CARMEN YTURRALDE AND CONSUELO G. AZURIN, ACCOMPANIED BY HER HUSBAND, DR. RAYMUNDO AZURIN, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, VS. MARIANO VAGILIDAD AND LUZ MANAGUIT, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

Prime objective of plaintiffs’ complaint is to nullify the real
estate mortgage on certain parcels of land – covered by Original Certificates
of Title Nos. 739, 742, and 743 – located in Sibalom,
Antique, allegedly executed by plaintiff Carmen Yturralde
in favor of defendant spouses Mariano Vagilidad and
Luz Managuit. 
Plaintiff Carmen Yturralde is the donor and
plaintiff Consuelo G. Azurin, the donee
of said parcels of land, amongst others, by a deed of donation claimed to have
been executed prior to the real estate mortgage afore­said.

The history of this case may be traced as follows:

Carmen Yturralde was the owner of ten
(10) parcels of land of the Sibalom Cadastre,
Antique, viz: Lots 1000, 1002 and 1004 covered
by Original Certificate of Title 739; 1/3 share of Lot 45, Original Certificate
of Title 740; Lots 756 and 765, Original Certificate of Title 741; Lot 7354,
Original Certificate of Title 742; Lot 977, Original Certificate of Title 743;
and Lots 385 and 419, Original Certificate of Title 744.

On December 10, 1955,
Carmen Yturralde executed in favor of Consuelo G. Azurin a notarial deed of
donation inter vivos covering all the
aforementioned lots, acceptance of which was also set forth in the same
document.

For purposes of registration of the deed of donation, Consuelo
asked Carmen where the titles were.  She
was referred to Carmen’s elder brother, Cipriano, who
informed Consuelo that the titles were in the possession of the defendants Vagilidad and Managuit.  The Azurins learned
that Cipriano Yturralde was
indebted to the Vagilidads.  Together with Cipriano,
Consuelo G. Azurin went to defendants on December 18, 1955 and asked for the
certificates of title.  Defendants
refused to deliver them.  Reason for
refusal was that it was Carmen Yturralde who owed
them money and they would part with the titles only when they were paid.  On January
8, 1956, Consuelo G. Azurin, accompanied
by Agripina Sabrine, made
another effort to procure the titles, but it was again in vain.  Towards the end of January 1956, plaintiff Raymundo Azurin himself requested
for the return of the titles.  He was
also rebuffed.  In all of those visits,
defendants were made to understand that the titles were needed to enable
Consuelo to register the donation in her favor.

On July 2, 1956,
plaintiff Consuelo G. Azurin was forced to go to the
cadastral court (Cadastral Case No. 24, G.L.R.O. Rec. 1232) with a prayer that
defendants be compelled to surrender the Torrens titles
to the lands donated.^[1]
Because of the court’s order of July
10, 1956 directing defendants to surrender the titles to therein
peti­tioner Consuelo G. Azurin within five days, the
titles were finally turned over to plaintiffs. 
Those titles were cancelled, and new transfer certificates of title were
issued in the name of Consuelo G. Azurin.

It was at the hearing of the petition of plaintiff Consuelo G. Azurin for the surrender of the titles that plaintiffs
first learned that there was a mortgage allegedly executed on February 14, 1956
by Carmen Yturralde in favor of defendant Mariano Vagilidad covering some of the lands donated, namely, those
described in Original Certi­ficates of Title 739, 742 and 743, and annotated at
the back thereof on March 2, 1956.  These
mortgage annotations, therefore, also appear at the back of Consuelo’s titles
issued in lieu thereof.

On December 29, 1956,
the donor Carmen Yturralde, the donee
Consuelo G. Azurin, assisted by her husband Raymundo Azurin, commenced the
present suit against defendant spouses Mariano Vagi­lidad
and Luz Managuit to annul the real estate mortgage.^[2]
They averred that without the knowledge and consent of Carmen Yturralde, defendants came to possess Original Certificates
of Title 739, 742 and 743 and fraudulently brought about the false execution of
the mortgage aforesaid in their effort to collect money due them by way of
loans extended to Cipriano Yturralde,
brother of Carmen; that plaintiff Carmen Yturralde
had absolutely nothing to do with said loans.

