G.R. Nos. L-29510-31. November 29, 1969
SIMPLICIO PALANCA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JOSE R. QUERUBIN, HON. NESTOR ALAMPAY, HON. CESAR KINTANAR, AND HON. JOSE FERNANDEZ, PRESIDING JUDGES OF BRANCHES II, III, IV AND V, RES…
SANCHEZ, J.:
Petitioner Simplicio Palanca is indicted before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in 22 separate criminal cases, all
involving estafa thru falsification of public
documents.[1]
These cases were spread by raffle amongst four district judges of the different
branches of the court, viz:
Branch II – Hon. Judge Jose Querubin:
Criminal Cases Nos. 9245, 9330, 9337,
9341.
Branch III – Hon. Judge Nestor Alampay:
Criminal Cases Nos. 9336, 9338, 9340,
9342, 9343, 9346.
Branch IV – Hon. Judge
Cesar Kintanar:
Criminal Cases Nos. 9329,
9331, 9335, 9339, 9345.
Branch V – Hon. Judge Jose Fernandez:
Criminal Cases Nos. 9244, 9246, 9328,
9332, 9333, 9334, 9344.
Petitioner moved to quash
in each of the cases. Ground therefor was that the court did not validly acquire
jurisdiction over his person since the warrants of arrest were issued by the
court without the judge personally examining the complainant and his witnesses
under oath or affirmation. Petitioner
charges infringement of his constitutional right to due process, particularly
citing Section 1(3), Article III of the Constitution. In an almost simultaneous move, he asked the
different judges to consolidate the different cases. Both the motion to quash and the motion to
consolidate were rejected by respondent judges. There were the familiar motions to reconsider
and the equally usual turndowns.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari to nullify the orders of denial of the motion to
quash; prohibition to stop the lower
court judges from proceeding with the cases; and mandamus to compel
consolidation, and to direct respondent judges to recall the warrants of arrest
and thereafter to personally conduct the examination of complainants and their
witnesses to determine the existence of probable cause. We issued a cease-and-desist order on October
3, 1968 upon a P5,000-bond.
1. One reason exists why petitioner’s cause must fall. Prior to petitioner’s questioning the court’s
jurisdiction over his person, he had already filed a bond for his provisional
liberty in all of the criminal
cases in question and had already pleaded to all the informations
therein.
We find a statement by
respondents in their return before this Court, to which petitioner does not
except, and which statement runs as follows: “The petitioner in the
above-entitled case cannot and does not deny that he has appeared before your
respondent Judges (both in person
and thru counsel),[2] that he has filed
bond for his provisional liberty in all
of the criminal cases in question, that he
has pleaded to all the informations
therein, that he has asked for postponements, and that he has otherwise
submitted himself to other court proceedings and processes.”[3] That petitioner had pleaded to the informations before he moved to quash is implicit in his
motion to quash of June 27, 1968. He
there stressed that his motion to quash was filed under Section 10, Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court, which explicitly allows questions of want of jurisdiction to be raised at any stage of the
proceedings.[4]
The foregoing facts attain meaning in the context of established
precepts in jurisprudence. Recognized by
case law is the principle that the posting of a bail bond constitutes waiver of
any irregularity attending the arrest
of a person,[5] estops him from
discussing the validity of his arrest.[6] Recently, this Court found occasion to pronounce
that when petitioner filed an application for bail and waived the preliminary
investigation proper, “he had waived his objection to whatever defect, if
any, in the preliminary examination conducted x x x prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest.”[7] And then, a rule that has by now acquired
deep roots is that an entry of a plea waives the right to preliminary
investigation and any irregularity that surrounds it.[8] Anyway, the absence of a preliminary investigation
does not impair the validity of a criminal information, does not otherwise render
it defective. Nor does it affect the
jurisdiction of the court over the case.[9] Besides, criminal procedure tells us that if
a person does not move to quash a complaint or information until after he has
pleaded thereto, he is deemed to have waived all objections then available
which are grounds of a motion to quash except when the complaint or information
does not charge an offense or the court is without jurisdiction of the same.[10] So it is that one of the grounds that must
be deemed waived if defendant does not move to quash the complaint or
information before pleading thereto is “that the court trying the cause has no jurisdiction of the person
of the defendant,”[11]
Here, the fact that petitioner posted bail bonds for his
provisional liberty and the other fact that he already entered his not guilty
plea to all the 22 informations, bar him from thereafter
questioning the validity of his arrest and bringing up the absence of a proper
preliminary investigation. His failure
to move to quash before plea is tantamount to the submission of his person to
the jurisdiction of the court.
