REYNALDO RODIL, PETITIONER, VS. SEGUNDO M. GARCIA (MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF STA. CRUZ, MARINDUQUE), AND PC TSGT. IRENEO DELLOSA, RESPONDENTS.

It was the insistence of
counsel for petitioner Reynaldo Rodil, against whom a
warrant of arrest had been issued the charge against him being that of murder, to recall witnesses for the
prosecution to enable such counsel to cross-examine them, on, to quote his words,
“clarificatory and amplificatory matters” and the denial thereof by respon­dent Municipal Judge Segundo M. Garcia of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque^[1]
that led to
this proceeding for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.^[2] What is prayed for is not only that such
order denying counsel’s request to recall government witnesses be set aside and
nullified, but also that bail be granted petitioner, a petition to that
effect having been denied with a subsequent motion for reconsideration still
undecided.  Respondents were required to
comment and the Court likewise issued a temporary restraining order.  Such a
comment was submitted on behalf of respondents by the Solicitor General^[3]
seeking the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the right to
cross-examine in a preliminary investigation is not a right granted an accused
and that the exercise of discretion by respondent Judge considering the
evidence of record sufficed to justify denial of the application for bail.  The case was then considered submitted for
decision.

An examination of the
record, as well as the pertinent doctrines, makes evident that the
jurisdictional issue posed arises from the failure to accord petitioner a
hearing on his application for bail. 
A resolution of that question in the sense of respondent Judge affording
petitioner his day in court is equally decisive of the other issue, whether or
not counsel for petitioner could recall witnesses for the prose­cution for the
purpose of asking clarificatory questions.  That he could very well do when they testify
to prove evidence of guilt is strong. 
Under the present state of the law, it cannot be said that the right to
cross-examine is guaranteed an accused at the stage of preliminary
investigation.

There is, in the light of
the above, merit in the petition.

1.  At the continuation of
the hearing on the prelimi­nary investigation conducted by respondent Judge,
held after he denied the petition for bail, counsel for petitioner asked the
categorical question whether in the opinion of the court “the evidence of
guilt is strong, final and irreversible.”^[4]
Respondent Judge categorically answered: 
“That is final, the said order of the Court states that the
evidence of guilt is strong.”^[5]
More­over, the order of respondent Judge denying bail explicitly admitted he
issued it on the basis of the motion of petitioner that he be granted such
right and the opposition filed by the First Assistant Provincial Fiscal without
conducting any hearing on such motion. 
Clearly, he acted on the mistaken belief that the presentation of
evidence by the prosecution for the purpose of the issuance of the warrant of
arrest, the preliminary examination proper, suffices for the denial of the plea
for bail.  In the latest case on the
subject, People v. Sola,^[6]
decided on March 17, 1981, this Court relying on People v. San Diego,^[7]
nullified an order of a municipal judge named respondent in that case as he
granted bail to the accused without hearing the prosecution.  The present case is much stronger; it is the
accused himself, the explicit beneficiary of the constitutional right, who was
not heard.

2.  There is misapprehension
on the part of respondent Judge of the import of the ruling in Ocampo v. Bernabe,^[8]
as to the summary nature of the hearing required to determine whether bail
should be allowed.  The opinion of the
then Chief Justice Moran speaks for itself: 
“The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the
court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to
substantial matters avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and
cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount
of corrobo­ration particularly on details that are not essential to the purpose
of the hearing.  Objection has been made
long ago to this method of hearing wherein the regular trial is anticipated
though to a limited extent at least.  But
the objection was dismissed as follows: 
‘The second objection is more serious, and, if the courts possessed
entire freedom of action in regard to the matter, would be very
persuasive.  The regular trial is, to a
limited extent at least, anticipated. 
While the guilt or innocence of the accused is not to be determined, the
quantity and character of the proofs on this point are, for the special purpose
in hand, necessarily considered. 
Occasionally much time is thus consumed, and the court’s attention is
correspondingly diverted from other business.  But these objections cannot avail against a
positive constitutional command; if the Constitution requires the court to
determine for itself whether or not the proof is evident or presumption great
in a given case, all considerations of expediency or convenience, however
potent they might be at the common law, must give way.”^[9]
As a matter of fact, the decision in that case was in favor of petitioner Ocampo, with the Fourth Division of the People’s Court
being adjudged as having committed a grave abuse of discretion for denying
bail.  What cannot be too sufficiently
stressed is that the procedure to be followed in the hearing on an application
for bail, while summary in character, is not to be a mere sham or pretense.  It must not be an exercise in futility.  The accused is not to be denied his day in court.