The gist of defendants’ answer and amended answer was that the
mortgage was executed as security for loans granted Carmen Yturralde
on various occasions.  It was in the
second amended answer that for the first time defendants alleged that the
donation relied upon by plaintiffs, the Azurins, was
made in fraud of creditors.

While the trial was going on, that is, on February 12, 1960, plaintiffs’ counsel filed a
notice of death of party.  Counsel
informed the court that plaintiff Carmen Yturralde
died on January 23, 1960,
and proposed that Cipriano Yturralde,
Carmen’s brother and the nearest of kin, be substituted as party-plaintiff in
place of the deceased Carmen Yturralde.

A hitch developed when, on August 17, 1960, this same Cipriano
Yturralde lodged a complaint against herein
plaintiffs Consuelo G. Azurin and Raymundo
Azurin docketed as Civil Case 207 of the Court of
First Instance of Antique^[3]
praying that the December 10, 1955
deed of donation heretofore mentioned be declared null and void.^[4]
With this development, we find defendants’ counsel joining plaintiffs, by
motion of September 5, 1960,
in the substitution of Cipriano Ytur­ralde
as party-plaintiff in place of the deceased Carmen Yturralde.  It was plaintiffs’ turn now to object to the
substitution of Cipriano Yturralde
upon the averments that there was no conflict of interests between surviving
plaintiffs and Cipriano Yturralde
before the death of plaintiff Carmen Yturralde, but
that after the death of the latter, Cipriano Yturralde filed the suit aforesaid to annul the donation;
that for this reason, he is not the ideal person to substitute for the late
Carmen Yturralde; that since Carmen Yturralde in her lifetime had already donated her
properties, the proceedings in this case could continue without the need of
having Carmen Yturralde substituted as
plaintiff.  In its order of September 30, 1960, the court ruled
that there was no necessity for substitution and denied defendants’ motion of September 5, 1960.

After trial on the merits, the court rendered its judgment of
July 6, 1962 declaring null and void the deed of mortgage dated February 14,
1956 as well as the registration of said document in the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Antique, and the annotation thereof as an incumbrance
on O.C.T. Nos. 739, 742 and 743 and on T.C.T. Nos. N-2692, N-2693 and N-2694,
all of the land records of Antique; directing the Register of Deeds of Antique
to cancel said incumbrance on said certificates of
title; and ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs P500.00 as attorneys’
fees, and the costs.

Defendants appealed direct to this Court.^[5]

1. The threshold question defendants’ brief presents is the trial
court’s denial of their motion to have Cipriano Yturralde substituted for the deceased Carmen Yturralde as co-plaintiff.

The power of a court to drop or add parties to an action “on
motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on
such terms as are just” is recognized by Section 11, Rule 3, both of the
old and the new Rules of Court.  The
problem before us, therefore, turns upon the question of whether or not the
plaintiffs Azurin may prosecute the complaint by
themselves, independently of the deceased Carmen Yturralde.

It is elementary in law and jurisprudence that an action for
annulment of a contract “may be instituted by all those who are thereby
obliged principally or subsidiarily.”^[6]
Upon the other hand, it has also been said that the nullity of a deed or
contract may be taken advantage of only by persons who bear such relation to
the contract that it interferes with their rights and interests.^[7]
It is likewise the jurisprudence of this Court that a “person who is not a
party obliged principally or subsidiarily in a
contract may exercise an action for nullity of the contract if he is prejudiced
in his rights with respect to one of the contracting parties, and can show the
detriment which would positively result to him from the contract in which he
had no intervention.”^[8]

In reality, the deceased Carmen Yturralde
had no material interest in the suit, for the reason that she had already
parted with the ownership of the properties involved.  By joining as plaintiff, Carmen Yturralde in effect confirmed the deed of donation and,
consequently, the right claimed by the Azurins to
clear their title to the properties of the mortgage allegedly executed by
Carmen Yturralde in favor of said defendants.  It is in this posture that we say that the
substitution of the deceased Carmen Yturralde has no
bearing on the issues in the case brought by plaintiffs against defend­ants.

