G.R. No. L-824. January 14, 1948
HILARIO CAMINO MONCADO, RECURRENTE, CONTRA EL TRIBUNAL DEL PUEBLO Y JUAN M. LADAW, COMO PROCURADOR ESPECIAL, RECURRIDOS.
PABLO, J.:
delito de traición en la causa Criminal No. 3522 del Tribunal del Pueblo, alega
que en 4 de Abril de 1945 a eso de las 6 de la tarde, fué arrestado por los
miembros del CIC del Ejército de los Estados Unidos en su residencia en la Calle
San Rafael, No. 199—A, Manila, sin mandamiento de arresto y fué llevado a las
prisiones de Muntinglupa, Rizal; que una semana después su esposa, que se habÃa
trasladado a su casa-residencia en la Calle Rosario, No. 3, Ciudad de Quezon,
fué invitada por varios miembros del CIC bajo el mando de Teniente Olves para
presenciar el registro de su casa en la Calle San Rafael; que rehusó seguirles
porque no llevaban un mandamiento de registro; pero como aseguraron que aún sin
su presencia tenian que hacer de todos modos el registro, ella les acompaño; que
a su llegada en la casa, vió que varios efectos estaban desparramados en el
suelo entre los cuales varios documentos; que el Teniente Olves informó a ella
que llevaba consigo algunos documentos para probar la culpabilidad de su esposo;
que el 27 de Junio de 1946 el recurrente presentó una moción ante el Tribunal
del Pueblo pidiendo la devolución de tales documentos alegando como razón que
han sido obtenidos de su residencia sin mandamiento de registro, y dicho
tribunal, con grave abuso de discreción o exceso de jurisdicción y siguiendo la
doctrina sentada en el asunto de Alvero contra Dizon (76 Phil., 637) la
denegó; que a menos que este Tribunal ordene al Procurador Especial que los
devuelva al recurrente, sus derechos constitucionales garantizados por la
Constituciòn quedarian violados. Y porque no tiene otro remedio sencillo, rápido
y adecuado en el curso ordinario de la ley, pide que este Tribunal (a)
anule la orden del Tribunal del Pueblo de 9 de Julio de 1946; (b) que
dicho Tribunal sea requerido a ordenar la devolución al recurrente de tales
documentos; (c) que se dicte una orden de interdicto prohibiendo al
Procurador Especial a presentarlos como prueba contra el recurrente en el asunto
de traición. Estas peticiones demuestran que los documentos son pruebas
relevantes, además de admisibles porque no hay regla que lo impide (Model Code
of Evidence, 87).
Esta bien fundada la contención del recurrente de que la decision en la causa
de Alvero contra Dizon 76 Phil., 637) no es aplicable al caso particular. Los
documentos en el asunto de Alvero han sido decomisados por los miembros del CIC
cuando el gobierno militar ejercÃa en todo su apogeo sus funciones de ejército
de ocupación. En cambio, cuando se apoderaron en 11 de Abril de 1945, de los
documentos que son objeto de esta causa, el General MacArthur en nombre del
Gobierno de los Estados Unidos, ya habia restablecido en 27 de Febrero del mismo
año, el Commonwealth con todos sus poderes y prerrogativas (41 Off. Gaz. 86). El
gobierno del Commonwealth estaba ya ejerciendo todos sus poderes
eonstitucionales y legales sin Iimitación alguna en la Ciudad de Manila. El
Presidente ho habla suspendido las garantÃas constitucionales.
Es doctrina bien establecida en Filipinas, Estados Unidos, Inglaterra y
Canada que la admisibilidad de los pruebas no queda afectada por la ilegalidad
de los medios de que la parte se ha valido para obtenerlas.[1] Es doctrina seguida por muchos años “hasta
que surgió — dijo este Tribunal en Pueblo contra Carlos, 47 Jur. Fil.,
660 — la funesta opinión de la mayorÃa en la causa de Boyd vs. U. S. en
1885, que ha ejercido perniciosa influencia en muchos Estados sobre opiniones
judiciales subsiguientes.”
“El desarrollo de esta doctrina del asunto de Boyd vs. U. S. fué
como sigue. (a) La causa de Boyd continuó sin ponerse en tela de
juicio en su mismo tribunal durante veinte años; mientras tanto recibÃa
frecuente desaprobación en los tribunales de Estado (ante, párrafo
2183). (b) Entonces en el asunto de Adams vs. New York, en
1904, fué implicitamente desechada. en el Tribunal Supremo Federal, y
los precedentes ortodoxos registrados en los tribunales de Estado
(ante, párrafo 2I83) fueron expresamente aprobados. (c) Luego,
después de otros veinte años, en 1914, en la causa de Weeks vs. U. S.,
el Tribunal Supremo Federal movido en esta época no por historia errónea, sino
por un sentimentalismo extraviado — retrocedió a la doctrina original
de la causa de Boyd, pero con una condición. a saber, que la ilegalidad
del registro y decomiso deberia primero haber sido directamente litigada y
establecida mediante una moción, hecha antes del juicio, para la devolución de
las cosas decomisadas; de modo que, después de dicha moción y sólo entonces, la
ilegalidad podria advertirse en el juicio principal y las pruebas asi obtenidas
deberia excluirse. * * *.” Bajo la autoridad de esta doctrina de Weeks
vs. U. S., y otras decisiones de la misma escuela el recurrente
ejercita el presente recurso, pidiendo la devolucion de los documentos
ilegalmente sacados por los miembros del CIC.
Concurrimos con la reclamación del recurrente de que, bajo estas garantÃas
constitucionales, tenia derecho a que su casa fuese respetada, sus documentos no
debÃan ser decomisados por ninguna autoridad o agente de autoridad, sin un
mandamiento de registro debidamente expedido.
Estas limitaciones constitucionales, sin embargo, no, llegan hasta el extremo
de excluir como pruebas competentes los documentos obtenidos ilegal o
indebidamente de é1. El Reglamento de los Tribunales, Regla 123, determina
cuáles son las pruebas que deben ser excluÃdas, cuáles son las admisibles y
competentes y no clasifica como pruebas incompetentes las obtenidas ilegalmente.
