LORENZA D. LANDICHO, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND CANLUBANG SUGAR ESTATE, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari (pp. 12-16, rollo) of the decision of the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission dated December 26, 1975 in RO5 WC Case No. C-2467
(Annex “F”, pp. 27-29, rollo).

Claimant-petitioner, Lorenza D. Landicho, is the wife of the deceased Estanislao
Landicho, who was employed by respondent Canlubang Sugar Estate first as a centrifugal cargador and then as a factory mechanic.  He worked seven (7) days a week and was
receiving a salary of Two Hundred Twenty-five (P225.00) Pesos a month.  While in the employ of private respondent, he
contracted acute peptic ulcer for which he was operated on at the Mary
Johnston Hospital
sometime in 1964.  He was not able to
fully recover, for which reason he was separated from the service on January 1, 1965, and was paid his
retirement gratuity in the amount of P3,386.80.  Even after his separation from the service,
he was still sick with peptic ulcer.  As
a matter of fact, in May, 1973, five months before his death, Dr. Paterno Andaya treated his peptic
ulcer.  Dr. Andaya
remarked in his report that “The patient has gastric hyperacidity while
working as centrifugal cargador.  The condition was
aggravated thereon by the nature of the employ­ment” (Physician’s Report,
p. 14, WCC rec.).  Deceased Estanislao Landicho died on October 12, 1973 of cerebral hermorrhage-hypertension.

On July 19, 1974,
petitioner filed a claim for death benefit (p. 17, WCC rec.) dated July 10, 1974, with the Department of
Labor, Regional Office No. 5, San Pablo
City, for the death of her husband.

On September 30, 1974,
private respondent filed its report controverting the
claim (p. 9, WCC rec.).

In an order dated June
19, 1975, Acting Referee Salvador C. Guevarra,
dismissed the claim because

“x x x his
death occurred beyond the two-year period provided for in Section 8 of the Act,
and therefore not actionable, and considering further that the cause of his
death is an entirely different disease from the disabling sickness pursuant to
Section 2 of the same Act, x x x”
(p. 24, WCC rec.).

On appeal by the claimant, who insists on disability compensation
benefit pursuant to Section 14 of the Act, the respondent Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, in a decision dated December 26, 1975, affirmed the decision of the Hearing
Officer.  The decision of the respondent
Commission is hereunder quoted in full:

“This is a review of an Order issued by Acting Referee
Salvador C. Guevarra of the Labor Provincial Office
of Lucena City attached to the Workmen’s Compensation
Unit, Regional Office No. 5, San Pablo
City, dismissing this claim for
lack of merit.  Aggrieved by the
dismissal of this case, Feliciano Reyes, representative for the claimant, filed
a Motion for Reconsideration substantially stating as grounds that the claimant
should be entitled to disability compensation benefits pursuant to
Section 14 of the Act from period beginning January 1, 1965 up to and until
October 12, 1973 when the deceased died and whatever compensation benefits
accrued to him should be transmitted to his heirs in accordance with the
doctrine laid down in the case of Adelaida Vda. de Calado,
et al., vs. WCC & Acoje Mining Co., Inc., G.R.
No. L-26149, April 30, 1971.

“As gleaned from the records of the case, the Acting Referee
observed that death occurred more than two (2) years from the time deceased
retired from the service of respondent, hence, the death claim pursuant to
Section 8 of the Act cannot prosper.  We
also observed that the cause of death was a different illness which disabled
the deceased allegedly.  We cannot invoke
the case of Calado vs. Acoje
Mining in this claim for we observe that there is no showing that deceased
was still ill of the same illness of ulcer at the time of his death which
illness was allegedly the cause of his having been disabled from con­tinuing
with his work.  The deceased died due
to illness of cerebral hemorrhage secondary to hypertension.  During his lifetime, as the records further
show, the deceased, as factory mechanic of the respondent allegedly
contracted acute peptic ulcer.  This
is the illness mentioned in the claim and to which a physician’s report has
been submitted in support thereof where the attending physician
categorically stated that the same was due to and in pursuance of employment, a
result of the nature of employment was likely aggravated by the employment.

