FELISA E. SANTIAGO, ET AL., APPLICANTS-APPELLEES, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT.

Santiago versus Republic of the Philippines

The Case

This is a land registration case: Felisa Santiago and her co-applicants asked the State to confirm and register in their names a parcel of land in Antipolo City, and the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the application. The trial court granted the application, the Republic appealed, and the Supreme Court decided the appeal in favor of the State. The case matters because it gathers into one decision the two burdens every applicant for confirmation of an imperfect title must discharge, and it shows how strictly the Court scrutinizes tax declarations, tax receipts, and survey plans offered to prove those burdens.

Procedural History

The applicants filed their application for registration of title before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72, and the case was raffled there. The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an opposition. At the hearing, the trial court issued an order of general default except as against the Republic, and appointed the Branch Clerk of Court as commissioner to receive the applicants' evidence. The trial court then rendered its decision confirming the applicants' title and ordering registration in their names. The Republic appealed that decision to the Supreme Court, assigning errors in the trial court's findings on possession and on the character of the land. The Supreme Court resolved the appeal and reversed the trial court.

Facts

On 11 November 1998, the applicants filed an application for registration of title over Lot 7727, situated in Barangay Dela Paz, Antipolo City, with an area of 3,051 square meters. They claimed ownership by inheritance from their father, whose death on 18 February 1987 was evidenced by a deed of extrajudicial partition. They alleged that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, peaceful, exclusive, and notorious possession of the lot in the concept of an owner for more than thirty years, and that the lot was not within any reservation and was alienable and disposable.

The Republic opposed, averring that neither the applicants nor their predecessors had possessed the lot since 12 June 1945 or earlier, that their tax documents did not constitute competent evidence of bona fide acquisition, and that the lot was part of the public domain not subject to private appropriation. At the hearing, three witnesses testified for the applicants: Felisa Santiago, Apolinario Lazaro, and Engracio Marquez. They testified that the lot belonged to the applicants' father, that he planted fruit trees on it, and that the applicants succeeded him upon his death. The applicants marked in evidence an extrajudicial partition, a lot plan, a technical description, Tax Declaration Number AN-004-01341 for the year 1994, and Tax Receipt Number 5901892 dated 30 July 1998.

The trial court granted the application, holding that the applicants had possessed the property for more than thirty years by tacking, that the land was shown by the plan to be an alienable and disposable portion of the public domain, and that it had never been forfeited for non-payment of taxes. The Republic appealed.

Issues

• Whether or not the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest proved open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
• Whether or not the applicants proved that the subject lot is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

Applicable Provisions

The decision applies the requirement of possession since 12 June 1945, drawn from the land registration law as amended, which the applicants themselves invoked in their application:

They apply for confirmation and registration of their title under Act 496 as amended by R.A. 6236 as they have been in open, continuous, peaceful, exclusive and notorious possession of the parcel of land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years, including that of their predecessors-in-interest.

This is the very allegation the Court measured against the evidence, and found wanting.

The decision also rests on the Regalian doctrine as embodied in the Constitution, which it states in these terms:

Under the Regalian doctrine which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

This presumption placed on the applicants the burden of proving that the lot had been classified as alienable and disposable.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the appeal is impressed with merit. Before one can register a title, the applicant must show that he, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, and that the land is alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The testimonies of the three witnesses showed only that the applicants' predecessor owned the lot, but none of them testified as to when he began cultivating it; Felisa Santiago said only that her father owned the lot since she was small. These bare testimonies are insufficient.

The tax documents did not save the application. The earliest tax declaration was issued only in 1994, and the tax receipt showed that realty taxes for the years 1966 to 1998 were paid in lump sum on 30 July 1998, about three months before the application was filed on 11 November 1998. The Court held that where realty taxes covering thirty-one years were paid only a few months before the filing of the application, such payment does not constitute sufficient proof of a bona fide claim of ownership prior to the filing, and a belated declaration is indicative that the applicant had no real claim of ownership prior to the declaration. The Court also noted that the tax declaration covered 4,478 square meters while the lot applied for had an area of 3,051 square meters, and that the declaration did not bear the signature of the City Assessor. It further noted a discrepancy casting doubt on the witnesses' credibility: all three testified that the applicants are the heirs of Cerilo Santiago, when the declared owner was Cerilo Esguerra and all the applicants bear the surname Esguerra.

On the second issue, the Court agreed with the Republic that no evidence showed the lot had been certified as alienable and disposable by the government agency concerned. The declassification of forest land and its conversion into alienable or disposable land requires an express and positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, or a legislative act or a statute. It cannot be presumed but must be established by convincing proof. The Court found nothing in the records that could be considered such an express and positive act. It rejected the argument that because the lot is a cadastral lot and the Bureau of Lands initiated the survey and approved the plan, the land is therefore alienable and disposable. The approval of the plan is not an express or positive act of the government; the plan merely identifies the lot for purposes of adjudication in the cadastral proceedings. The Court quoted with approval the ruling in Republic versus Lao:

In the case at bar, no certification from the appropriate government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land as alienable and disposable was presented by respondent. Respondent merely submitted the survey map and technical descriptions of the land, which contained no information regarding the classification of the property. These documents are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.

The Court closed by recalling that the presumption is that lands of whatever classification belong to the State, that evidence of a land grant must be well-nigh incontrovertible, and that the burden of proof in land registration cases is on the applicant, who must show that she is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for. The applicants failed to discharge this burden.

Doctrine

An applicant for confirmation of an imperfect title must prove two things: first, that he, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier; and second, that the land is alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Both must be established by competent evidence, and failure on either defeats the application.

On possession, tax declarations and tax receipts are not sufficient proof of possession since 12 June 1945 where the earliest declaration is recent and the taxes covering decades were paid in lump sum only a few months before the application was filed. A belated declaration is indicative that the applicant had no real claim of ownership prior to the declaration, and bare testimonies that a predecessor owned the land, without proof of when his possession began, do not meet the requirement.

On the character of the land, the Regalian doctrine presumes that all lands not clearly shown to be in private ownership belong to the State. The applicant bears the burden of overcoming this presumption with incontrovertible evidence of an express and positive act of the government classifying the land as alienable and disposable, such as a presidential proclamation or executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, or a legislative act or a statute. A cadastral survey plan approved by the Bureau of Lands is not such an act; it merely identifies the lot for purposes of adjudication.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the Republic's appeal, reversed and set aside the trial court's decision, and entered a new judgment dismissing the application for land registration.

Remember This

Memorize the twin burden: possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, plus proof by express and positive government act that the land is alienable and disposable. Examiners use this case to test whether a cadastral plan or a lump-sum tax payment made shortly before filing can substitute for that proof, and the answer is no.