La ley fundamental señala los lÃmites hasta dónde pueden llegar los poderes
ejecutivo, legislative y judicial en el ejercicio de sus funciones. El ejecutivo
no debe abusar de su poder, violando el domicilio del ciudadano o incautándose
indebidamente de sus bienes y documentos; el legislador no debe aprobar leyes
que hacen ilusorio lo sagrado del hogar y los tribunales deben castigar a los
infractores de la Constitución, sin tener en cuenta si son funcionarios públicos
o no. Como dijo el Presidente Lumpkin en Williams vs. State, 28 S. E.,
624:
“As we understand it, the main, if not the sole, purpose of our
constitutional inhibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures, was to
place a salutary restriction upon the powers of government.That is to say, we
believe the framers of the constitutions of the United States and of this and
other states merely sought to provide against any attempt, by legislation or
otherwise, to authorize, justify, or declare lawful, any unreasonable search or
seizure. This wise restriction was intended to operate upon legislative bodies,
so as to render ineffectual any effort to legalize by statute what the people
expressly stipulated could in no event be made lawful; upon executives, so that
no law violative of this constitutional inhibition should ever be enforced; and
upon the judiciary, so as to render it the duty of the courts to denounce as
unlawful every unreasonable search and seizure, whether confessedly without any
color of authority, or sought to be justified under the guise of legislative
sanction. For the misconduct of private persons, acting upon their individual
responsibility and of their own volition, surely none of the three divisions of
government is responsible. If an official, or a mere petty agent of the state,
exceeds or abuses the authority with which he is clothed, he is to be deemed as
acting, not for the state, but for himself only; and therefore he alone, and not
the state, should be held accountable for his acts. If the constitutional rights
of a citizen are invaded by a mere individual, the most that any branch of
government can do is to afford the citizen such redress as is possible, and
bring the wrongdoer to account for his unlawful conduct. * * *.”
Creemos que los autores de la constitución filipina nunca nan tenido la más
ligera idea de conceder immunidad penal al que viola la santidad del hogar, ni a
cualquier Infractor de la ley criminal por el solo hecho de que las pruebas
contra el hayan sido obtenidas ilegalmente. El procedimiento sano, justo y
ordenado es que se castigue de acuerdo con el artÃculo 128 del Código Penal
Revisado al individuo que, so capa de funcionario público, sin mandamiento de
registro, indebidamente profana el domicilio de un ciudano y se apodera de sus
papeles y que se castigue también a ese ciudadano si es culpable de un delito,
no importando si la prueba de su culpabilidad ha sido obtenida ilegalmente. El
medio empleado en la adquisición del documento no altera su valor probatorio.
Asà en Stevison vs. Earnest, 80, 111. 5l3, se dijo; “It is contemplated, and
such ought ever to be the fact, that the records of Courts remain permanently in
the places assigned by the law for their custody. It does not logically follow,
however, that the records, being obtained, cannot be used as instruments of
evidence; for the mere fact of (illegally) obtaining them does not change that
which is written in them * * *. Suppose the presence of a witness to have been
procured by fraud or violence, while the party thus procuring the attendance of
the witness would be liable to severe punishment, surely that could not be urged
against the competency of the witness. If he could not, why shall a record,
although illegally taken from its proper place of custody and brought before the
Court, but otherwise free from suspicion, be held incompetent?”
En Com. vs. Dana, 2 Metc., 329, el Tribunal dijo: “Admitting that
the lottery tickets and matetials were illegally seized, still this is no legal
objection to the admission of them in evidence. If the search warrant were
illegal, or if the officer serving the warrant exceeded his authority, the party
on whose complaint the warrant issued, or the officer, would be responsible for
the wrong done. But this is no good reason for excluding the papers seized, as
evidence, if they were pertinent to the issue, as they unquestionably were. When
papers are offered in evidence the Court can take no notice how they were
obtained, — whether lawfully or unlawfully, — nor would they form a collateral
issue to determine that question.”
El recurrente cita el caso de Burdeau vs. McDowell en los siguientes
términos:
“Ciertos libros, papeles, memoranda, etc., de la propiedad privada de
McDowell fueron robados por ciertas personas que estaban interesadas en la
investigación que iba a practicar el Grand Jury contra McDowell por cierta
ofensa que se decÃa habÃa cometido éste, relativa al uso fraudulento del correo.
Estos documentos y libros fueron después entregados a Burdeau por las personas
que los habÃan robado. Burdeau era el ayudante especial del Attorney-General de
los Estados Unidos, que iba a tener la dirección y control de la prosecución
ante el Grand Jury. McDowell trató de impedir que Burdeau utilizara dichos
libros y documentos mediante una moción que habÃa presentado en tal sentido.
Burdeau se opuso a la moción, alegando que tenia derecho de usar dichos papeles.
La Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos sostuvo la contención de Burdeau,
diciendo;“‘We knew of no constitutional principle which requires the government to
surrender the papers under such circumstances.“‘The papers having come into possession of the government without a
violation of petitioner’s rights by governmental authority, we see no reason why
the fact that individuals unconnected with the government may have wrongfully
taken them, should prevent them from being held for use in prosecuting an
offense where the documents are of incriminatory character.’ (Burdeau
vs. McDowell.)“Adoptará nuestra Corte Suprema la doctrina que se anuncia en esta decisión?
Sometemos que esta es una mala regla de derecho, y a nuestro humilde parecer, no
debe adoptarla nuestra Corte.”