It is the Azurins whose title to the
properties is directly affected by, the real estate mortgage.  As a real right, a recorded mortgage follows
the property whoever is the owner.  As
successors-­in-interest of Carmen Yturralde, the Azurins are certainly prejudiced by the existing mortgage
annotated on their titles which were issued to them upon registration of the
donation in their favor.  As long as the
mortgage remains unannulled, the Azurins
are bound to pay the mortgage debt and its interests or face foreclosure of the
mortgage.

There is thus no other conclusion than that the Azurins are the real party-plaintiffs in interest who can
go forward with the present complaint.

Besides, Cipriano Yturralde
is certainly not a proper person to be joined as co-plaintiff.  By his complaint in Civil Case 207, he has truly
assumed a position inimical to plaintiffs, the Azurins,
and the deceased Carmen Yturralde,
in his attempt to impugn the deed of donation. 
Indeed, he wants the properties involved for his own upon the averment
that he is the legal heir of the deceased Carmen Yturralde.  In fact, he (Cipriano
Yturralde) testified in this case for defendants to
sustain the validity of the mortgage. Correctly then did the lower court say in
its order of September 30, 1960
that: “We cannot have two plaintiffs maintaining diametrically opposite
views.”

Furthermore, the non-substitution at best is a harmless error
which “does not affect the substantial rights of” defendants.^[9]
They have no cause for complaint.

2. Defendants next protest that in the resolution of the dispute, the
court below did not find it necessary to pass upon the validity of the donation
made by Carmen Yturralde over her properties in favor
of Consuelo G. Azurin.  The lower court’s expressed view is that such
“is not necessary for the determination of the case”.  More important still is that, in the lower
court’s opinion, “that question is now in issue in Civil Case No. 207 of
this Court (Exh. 2) and will there be decided.”
Parenthetically, Civil Case 207, as heretofore mentioned, is a suit filed by Cipriano Yturralde, brother of
Carmen Yturralde, against herein plaintiffs, the Azurins, to annul the donation.  As previously stated (footnote 4), plaintiff,
the defeated party, brought that case before us on appeal in G.R. L-22158.

We perceive of no legal right on the part of defendants to assail
the validity of the donation.  Valid or
void, the donation would not affect their real right as mortgagees, which
attaches to the properties independent of whether the owner thereof be the
deceased Carmen Yturralde or the present plaintiffs.
And this, on the assumption that their mortgage is valid.  They may not seek the annulment of the
donation because they cannot show prejudice to them resulting from said
donation in which they had no inter­vention.^[10]

Nor can defendants ask the courts to strike down the donation as
having been executed in fraud of creditors. 
That donation cannot defraud, much less prejudice, defendants in any
way.^[11]
They are secured by the registered mortgage.

More on this point.  The
original and amended answers did not assail this donation.  It was only in the second amended answer that
defendants charged that such donation was contrived to defeat the creditors of
Carmen Yturralde, amongst whom were defendants.^[12] Inspite of this specific allegation, no evidence at all was
presented by defendants to prove that the deed of donation was a document the
execution of which was tainted with fraud. 
Since the deed of donation is a public document, it enjoys the
presumption of validity. It is evidence even as against third persons of the
fact which gives rise to its execution and of the date of the latter.^[13]

3. The preliminary questions disposed of, we now go to the meat of
the case.  Defendants decry the finding below
that the deed of mortgage of February
14, 1956 is null and void.  A
question of fact is here involved.

