compensation and we said it
should be. The Court of Industrial Relations therefore committed no
error in ordering the payment of 50 per cent additional compensation in
line with the practice of the company and the collective bargaining
agreement of the parties.

Wherefore the decision dated November 2, 1960 and the resolution
dated January 31, 1961 of the Court of Industrial Relations are hereby
affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.