PACITO ABREA, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. ISABELO A. LLOREN, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

OZAETA, J.:


In the general elections of November 11, 194-7, appellant Pacito Abrea and
appellee Isabelo A. Lloren were the candidates for the office of municipal mayor
of Inopacan, Leyte. In his certificate of candidacy appellee Isabelo Lloren
stated that he was also known by the following names Isabelo A. Lloren, Isabelo
Lloren Abrea, Beloy Abrea,. Beloy Lloren, I. Lloren, I. Abrea, Loy Lloren, and
Loy Abrea.

The municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Isabelo Lloren
municipal-mayor-elect with 1,010 votes, which gave him a majority of 198 votes
over Pacito Abrea, who obtained only 812 votes.

Pacito Abrea protested the election of his opponent on four grounds, only the
first of which is relied upon by him in this appeal, to with “(a) That a total
of 417 votes cast in all the precincts in said municipality in favor of one
Beloy as clearly written in the ballots were credited and read in favor of the
above respondent.”

In the course of the trial the ballot boxes were opened, and it resulted that
517 votes were cast for the office of municipal mayor in the name of Beloy, 77
votes in the name of Biloy, and 8 votes in the name of Belog.

The trial court found—and its finding is not questioned in this appeal—that
it had been clearly proved that the protestee Isabelo A. Lloren was popularly
and . commonly known in the whole municipality of Inopacan by his nickname Beloy
or Biloy; and that the protestant himself proved that before and on the day of
the election the protestee distributed sample ballots on which was written the
name Beloy on the line corresponding to the office of municipal mayor. The trial
court also found that in the said elections in Inopacan there was no other
candidate for mayor or any other office who was known by the name Beloy.

Declaring that the votes for municipal mayor in the names of Beloy, Biloy,
and Belog had been correctly counted in favor of the protestee, the trial court
confirmed the proclamation made by the municipal board of canvassers and
declared the protestee municipal-mayor-elect of Inopacan, ordering the
protestant to pay the costs. From that judgment the protestant has appealed to
this court upon the questions of law which we shall now discuss.

1. Appellant’s main contention is that the 602 ballots in -which only the
   nickname Beloy, Biloy, or Belog was voted for municipal mayor should have teen
   rejected, thereby adjudicating only 408 votes to the appellee against the
   appellant’s 812 votes. In other words he contends that all ballots in which only
   the nickname of the appellee was written were invalid for said candidate. In
   support of his contention he cites paragraph 9 of section 149 of the Revised
   Election Code (Republic Act No. 180), approved June 21, 1947, which reads as
   follows:

   “9. The use of nicknames and appellations of affection and friendship, if
   accompanied by the name or surname of the candidate, does not annul such vote,
   except when they were used as a means to identify their respective
   voters.”

   The foregoing Is one of twenty-three rules for the appreciation of ballots
   contained in section 149 of the Revised Election Code, the first two rules being
   the following:

   “1. Any ballot where only the Christian name of candidate or only his surname
   appears is valid for such candidate, if there is no other, candidate with the
   same name or surname for the same officej but when the word written in the
   ballot is at the same time the Christian name of a candidate and the surname of
   his opponent, the vote shall be counted in favor of the latter.

   “2. A name or surname incorrectly written which, when read, has a sound equal
   or similar to the real name or surname of the candidate shall be counted in his
   favor.”

   Rule No. 9, which is relied upon by appellant, provides only for the
   determination of whether a ballot or vote shall or shall not be annulled on the
   ground that it is marked by means of a nickname. It says that it shall not be
   annulled on that ground unless the nickname, accompanied by the name or surname
   of the candidate, was used as a means to identify the voter. It does not say
   that when a nickname alone is written to identify the candidate voted for the
   vote is invalid. If it had been the intention of the Congress to annul such vote
   it would have preserved in the Revised Election Code the provision of a previous
   election law (Act No. 4203, section 16), which said:

   “* * * Nor shall any vote be counted on which the candidate is designated by
   his nickname or alias, although mention thereof is made on his certificate of
   candidacy.”

   The nonlncorporation of that provision or rule in the evised Election Code is
   indicative of the intention of the Congress to abandon it.