Petitioner’s waiver is patent.
2. One other question: Did the judges below abuse their discretion
in denying petitioner’s motion to consolidate all the 22 criminal cases in one
branch of the trial court?
In arguing for consolidation, petitioner submits that all the 22 informations filed against him show only one offended
party, one accused, one set of witnesses listed by the prosecution, the
identical offense of “estafa thru falsification of
public documents”, the identical language of the informations,
and the commission of the offenses over the same period of time. Petitioner submits that much will be gained
and nothing will be lost by consolidating these 22 cases. He reasons out thus: (1) considering that the
alleged offended party has its offices and lawyers in Manila, that defendants’
counsel is also from Manila, and the witnesses are mostly from Iloilo City, the
requirement that the parties and the witnesses be made to repeat the same
evidence, objections and arguments in the four branches of the court is not
only wasteful of time, energy and money, but is patently vexatious and
harassing which could be avoided if both prosecution and defense would present
their respective witnesses, offer their documentary evidence, make their
objections, and submit their arguments only once and to one judge at a great
saving of time, energy, trouble and expense; (2) the 22 cases will engage the
time of only one judge and the three other judges will be free to attend to
other cases; (3) the assignment of all these 22 cases to one judge will not
materially increase the judge’s case load, for he would be passing on the
credibility of the same witnesses, and the validity of the same objections and
arguments.
For his part, respondent fiscal denies that the informations list the same set of witnesses; that
the witnesses will be the same for
all cases because after listing the witnesses, the informations
specifically state “and others”; and that the testimony of the witnesses
will be the same in each and every one of the aforesaid 22 cases. He says that the 22 cases are distinct from
one another, involve different subject matters, different manners of commission, different dates of
commission, different sets of documents, and different testimony of different
witnesses. He submits that consolidation
will only cause confusion.
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, provides that
“[c]harges for offenses founded on the same
facts, or which form or are a part of a series of offenses of the same or
similar character may, in the discretion of the court, be tried jointly.”
The question that projects itself, therefore, is whether the
discretion granted respondent judges has been here abused.
We are not to lose sight of the object of consolidation – avoid
multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression or abuse, prevent delay, clear
congested dockets, simplify the work of the trial court, save unnecessary costs and expense, In brief,
consolidation seek to attain justice with the least expense and vexation to the
litigants.[12]
Elsewhere, the present tendency is to permit consolidation whenever possible
and irrespective of the diversity of the issues involved.[13]
There is no question that separate accusations charging a
defendant with disconnected but joinable crimes may be tried together on
condition that no substantive rights of defendant are adversely affected.[14]
More elaborately, joint trial is proper “where the offenses charged are
similar, related, or connected, or are of the same or similar character or
class, or involve or arose out of the same or related or connected acts,
occurrences, transactions, series of events, or chain of circumstances, or are
based on acts or transactions constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, or
are of the same pattern and committed in the same manner, or where there is a
common element of substantial importance in their commission, or where the
same, or much the same, evidence will be competent and admissible or required in their prosecution, and if not
joined for trial the repetition or reproduction of substantially the same
testimony will be required on each trial.”[15]
Appropriately to be emphasized here is the appellate court’s
supervisory authority over the lower court, notwithstanding the wide discretion
given the latter, whenever the appellate court is satisfied that the trial court has abused its discretion in
denying motions to consolidate.[16]
In De Luccy vs. Ferrara, 209
N.Y.S. 2d. 676, 678, the lower
court’s denial of the motion to consolidate was stricken down because it appeared that no party would be
prejudiced and multiplicity of trials would be avoided. Indeed, in a cluster of American cases, the
lower court’s refusal to consolidate was overruled by the appellate
court. And this, because no substantial
rights were shown to be prejudiced, the same witnesses were to be presented,
and the cases involved common issues save in some cases for the question of
damages.[17]
In Sideco vs. Paredes, 74 Phil. 6, 7, an action for certiorari and
mandamus, we found no valid reason for the lower court’s refusal of a
consolidated appeal of sixteen cases involving a common question of law,
Instead, we held that consolidation was an imperative necessity to minimize
appellant’s expense in prosecuting his appeal.