“The deceased, Estanislao Landicho, stopped working on January 1, 1965.  This claim was filed on July 19, 1974 as appearing in
the notice.  The respondent filed a controversion of the claim on the ground that it is barred
by prescription and that death occurred eight (8) years after separation from
the service.  The deceased died on
October 12, 1973.

“We do not find merit in the contention of the herein
representative of the claimant, for there is no showing that it was also the
said illness which caused the separation of the deceased from the service
because after his operation at the Mary
Johnston Hospital
sometime in 1964, he still continued working up to January 1, 1965.  Although the illness apparently surfaced at
the time when the deceased was still employed by the respondent, the same has
been treated and after which he returned to work.  He retired on January 1, 1965 and was given the
corresponding retirement benefits in the amount of P3,386.80.  The physician’s report of the attending
physician of the deceased was apparently issued on May 15, 1973. 
We further observed that, if at all there was a relapse in the illness
of the deceased of peptic ulcer, it surfaced long after his retirement for the
same was discovered only by the attending physician in 1970 and he retired
on January 1, 1965.  He died on October 12 1973 due to an
illness diagnosed as cerebral hemorrhage secondary to hypertension, not
known to have existed while still an employee of the respondent and which
surfaced long after his retirement.

“x x x x” (pp. 33-35, WCC rec., underscoring supplied).

From the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission,
herein claimant filed with this Court the instant petition for review on June 30, 1977.

In denying the claim of claimant, the position of respondent is that
the dismissal by the Workmen’s Compensation Commission of the claim of
petitioner was primarily based on its findings that the death of the deceased Estanislao Landicho occurred
beyond the two-year period from the date of retirement provided for in Section
8 of the Compensation Act, thus:

“If the disease contracted or injury received by the employee
as provided in section two hereof causes his death within two years from the
date of such injury or sickness, the employer shall pay the compensation to the
persons entitled thereto x x x.”

and therefore not actionable and that the
cause of his death, which is cerebral hermorrhage,
secondary to hypertension, is an entirely different disease from the disabling
sickness pursuant to Section 2 of the same Act.

In other words, it is the contention of respondent that insofar
as a death claim is concerned, the illness contracted by the employee in the
course of his employment should cause his death within two years from the date
of such sickness in order that the (deceased) defendant could be entitled to
compensation, and since he stopped working with the respondent Canlubang Sugar Estate on January 1, 1965 and he died on
October 12, 1973 – or eight years, nine months and eleven days thereafter – due
to “cerebral hemorrhage-hypertension”, petitioner’s claim for death
benefits must necessarily fall.

On the other hand, it is claimed by the peti­tioner-claimant that
Section 8 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act does not provide that if death
occurred after two years from retirement, the next of kin is barred from filing
any claim.

The contention of the claimant is that Section 8 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act merely provided for the amount of compensation due the heirs
in cases where the death of an employee occurred within two years from the date
of injury or sickness, hence, said section is not applicable to the instant
case.  Furthermore, claimant, answering
the argument of the respondents that the deceased Estanislao
Landicho had already recovered from his illness when
he was separated from the service and that he died of cerebral hemorrhage, an
illness different from the one he suffered while still an employee of Canlubang Sugar Estate, maintained that it is an undisputed
fact that the illness of the petitioner had set in during the course of his
employment and that the weight of authority is to the effect that once it is
shown that the illness supervened during employment, there is the legal
presumption that the illness arose out of or was at least aggravated in the course
of his employment and the burden shifts to the employer to overthrow by
substantial evidence such presumption, and the claimant is relieved from
proving causation.

The decision of the Commission that the death claim should not
prosper is well-taken since deceased died at the age of 60 on October 12, 1973,
more than two years from January 1, 1965 when the deceased was separated from
the service still afflicted with peptic ulcer and was granted P3,386.80 as retirement benefits, or even from 1970 when the
medical examination showed that he was still suffering from peptic ulcer.