Plaintiffs’ evidence, as testified to by two maids, Flora Gar­cinela and Angelica Presente,
shows the following:  About the middle of
February 1956, defendant Luz Managuit, a niece of
Carmen Ytur­ralde, went to the house of the latter
sometime after lunch with a piece of cake. 
Luz prevailed upon Carmen to eat it. 
After Carmen did, she fell asleep. 
She was still asleep when suppertime came.  Not long after 10:00
o’clock p.m., when the maids retired, Flora heard someone open the
door.  She saw Luz enter and approach
Carmen’s bed with a bundle of papers. 
Luz got hold of the right hand of Carmen, applied something to the thumb
and pressed said thumb to the papers she brought with her.  Luz then folded the papers again.  When she was about to leave, Flora inquired
from her as to what she did.  Luz
answered: “Just keep quiet, you have nothing to do with it.” Flora
woke up her husband and Angelica, and told, them what Luz did.  Flora and Angelica went to Carmen. When they
saw that her thumb was stained with ink, they washed her thumb because she
might get angry when she would wake up. 
Carmen slept through it all.

The lower court came to the conclusion that the papers Luz
brought with her could have been no other than the mortgage papers.  A meticulous dig into the evidence by His
Honor, Judge Juan de Borja, the trial judge, is
reflected in his findings, as follows:

“From the evidence of the defendants themselves, it has
been established that the defendants loaned
money and goods to Cipriano
Yturralde and not to Carmen
Yturralde. 
This is evident from the ‘vales’ Exhibits G, G-1, G-2 and G-3 which are
all signed by Cipriano as well as from Exh. H where it appears that the rest of the ‘vales’ were
also signed by him.  This fact makes
understandable the reluctance of Luz Managuit to
produce said ‘vales’ in Court.  She at
first denied that she had them, saying that they have been lost.  When she was finally cornered in
cross-examination into admitting that she had the receipts and was then ordered
by the Court to produce them, she brought only these four receipts and claimed
she could not find the rest.

Luz Managuit and Cipriano
Yturralde sought to explain the latter’s signatures
on the receipts by stating that Cipriano was
authorized by Carmen to secure the loans from the defendants.^[14] Carmen’s
circumstance in life does not indicate
that she needed any loan of money
or goods to maintain herself.  According to the defense witnesses
themselves, Carmen received 252 cavanes of palay and 20 cavanes of mongo
yearly from her lands, and a monthly pension of P65.00 from the U.S.
Government.  She had nobody but herself
to support.  She lived frugally. It was
not shown that her illness was such as to require expensive treat­ment or
medication.  Surely she could not have
spent all her income and ran up an indebtedness of P2,000.00 yearly besides.

There is evidence in the record that Cipriano
Yturralde is somewhat of a
prodigal or wastrel. Susana Duatin
testified that he owed several people money, including herself.  An examination of the ‘vales’ of Cipriano in favor of Susana Duatin
(Exhs. D, D-1 to D-5) seems to support this view. The
‘vales’ are each for five cavanes of palay taken successively on March 8, 1955, March 23, 1955,
April 2, 1955, April 4, 1955, April 13, 1955, and July 23, 1955.  It will be noted that he took a total of 30 cavanes within a period of hardly more than four months, 15
cavanes of which were between April 2 and April 13,
1955, or only 11 days.  Carmen and Cipriano, and their household help, could not have eaten or
needed 7 1/2 cavanes of rice during that period.  The only conclusion is that Cipriano must have taken the loan either in palay or in money and used it for his own
purposes.

While it is true that Cipriano was the
one who owed the money to the defendants, it may still be possible that Carmen,
out of love for her brother had agreed to shoulder payment of the debt.
However, the defendants did not allege this matter in their answer and their
evidence did not touch on that point. 
Their theory is that it was Carmen who contracted the obligation.  But even this possibility was met by the
evidence of the plaintiffs, thru the testimony of Susana Duatin,
that she heard Luz try to collect from Carmen the indebtedness of Cipriano, and Carmen angrily refused.