El recurrente cita después decisiones de algunos Tribunales Supremos de
Estado que no nan adoptado esta doctrina del Tribunal Supremo Federal. No es
extraño. Cada tribunal adopta su propio criterio. Pero de los 45 Estados de la
Unión Americana — según el Magistrado Cardozo en su decisión dictada en 1926, en
People vs. Defore, 150 N. E., 585 — catorce adoptaron la doctrina
heterodoxa de Weeks y 31 la rechazaron, y según Wigmore, en 1940, catorce años
después, seis Estados más, 37 en total, incluyendo Hawaii y Puerto Rico la
rechazaron, manteniendo la doctrina ortodoxa. (8 Wigmore on Evidence, 3.ª Ed.,
páginas. 5-11) Y después de considerar las varias decisiones de las dos
escuelas, Cardozo hizo estas atinadas observaciones sobre la doctrina de
Weeks:
“We are confirmed in this conclusion when we reflect how far-reaching in its
effect upon society the new consequences would be. The pettiest peace officer
would have it in his power, through overzeal or indiscretion, to confer immunity
upon an offender for crimes the most flagitious. A room is searched against the
law, and the body of a murdered man is found. If the place of discovery may not
be proved, the other circumstances may be insufficient to connect the defendant
with the crime. The privacy of the home has been infringed, and the murderer
goes free. Another search, once more against the law, discloses counterfeit
money or the implements of forgery. The absence of a warrant means the freedom
of the forger. Like instances can be multiplied.”
Concretémonos al caso presente. Si los documentos cuya devolución pide el
recurrente, prueban su culpabilidad del delito de traición, ¿por qué el Estado
tiene que devolverlos y librarle de la acusación? ¿No es esto consentir y
convalidar el crimen? ¿No constituye una aprobación judicial de la comisión de
dos delitos, el de violación del domicilio del acusado cometido por los miembros
del CIC y el de traición cometido por el recurrente? Semejante práctica
fomentarÃa el crimen en vez de impedir su comisión. Además, la obtención de los
documentos no altera su valor probatorio. Si hubiera mediado un mandamiento de
registro, los documentos serÃan pruebas admisibles. No hay ninguna disposición
constitucional, ni legal que libere al acusado de toda responsabilidad criminal
porque no hubo mandamiento de registro. La vindicta pública exige que los
infractores de la ley penal sean castigados. Poner en libertad al culpable por
el simple hecho de que la prueba contra é1 no ha sido obtenlda legalmente es
sancionar judicialmente el crimen.
Consideremos un caso: Juan que presencia un asesinato, consigue arrebatar del
asesino el puñal, y con el cual le ordena que se dé por arrestado y le conduce a
la presidencia del pueblo. En el camino se encuentra con Pedro que intercede por
el asesino; Juan, por un sentimentalismo mal comprendido, devuelve el puñal y
ayuda al acusado a hacer desaparecer todo vestigio del crimen para no ser
descubierto. Juan y Pedro, no solamente cometen actos indignos de buena
ciudadania, sino que deben ser castigados por encubridores (art. 19, Cód. Pen.
Rev.). El público nunca llegará a comprender por qué estos dos individuos deben
ser castigados y, en cambio, un juzgado, bajo la doctrina de Weeks, puede
ordenar la devolución del documento robado que prueba la culpabilidad de un
acusado y dejar libre a éste y al que robó el documento.
Otro caso. Por su sospechosa catadura, un tal José es arrestado por dos
policÃas al dirigirse a la tribuna en donde están reunidos los altos
funcionarios del poder ejecutivo, legislativo y judicial Juntamente con los
representantes diplomáticos de las naciones amigas para presenciar la parada del
aniversario de la independencia; en su bolsillo encuentran una bomba que es
capaz de volar toda la tribuna. Otros dos policÃas, después de enterarse del
arresto, requisan la casa de José y encuentran documentos que revelan que él ha
recibido órdenes de una organización extranjera para polverizar a todo el alto
personel del gobierno en la primera oportunidad. Los policÃas no tienen
mandamiento de arresto, ni mandamiento de registro. Es justo que a moción de
José en la causa criminal seguida contra él, se ordene por el juzgado la
devolución de los documentos que prueban su crimen? ¿No se darÃa aliciente al
anarquismo con semejante practica? El juzgado desempeñaria el triste papel de
ayudar a los que desean socavar las bases de nuestras instituciones. En U. S.
vs. Snyder, 278 Fed., 650, el Tribunal dijo: “To hold that no criminal
can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his
crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the
mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals,
facilitating their escape in many instances.” Y en People vs. Mayen,
205 Pac., 435 se dijo: “Upon what theory can it be held that such proceeding
(for the return of the articles) is an incident of the trial, in such a sense
that the ruling thereon goes up on appeal as part of the record and subject to
review by the appellate court? It seems to us rather an independent proceeding
to enforce a civil right in no way involved in the criminal case. The right of
the defendant is not to exclude the incriminating documents from evidence, but
to recover the possession of articles which were wrongfully taken from him. That
right exists entirely apart from any proposed use of the property by the State
or its agents. * * * The fallacy of the doctrine contended for by appellant is
in assuming that the constitutional rights of the defendant are violated by
using his private papers as evidence against him, whereas it was the invasion of
his premises and the taking of his goods that constituted the offense
irrespective of what was taken or what use was made of it; and the law having
declared that the articles taken are competent and admissible evidence,
notwithstanding the unlawful search and seizure, how can the circumstance that
the court erred in an independent proceeding for the return of the property on
defendant’s demand add anything to or detract from the violation of the
defendant’s constitutional rights in the unlawful search and seizure?
“The Constitution and the laws of the land are not solicitous to aid persons
charged with crime in their efforts to conceal or sequester evidence of their
iniquity.” (8 Wig., 37)
La teorÃa de Weeks vs. U.S. que subvierte las reglas de prueba no
es aceptable en esta jurisdicción; es contraria al sentido de justicia y a la
ordenada y sana administración de justicia. La doctrina ortodoxa se impone por
su consistencia probada a traves de muchÃsimos años. No hay que abandonarla si
se desea que los derechos constitucionales sean respetados y no profanados. Los
culpables deben recibir su condigno castigo, aunque las pruebas contra ellos
hayan sido obtenidas ilegalmente.[2] Y los
que con infracción de la ley y de la Constitución se
apoderan indebidamente
de tales pruebas deben también ser castigados. Asi es cómo la ley impera,
majestuosa e incólume.
Se deniega la solicitud con costas.
Moran, Pres., Feria, y Padilla
MM., están conformes.
Tuazon J., concur in the result.