However, the deceased was entitled to disability compensation
when he was separated from the service on January 1, 1965 by reason of his peptic ulcer.  It will be noted that the deceased was
treated by the doctors of private respondent, was hospitalized and operated on
for peptic ulcer in the Mary Johnston Hospital in 1964, and retired on January
1, 1965, when he was still below 60 years of age, because of his peptic ulcer,
from which he had not fully recovered despite the operation.  The physician’s report of Dr. Paterno Andaya dated May 15, 1973
stated that his diagnosis is that the deceased had peptic ulcer (sometimes
called stress ulcer); that “due to the nature of his employment
(mechanic), patient developed gastric hyperacidity”, which resulted in
total permanent disability from his work; and that the patient had gastric
hyperacidity while working as centrifugal cargador
and aggravated by his employment (p. 14, WCC rec.).  In 1970, he still had peptic ulcer according
to the medical examination.  The claim
was filed on July 19, 1974.

Since all the aforesaid events occurred before the effectivity of the New Labor Code, all the provisions of
the Workmen’s Compensation Law, as amended, as well as the decisions affirming
(1) the presumption of compensability, or presumption of work-connection or
work-aggravation, (2) waiver of non-jurisdictional defenses due to non-controversion, and (3) the ten-year prescriptive period,
still apply to the case at bar.

The word “peptic” originated from the Greek word “peptikos“, meaning “conducive to or pertaining to
or promoting digestion” (Medical Dictionary for Lawyers by Maloy, p. 443). 
While the word “ulcer” came from the Latin word “ulcus“, meaning “an open sore other than a wound
that discharges pus.  It
occurs upon the surface of the skin or any of the mucous membranes”
(Medical Dictionary for Lawyers by Maloy, p. 553).  “Peptic ulcer is a stomach ulcer, an
ulcer of the duodenum (the first part of the small intestine), or an ulcer in
the lower part of the esophagus (gullet). 
An ulcer is an erosion in the skin or mucous membrane (moist lining, as
of mouth), along with some destruction of the tissue below.  A stomach ulcer is such an
erosion in the stomach, the inside of the stomach.  When the erosion is a little farther down, in
the duodenum (the first part of the intestine), it is a duodenal ulcer.  Both a stomach ulcer and a duodenal ulcer are
referred to, loosely, as a peptic ulcer, which means a digestive ulcer.  A gastric ulcer is the same
as a stomach ulcer” (Attorney’s Dictionary of Medicine by Schmidt, p.
757).

It is undisputed from the facts of this case that the illness of
peptic ulcer of Estanislao Landicho
occurred while he was still under the employ of Private respondent.  When an illness supervened in the course of
employment, there is the presumption that the same arose out of or was at least
aggravated in the course of the employment. 
It is a settled rule in our jurisprudence that the law presumes, in the
absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that a claim is compensable,
and so rigid is the rule that even where the cause of death is unknown the
right to compensation subsists (Industrial Textile Mfg. Co. of the Phil. vs. Florzo, et al., 17 SCRA 1104, reiterated in Vallo vs. WCC, et al, 73 SCRA 623; see also Trinidad vs.
WCC, 81 SCRA 668; Vda. de Torres vs. Warner Barnes
& Co., Inc., 81 SCRA 681; Gonzales vs. WCC, 81 SCRA 703; Cañonero vs. WCC, 81 SCRA 712; Mercado vs. WCC, 81 SCRA
730; Romero vs. WCC, et al., 77 SCRA 483 and Buenaventura vs. WCC, et al., 76
SCRA 485).

It is also undisputed that Estanislao Landicho retired at the age of 60 years by reason of his
ailment.  It may be true that after his
operation at the Mary Johnston Hospital, he was able to resume his work and
continued up to the day prior to his retirement, but this does not detract from
the fact that he had by that time been disabled because his “x x x ability to resume work may
only have been through his sheer determination to continue earning a living for
himself and his family x x x”
(Gonzales vs. WCC, 81 SCRA 703, 709).