It is against this background that the Court has to inquire into
and determine what were the true cir­cumstances that attended the preparation
and execution of the deed of mortgage. 
The plaintiffs claim, thru the testimony of Flora Garcinela
and Angelica Presente, that Luz Managuit^[15]
approached Carmen while the latter was asleep and impressed her thumb on the
pages of a document that Luz had with her. 
The defendants maintain, thru the testimony of Luz herself, that the
document was signed by Carmen voluntarily in the pre­sence of Atty. Novisteros, Atty. Valente and the
ins­trumental witnessed Felix Sabrine and Jesus
Morales.  It is also claimed by the
defendants that even admitting the testimony of Flora and Angelica, there is no
evidence that the papers carried by Luz were the document of mort­gage.  There is no merit to this claim, since this
is the only document that bears the thumbmark of
Carmen dated February of 1956, and if Luz had caused Carmen’s
thumbmark to be placed on
document in that month, it can be
no other than this one.

The Court finds the narration made by Flora and Angelica clear
and believable.  They
both appeared untutored, and could have
been easily disconcerted if their stories
were only made up. But they gave
the impression of telling the truth.  The defense tried to discredit their
testimony by evidence that they did not live with Carmen as claimed by
them.  This evidence consists of a group
picture of the members of Carmen’s household (Exh. 7)
in which Flora and Angelica do not appear, and of the testimony of Crisanto Basañez and Carlos Sasi, barriomates of the two, who
said that Flora and Angelica were both living in their respective barrios in
February of 1956. Said evidence is not con­vincing.  It was shown that the picture was taken in
1953 or 1954, long before Flora and Angelica came to live with Carmen, and they
could not therefore have been included in the picture.  As to the testimony of Crisanto
Basañez and Carlos Sasi, the
Court does not find the same worthy
of credit.  It could have
been possible for them to remember in 1961, when they gave their testimony,
whether or not a particular barriomate was in the
barrio in the month of February, 1956.

The testimony of Luz Vagilidad, on the other hand,
was characterized by demonstrated falsehoods,
incon­sistencies, and improbabilities. Her initial refusal
to produce Cipriano’s ‘vales’ has already been
mentioned.  She claimed that the deed of
mortgage was prepared by Atty, Novisteros
in the house of Carmen on February 14,
1956, the same day it was signed. 
If this was true, then Atty. Novisteros should
have typed the date and place of execution along with the rest of the
document.  But the spaces for these
particulars were left in blank, which can only indicate that the document was
prepared at some other time and place.

Luz’ testimony about the execution of the docu­ment was
uncorroborated.  Neither Atty. Novisteros nor Atty. Valente nor
the two instrumental witnesses to the execution of the document were presented,
although the evidence for the plaintiffs
placed in issue the due and regular
execution of the document.  The defendants’ failure to call any of these
persons to testify is considered by the Court most significant,^[16]
and leads it to believe that said document was irregularly executed.

The Court finds the supposed deed of mortgage void because: (1)
There was no consent on the part of Carmen Yturralde,
her thumbmark on the document having been placed
thereon while she was asleep (Art. 1319, New Civil Code); and (2) It was
not shown that the terms of the
document were fully explained to her when it was
executed, it being incumbent upon the defendants to show this since Carmen Yturralde was illiterate and could not
even sign her name (Art. 1332, New Civil
Code).”^[17]

A rule long familiar is that appellate courts, when faced with a
conflict of testimony, are bound to sustain the lower court’s find­ings on the
evidence unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight
and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted^[18]
or unless some conclusion established from the facts is inconsistent with the
court findings or there is some inherent weakness in the evidence upon which
the conclusion is based.^[19]
And this is because the trial judge is unquestionably in a superior position
to, gauge the credibility of those who take the witness seat before him, He has
the opportunity to size up the appearance, the demeanor, the manner
of testifying, the probability or improbability of the testimony,
of the witnesses.  Indeed, the trial
court has a first hand advantage to assess the value to be given the testimony
of a witness.