[1] Véanse las decisiones de Inglaterra,
Canada, los Estados de Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut,Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New york, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West
Virginia, Wyoming, Hawaii y Puerto Rico citadas por el autor en 8 Wigmore on
Evidence, 3.ª Ed., páginas. 5-11. La Constitución garantiza la inviolabilidad de
los derechos individuales en los siguientes términos “No seviolará el derecho
del pueblo a la seguridad de sus personas, moradas, papeles y efectos contra
registros y secuestros irrazonables, ni se expedirán mandamientos de registro o
arresto, a no ser por causa probable que se determinará por el Juez después de
examinar bajo juramento o afirmación al denunciante y a los testigos que
presentare, y con descripción detallada del sitio que se ha de registrar y de
las personas que se nan de aprehender o de las cosas que han de ser incautadas.”
(Titulo III, artÃculo 1.º, párrafo 3.º.)
[2]
Fil., 973.
CONCURRING
HILADO, J.:
I concur, but I would further support the conclusion arrived at by the
following additional considerations:
In April, 1945, when the CIC Detachment
of the United States Army made the search at petitioner’s house and effected the
seizure of his papers and effects mentioned in the majority decision, as is of
general knowledge and within the judicial notice of this Court, fighting
continued in Luzon; in fact, as late as June, 1945, the cannonades and shellings
could still be clearly heard in this City of Manila, and there were still units
of the Japanese Army resisting the liberation forces. Under such circumstances,
the war was continuing not only technically but actually in the island
of Luzon; and the military security and safety of the liberation forces demanded
such measures as were adopted by the CIC Detachment of the United States Army in
making said search and effecting said seizure to the end that the activities of
pro-Japanese elements and their chances of effectively aiding the Japanese
forces which thus still continued to resist might be brought down to a minimum
and, if possible, entirely foiled. The difference between this case and the case
in L-342, Alvero vs. Dizon, 43 Off. Gaz., 429), is, to my mind, merely
one of degree—the principle involved is identical in both cases.
DISSENTING
PERFECTO, J.:
Petitioner stands accused of treason before the People’s Court, the
information against him having been filed by Prosecutor Juan M. Ladaw on
February 28, 1946.
Almost a year before, on April 4, 1945, at about 6;00 p.m., petitioner was
arrested by members of the Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States army
at his residence at 199-A San Rafael St., Manila, without any warrant of arrest,
and taken to the Bilibid Prison at Muntinglupa, where he was detained.
On April 11, 1945, petitioner’s wife, who transferred to their house at 3
Rosario Drive, Quezon City, was approached by several CIC officers, headed by
Lt. Olves, and ordered to accompany them to the house at San Rafael to witness
the taking of documents and things belonging to petitioner. Upon hearing from
the officers that they did not have any search warrant for the purpose, she
refused to go with them, but after the officers told her that with or without
her presence they would search the house at San Rafael, Mrs. Moncado decided to
accompany them.
Upon arrival at the house, Mrs. Moncado noticed that their belongings had
been ransacked by American officers and that the trunks which she had kept in
the attic and in the garage when she left the house, had been ripped open and
their contents scattered on the floor. Lt. Olves informed Mrs. Moncado that they
were going to take a bundle of documents and things, which were separated from
the rest of the scattered things, because they proved the guilt of her husband.
Mrs. Moncado protested in vain. No receipt was issued to her. Subsequently,
after making an inventory of their belongings at San Rafael, Mrs. Moncado found
the following things missing:
“(a) Passes issued by Japanese friends for the personal safety and
couduct of the petitioner;“(b) Correspondences of the petitioner as president of the
Neighborhood Association in Quezon City during the Japanese occupation;“(c) Correspondence of the petitioner with certain Japanese
officers;“(d) The personal file and the love letters of Mrs. Moncado to Dr.
Moncado and vice versa;“(e) Marriage certificate of Dr. Moncado with Mrs. Moncado issued at
Reno, Nevada;“(f) Private correspondence and letters of Dr. Moncado to and from
his Filipino Federation of America in Hawaii and United States;“(g) Several law books by Guevara, Albert, Francisco, Harvard
Classics (complete set), books on diplomacy, international law;“(h) A complete collection of the ‘Tribuna’ compilation of the same
during occupation until the last day of its Issuance;“(i) Complete collection of American magazines, from 1940 to 1941 —
Los Angeles Examiner, San Francisco Chronicle, Los Angeles Evening Herald and
newspapers edited and owned by Dr. Moncado and published in the United States;
and National Geographic Society;“(j) Personal letters of Dr. Moncado with several members of the
United States Senate and Congress of the United States including a picture of
President Hoover dedicated to Dr. Moncado;“(k) Pictures with personal dedication and autograph to Dr. and Mrs.
Moncado by actors and actresses from Hollywood, including Mary Astor, Binnie
Barnes, Robert Montgomery, Clark Gable, Gary Cooper, Boris Karloff, Wallace
Beery, William and Dick Powell, Myrna Loy, Bette Davis and Ceasar Romero;“(l) Certificate as first flighter in the Pan-American Airways and
even several stickers Issued by Pan American Airways for passengers’
baggage;“(m) A promissory note of Dr. Moncado for Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000) in favor of Architect Mr. Igmidio A. Marquez of Quezon City;“(n) Three (3) volumes of modern ballroom dancing by Arthur
MacMurray of New York, pamphlets of dancing obtained by Dr. Moncado while he was
studying dancing at Waldorf-Astoria, New York;“(o) Two (2) volumes of rhumba, zamba and tango obtained from Mexico
and Argentina by Dr. Moncado.” (Pages 3 and 4, Petition for Certiorari and
Injunction.)
On June 27, 1946, petitioner filed with the People’s Court a motion praying
that the return of said documents and things be ordered. The petition was denied
on July 9, 1946.
Thereupon, petitioner filed with this Supreme Court on August 10, 1946, a
petition praying that the lower court’s order of July 9, 1946, be set aside,
that said court be required to order the return of the documents and things in
question to petitioner, and that the prosecutor be restrained from using and
presenting them as evidence at the trial of the criminal case for treason.