The Court ruled in Bello vs. WCC (80
SCRA 153) that for purposes of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, there is
disability when there is a loss or diminution of earning power which is due to
an injury arising out of and in the course of employment.  It is not the injury which is compensated but
rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s
earning capacity (see also Roma vs. WCC, 80 SCRA 170; National Development Co.
vs. WCC, 12 SCRA 381).

When an employee is forced to ask for retirement, not because of
old age, but primarily because of his weakened bodily condition due to an
illness contracted in the course of his employment, he is to be given
compensation for his inability to work during the remaining days before his
scheduled compulsory retirement, aside from the retirement benefits due him
(Roma vs. WCC, 80 SCRA 170; Hernandez vs. WCC, 14 SCRA 219).

In Bautista vs. WCC (80 SCRA 313), so long as the claimant’s
action had not prescribed, the Commission had jurisdiction to act on her claim
even if at the time of the filing thereof the employer-employee relationship
had terminated, for what vests jurisdiction is the fact that the illness which
caused the disability supervened and/or was aggravated during his
employment.  In other words, the
employment was coeval with the ailment, and with the two co-existing, an alleged
absence of employer-employee relationship at the time of filing the claim is
untenable as a defense.

As stated in Romero vs. WCC (p. 489, supra), cited in
Gonzales vs. WCC (p. 709, supra), quoting Inton
and Morabe’s the Workmen’s Compensation Act (1955
ed., p. 76) –

“Disability, as a basis for compensation, is the combination
of partial or total physical incapacity and of inability to work, or inability
to work with the same ease and competency as before the injury, or the loss,
total or partial, of earning power from the injury (Corpus Juris,
Sec. 535, p. 813).

“Disability is used either in the medical or physical sense,
as evidenced by obvious loss of members or by medical testimony that the
claimant simply cannot make the necessary muscular movements and exertions; it
is also used to mean de facto inability to earn wages, as evidenced by
proof that claimant has not in fact earned anything.

“These medical and wage-loss aspects of disability may be more
clearly illustrated as follows:  A
claimant may be, in a medical sense, utterly shattered and ruined, but by mere
sheer determination and ingenuity contrive to make a living for himself;
conversely, a claimant may be able to work, in both his and the doctor’s
opinion, but awareness of his injury may lead employers to refuse him employment.

“The problem of the administrators of the Act is the proper
balancing of these medical and wage-loss factors.  An absolute insistence on medical disability
in the abstract would produce a denial of compensation in the latter case,
although the wage-loss is as real and as directly traceable to the injury as in
any other instance.  At the other
extreme, an insistence on wage-loss as the test would deprive the claimant in
the former illustration of an award, thus not only penalizing his laudable
efforts to make the best of his misfortune but also fostering the absurdity of
pronouncing a man non-disabled in spite of the unanimous contrary evidence of
medical experts and of common observation (Larson, p. 3, Vol. II).”

In Galang vs. WCC (72 SCRA 454, 458),
the Courts ruling that since the petitioner was forced to retire from the
service due to his disability to continue with his work with private
respondent, he should be entitled to disability compensation benefits authorized
by the Workmen’s Compensation Act for persons suffering from permanent
disability (Sec. 14, WCA).

Other authoritative comments on the coverage of the term
“permanent total disability” as used in the Workmen’s Compensation
Act, are (a) Comments and Annotations on the Workmen’s Compensation Act by Severo M. Pucan and Cornelio R. Besinga, that “total disability does not mean a state
of absolute helplessness, but means disablement of an employee to earn wages in
the same kind of work, or a work of similar nature, that he was trained for or
accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and
attainments could do”; (b) Philippine Labor and Social Legislation by
Justice Ruperto Martin, that “permanent total
disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of
work, or work of a similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to
perform, or any other kind of work which a person of his mentality and
attainment could do x x“; and (c) Labor
Standards and Welfare Legislation by Perfecto Fernandez and Camilo
Quiason that “permanent total disability means
an incapacity to perform gainful work which is expected to be permanent.  This status does not require condition of
complete helplessness.  Nor is it
affected by the performance of occasional odd jobs” (cited in Marcelino vs. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of the Philippines,
47 SCRA 343).

