LOURDES BARRERA, PLAINTIFF, VS. LEON BARRERA AND FIDELA ANDRES BARRERA, DEFENDANTS. RE CONTEMPT CHARGE AGAINST JUDGE ALFREDO CATOLICO, RESPONDENT.

This Court is faced with a question of the most unique kind.  Respondent Judge Alfredo Catolico
of the Court of First Instance of Cavite was cited
for contempt and asked why no disciplinary action should be taken against him
for hurling the accusation that this Court had delegated to its Clerk a power
which under the Rules of Court appertained to its Chief Justice, an accusation
made in the context of an explicit avowal that he was in no mood to accord recognition and respect to a binding decision of this Court,
which for him was obsolete and no longer authoritative.  Such an attitude betrayed a refusal to apply
the law as interpreted by this tribunal. 
He could not bring himself to abide by a settled doctrine.  Given the opportunity to explain both in a
memorandum and in an oral argument, he remained adamant and obdurate.  It was apparent he was not averse to
disciplinary action being visited on his conduct.  He leaves us no choice.  We find him in contempt.

It all started innocently enough in a letter dated September 8,
1969, received by us two days thereafter. 
Counsel for the plaintiff in Barrera v. Barrera, a civil case pending in
the Court of First Instance of Cavite^[1]
requested “that the Court of First Instance of Cavite,
Branch III, presided over by the Hon. Judge Alfredo Catolico
be authorized to continue with the hearing of the above-entitled case pursuant
to Section 3, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court.”^[2]
Why such request was made was explained by counsel in these words:  “The said case is pending trial.  The plaintiff has one more witness to present
and thereafter, she intends to rest her case. 
Unfortunately, on May 22, 1969, when this case was set for hearing, the
presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite,
the Hon. Judge Jose B. Jimenez, was appointed as District Judge for the Court
of First Instance of Manila, and on said date, he did not hold court
session.  Because of this, the trial of
this case was left pending, and it was only in the month of July when it was
reset for hearing on August 6, 1969. 
However, on this date, this case was not again heard because the new
Presiding Judge did not arrive due to bad weather.”

Under our resolution of September 12, 1969, the aforesaid letter
was referred to the Department of Justice. 
The then Undersecretary of Justice, now the Solicitor General, Felix Q.
Antonio, referred the matter to respondent Judge whose comments were received
by the Department of Justice in an indorsement of
October 22, 1969.  After pointing out
that the first day of trial on the merits of the case in Barrera v. Barrera
having been held on August 21, 1968, there had elapsed by then the period of
fourteen months, far beyond the three-month limit as set forth in the Rules of
Court, he continued:  “When the
undersigned Presiding Judge assumed his duties as such, he found no written
authority by the Honorable Chief Justice of the Supreme Court extended to this
branch for it to be able to continue trying the case by receiving evidence yet
to be presented, seasonably adjourning and transferring continuation of the
trial, and finally thereafter, adjudging the case.  Considering the express provision of Rule 22
of the Rules of Court on the subject of adjournments and postpone­ments, same
need not be interpreted or construed for indeed, the Court can only apply its
clear and express provisions; and that upon the lapse of three months from the
first day of trial on the merits, the trial judge lost control of the same, and
may not continue trying the same for the only thing possible to be done is to
dismiss the case.”^[3]

That policy he adopted, notwithstanding his awareness of our
ruling in Barrueco v. Abeto,^[4]
as is evident from his comments. 
Thus:  “This is the only
conceivable way of complying with the express provision of Rule 22 of the Rules
of Court.  Indeed, this same provision
was incorporated in the original rules of court of 1940.  In an identical case submitted for ruling by
the Hon. Supreme Court, Barrueco v. Abeto, 71 Phil. 7, Justice Laurel who penned the decision
interpreted the same to be of directory character rather than mandatory.”^[5]
Clearly then, he was not disposed to yield obedience.  What the Court had said, he would blithely
ignore.  So his comments would
indicate:  “Way back in 1941 where
throughout the Philippines there were few thousands of cases undecided beyond
90 days, the said decision of the Supreme Court could be well-sustained
according to the facts then existing; but, could that ruling be sustained now
where throughout the Philippines there are pending cases with a dormancy of
between four months to seventeen years reaching the awful number of almost
100,000 cases be justified in its observance as directory when according to the
present circumstances and the policy adopted by the same Supreme Court in
incorporating this provision in its Rules of Court the idea is to make judges
decide cases as fast as possible within 90 days rather than allowing cases with
a dormancy reaching up to 17 years?^[6]

In the meanwhile, he would follow his own interpretation contrary
to what was decided by this Court: 
“It is submitted that under the said rule, not even the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court could validly, legally and morally extend power to
the trial Judge to reacquire control of the case tantamount to reacquiring
jurisdiction of the subject matter when the said written authority is extended
far beyond the three months limit in the said Rule 22 of the Rules of Court,
for indeed, it is elementary, and it has been reiterated time and again by the
Hon. Tribunal that when it comes to time or period in order that it could be
extended, the petition for extension should be filed before its expiration or
there is nothing that could be extended.”^[7]