Before proceeding to consider the questions of law raised in this case, we
should not ignore three questions of fact raised in the answers of respondeds:
as to the identity of the documents and things, as to whether they were taken
from the house at San Rafael or from the house at Rosario Heights, and as to
whether they were taken at the time of petitioner’s arrest or later.
The fact that the return of the documents and things were opposed to in the
lower court by the prosecutor, without disputing their identity, and that in the
present proceeding the prosecutor admits to have them in his possession, without
disputing their identity or correcting any error of description made by
petitioner, convinced us that in petitioner’s and respondent’s minds there is no
d isagreement on the identity in question. There should not be any doubt that
the papers and things described and claimed by petitioner are the ones in the
prosecutor’s possession, otherwise, instead of objecting to the return on legal
grounds, he would have alleged that such things are not in his possession, or he
does not know where they are, or that they did not exist at all.Whether the
things were taken at San Rafael or at Rosario Heights is compeltely immaterial.
The fact is that the reality and existence of things and petitioner’s ownership
thereof, are undisputed, and that they were taken from a house of
petitioner.
That they were taken not at the time of petitioner’s arrest but much later,
is indisputably proved by petitioner’s and his wife’s depositions not
contradicted by any other evidence.
This case offers a conclusive evidence that fundamental ideas, rules and
principles are in constant need of restatement if they are not to lose their
vitality. So that they may continue radiating the sparks of their truth and
virtue, they need the repeated pounding of intense discussion, as the metal
hammered on the anvil. To make them glow with all their force, purity and
splendor, they need the continuous smelting analysis and synthesis as the molten
iron in a Bessemer furnace. Otherwise, they become rusty, decayed or relegated
as useless scraps in the dumping ground of oblivion. What is worse, they are
frequently replaced by their antitheses, which pose with the deceitful dazzle of
false gods, clothed in tinsel and cellophane. The risk, always lurking at every
turn of human life, exacts continuous vigilance. Human minds must always be kept
well tempered and sharpened as damask swords, ready to decapitate the hydra of
error and overthrow the gilded idols from the muddy pedestals of pretense and
imposture.
May the government profit from an illegality, an unconstitutional act, or
even a crime to serve its aims, including the loftiest? May justice be
administered by making use of the fruits of a lawless action? If a private
individual, when profiting from the fruits of a criminal offeHse, is punished by
law as an accessory after the fact, why should the government or an official
system of justice be allowed to ignore and mock the moral principle which
condemns the individual? Is there a moral standard for the government different
from the one by which private conduct is measured? While a private citizen is
not allowed to violate any rule of decency and fair play, may the government
follow a procedure which shocks the common sense of decency and fair play? If a
person cannot enrich himself with stolen property, why should a government be
allowed to profit and make use of property tainted by theft or robbery or
smeared with the blood of crime?
The above are among the elemental questions that must be answered in this
case, if we are not lacking the moral courage to face all the issues raised by
the parties. Other questions concern personal liberty as affected by illegal
detention, personal security against illegal searches and seizures, judicial
emancipation from colonial mental attitude.
Respondents urge us to follow the decision ill Alvero vs. Dizon
(L-342) which, besides having been rendered by a second Supreme Court, whose
existence is violative of the Constitution, cannot olaim better merit than a
servile adherence to a wrong legal doctrine, decorated by the halo of authority
of courts of a former metropolis. There are minds that forget that duty of
thinking by ourselves and of not sticking to the teachings of foreign mentors
has become more imperative since July 4, 1946.
The seizure of the papers and effects in question, having been made without
any search warrant, was and is illegal, and was effected in open violation of
the following provisions of the Constitution:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the Judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.” (Article Ill, section 1 [3] of the
Constitution.)
“The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court or when public safety and order require
otherwise.” (Article Ill, section 1 [5] of the Constitution.)
The seizure was also in open violation of sections 3, 10, and 11 of Rule 122,
which are as follows:
“SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant.—A search warrant
shall not issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge or justice
of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”“SEC. 10. Receipt for the property seized.—The officer seizing
property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the
person on whom or in whose possession it was found, or in the absence of any
person, must, in the presence of at least two witnesses, leave a receipt in the
place in which he found the seized property.”“SEC. 11. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court.— The
officer must forthwith deliver the property to the justice of the peace or judge
of the municipal court or of the Court of First Instance which issued the
warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified by
oath.”
Even more, the illegality and unconstitutionality amounted to two.criminal
offenses, one of them heavily punished with prision correccional. The
offenses are punished by articles 128 and 130 of the Revised Penal Code, which
read:
“ART. 128. Violation of domicile.—The penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any public officer
or employee who, not being authorized by judicial order, shall enter any
dwelling against the will of the owner thereof, search papers or other effects
found therein without the previous consent of such owner, or, having
surreptitiously entered said dwelling, and being required to leave the premises,
shall refuse to do so.“If the offense be committed in the nighttime, or if any papers or effects
not constituting evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the
search made by the offender, the penalty shall be prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods.”“ART. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses.—The penalty of
arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a public
officer or employee who, in cases where a search is proper, shall search the
domicile, papers or other belongings of any person, in the absence of the
latter, any member of his family, or in their default. without the presence of
two witnesses residing in the same locality.”
The main authority upon which respondents rely is the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Bordeau vs. MacDowell (256 U.S., 465),
the same followed in the decision in Alvero vs. Dizon, L-342. In the
Bordeau case, certain documents were stolen from MacDowell. Upon finding that
the documents contained evidence of the fraudulent use of the mails by
MacDowell, the robbers delivered them to Bordeau, in charge of the prosecution
against MacDowell. The latter filed a motion to prevent Bordeau from using the
documents as evidence against him. The federal Supreme Court denied the motion
on the ground that there is no law or constitutional principle requiring the
government to surrender papers which may have come into its possession where the
government has not violated the constitutional rights of the petitioner. Two of
the greatest American Justices, Justices Holmes and Brandeis, whose dissenting
opinions, written twenty years ago, are now the guiding beacons of the Supreme
Court of the United States, dissented, the latter sayings:
“At the foundation of our civil liberty lies the principle which denies to
government officials exceptional position before the law, and which subjects
them to the same rules of conduct that commands to the citizen. And in the
development of our liberty insistence upon procedural regularity has been a
large factor. Respect for law will not be advanced by resort, in its
enforcement, to means which shock the common man’s sense of decency and fair
play.”