Instructive in this respect is Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court,
which gives the guideline that the “rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”
Let us go back to the cases before us. It cannot be denied that in all these cases
there is only one offended party, one accused, an identical offense committed
in substantially the same way over the same period of time, such that the criminal informations were couched in almost identical
language. The witnesses listed are the
same except that in some informations, Atty. Romeo H.
Mediodia appear as a witness and in others, Atty.
Fernando Mirasol.
And this, because these two were the two notaries public that
interchangeably notarized the documents.
There is much to petitioner’s claim. The reasons he advances deserve assent. To be achieved by consolidation are simplification,
not confusion, of procedure; economy, not waste, of time, energy and expense.
And with one judge to hear the case, shuttling from one judge to three others
at the same time or at different times will be obviated. Defendant will be insulated from unjust vexation. It is, indeed, correct to say that, all
things considered, the administration of justice would be better served if only one trial
before one judge is conducted in these 22 cases. We particularly note the absence of justifiable
ground back of respondent judges respective rulings against consolidation. All they say is that the cases are well
distributed to the four branches of the court and that the denial was the
consensus of all the judges. In the
circumstances here presented, no potent reason suggests itself why these cases
should not be lumped together in one branch of the trial court.
A policy statement of note is that “[t]he public interests
of economy and speed weigh in favor of trying x x x closely related charges together, especially where x x x no prejudice to defendant
appears.”[18] In the case at bar, we fail to
discern any prejudice to defendant in consolidating trial. In fact, it is precisely defendant himself who requests such consolidation. Consolidation
is proper.
The conclusion here reached does not cross paths with our
decision in Philippine Air Lines, Inc. vs.
Teodoro, 97 Phil. 461, 468, an original
action before this Court for certiorari and mandamus. In that case, a motion was filed below to
have one case before one branch of a court transferred to another branch for
joint hearing with a second case involving similar issues. After denial of the motion for consolidation,
the first case was partially heard by the court. We held that no ministerial duty existed to
compel the transfer. The factual
background of the Philippine Air Lines case is different. One of the cases was there already partially
heard before one judge. Here, hearing has not yet started in
any of the 22 cases concerned.
Consolidation of trial is the clear course of action to
take. But the judges below refused to so
act. We, therefore, do not hesitate to
say that respondent judges gravely abused their discretion in denying
petitioner’s motion for consolidation.
And certiorari lies.
For the reasons given –
(1) The orders of respondent judges denying petitioner’s motion to
quash the informations in the 22 criminal cases
against petitioner (Criminal Cases 9244, 9245, 9246, 9328, 9329, 9330, 9331,
9332, 9333, 9334, 9335, 9336, 9337, 9338, 9339, 9340, 9341, 9342, 9343, 9344,
9345, and 9346 of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, all entitled “People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Simplicio Palanca, Accused”)
and denying the recall of the warrants of arrest issued in said criminal cases,
are hereby affirmed;
(2) Respondent judges, or those who may take their place, are
directed to grant petitioner’s motion to consolidate the said 22 criminal cases
against him and to have these cases assigned to one of them after due raffle;
and
(3) The preliminary
injunction we heretofore issued is hereby dissolved.
No costs allowed.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Castro and Fernando,
JJ., in the result.
[1]
Three informations were filed on August 1, 1967 and the other nineteen informations, on December I3, 1967.
[2]
Respondents’ memorandum, pp. 7 and 8.