   It is not contended by the appellant that the 602 votes fin question should
   be annulled as marked ballots. His contention is that they should not be counted
   in favor of the appellee because the latter was not sufficiently identified by
   his nickname Beloy, Biloy, or Belog.

   We agree, however, with the trial court that the appellee was sufficiently
   identified by his nickname Beloy or Biloy, first, because such nickname is a
   derivative, or a contraction, of his Christian name Isabelo; second, because he
   was popularly and commonly known in the entire municipality of Inopacan by that
   nickname; and, third, because there was no other candidate for mayor with the
   same nickname. We do not deem it necessary to decide whether the eight votes for
   “Belog” are valid or not, because they are immaterial to the resuit.

   Previous to the enactment in 1938 of the Election Code (Commonwealth Act No.
   357) the rules were: (1) that ballots bearing the Christian name only or the
   Christian name and the initial of the surname of one candidate should be
   rejected as insufficient to identify the person voted for (Cailles vs.
   Gomez and Barbaza [1921] 42 Phil. 496, 533); and (2) that, for the same reason,
   votes cast with only the nickname or the familiar name should not be counted in
   favor of any candidate (Cecillo vs. Tomacruz [1935], 62 Phil. 689). But
   such rules were changed or abandoned by the legislature when it enacted section
   144 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and, subsequently, section 149 of Republic Act
   No. 180, which provided rules for the appreciation of ballots. Said section is a
   compilation in statutory form of most of the doctrines theretofore laid down by
   the Supreme Court regarding the appreciation of ballots. Rule No. 1 contained in
   section 149 reverses the doctrine or rule laid down by the Supreme Court
   regarding the use of the Christian name alone of a candidate by providing
   that—contrary to said doctrine —any ballot where only the Christian name of a
   candidate or only his surname appears is valid for such candidate if there is no
   other candidate with the same name or surname for the same office. The purpose
   of this new rule is to validate the vote provided the name written on the ballot
   identifies the candidate voted for beyond any question or possible confusion
   with any other candidate for the same office. Hence, conformably to such purpose
   we hold that when the nickname of a candidate is a derivative or contraction of
   his Christian name or of his surname, and if he is popularly and commonly known
   by that nickname, a ballot where only such nickname appears is valid for such
   candidate if there is no other candidate with the same nickname for the same
   office. This ruling is in consonance with the well- known principle of election
   law which this court reiterated in Mandac vs. Samonte, 49 Phil. 284,
   301-302, as follows:

   “A ballot is indicative of the will of the voter. It is not required that it
   should be nicely or accurately written, or that the name of the candidate voted
   for should be correctly spelled. It should be read in the light of all the
   circumstances surrounding the election and the voter, and the object should be
   to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it can be
   determined with reasonable certainty. The ballot should be liberally construed,
   and the intendments should be in favor of a reading and construction which will
   render the ballot effective, rather than in favor of a conclusion which will, on
   some technical grounds, render it ineffective. At the same time, it is not
   admissible to say that something was Intended which is contrary to what was
   done; and if the ballot is so defective as to fail to show any intention
   whatever, it must be disregarded.”

2. Appellant further contends that “the lower court erred in admitting evidence
   aliunde to determine the intention of the voter.” Counsel in his brief does not
   specify what evidence he is referring to, nor does he show that it was admitted
   over his objection and exception. He merely says: “The fact that in its decision
   the lower court makes a conclusion that the protestee is popularly known In his
   place by the nicknames already mentioned, presupposes consideration of
   testimonial evidence to Influence Its mind in making said conclusion.” He
   evidently refers to the roof upon which the trial court based its finding that
   the rotestee was popularly and commonly known in the whole municipality of
   Inopacan by the nickname Beloy or Biloy. We do not feel bound to consider the
   admissibility or inadmissibility of such proof in the absence of any showing
   that the adverse party duly interposed an objection to its admission. But we
   think the protestee had the right to prove that he was popularly and commonly
   known by his nickname to overcome the contention of the protestant that the use
   of such nickname on the ballots in question did not sufficiently identify the
   protestee as the candidate voted for.
3. Lastly, appellant contends that the lower court erred in not ordering the
   recounting of all the votes of the contending candidates.