Taking aside the great intellectual, moral and judicial prestige of the two
dissenters, the poignant logic and rockbottom sense of truth expressed by
Justice Brandeis is enough to completely discredit the majority doctrine in the
Bordeau case, a doctrine that in principle and by its evil effects appears to be
irretrievably immoral.
To merit respect and obedience, a government must be just. Justice cannot
exist where the good is not distinguished from the wicked. To be just, the
government must be good. To be good it must stick to the principles of decency
and fair play as they are understood by a common man’s sense, by universal
conscience. Good ends do not justify foul means. No one should profit from
crime. Principles are not to be sacrificed for any purpose. What is bad per
se cannot be good because it Is done to attain a good object. No wrong is
atoned by good Intention. These are some of the maxims through which the common
sense of decency and fair play is manifested.
Reason is a fundamental characteristic of man. There is no greater miracle
than when its first sparks scintillated in the mind of a child. What before had
only the vegetative life of a plant or the animal life of a mollusk or frog,
suddenly begins to wield the prodigious power of understanding and of
intelligent grasping of the meanings and relations of the things with which he
is In direct or remote contact through his senses. The power of understanding
brings forth freedom of choice. This freedom develops the faculty of
discrimination between good and evil. That discrimination Is further developed
into a sense of justice.
While the advent of the astounding miracle of reason has so much kindled the
pride of man, to the extent of symbolizing it with the fire stolen by Prometeus
from the heavens, and of proclaiming himself as the king of the creation, man
had taken millennia of struggles in order to develop the basic ideas which will
insure his survival and allow him to enjoy the greatest measure of well-being
and happiness. He soon discovered that society is an indispensable condition to
attain his ends. As a consequence, he fought against all anti-social ideas and
conduct and had to discover or invent and then develop the principles and
qualities of sociability. The struggle has been long and it will have to
continue until the end of the centuries. It is the same eternal struggle between
truth and error, between right and wrong.
While man, in the multifarious ensemble of the universe, seems to be the lone
and exclusive holder of the divine fire of reason, he has so far failed to find
the key to always correct thinking. The solution to the failures of reason is a
riddle yet to be unlocked. Man is easily deceived into committing blunders or
led into the most absurd aberrations. The mysterious genes which keep
uninterrupted the chain of heredity, while permitting the transmission of the
best qualities and characteristics, seems to lack the power of checking and
staving off the tendencies of atavism. In the moral ctetology, either kind of
characteristics and qualities may be originated and developed. The inconsistency
of respondents is thus explainable. While they would raise their brows at the
mere insinuation that a private individual may Justifiably profit by the results
or fruits of a criminal offense, they would not measure the government with the
same moral standard. That the inconsistency may be explained by its genesis is
no ground why we should surrender to it. To set two moral standards, a strict
one for private individuals and another vitiated with laxity for the government,
is to throw society into the abyss of legal ataxia. Anarchy and chaos will
become inevitable. Such a double standard will necessarily be nomoctonous.
The idea of double moral standard is incompatible with the temper and
idiosyncracy of social order established by our Constitution, and Is repugnant
to its provisions. All government authority emanates from the people in whom
sovereignty resides. The Filipino people ordained and promulgated the
Constitution “in order to establish a government that shall embody their
ideals.” Among these Ideals are justice, democracy, the promotion of social
justice, equal protection of the laws to everybody. Such ideals are trampled
down by the adoption of the double moral standard which can only take its place
in the ideology of the supporters of absolute monarchies. Theirs is the maxim
that “the king can do no wrong.” The iniquities and misery havocked by such
maxim would need hundreds or thousands of volumes to record them. The infamy of
Japanese occupation gave our people the bitter taste of the operation of the
double moral standard. It is the antithesis of the golden rule. It would place
government in a category wholly apart from humanity, notwithstanding its being a
human institution,—an unredeemable absurdity.
From “Brandeis, A Free Man’s Life” by Alpheus Thomas Mason (pp. 568 and 569),
we quote an analogous legal situmtion:
“In the famous wire-tapping case Chief Justice Taft, delivering the opinion,
overruled the defendants’ claim that the evidence obtained when government
agents tapped their telephone wires violated either unreasonable searches and
seizures or the constitutional protection against self-incrimination. No tapped
wires entered their homes and offices, Taft reasoned, so there was neither
search nor seizure,“For Justice Brandeis such a narrow construction degraded our great charter
of freedom to the level of a municipal ordinance. Quoting Chief Justice
Marshall’s famous admonition—’We must never forget that it is a Constitution we
are expounding’—he pointed out that just as the power of Congress had by
judicial interpretation been kept abreast of scientific progress, and extended
the Fundamental Law to objects of which the Founding Fathers never dreamed, so
also must the judges in construing limitations on the powers of Congress be
evermindful of changes brought about by discovery and invention. To have a
living Constitution, limitations on power no less than grants of power must ba
construed broadly, ‘Subtler and. more far-reaching means of invading privacy
have become available to the government,’ Brandeis observed, * * * The progress
of science in furnishing the government with means of espionage is not likely to
stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day be developed by which the government,
without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by
which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of
the home. * * *” ‘Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it
teaches the whole people by example, crime is contagious. If the government
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become
a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of
the criminal law the end justifies the means — to declare that the government
may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal —
would bring terrible retribution. * * *” ‘The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to
the pursuit of happiness,’ he emphasized. “They recognized the significance of
man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that
only a part of the pain, pleasure, and satisfactions of life are to be found in
material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions, and their sensations, They conferred, as against the
government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men. * * *” ‘Experience should teach, us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the government’s purposes are beneficent. Men horn to freedom are naturally
alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest
dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning,
but without understanding.'” (Olmstead vs. U.S., 277 [U.S.] 438 [1928],
pp. 473-474, 478, 479, 485.)