In Jacob vs. WCC, et al. (72 SCRA 575), the illness of petitioner
caused her to apply for retirement a year before her retirement age and the
gravity of her illness was such that it totally disabled her from work.  The Court ruled that she was entitled to the
maximum amount of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos as disability compensation
under Section 14 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

Private respondent should have controverted
the claim from the time it had knowledge of the illness of Estanislao
Landicho. 
Private respondent cannot deny having knowledge thereof (a) since
deceased was examined by its company physicians (b) it knew of deceased’s
operation at the Mary Johnston
Hospital in 1964 and (c) it allowed
the deceased to retire at the age of 60 years when the deceased was permanently
disabled by reason of his peptic ulcer. 
Private respondent had only ten (10) or fourteen (14) days from
knowledge of the ailment or from the occurrence of the injury, within which to
controvert the claim (Sec. 45, Act No. 3428, as amended).  This it failed to do, which failure generates
a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defenses (Sebastian vs. WCC, 81 SCRA 675;
Mercado vs. WCC, 81 SCRA 730; Roma vs. WCC, 80 SCRA 170; Galindez
vs. WCC, 79 SCRA 332; Ilingan vs. WCC, 79 SCRA 345;
Development Bank of the Philippines vs. WCC, 49 SCRA 365; Guardian Security and
Investigation Agency vs. WCC, 34 SCRA 29; Carlos vs. De la Rosa, et al., 5 SCRA
262).

Moreover, the Employer’s Report was filed only on September 30, 1974 (p. 9, WCC
rec.), twenty-four days after the respondent employer
received the notice of the claim on September
6, 1974 (p. 7, WCC rec.). 
Controversion was too late.

Furthermore, the cause of the death of the deceased which is
cerebral hemorrhage secondary to hypertension is NOT an “entirely
different disease from the disabling sickness” which is peptic ulcer.  Hypertension and peptic ulcer are related to
each other as to CAUSE.  Stress or
tension is one of the causes of these two ailments.  From Harrison’s
Principles of Internal Medicine, p. 1445, it is stated that “emotional
factors may alter gastric function profoundly. 
However, studies of patients with gastric fistulas have shown that
different types of stimuli affect the stomach in varying ways which differ from
one individual to another.  Patients with
duodenal ulcers themselves can often clearly point to an emotional upset which
may have triggered the onset or exacerbation of their ulcer.  Experimentally, ulcers can be produced in
monkeys under the stress of being placed in an executive capacity, or it
can be produced in rate by physical restraints.  x x
x“.

And quoting again from the physician’s report of Dr. Paterno Andaya (p. 14, WCC rec.) ..  “The
patient has gastric hyperacidity while working as centrifugal cargador.  The
condition was aggravated due to the nature of the employment.”

WHEREFORE, THE APPEALED DECISION IS HEREBY REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE, AND RESPONDENT CANLUBANG SUGAR ESTATE IS HEREBY ORDERED

1. TO PAY CLAIMANT-PETITIONER THE AMOUNT OF SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS AS DISABILITY COMPENSATION BENEFIT;

2. TO REIMBURSE CLAIMANT-PETITIONER EXPENSES INCURRED FOR MEDICAL
SERVICES, HOSPITALIZATION, MEDICINES, APPLIANCES AND OTHER SUPPLIES, OF THE
DECEASED, DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER RECEIPTS;

3. TO PAY CLAIMANTS COUNSEL THE AMOUNT OF SIX HUNDRED (P600.00)
PESOS AS ATTORNEY’S FEES; AND

4. TO PAY ADMINISTRATIVE FEES.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Fernandez,
Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.