Not content with such an attitude that breathes of defiance, he
would impute a delegation of such authority by the Chief Justice of this Court
to its Clerk with this unfounded assertion: 
“Further, the clerk of court of the Supreme Court had been
extending this power to the undersigned trial judge upon petition of counsel
for the plaintiff to continue trying the case where the same has already been
dismissed ‘without prejudice’ and where there is no more case to continue, for
indeed, the counsel for the plaintiff has not as yet secured the
reconsideration of the said order of dismissal previous to the granting of
power to continue trying and handling the case by the undersigned trial
judge.  Another question that cropped up
as a consequence of the above observation is as to whether the phrase ‘by
authority of the Chief Justice’ has given enough legal power and authority to
the said employee of the Supreme Court to in turn give power and authority to
the undersigned trial judge to continue trying the case even if it has already
been dismissed.”^[8]

Pursuing the same line, he continued thus:  “In one case, it was the same clerk of
court who informed the undersigned trial judge that by resolution of the
Supreme Court he is empowered to continue trying the case until finished.  In this case, could the Supreme Court as a
body validly and legally authorize the undersigned trial judge to continue
handling a case pending in his Court which was not
brought to the appellate jurisdiction of the Hon. Supreme Court either by
appeal or by certiorari?  Can the Supreme
Court take cognizance of a case pending before the Court of First Instance
without the benefit of appeal or certiorari? 
If this could be done, could the Supreme Court order the trial judge to
continue a case which was already dismissed and not existing anymore where the
counsel for the plaintiff has not filed a motion to set aside an order of
dismissal or has not filed any petition for certiorari to the Supreme Tribunal
for the review of said order?”^[9]

The closing portion of his comments let no doubt as to his
determination to adhere to the policy adopted by him contrary to the ruling in
the Abeto case: 
“The above considerations and questions are hereby humbly submitted
to the Hon. Department of Justice for its consideration in the sanguine belief
and expectation that something be done tending to remedy the nebulous situation
wherein the undersigned trial Judge is found, not only by the clear and express
provisions of Sec. 3 of Rule 22 of the Rules of Court but also by the ruling of
the highest tribunal of the land in the Abeto case
and in the letters written by the Clerk of the Supreme Court extending
authority to the undersigned trial judge to continue handling all these cases
even if dismissals have already been ordered and no petition for the setting
aside of the order, or no certiorari has been presented for the review thereof
and where factually, there is no case to continue.”^[10]

In our resolution of November 12, 1969, his comments being sent
to us by the then Undersecretary of Justice on November 3 of that month, he was
given the opportunity to explain in writing not later than November 24, and to
appear personally before the Court on November 26, to show cause why he should
not be dealt with for contempt.  His
explanation was filed on November 24.  It
was apparent that further reflection did not occasion a change of heart.  As set forth therein:  “It may not be amiss to state in this
connection, that your herein respondent is at a loss for really he cannot
ascertain who is the offended party in this proceeding.  Is it the Hon. Tribunal as a whole or the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or the deputy clerk of court?  Indeed, there is no written charge by anybody
or specific person seeking the institution of a contempt proceeding against
your herein respondent.”^[11]

This is how he would answer his question:  “If it is the Hon. Tribunal as a whole
who might be the offended party your herein respondent
would be at a loss to understand how he could incur the responsibilities
attached to a contempt of court proceeding when he has not disobeyed any order
of the Supreme Court.  If it is the Hon.
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court who might be the offended party in this
case, it is respectfully submitted that the respondent judge might not be
subjected to contempt proceeding for expressing his honest opinion which
happens to be different from the highly respected one of the Hon. Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, and if there is any error in this case it might be one
where interpretation of law rather than a deliberate misstatement of facts as
specified in the communi­cation of the deputy clerk of court.  And if it is the deputy clerk of court who
has been writing all these letters to your herein respondent who might be
considering himself as an offended party and has initiated this contempt of
court proceeding, your herein respondent, with all humility, submits the fact
that he cannot be made respondent in a contempt of court proceeding just
because of an erroneous communication written by the said deputy clerk of court
and may your humble respondent be allowed to say that he cannot be charged with
contempt of court because of the erroneous letters of a deputy clerk of court
who might want to exert a personality higher than that of your herein
respondent, and finally, if these were the case, let your humble respondent say
with Dolores Ibarruri as follows:  ‘[Better to die on one’s feet than to live on
one’s knees.].'”^[12]

Then two days later, on November 26, respondent Judge argued his
case in a manner that erased any lingering doubt as to his being obsessed with
the conviction that nothing said or done by him could in no wise be
objectionable, a position maintained with all the obstinacy at his
command.  He could not be reconciled to
the thought that our Clerk when speaking for this Court was performing a duty
to which lower court judges would do well to pay heed.  It was even more apparent that while making
much of his refusal to believe that the order received by him proceeded from a
source not authorized to do so, in itself an unfounded charge that this Court
was recreant to its responsibility not to allow any one to usurp its authority,
he was acting in accordance with a fixed and resolute determination not to be
bound by the Barrueco doctrine.  For him, it was no longer in force.  It did not matter that this Court had not so
decreed.  He could not bring himself to
accord it deference.  So his acts and
words did indicate.  What other
alternative is there then than to find him guilty of contempt?