The argument that goods and personal properties illegally taken, stolen, or
snatched from the owner or possessor without a duly issued search warrant can be
retained by the prosecution for use as evidence in a criminal case instituted is
initiated by an original and basic flaw. The argument rests on the assumed
existence or commission of a crime as its minor premise. But, under the orderly
processes of law, the assumption has yet to be proved, and it is impossible to
be proved before it can be of any use to support and clinch the argument. The
prosecution is called upon to make the assumption that the goods and properties
in question are evidence of a crime. To be valid, the assumption has to
presuppose the commission or existence of the crime. That presupposition, in
order to be valid, must in turn stand on an authoritative pronouncement which
can only be made in a final and executory decision rendered by a court of
justice. The prosecution cannot make a conclusive pronouncement, as to the
existence or commission of a crime, the basic fact which, under the argument,
will entitle the prosecution to retain and use the goods and properties in
question. the argument assumes a fact the existence of which still remains to be
proved and continues to be enveloped in the mists of the realm of uncertainties,
which fact may lead to the disputed right of the prosecution to retain the goods
and properties illegally seized as essential evidence of the crime. The line of
reasoning that build up the argument can be restated in more abstract terms as
follows: Justify the means by their necessity to attain an end by starting from
the premise that the end was accomplished, such a reasoning process is
fundamentally subversive to logic and is incompatible with the natural workings
of the human mind.
The rules governing the phenomena of diffusion and osmosis, of permeability
and isotonic equilibrium, of assimilation and waste dislodgment, of development
and reproduction, like all laws of life, are uniform and universal, Whether in
the nuclear chromatin or the cytosome of a single protoplasmic cell of amoeba or
in the sinews of the heaviest marsupial, whether in the formation of the
smallest bud or in the display of color and aroma by the most beautiful flower,
whether in the development of a frog or in the attainment of the perfect curves
and velvety skin of a lovely girl, the uniformity and universality of biological
laws are manifested unrelentlessly. Any disregard of them is fatal, and will
lead to irretrievable disaster and destruction. Moral standards are the laws of
social life. In a different plane and order, they are but biological laws,
governing the vital processes and functions of social organism. They are and
should be uniform and universal and no single unit or organ of human society can
disregard them or any one of them without alluring catastrophic
consequences.
Our decision is to grant all the prayers of the petition, and
it was so ever since February 24, 1947, when this Court took the vote for the
disposal of this case. In stating this fact we do not want to put any blame on
the distinguished member who penned the decision now to be promulgated. In
justice to him, we may record that the drafting of the majority decision was
transferred and entrusted to him many months after a final vote had been taken
on the case. and it did not take him more than a month to have majority opinion.
In exposing the fact we mean only to emphasize the crying need of changing a
situation or a system of procedure that permits the promulgation of our
decisions one year or more after a case has been submitted to us for final
action. It is only part of the crusade to curtail judicial delay which we felt
our duty to engage in since it had been our privilege to sit in the supreme Court, whose vantage in the legal field imposes upon the members
thereof the role of leadership in legal thought and practice for the most
effective administration of justice.
DISSENTING
BENGZON, J.:
Sanctity of the home is a by-word anywhere, anytime. The house of man was the
first house of God.
In Rome the citizen’s dwelling was a safe asylum. Invasion thereof was
anathema. Down through the centuries respect for men’s abodes has remained a
heritage of civilization.
In England, the poorest man could in his cottage, defy all the forces of the
Crown. “It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the
storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England may not enter; all
his forces dare not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.” His home was
indeed his castle.
And in the United States: “The right of the citizen to occupy and enjoy his
home, however mean or humble, free from arbitrary invasion and search, has for
centuries been protected with the most solicitous care. * * * “The mere fact
that a man is an officer, whether of high or low degree, gives him no more right
than is possessed by the ordinary private citizen to break in upon the privacy
of a home and subject its occupants to the indignity of a search for the
evidence of crime, without a legal warrant procured for that purpose. No amount
of incriminating evidence, whatever its source, will supply the place of such
warrant. At the closed door of the home, be it palace or hovel, even bloodhounds
must wait till the law, by authoritative process, bids it open. * * *” (McLurg
vs. Brenton, 123 Iowa 368, quoted in 20 Phil. 473.)
Logical culmination and practical application of the above principles,
embodied in our Organic Laws, is the ruling we announced in Alvarez vs.
Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33, that documents unlawfully
seized in a man’s home must be returned — irrespective of their evidentiary
value — provided seasonable motions are submitted. We
followed the Federal rule in Boyd vs. U. S. 116 U.S., 616 and many
others. We had said before that “it is better oftentimes that crimes should go
unpunished than that the citizen should be liable to have his premises invaded,
his desks broken open, his private books, letters, and papers exposed to prying
curiosity, * * * under the direction of a mere ministerial officer” * * *
insensitive perhaps to the rights and feelings of others. (U.S. vs. De
los Reyes and Esguerra, 20 Phil. 472, citing Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations.)
In the Alvarez decision we reflected that “of all rights of a citizen few are
of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the
right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private
affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others”, and
while the power to search and seize is necessary to public welfare, still it
must be exercised without transgressing the constitutional rights of citizens,
because the enforcement of statutes is never sufficiently important to justify
violation of the basic principles of government. It is agreed that the
fundamental rights of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution, must be
given such a liberal construction or strict construction as will be in his
favor, to prevent gradual encroachment or stealthy depreciation of such
fundamental rights. (State vs. Custer County, 198 Pac., 362; State vs.
McDaniel 231 Pac., 965; 237 Pac. 373.)
Our Constitution in its Bill of Bights decrees that “the right pf the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized”. (Constitution, article III, section 1 [3].)
This is an improvement over the provisions of the Jones Law regarding
warrants and seizures. It was designed to make our Constitution “conform
entirely” to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. (Aruego, Framing of
the Philippine Constitution, Vol. II, p. 1043.)
The split between several State Supreme Courts on one side and the Federal
Supreme Court on the other, about the admissibility of evidence obtained through
illegal searches and seizures, was familiar to this Court (People vs.
