LAMBEETO YNOTORIO AND SANTOS CATALAN, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELEES, VS. CANUTA LIRA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS; JOSEFINO LIRA, VICENTE LIRA, PEPITO LIRA, MANUEL GRINO JR., AND CRIPINA C. VD…

DIZON, J.:

On July 8, 1907 Lambeito Ynotorio and Santos Catalan filed an action in the
Court of First Instance of Capiz (Civil Case No. V-2209) against Canuta (now
deceased), Joselino Vicente, and Pepito, all surnamed Lira, Crispin Catalan Vda.
de Grino and Manuel Grino, Jr. for partition and/or to recover from the hitler
the ownership and possession of one-half undivided interests in 141 parcels of
land situated in the municipalities of Dumalaa and Sigma, Capiz, in the
municipality of Pototan, Iloilo, and in the city of Iloilo, and to recover
damages in the total sum of Pl,492,250.00.

Their complaint alleged, in substance, that Lamberto Ynotorio’s father
Eustaquio, and Santos Catalan’s mother, Domingn Ynotorio, (both deceased) were
brother and sister, respectively of Felipe Ynotorio who died in 1924 intestata
and without issue, survived by his wife, def fenriant Canuta Lira, leaving the
Ml parcels of land described in the complaint as their conjugal properties; that
Canuta Lira thru fraud and illegal transactiolis, transferred several of said
properties to her co-defendants Joselino, Vicente and Pepito, all surnamed Urn,
their natural mother, Crispiua Catalan Vda. do Grino, and the altar’s son,
Manuel Grino, Jr., thus deprivins plaintiffs of thier lawful share in the
inheritance of their late uncle, Felipe Ynotorio; that defendants had teen in
possession of said properties since the (tenth of Felipe, and had refused to
deliver to the plaintiffs their one-half interest therein a3 well as the
corresponding produce thereof, despite repeated demands therefor.

Defendants’ answer alleged, among other things, that Felipe Ynotorio died
leaving a will which was duly probated and wherein Canuta Lira was made
universal heir of all the properties left by the decedent; that 80 of the 144
parcels of land described in the complaint belonged exclusively to Canuta who
acquired them after the death of her husband, and the remaining 64 parcels were
owned by Crispina Catalan Vda. de Grino, having acquired them from her deceased
husband, Manuel Grino; that on February 27, 1936, Canuta Lira donated her
properties mentioned above to her legally adopted children, Joselino, Vicente
and Pepito all surnamed Lira, legitimate children of the spouses Manuel Grino
and Crispina Catalan; that defendants and their predecessors-in-interest had
been in exclusive and actual possession as owners of all the properties
aforesaid for more than seventy years. As affirmative defenses, they further
alleged that the complaint stated no cause of action; that, if it did, the same
had prescribed, and that plaintiffs had no legal capacity to sue; and, as
counterclaim, they sought recovery of the sum of P160.00000 as damages.

Defendants subsequently filed a motion for a preliminary hearing on their
affirmative defenses, and a motion to strike out the allegations made in the
complaint that no testate nor intestate proceedings had been instituted to
settle the estate of the late Felipe Ynotorio and that the latter left no will,
which allegations were, allegedly inconsistent with those in plaintiffs’ reply
of August 13, 1957. Both motions were denied by the court on the ground that the
facts alleged therein would require the presentation of evidence by the parties.

On February 7, 1958, while the case was pending be- fore the lower court,
defendant Canuta Lira died, and Arsenio Frial, on behalf of the legal heirs of
Felipe Ynotorio, filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Capiz for
letters of administration of the conjugal properties of Felipe Ynotorio and
Canuta Lira, including the properties involved in the present case (Special
Proceedings No. V-2269). The petition was granted over the opposition interposed
by the plaintiffs herein, who appealed to the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile,
plaintiffs moved for the dismissal of the present case, without prejudice to
their taking such subsequent action or actions as the outcome of said appeal may
warrant. Defendants opposed the motion on the ground that their counterclaim for
damages contained in the answer cannot remain pending for independent
adjudication by the court.

