PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PANCHO PELAGIO Y ALFONSO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS, PANCHO PELAGIO Y ALFONSO, OSCAR CAYMO Y REYES AND JOSE GUICO Y PARAS, DEFENDANTS…

People versus Pelagio

The Case

This is a criminal appeal in which the People of the Philippines prosecuted Pancho Pelagio, Oscar Caymo, and Jose Guico for the crime of robbery with homicide under the Revised Penal Code, arising from a robbery of a house in Pasay City during which a police officer was shot dead. The case matters to a reviewee because the Supreme Court, in one decision, teaches three distinct lessons: the weakness of alibi as a defense, the rule that a conspirator in a robbery is not automatically liable for a killing committed by his companions when the robbery was not in band, and the effect of a conspirator's voluntary desistance before the crime is carried out.

Procedural History

The case was tried by the Court of First Instance of Pasay City, which convicted all three appellants of robbery with homicide and sentenced them to death. The case went directly to the Supreme Court on appeal from that judgment. Before the Supreme Court, only Oscar Caymo persisted in the defense of alibi; Pancho Pelagio admitted participation in the robbery but argued that he should be convicted only of simple robbery; and Jose Guico argued that even on the facts found by the trial court he could not be convicted of the crime charged. The Office of the Solicitor General recommended affirmance as to Pelagio and Caymo but the acquittal of Guico on reasonable doubt.

Facts

Jose Guico, an ex-convict, lived in a common law relationship with Evelyn Villanueva in Pasay City. Among their friends were Pancho Pelagio, also an ex-convict, and Armando Manalang. In the afternoon of March 23, 1955, Pelagio visited the house to borrow money for his wife's hospital expenses. Taking advantage of the visit, Manalang told Pelagio of a robbery he was planning with Guico, Caymo, and Arcadio Balmeo. The plan was discussed again that afternoon in the presence of Guico and Villanueva, and on March 24, 1955, the group met once more and finalized the plan to rob the house of Guico's former landlady, Aling Nena. Guico was absent from that second meeting. It was established, however, that after Manalang sketched the intended victim's house, Guico explained its location in relation to the surrounding streets and the points of entrance and exit.

That evening, Pelagio, Caymo, Manalang, and Balmeo set out to execute the plan. Only Balmeo and Caymo entered the house, through an open back kitchen door; Pelagio posted himself as lookout by the gate. Inside, Caymo pointed a gun at the lone occupant, an old woman named Severina de Gloria, and intimidated her into producing money and jewelry. After taking the loot, Caymo ordered her to lie face downward, covered her with a blanket, and warned her not to raise an alarm. The two then left, but found Pelagio no longer at the gate.

Caymo and Balmeo walked to a corner where Manalang waited in a taxi. As the taxi was about to leave, a jeep blocked its way, and a man alighted and walked toward the taxi. Manalang told Caymo to shoot the man because he was a police officer. Caymo fired about six shots, and the man, Patrolman Francisco Trinidad of the Pasay Police Department, fell dead. The three then went to a house on Buendia Street, changed clothes, and hid the weapon and the loot. Caymo was later found positive for nitrate burns in both hands and executed an extrajudicial confession; Guico also confessed, owning his participation in the formation of the conspiracy. At trial, all three set up alibi and claimed their confessions were extracted through threat and maltreatment.

Issues

• Whether or not Oscar Caymo's defense of alibi should be rejected and his conviction for robbery with homicide affirmed.
• Whether or not Pancho Pelagio, who acted only as lookout and had fled before the killing, may be held liable for the homicide committed by his companions, or only for simple robbery.
• Whether or not Jose Guico, who participated only in the first meeting and was absent from the final meeting and from the robbery itself, is criminally liable as a conspirator.

Applicable Provisions

Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, on conspiracy, provides:

Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are punishable only in the cases in which the law specially provides a penalty therefor.

This provision bears on the case because the Court used it to hold that Guico's participation in the conspiracy alone, without the execution of its purpose, could not make him criminally liable, since robbery is not among the special instances in which conspiracy is punished.

Article 296 of the Revised Penal Code, on robbery in band, provides:

When more than three armed malefactors shall take part in the commission of a robbery, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band.

This provision bears on the case because the Court found that only three persons took part in the robbery and only one was armed, so the robbery was not in band, and Pelagio could not be held liable for the killing committed by his companions.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that Caymo's alibi was futile. He was positively identified by Severina de Gloria as one of those who robbed her at gunpoint, by the taxi driver as the gunwielder in the fatal shooting, and by the state witnesses as among those who hatched the robbery; he was also found positive for nitrate burns the day after the incident, without denial or explanation. The Court restated the settled rule that alibi is the weakest of all defenses and must be rejected when the identity of the accused has been sufficiently and positively established by eyewitnesses, and that for alibi to prosper the defendant must show it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.

On the second issue, the Court held that Pelagio's liability could not extend beyond simple robbery. By the trial court's own findings, Pelagio had fled from his lookout post before Caymo and Balmeo came down, and the shooting happened later, at the corner, when Caymo, Balmeo, and Manalang were already in the taxi. The conspirators had agreed only on robbery, and there was no evidence that homicide was determined when they plotted the crime. Since only three persons took part in the robbery and only one was armed, the robbery was not in band, and it is only when the robbery is in band that all those present may be punished for any of the assaults its members might commit.

On the third issue, the Court held that Guico's participation in the first meeting, even if it involved him in the conspiracy, was inadequate to render him criminally liable as a conspirator, because conspiracy alone, without the execution of its purpose, is not a crime punishable by law except in special instances that do not include robbery. His absence from the second meeting and from the robbery itself strongly pointed to a change of mind, and under a policy of liberal consideration for timely retreat or repentance, he was deemed to have desisted voluntarily from the conspiracy before the crime could be carried out, and was therefore free from penal accountability.

Doctrine

First, alibi is the weakest of all defenses; it must be rejected when the accused has been positively identified by eyewitnesses, and it prospers only when the accused shows that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed.

Second, a conspirator in a robbery is not liable for a killing committed by his companions where the robbery was not in band, because under Article 296 of the Revised Penal Code it is only when the robbery is in band that all those present in the commission of the robbery may be punished for any of the assaults its members might commit. Where the conspirators agreed only on robbery and no homicide was determined in the plot, the lookout who had fled before the killing is liable for simple robbery only.

Third, conspiracy alone, without the execution of its purpose, is not a crime punishable by law except in the special instances provided by Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, which do not include robbery. A conspirator who absents himself from the final meeting and from the execution of the plan may be deemed to have desisted voluntarily from the conspiracy before the crime was carried out, and is free from penal accountability.

Disposition

The Court affirmed the death penalty imposed on Oscar Caymo, reduced the conviction of Pancho Pelagio to simple robbery and sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term, raised the death indemnity for Patrolman Trinidad to 6,000 pesos chargeable alone against Caymo, and acquitted Jose Guico on reasonable doubt.

Remember This

Memorize this line: conspiracy alone, without the execution of its purpose, is not a crime punishable by law except in the special instances of Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, and a robber is liable for a companion's killing only when the robbery is in band. Examiners use this case to test the limits of conspiracy liability, the requisites of alibi, and the effect of voluntary desistance before the crime is carried out.