We think the trial court acted properly in limiting the inquiry to the number
of votes cast for the protestee with only his nickname written on the ballots,
because the basis of the protest was not that the election inspectors had erred
in counting all the votes cast for each of the ,two candidates but that they
erred in counting in favor of the protestee 417 votes in which only his nickname
was used. No fraud, mistake, or misreading of the ballots was alleged in the
protest. The issue presented to the court was confined to whether there were
really 417 votes for the protestee in which the nickname Beloy alone was written
and whether1 those votes were valid or not. If there were at least 417 of such
votes and if they were not valid, the protestant should win because the
protestee’s majority was only 198 votes. The inquiry brought out the fact that
there were more than 417 of such votes; but as a matter of law the court found
that they were valid. We confirm that finding.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

Moran,
C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

CONCURRING

PERFECTO, J.:

Two candidates ran for mayor of Inopacan, Leyte, in the elections of November
11, 1947 Isabelo A. Lloren, Liberal, and Pacito Abrea, Nationalista. The Liberal
candidate was proclaimed elected with 1,010 votes, with majority of 198 against
the Nationalista who was credited with 812 votes.

The Nationalista protested, seeking the annulment of 417 ballots in which
Beloy was voted for mayor and were credited as votes for the Liberal
candidate.

When the ballot boxes were opened, it was found that the names of Beloy,
Biloy and Belog appeared written in the following numbers of ballots: Beloy 517,
Biloy 77 and Belog 8. All these 602 ballots were counted among the 1,010 votes
credited to the Liberal candidate.

The Nationalista candidate contended in the lower court and in this appeal
that the 602 ballots with the three nicknames should not be counted as votes for
the Liberal candidate, invoking the numerous decisions of the Supreme Court
holding that nicknames alone are not sufficient identification of a candidate.
“(Molina vs. Nuesa, G. R. No. 3058, June 5, 1929, not reported; Alegre
vs. Perey, G. R. l,o. 3107, March. 26, 1929, not reported; Valenzuela
vs. Carlos, etc., 42 Phil., 428; Bayona vs. Siatong, 56 Phil.,
831; Marquez vs. Santiago, 57 Phil., 969; Fausto vs. Ramos,.61
Phil., 1035; Sarenas vs. Generoso, 61 Phil., 459; Cecilio vs.
Tomacruz, 62 Phil., 693; Coscolluela vs. Gaston, 63 Phil., 41;
etc.)

Paragraph 9, sec. 149, of the Election Code, taken jointly with the provision
of section 34 thereof, that provides that “certificates of candidacy shall not
contain nicknames of the candidates” and the fact that the nicknames alone in
question are not mentioned by the Liberal candidate among the many names he has
mentioned in his certificate of candidacy with which he alleged he is known,
aside from the long line of decisions of the Supreme Court, appear to support
the contention of the Nationalista candidate. We are of opinion, however, that
all these legal reasons must give way to the unmistakable expression of the
popular will.

The record of the case offers conclusive evidence that those voters who cast
their ballots for the three nicknames in question intended in fact to vote for
the Liberal candidate who is known by the electorate, friends and opponents, by
the nicknames in question, derivatives of his Christian name and are among the
nicknames with which the people call for short those who carry the same
Christian name.

It is inconceivable to nullify the votes of so many voters, more than
one-half of those who voted for the Liberal candidate, when there is no possible
mistake that they have voted for said candidate. While we would not give effect
to isolated ballots simply in nicknames, that may refer to persons other than a
candidate, in abidance with the legal authorities above mentioned, in this
specific case we feel no hesitancy in brushing them aside as ineffective legal
technicalities for the sake of the fundamental purpose of popular suffrage: that
of giving effect to the will of the people as freely and clearly expressed in
the ballots.

Election statutory provisions and judicial doctrines are enacted and laid
down to insure the determination of the true will of the people and to give it
full effect, in consonance with the basic principle of the Constitution that
“sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them”. (Section 1, Art. II.) All provisions of law and legal doctrines should be
interpreted, applied and enforced not to defeat that basic principle but to give
it full effect. The Constitution is the supreme law and all legal provisions are
and should give way to its paramount authority.

We concur in the affirmance of the appealed decision.