3.  That leaves the question
of the alleged grave abuse of discretion in that he refused to allow counsel
for petitioner during the stage of preliminary investigation proper to recall
prosecution witnesses so that counsel could cross-examine them on “clarificatory and amplifica­tory matters.” As set
forth earlier, the accused is not by law entitled to such a right.  The leading case is still Abrera
v. Muñoz and Flordeliza,^[10]
a 1960 decision, with Justice J.B.L. Reyes as ponente. 
While the specific question differs, the principle announced is
applicable.  In that certiorari
proceeding, it was alleged that there was a grave abuse of discretion by
respondent Justice of the Peace for permitting the cross-examination by the
prosecution of the accused and her witnesses during the preliminary investi­gation.  This Court held:  “At the outset, it should be stated that
the refusal of the Justice of the Peace to allow the defense to cross-examine
the prosecution’s witnesses pre­sented prior to petitioner’s arrest, cannot be
utilized as argument for the contention that the prosecution should not have
been allowed to cross-examine the defense witnesses.  An accused is not entitled to cross-examine
the witnesses presented against him in the preliminary investigation before his
arrest, this being a matter that depends on the sound discretion of the Judge
or investigating officer concerned (People v. Ramilo,
98 Phil., 545; Dequito v. Arellano, 81 Phil., 128; Bustos v. Lucero, 81 Phil., 640).  Petitioner-appellant’s attempt to draw a
parallel between the refusal of the judge to allow her
to cross-examine prosecution’s witnesses, with the permission granted to the
latter as against the defense witnesses, assumes the existence of a vested
right of which petitioner-appellant had been deprived.  In being denied confrontation of the
prosecution witnesses, she was not deprived of any right but was merely refused
the exercise of a privilege.”^[11]
With the ruling on the question for bail, counsel for petitioner, as above
intimated, would be able to attain the objective which was denied him when he
was not allowed to recall the prosecution witnesses.  To follow the language of Abrera,
petitioner as the accused “was not deprived of any right but was merely
refused the exercise of a privilege.”

4.  The Abrera
decision likewise stands for this proposition first set forth in the aforecited Dequito case:  “There are an infinite number of things
which a party may not in strict law do or cause to be done but which may be
permitted by the court in the exercise of its discretion and in the interest of
justice.  Specially
is this true in matters affecting the conduct of the trial and the calling,
recalling and examination of witnesses.”^[12]
There is added emphasis as shown by this excerpt:  “The judge is not a ministerial officer
reduced to recording what takes place and what witnesses say in the
examination.  Above all, his is the great
responsibility of safeguarding the accused from ground­less or vindictive
prosecution.  If the justice of the peace
is to ascertain, as he must, whether a crime has been committed and, if so,
whether there is probable cause that the accused committed it, his authority
cannot be confined as in a straight jacket to the stiffness of medieval and
outmoded technicalities of practice.”^[13]
It thus appears clearly that in the exercise of his discretion respondent Judge
could have granted the request and thus avoided the necessity of a petition of
this character having to be filed.

5.  The interest of a more
speedy and a more efficient administration of justice would be best served if
there is a greater awareness on the part of judges that in addition to
safeguarding the express rights of an accused person, a matter mandated by the
Constitution or the Rules of Court, they should likewise exercise their
discretion in such a way that the purpose of a preliminary investigation, the
avoidance of groundless or vindictive prosecutions, could be attained in as
fair and objective manner as possible. 
Nor is counsel for petitioner entirely blameless.  From the transcript of stenographic notes
submitted by him, there is readily discernible that tone of
“asperity,” as noted in the Comment of Solicitor General Mendoza,
when he addressed respondent Judge.  An
occupant on the bench, while he should be on guard against undue emotional
reaction, is, after all, not expected to be totally free from such traits as
irritability and exasperation.  Moreover,
he is entitled and should get that proper degree of respect and courtesy from a
lawyer appearing before him.  While it is
not only the right of an advocate but his duty to cite all pertinent
authorities, counsel for petitioner could have done so in a less assertive
manner and by way of a submission rather than a lecture.  It must never be forgotten that a lawyer
pleads; he does not dictate.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is
granted.  The order of respondent Judge
denying bail is set aside.  He, or
whoever is now the Municipal Judge of Santa Cruz, Marinduque,
must set forthwith the hearing on the appli­cation for bail of petitioner, to
be conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution, the Rules
of Court, and this opinion.  No costs.

Aquino, Abad
Santos, Guerrero, and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., did not take part.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

^[1]
The other respondent is PC TSGT. Ireneo Dellosa.

^[2]
Petition, Annexes A, B, and H.

^[3]
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza was assisted by
Assistant Solicitor General Santiago M. Kapunan and
Solicitor Celso P. Ylagan.

^[4]
Annex F of Petition and Comment of Solicitor General, par. 4.

^[5]
Ibid.

^[6]
G.R. No.
56158-64.  Cf. Inocencio
v. Alconcel, G.R.
No. 55658, February 5, 1981 citing Teehankee v.
Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945); Ocampo
v. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55 (1946); De la Rama v. People’s Court, 77 Phil. 461 (1946); Ching Juat v. Ysip, 77 Phil. 849 (1947); Sy
Guan v. Amparo, 79 Phil. 670 (1947); People v.
Berg, 79 Phil. 842 (1947); People v. Alano, 81
Phil. 19 (1948); Muñoz v. Rilloraza,
83 Phil. 609 (1949); Villaseñor v. Abano, L-23599, September 29, 1967, 21 SCRA
312; People v. San Diego, L-29676, December 24, 1968, 26 SCRA 522.

^[7]
L-29676, December 24, 1968, 26 SCRA 522.

^[8]
77 Phil. 55 (1946).

^[9]
Ibid, 62-63.  The case of Re Losasso, 10 L.R.A. 847, 850
(1890) was cited by Chief Justice Moran.

^[10]
108 Phil. 1124.

^[11]
Ibid, 1126. 
It must be noted that while in Dequito v.
Arellano it was at the stage of preliminary examination when a plea to allow
the accused to cross-examine arose, in Bustos v.
Lucero, the question came up at the preliminary investigation proper. In
both cases, both decided in 1948, Justice Tuason
spoke for the Court.  The Ramilo decision reiterating such a rule was the result of
the failure of a City Attorney to allow the accused to cross-examine witnesses
during a reinvestigation.

^[12]
81 Phil. at 130.

^[13]
Ibid, 130-131.