LIM SON, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

Appeal by petitioner Lim Son from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

On February 29, 1960, said petitioner commenced this special civil
action in said Court, to secure a writ of certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction against respondent, Board of Commissioners
of the Bureau of Immigration, mainly to enjoin the latter from
proceeding with his deportation from the Philippines. After a hearing
on the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction, the same was
denied. Subsequently, respondent filed its answer, and, after several
postponements of the hearing on the merits, petitioner, without
introducing any evidence, submitted the case for decision, upon the
filing of the memoranda of the parties. Thereupon, the lower court
rendered its aforementioned decision. A reconsideration thereof having
been denied, petitioner interposed the present appeal.

It appears that on October 12, 1949, a warrant for petitioner’s
arrest was issued for the purpose of deporting him, under Section 37
(a) (9) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, upon the charge that
he had given false testimony under oath in an administrative
investigation conducted by the Bureau of Immigration. The Board of
Commissioners of Immigration found petitioner—in a decision dated July
14, 1955, in immigration Case No. 14708F—guilty as charged, and,
accordingly, ordered his deportation. Said decision having become
final, the corresponding warrant for petitioner’s deportation was, On
August 6, 1955, issued by the Commissioner of Immigration. A motion of
petitioner to re-open the deportation proceedings was denied by said
respondent Board on September 3, 1955. Petitioner took no further
action on the matter until the institution, on February 29, 1960, of
this case, in which he assails said decision as null and void, upon the
theory that said Board had “acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion”, but the Court of First
Instance of Manila found this pretense devoid of merit, aside from
holding petitioner guilty of laches. Hence, this appeal by petitioner.

He maintains that the lower court has erred in finding that his
cause of action is barred by laches. Mere delay, he says, does not
amount to laches, when there has been an irregularity in the procedure,
and, there has been, he maintains, such irregularity in the present
case, because his motion to re-open the deportation proceedings was
denied by the Board of Commissioners, not by the Commissioner of
Immigration, who, petitioner asserts, has, under Rule 3, Subdivision A,
Section 21 of Administrative Order No. 1, the exclusive authority to
act on said motion. There is, however, no merit in this pretense, for
the Commissioner of Immigration is the Chairman of said Board, so that
the action of the latter is, also, actually an action of the former.
Moreover, considering that the decision of the Board finding petitioner
guilty of false testimony was rendered on July 14, 1955, and that he
neither assailed the action of the Board until February 29, 1960, nor
tried to explain this long inaction, we find that the lower court was
justified in declaring petitioner herein guilty of laches. Regardless
of the foregoing, there is no reason to review the decision of the
Board of Commissioners there being absolutely no evidence that the same
had committed a grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioner guilty
of false testimony.

One other point. Nobody appeared before this Court at the hearing of
this case, on July 20, 1962. Five (5) days later, counsel for
petitioner filed an unverified motion, alleging that his failure to
attend said hearing was due to his presence in Samar in connection with
several cases, neither the number nor the title of which he gave, that
he did not return to Manila until July 24, 1962, and that it was only
on July 25, 1962 that he received the notice of said hearing, and
praying, accordingly, that this case be re-scheduled for hearing. The
motion is denied, it appearing that the notice of hearing was mailed on
July 13,1962 that it was received in the office of the postmaster of
Caloocan City where counsel for petitioner resides, on July 14, 1962,
and that it could not be delivered to said counsel prior to July 24,
1962, owing to his absence from Caloocan up to such date. Besides, the
appeal and the case in itself are so manifestly devoid of merit that
another hearing would merely delay further the execution of a valid
decision that has been final since 1955.

The decision appealed from is, therefore, affirmed, with costs against petitioner. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.