At this distance, we find ourselves unwilling to say that we are
better prepared to ascertain the relative weight to be given the testimony of
those who appeared and testified in the court below.  We have nothing before us but the cold words
written into the trans­cript.  It is in
this context that we say that we cannot downgrade the findings of the lower
court just quoted.  Our review of the
record does not yield any cause or reason why we should overturn the said
findings.

More than these, the facts and circumstances spread over the
record plainly and manifestly demonstrate a pattern of conduct on the part of
defendants aimed at assuring themselves of payment from the deceased Carmen Yturralde for debts incurred by the latter’s brother, Cipriano Yturralde.  The receipts of indebtedness produced in
court (Exhibits G, G-1, G-2 and G-3) all show that the different vales on
different occasions during the year 1954 were signed by Cipriano
Yturralde in favor of defendants.  The minutes of the court’s session of July
10, 1956 in the cadastral proceedings (Exhibit H) to procure surrender by
defendants to plaintiffs of the Torrens titles list 46 vales signed by Cipriano Yturralde for the period
from March 17, 1953 to January 11, 1955.

There is no question in our mind that defendants knew of the
donation executed by Carmen Yturralde in favor of
Consuelo G. Azurin before February 14, 1956, the date of the mortgage
allegedly executed by Carmen Yturralde in favor of
defendants.  By Cipriano
Yturralde’s own admission, as he testified for
defendants, he had no means of livelihood as he was jobless.  He confessed that he transferred all of his
properties to Vicente Grasparil, who was the
brother-in-law of defendant Luz Managuit.  Carmen Yturralde
adamantly refused to pay her brother’s debt to defendants.  The following testimony of Susana Duatin, another creditor of Cipriano
Yturralde, speaking of her conversation with Mariano Vagilidad in January of 1956, is illuminating:

“Q   Do
you have any conversation with Mariano Vagilidad at
that time?

A     Yes,
sir.

Q    What
did you talk about?

A     When
I came up the house Mariano Vagilidad asked me, Susing, what shall we do? I answered him, what shall we do
because according to Carmen Yturralde she already
donated her properties to Mrs. Azurin.

Q    And
then what did Mariano Vagilidad say if he said
anything more?

A     He
said that, I let Cipriano indebted to me [sic] because
we thought we could acquire the land
of Yturraldes.”^[20]

It is but natural that defendants should look up to someone from
whom they could recoup their impending losses. 
It is in this environment that the mortgage now disputed came
about.  We are constrained to state that
on the face of the record, plaintiffs have made out a case of fraud by evidence
clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.^[21]  This evidence overcomes the known presumption
fraus est odiosa et non praesumenda.

For the reasons given, the judgment under review is hereby
affirmed.

Costs against defendants-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., (Acting C.J.), Dizon, Makalintal, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee,
and Barredo,
JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., and Ruiz Castro, on
official leave.

Zaldivar, J., did not take part.

^[1]
Exhibit B.

^[2] Civil
Case 779, Court of First Instance of Antique (San Jose),
entitled “Carmen Yturralde and Consuelo G. Azurin, accompanied by her husband Dr. Raymundo
Azurin, Plaintiffs, versus Mariano Vagilidad and Luz Managuit,
Defendants.”

^[3]
Entitled “Rev. Cipriano Yturralde, Plaintiff, versus Dr. Raymundo
Azurin, Mrs. Consuelo G. Azurin,
R.F.C. now Development Bank of the Philippines
and Register of Deeds of Antique, Defendants.”

^[4]
The complaint having been dismissed in the Court of First Instance of Antique
after trial on the merits, this case was appealed to this Court by plaintiff
therein, Cipriano Yturralde,
and docketed as G.R. L-22158.

^[5]
R.A., pp. 192-193.

^[6]
Article 1397, Civil Code; Ong vs. Jariol, 17 Phil. 244, 251; Wolfson
vs. Estate of Martinez, 20 Phil. 340, 344; Concepcion
vs. Sta. Ana, 87 Phil. 787, 792; Armentia vs.
Patriarca, 18 SCRA 1253, 1257.