It is to be made clear that the disciplinary action taken against
him is not for the thoughts entertained or opinions uttered by him.  Judges are not expected to be wholly in
agreement with every decision of this Tribunal. 
Nor are they required to keep locked up within their breasts their own
views on such matters.  Doubts and skepticism
about the continuing validity of doctrines announced by us may under
appropriate circumstances be ventilated. 
As a matter of fact, they should not be discouraged, for the progress of
the law may very well depend on a More searching
inquiry as to the continuing validity of certain assumptions and
presuppositions uncritically accepted. 
Nonetheless, as long as our rulings constitute authoritative precedents,
the duty of obedience is cast on inferior court judges.

Nor is respondent Judge to be held responsible for the manner in
which he gave expression to his thoughts. 
There is no offense against this Court arising from a rather truculent
tone that fails to exhibit the redeeming grace of urbanity.  Nor could the mere fact that the impression
left is one of dogmatic finality, that apparently
could not harbor the least suspicion that one could possibly be in the
slightest bit mistaken, call for a reproof. 
After all, the style reflects the man, and perhaps he cannot help
himself.

What calls for disciplinary action is the recklessness with which
respondent Judge did hurl the baseless allegation that the Clerk of this Court
was permitted to exercise an authority which appertained to the Chief
Justice.  He did speak with all the valor
of ignorance.  Nor did he retreat from
such an indefensible stand in the face of his being informed that what the
Clerk did was solely in accordance with what was previously decided by this
Court, which certainly will not tolerate, anybody else, much less a
subordinate, to speak and act for itself. 
This gross disrespect shown to this Court has no justification.  The misdeed of respondent Judge is compounded
by such an accusation apparently arising from his adamantine conviction that a
doctrine of this Court that fails to meet his approval need not be
applied.  No inferior court judge, to
repeat, can be permitted to arrogate unto himself such a prerogative at war
with everything that the rule of law stands for.

The delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches
to a constitutional statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural norm
or a municipal ordinance is committed to the judiciary.  It thus discharges a role no less crucial
than that appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance of the
rule of law.  To assure stability in
legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice.  It does so with finality, logically and
rightly, through the highest judicial organ, this Court.  What it says then should be definitive and
authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial
hierarchy.  They have to defer and to
submit.  What was so appropriately said
by Justice Laurel comes to mind:  “A
becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position
that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial
system of the nation.”^[13]

Such a thought was reiterated in an opinion of Justice J.B.L.
Reyes and further emphasized in these words: 
“Judge Gaudencio Cloribel
need not be reminded that the Supreme Court, by tradition and in our system of
judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is; it is the final
arbiter of any justifiable controversy. 
There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should
take their bearings.”^[14]
To the same effect is the following excerpt from a 1958 decision:  “Now, if a Judge of a lower Court feels,
in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases, that the application of a
doctrine promulgated by this Superiority is against his way of reasoning, or
against his conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter, but rather than
disposing of the case in accordance with his personal views he must first think
that it is his duty to apply the law as interpreted by the Highest Court of the
Land, and that any deviation from a principle laid down by the latter would
unavoidably cause, as a sequel, unnecessary inconveniences, delays and expenses
to the litigants.  And if despite of what
is here said a Judge, by delicate or acute qualms of conscience, still believes
that he cannot follow Our rulings, then he has no other alternative than to
place himself in the position that he could properly avoid the duty of having
to render judgment on the case concerned (Art. 9, C. C.), and he has only one
legal way to do that.”^[15]

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Alfredo Catolico
is reprimanded by this Court for the above offense.  Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to
the Honorable, The Secretary of Justice.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., took no part.

Villamor, J., reserves his vote.

^[1] Civil Case No. 1179 of the Court of First Instance of Cavite.

^[2]
The aforesaid section is worded thus: “[Sec.] 3. Adjournments
and postponements. – A court may adjourn a trial from day to day,
and to any stated time, as the expeditious and convenient transaction of
business may require, but shall have no power to adjourn a trial for a longer
period than one month for each adjournment, nor more than three months in all,
except when authorized in writing by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court.”

^[3]
Comments of Respondent Judge, pp. 1-2.

^[4] 71 Phil. 7 (1940).

^[5]
Comments of Respondent Judge, pp. 2-3.

^[6] Ibid,
pp. 3-4.

^[7] Ibid,
pp. 5-6.

^[8] Ibid, pp. 6 -7.

^[9] Ibid, p. 7.

^[10] Ibid, p. 8.

^[11]
Explanation of Respondent Judge, p. 7.

^[12] Ibid, p. 8.

^[13] People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 82 (1937).

^[14]
Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila
(Br. VI), L-26364, May 29, 1968,
23 SCRA 948, 961.

^[15] People v. Santos, et al., 104 Phil. 551, 560. Cf.
Commissioner of Immigration v. Cloribel,
L-24139, August
31, 1967, 20 SCRA 1241.