On November 13, 1959, the court issued an order dismissing the case without
prejudice, and ruling that the amount which defendants ought to recover in their
counter-claim may be the subject of a separate action or may be claimed in
Special Proceedings No. L-2269.

The present is an appeal taken by defendants from (1) the order of the lower
court of March 20, 1958 denying: (a) their motion for a preliminary hearing on
their affirmative defenses; (b) their motion of September 4, 1957 for the
striking out of certain allegations made in plaintiffs’ reply, etc., and (2)
from the lower court’s order of November 13, 1959 dismissing the case, without
prejudice, and ruling besides that the amount involved in the counterclaim may
be the subject of a separata action or a claim filed in Special Proceedings No.
2269;

This appeal, insofar of it refers to the order of the lower court of March
20, 1958 is without merit. The trial court refused to hold a preliminary hearing
in connection with the affirmative defenses interposed by appellants in their
amended answer—that appellees’ complaint did not state a cause of action; that
they had no legal capacity to sue; that their causes of action, if any, had
prescribed, and that, at any rate, all the questions raised in their complaint
were already res judicata— upon the ground that there would bo need for the
parties to present evidence for a proper resolution thereof. ThU appears to be
true and an accurate appreciation of the situation Involved. It was obviously
the best thing to have the case fully tried on the merits instead of holding
merely a preliminary hearing, in order that the trie! court may be placed in a
position to resolve correctly the questions raised by appellants.

However, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the lower court erred in
dismissing the case, as stated heretofore, over the objection of appellants who
claimed that their counterclaim could not remain pending for inde- pendent
adjudication. Said counterclaim is as follows:

“COUNTERCLAIM”

the defendants allege:

1. That the plaintiffs, at the pendency of Special Proceeding No. 1817 of this
   Honorable Court entitled, ‘Testate Estate of the late Felipe Ynotorio’, were
   aware of the institution and pendency of the aforesaid Special Proceedings for
   the settlement of the estate of the deceased, Felipe Ynotorio, and of tile fact
   that the said deceased left a will naming and instituting the defendants, Canuta
   Lira, as his universal heirs, and that the said Special Proceeding had been
   terminated with the settlement of the estate of the deceased and that all the
   properties of the deceased had been adjudicated by this Honorable Court in favor
   of the defendant, Canuta Lira, the universal heir of the deceased under the said
   will, and that the said will was duly probated by this Honorable Court way back
   on October 1, 1924;

2. That prior to the filing of this action, the attorneys for the plaintiffs
   were duly advised by the undersigned counsel for the defendants of the judicial
   settlement of the estate of the de- ceased Felipe Ynotorio, and of the
   adjudication by this Honorable Court of all the properties of the said deceased
   in favor of the defendant, Canuta Lira, by reason of her having been instituted
   universal heir of the said deceased in his will, and of the fact that the said
   wilt of the said deceased had been duly probated by this Honorable Court;

3. That notwithstanding all the foregoing, the plaintiffs instituted the
   present action as a result of which the defendants have been constrained to
   retain the services of their counsel and incur expenses in connection therewith
   in the sum of P50,000.00;

4. That by reason of the institution of the present action the defendants have
   incurred and will incur expenses incident to this case which expenses will
   amount to not less than P10,000.00; and

5. That by reason of the institution of the present action, the defendants have
   been greatly humiliated, their feelings have been gravely wounded, thus
   suffering moral and sentimental damages in the sum of not less than
   P100,000.00.”

It is clear that the counterclaim stated above is one that arises from, or is
necessarily connected with, appellee’s own action and cannot remain pending for
independent adjudication by the court. We have already held that, in such case,
the court may not dismiss the case over the opposition of the defendant (Belleza
vs. Huntington, 89 Phil., 689, Froilan vs. Fan Oriental, etc., September 30,
1954 and Domingo vs. Santos, et al., 55 Phil. 361).

Having arrived at the above conclusion, we do not find it necessary to
resolve the other merely incidental issues raised in appellants’ brief.

WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are set aside, and this case is remanded
to the lower court for further proceedings.

Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Regala, Makalintal,
Bengzon, J. P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.