^[7]
Cook vs. McMicking, 27 Phil. 10, 12; Lim vs.
Dee Hao Kim (unreported), 102 Phil. 1171, 1172.

^[8] Teves vs. PHHC (1968), 23 SCRA 1141, 1147-1148, citing
Ibañez vs. Hongkong
and Shanghai Bank, 22 Phil. 572, 584-585

^[9]
Section 5, Rule 51, Revised Rules of Court.

^[10] Teves vs. PHHC, supra.

^[11]
Article 1381, Civil Code, provides: “The following contracts are rescissible: x x x (3) Those undertaken in fraud of creditors when the
latter cannot in any other manner collect
the claims due them; x x x.” Emphasis supplied.

^[12] See:  R.A., pp. 45, 78 and 107.

^[13]
Section 24, Rule 132, Revised Rules of Court.

^[14]
We read from the transcript the following given on cross-examination by witness
Cipriano Yturralde,
testifying for the defense:

“ATTY. ZALDIVAR

Q       When you contracted this alleged amount of four thousand for
Carmen Yturralde according to you from the spouses
Mariano Vagilidad and Luz Vagilidad,
was there any docu­ment made or was there any writing evidencing that in­debtedness?

A       None.

Q       You mean to tell the Court that in the year 1954, the spouses
Mariano Vagilidad and Luz Vagilidad
gave you four thousand pesos indebtedness without any paper, without any
writing that that amount was borrowed?

ATTY. MERCADO

That is misleading, the witness did
not state that four thousand was in cash but those were the goods and cash
taken from the store of the Vagilidad.

COURT

Witness may answer.

A       Yes, sir.

ATTY ZALDIVAR

Q       Did you get that amount all in one occasion in 1953?

A       Several times.  Those
were spent for the schools because there were two who were studying in Iloilo.  She spent for somebody there, someone in Bugasong also asking money, also for the payment of medicines,
hilot and spending for Tonguia
who got first in the examination.

Q       My question was, when you got the amount, let us say, the
total amount of four thousand pesos, was there any writing or document to
show that you got this amount of four thousand?

A       Only trust and confidence. 
They did not askfor any sheet of writing.  Later I left for Manila.  I never mind because Dr. Azurin
was already the administrator.

Q       In 1954, you got money from the spouses and no writing nor
promissory note nor vale were made?

A       No, sir. I cannot remember.  When the amount reached four thousand pesos,
we continued to get from the spouses Mariano and Luz Vagilidad
until the amount reached six thousand pesos,” Tr., Hearing of March 13,
1961, pp. 23-25; emphasis supplied.

But see:  Exhs. G, G-1, G-2,
G-3 and H.

^[15]
Our note:  Luz Managuit
testified on cross-examination that Carmen Yturralde
“was my aunt because she was the second cousin of my father” Procopio Managuit. Tr., July 28, 1961, pp. 188-189.

^[16]
On this point, see Section 5(e), Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court, which reads:

“SEC. 5. Disputable presumptions.
-The following pre­sumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted,
but may be contra­dicted and overcome by other evidence:

x          x          x

(e) That evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced;

x          x          x”

^[17]
Emphasis supplied.

^[18] Salonga, Philippine Law on Evidence, 1964 ed., pp. 781-782,
citing Se La O vs. Director of Lands, 43 O.G. 504 (1947); People vs.
Masin, 64 Phil. 757 (1937); People vs.
Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64 (1922); Salmon Dexter & Co. vs. Wijangco, 46 Phil. 386 (1924); People vs. Balines, G.R No, L-9045, Sept. 28, 1956; People vs. Lardizabal, G.R. No. L-8944, May 11, 1956.

^[19] Ibid.,
p. 782, citing People vs. Villaroya,
L-5781, August 30, 1957

^[20]
Tr., November 7, 1960, pp.
84-85

^[21] Mendezona vs. Philippine Sugar Estates Dev.
Co., 41 Phil. 475, 493; El Hogar Filipino vs. Olviga, 60 Phil. 17, 21.