Carlos, 47 Phil. 626, 630) before it voted to adopt the Federal doctrine in
Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, supra.
This last doctrine, applied in several subsequent cases (People vs.
Sy Juco, 64 Phil. 667; Rodriguez vs. Villamil, 37 Off. Gaz., 2416) was
probably known to the Constitutional Convention that, in addition, made the
constitutional mandate on the point more complete and explicit, copying
exactly the wording of the Federal Constitution, a circumstance which,
coupled with the citation of Boyd vs. U.S., showed adherence to the
Federal doctrine that debars evidence obtained by illegal search or unlawful
seizure.
It is significant that the Convention readily adopted the recommendation of
the Committee on Bill of Rights after its Chairman had spoken, explaining the
meaning and extent of the provision on searches and seizures and specifically
invoking the United States decisions of Boyd vs. U. S. 116 U. S. 616
and Gould vs. U.S. 225 U.S. 298, which the majority of this Court
would now discard and overrule. (Aruego op. cit. Vol I, p. 160; Vol. II, pp.
1043, 1044.)
Therefore, it is submitted, with all due respect, that we are not at liberty
now to select between two conflicting theories. The selection has been made by
the Constitutional Convention when it impliedly chose to abide by the Federal
decisions, upholding to the limit the inviolability of man’s domicil. Home! The
tie that binds, the affection that gives life, the pause that soothes, all
nestle there in an atmosphere of security. Remove that security and you destroy
the home.
Under this new ruling the “King’s forces” may now “cross the threshold of the
ruined tenement” seize the skeleton from the family closet and rattle it in
public, in court, to the vexation or shame of the unhappy occupants. That those
forces may be jailed for trespass, is little consolation. That those forces may
be pardoned by the King, their master, suggests fearful possibilities. The
sanctuary, the castle, are gone with the wind.
An opinion of Mr. Justice Gardozo in the Court of Appeals of New York is
cited as authority for the majority view (People vs. Defore 150 N. E.,
585). Yet it is markworthy that, in New York, protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures is hot promised by the Constitution of the State but by a
mere statute. (Civil Rights of Law) (See the same case, and 56 C. J., p. 1156.)
New York is the only state that denies this privilege the status of a
constitutional prerogative, (supra). Hence the precedent is obviously
inconclusive.
Moreover, admitting, for purposes of argument only, that the Alvarez decision
is legally erroneous, I maintain that the new doctrine should apply to future
cases — not to herein petitioner who has relied on it. In Santiago and Flores
vs. Valenzuela, No. L-670, April 30, 1947 (44 Off. Gaz., 3291, 3296) I
argued for that proposition as follows:
“* * * the reserved right to upset previous decisions is likewise qualified
by the proposition that such upsetting shall have prospective — not retroactive
— effect.“In Douglass vs. Pike County, 101 U.S. 677 at p. 667, it was declared, “The
true rule (of stare decisis) is to give a change of judicial
construction * * * the same effect in its operation’ * * * as to ‘a legislative
amendment, i.e., make it prospective but not retroactive.’“And in Great Northern R. Co. vs. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287
U.S. 358, the Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Cardozo, said:” ‘A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice
for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation
backward. It may say that decisions of its highest court, though later
overruled, are law none the less for intermediate transactions. Indeed there are
cases intimating, too broadly (cf. Tidal Oil Co. vs. Flanagan. 263 U.
S. 444; 68 Law. ed., 382, 44 S. Ct. 197, supra), that it must give them
that effect; but never has doubt been expressed that it may so treat them if it
pleases, whenever injustice or hardship will thereby be averted. Gelpcke
vs. Dubuque, 1 Wall ., 175; 17 Law . ed., 250; Douglass vs.
Pike County, 101 U. S. 677, 687; 25 Law. ed., 968, 971; Loeb vs.
Columbia Twp., 179 U. S; 472, 492, 45 Law. ed., 280, 290, 21 S. Ct., 174,
etc.'”“This view is not unanimous, I know. However, inasmuch as one of the
principal arguments of the opposing school of thought is that it makes the
overruling decision a mere ‘declaratory judgment’, and since that objection is
untenable in this jurisdiction where declaratory relief is permitted (Rule 66),
the view herein advocated — future operation only — should all the more be
acceptable to our system of jurisprudence. More about this in the future, if I
should happen to agree to an orerruling of previous decisions and the question
should hinge on its backward or forward application. For the present, enough to
note some of the abundant literature on the point. [1]”
[1] Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of
Last Resort, 39 Harvard Law Review 409; Freeman, Retroactive Operation of
Decisions, 18 Col. Law Review 230; Kocourek Retrospective Decisions and Stare
Decisis, 17 A. B. A. Journal I80; Effect of Overruled and Overruling Decisions
on Intervening Decisions, 47 Harvard Law Review 1403; Retroactive Effect of an
Overruling Decision, 42 Yale L. J. 779; Retrospective Operation of Overruling
Decisions, 35 III. Law Review 121; Precedent in Legal Systems, Mich. Law Review,
Vol. 44 p. 955 et seq.
DISIDENTE
BRIONES, M.:
Disiento de la ponencia. Estimo que debe concederse la solicitude presentada
por el recurrente. Creo que en esta jurisdiccÃon debemos adherirnos a la
jurisprudencia sentada en el asunto de Weeks vs. U. S. que se cita en
la decisÃon de la mayorÃa.
Si en una demooracia como la nortearnericana — ya madura y bien solidificada,
fortalecida por una tradición de siglos de respeto a las libertades individuales
y ciudadanas y por el temperamento ecuánime y sereno de una raza tan admirable
como la anglosajona — se ha considerado necesario garantizar los fueros del
ciudadano bajo la coraza de semejante doctrina, con mayor razón debemos tener y
asegurar esas garantÃas en una democracia como la nuestra, joven, que apenas
está haciendo los pinitos iniciales en el camino de la independencia politica, y
donde la demagogia y la anarquÃa y las tendencias peligrosas al establecimiento
de un régimen de fuerza podrÃan frustrar las bendioiones de la libertad a tanta
costa ganada.
PARAS, M., conforme.
Se deniega la solicitud.