[3]
Rollo p. 183; emphasis supplied.
[4]
Section 10, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, is hereinafter quoted at footnote
10, infra. See: Rollo, p.126
[5]
U.S. vs. Grant, 18 Phil. 122, 147; Doce vs.
Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
(1968), 22 SCRA 1028, 1031, citing
Carrington vs. Peterson, 4 Phil. 134, and U.S. vs. Grant, supra.
[6]
People vs. Dorado (unreported), No. 21540, February 12, 1924, cited
in People vs. Red, 55 Phil. 706, 711.
[7]
Luna vs. Plaza (1968), 26 SCRA 310, 321-322. See also: People vs. Selfaison
(1961), 1 SCRA 235,244, citing People vs. Ricarte,
49 O.G. 974;
People vs. Quinto, 60 Phil. 451; People vs.
Moreno, 77 Phil. 548; Bustos vs. Lucero, 46
O.G. [Supp.] 445.
[8]
Lozada vs. Hernandez, 92 Phil 1051, 1054;
People vs. Casiano, (1961), 1 SCRA 478, 483, citing People vs. Solon, 47
Phil. 443, 448,People vs. Magpale, 70 Phil.
176, and People vs. Lambino, 55 O.G. 1565;
People vs. de la Cerna (1967), 21 SCRA 569,
572, citing Oca vs. Jimenez, L-17777, June 29, 1962.
[9]
People vs. Figueroa (1969), 27 SCRA 1239, 1248, citing People vs. Casiano, supra.
[10]
See: Section 10, Rule 117, Rules of
Court, which provides:
“SEC. 10. Failure to move to quash – Effect of – Exception. – If the defendant does not move to quash the complaint or information before
he pleads thereto he shall be taken to have waived all objections which are
grounds for a motion to quash except when the complaint or information does
not charge an offense, or the court is without jurisdiction of the same, If,
however, the defendant learns after he has pleaded or has moved to quash on
some other ground that the offense for which he is now charged is an offense
for which he has been pardoned, or of which he has been convicted or acquitted
or been in jeopardy, the court may in its discretion entertain at any time
before judgment a motion to quash on the ground of such pardon, conviction,
acquittal or jeopardy.”
[11]
Francisco, Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. V, Part III, Revised
Edition, p. 197
[12]
1 C.J.S., pp. 1342-1343, citing cases.
[13]
Anno: 68
A.L.R. 2d. 1378.
[14]
53 Am. Jur., p. 70, citing Com. vs.
Slavski, 140 N.E. 465. See: Ann. Cas. 1913A,
1005.
[15] 23 C.J.S., pp. 680-681, citing cases.
[16]
See: 104 A.L.R. 76, citing
McAllister vs. Drislane, 266 N.Y.S.
[17]
Anno: 68
A.L.R. 2d. 1407, citing Tascio vs.
Citizens Bank of White Plains, 5 N.Y.S. 2d. 35; Gruber vs. Alpert, 13
N.Y.S. 2d. 771; Kubran vs. Acme Brick
Corporation, 52 N.Y.S. 2d. 232; Shea vs.
Benjamin, 91 N.Y.S. 2d. 745; Kelly vs. John Vogel, Inc., 109 N.Y.S. 2d.
282; Haber vs. Newton, 113 N.Y.S. 2d. 777; Yammerino vs. Surdi, 130
N.Y.S. 2d. 291; D’Ercole vs. Frederick, 156
N.Y.S. 2d. 380; Littman vs. Jacobowski, 156 N
.Y.S. 2d. 957; Tammany vs. Bloom, 173 N.Y.S. 2d. 551; Preiss vs. Branningan; 179
N.Y.S. 2d. 91; Cotton vs. Henger, 312 S. W. 2d. 299.
[18]
Williams vs. U.S., 265 F. 2d. 214, 216, citing U.S. vs.
Smith, 112 F. 2d. 83, 85. See also: Williams vs. State, 135 A. 2d. 605, 610; State vs.
Coleman, 214 A. 2d, 393, 397