LEODIGARIO GILLEGO, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. SALVACION DIAZ AND MANUEL GATA, AND HON. MAYORICO GALLANOSA, AS MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF MATNOG, RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.

Direct appeal on a question of law from the order of the Court of
First Instance of Sorsogon dismissing appellant’s
petition for certiorari seeking to restrain the execution of a judgment
of ejectment rendered by the municipal court of Matnog, Sorsogon, on the ground
of the latter court’s alleged loss of jurisdiction over the ejectment
case after the lapse of one year from the filing of the complaint.

On January 15, 1964,
respondents Salvacion Diaz and Manuel Gata filed a complaint for ejectment
and illegal detainer of a certain residential
property against petitioner before the municipal court of Matnog,
Sorsogon, presided by respondent judge Mayorico Gallanosa.

After numerous postponements attributed by respondents to the
effort of respondent judge to effect an amicable settlement of the case
(petitioner’s wife being the sister of respondent Salvacion
Diaz) and to postponements secured by the parties, judgment of ejectment was rendered on November 1, 1965 by respondent
judge, sentencing “the defendant Leodigario Gillego and other occupants therein to vac­ate the premises
as soon as possible, to pay the amount of P315.00 as rentals in arrears at the
rate of P15.00 a month which is considered a reasonable compensation for the
use and occupation of the premises from the final filing of the complaint to
date, and finally to pay P100.00 as attorney’s fee and the cost of this
action.”

The judgment having become final and executory,
respondents filed on February 16, 1966 the corresponding motion for
execution  of judgment, but petitioner
filed with the lower court on March 22, 1966 the present petition for certiorari
with injunction, praying for a declaration of nullity of the judgment of ejectment on the sole ground that “the said decision
of the respondent Municipal Judge of Matnog, rendered
on November 1, 1965 is null and void ab initio for the reason that the same was rendered by him
after he has lost jurisdiction over the case due to the lapse of one year from
the date of filing of the complaint.”

The lower court made short shrift of the petition, and issued its
order of May 3, 1966, dismissing the petition without costs, upon the authority
of Alejandro vs. Court of First Instance of Bulacan,^[1] Barrueco vs. Abeto,^[2] Gallano vs. Rivera,^[3]
and Casilan vs. Tomassi,^[4]
and ruling that “(T)he Municipal Judge of Matnog, Sorsogon, did not lose
jurisdiction over the case just for the reason that the decision was rendered
more than one year after the filing of the complaint.”

Hence, this appeal which the Court finds bereft of merit.

Sections 9 and 11 of Rule 4 of the old Rules of
Court (now Rule 5, sections 8 and 10) providing that “Adjournment.
– Inferior courts may adjourn the hearing of an action from day to day as the
interest of jus­tice requires, but shall not have power to adjourn hearings for
a longer period than five (5) days for each adjournment, nor for more than
fifteen (15) in all,” and that at the conclusion of trial, the municipal
judge shall render judgment, “(B)ut he may
adjourn the disposition of the case to a stated day, not exceeding one week
from the time of conclusion of the trial, for the consideration of the
judgment, if he requires time for consideration” – have long been
uniformly held by the Court in the above-cited cases of Alejandro, Gallano and Casilan
to be merely directory in character, a violation or non-observance of which
would not nullify the judicial proceeding, although a willful disregard or
reckless violation thereof by a judge would constitute a breach or neglect of
duty which may subject him to appropriate administrative action.

In Casilan, where the Court
reaffirmed anew the above-cited cases, including Barrueco
involving the counterpart provision of Rule 31, section 4 of the old Rules of
Court (now Rule 22, section 3) for courts of first instance, the Court stressed
that the requirement in the cited Rule “for the judge of an inferior court
to decide a case within one week after trial is not jurisdictional and that a
violation thereof does not render the decision void but subjects the judge to
disciplinary action.”

The Court has but last month reaffirmed the doctrine in People
vs. Catolico,^[5]
emphasizing that “(I)ndeed,
the Rule could not but be directory rather than mandatory in character, for it
could not have been possibly intended to divest without sanction of law the
trial courts of their jurisdiction and authority to try and decide cases within
their competent jurisdiction, as conferred by statute.”

The earlier case of Monteblanco
vs. Hinigaran Sugar Planta­tion^[6]
cited by petitioner-appellant clearly has no application to the present
case.  In that case, the action for detainer first instituted in 1924 was not sought to be
reactivated until after more than eight years later in 1933, and the ratio decidendi was that “(F)or
purposes of the law, the case had died in the justice of the peace court one
year after it had been remanded thereto by the Court of First Instance, with no
step having been taken towards its termination in one way or another.”
Plaintiffs there had been deemed to have abandoned their detainer
suit after the lapse of over eight years, with the consequent loss of
jurisdiction of the inferior court over the case, since, as stated by the
Court, “(I)t is known that under the law (Acts
Nos. 3881 and 4115), justice of the peace courts alone have jurisdiction in
cases of forcible entry and detainer, when the action
arising therefrom is commenced within one year from
the time said acts took place.”

Petitioner, in his brief on appeal, would belatedly assail the
municipal court’s ejectment judgment against him on
the alleged ground that the said suit should have been considered as one
between members of the same family under Article 222 of the Civil Code (since
he is a brother-in-law of respondent Salvacion Diaz)
and it had not been shown that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been
made but failed, as enjoined by said codal
provision.  Assuming arguendo
the applica­bility of the cited article, it is much too late now for petitioner
to raise this question for the first time here on appeal.  Not having raised it in the ejectment suit, which has long become final and executory, he is barred now by laches
and waiver from invoking the cited provision. 
Not having raised it either in his petition for certiorari below,
where the sole issue raised by him was the alleged nullity of the municipal
court’s ejectment judgment “for loss of
jurisdiction over the case due to the lapse of one year from the date of filing
of the complaint,” he is doubly barred from raising it for the first time
in this appeal, under the well-settled principle that issues of fact or of law
not proper­ly brought to the attention of the trial court cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal and will not be considered by the reviewing court.^[7]

The case at bar recalls to mind the Court’s admonition, through
Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, in a similarly unmeritorious case^[8]
that “(T)he circumstances surrounding this
litigation definitely prove that appeal is frivolous and a plain trick to delay
payment and prolong litigation unnecessarily. 
Such attitude deserves severe condemnation, wasting, as it does, the
time that the courts could well devote to meritorious cases.” In Lopez
vs. Aquino^[9]
promulgated last month, the Court exhorted counsel that “the cooperation
of litigants and their attor­neys is needed so that needless clogging of the
court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be avoided.  There must be more faithful adherence to Rule
7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that ‘the signature of an
attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and
that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay’ and
expressly admonishes that ‘for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may
be subjected to disciplinary action.'”

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed and
petitioner’s counsel shall pay treble costs in both instances.  Let this decision be noted in the personal
record of petitioner’s counsel.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Ruiz Castro, J., no part.

^[1] 70 Phil. 749 (1940).

^[2] 71 Phil. 7 (1940).

^[3] 72 Phil. 277 (1941).

^[4] 98 Phil. 360 (1956).

^[5]
L-31261-65, April 20, 1971.

^[6] 63 Phil. 797 (1936).

^[7] Corpus vs. Phodaca-Ambrosio, 32 SCRA 279 (Mar. 30, 1970) and
cases cited.

^[8] Uypangco vs. Equitable Bank, 27 SCRA, 1272 (Apr. 30, 1969).

^[9]
L-28078, Apr. 29, 1971,
citing Pajares vs. Abad
Santos, 30 SCRA 748 (Nov. 29, 1969),
emphasis copied.